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מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

לשרד ראש הממשלה

משרד

לש, אס

המשק מתיק שם ו

לשכת ראש הממשלה -

אברהם

4/1986

נ

מס. תיק מקורי

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שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס - אר

א - 12 / 4382

מזהה פיזי:	43.4/3 - 218
מזהה לוגי:	02-111-01-07-10
מס פריט:	1739250
כתובת:	24/08/2010

מחלקה

אל: המשרד, נד: 53, מ: מיאמי
 דח: מ, סג: ב, תא: 160486, זח: 1530

בלמס/מידי

אל: אשר נעים/ווש

דע: השגריר, ציר

דע: מצפא, הסברה

ארהב-לוב

1. גל פטריוטי שוטף את פלורידה בהקשר לבעיות המרוור. ההיספנים מקוים שלפעולת ארהב יהיו השלכות גם באזור הקריבי. העיתונים MIAMI HERALD, MIAMI NEWS תומכים בפעולת הנשיא.

2. בהקשר זה האהדה לישראל בשיא שאיני זוכר כמותו. בכל הראיונות בטלוויזיה ורדיו כולל ראיון טלפוני לאורלנדו וכן במיאמי ופנסיקולה בא לידי ביטוי סיפוק האמריקנים מהעובדה שמנהיגי ישראל ונציגיה הדיפלומטיים תומכים ללא סייג בארהב-לפני ואחרי המבצע האמריקני.

טריגור

נד

תפ: שהח, דהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, ממד, רם, אמן, מצפא, מעת, הסברה

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אל: המשרד, נד: 53, מ: מיאמי
 דח: מ, סג: ב, תא: 160486, רח: 1530

בלמס/מידי

אל: אשר נטימ/ווש

דע: השגריר, ציר

דע: מצפא, הסברה

ארהב-לוב

1. גל פטריוטי שוטף את פלורידה בהקשר לבעיות המרוך.
 ההיסטורים מקוים שלפעולת ארהב יהיו השלכות גם באזור הקריבי.
 העיתונים MIAMI HERALD, MIAMI NEWS תומכים בפעולת הנשיא.

2. בהקשר זה האהדה לישראל נשיא שאיני זוכר כמותו. בכל
 הראיונות בטלוויזיה ורדיו כולל ראיון טלפוני לאורלנדו וכן
 במיאמי ופנסיקולה בא לידי ביטוי סיפוק האמריקנים מהעובדה
 שמנהיגי ישראל ונציגיה הדיפלומטיים תומכים ללא סייג בארהב-
 לפני ואחרי המבצע האמריקני.

מריגור

נד

תפ: שהח, דהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, ממד, רם, אמן, מצפא,
 מעת, הסברה

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שמוך

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נבנס

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אל: המשרד, נר: 413, מ: 1105
דח: ד, סג: ש, תא: 160486, רח: 1000

אלהים

שמוך/רגיל

אל: תפוצות, מצפ"א, ארבי"ל.
דע: ניו יורק (נר 1114), וינה (כ)
קונגראס: וולדהיים

1. הענין בפרשה הגיע גם לגבעת הקפיטול. בדיפי מועבדים מסמכים כלהלן:-


א. מכתב שניסח המורשה צירלס שומר נ דמוקרס, יהודי מניו יורק) לתובע הכללי הקודא לו לאחד את מסמכי צוא ארה"ב והסי. אי. איי הרלבנסטיים על מנת להעמידם לרשות מחלקת המשפטים ולרשות מדינות אחרות המחפשות מידע על וולדהיים. עשרים מורשים כבר שלחו המכתב הנ"ל.

ב. נוסח הצעת החלטה בלתי מחייבת מטעם שומר, שהועברה לוועדת החוק הקובעת שעל מחלקת המשפטים לבדוק ביסודיות המסמכים ממקורות שונים, לרבות הקונגראס היהודי העולמי, וזאת נוכח מדיניות ארה"ב כלפי הנאצים. הוא הפיץ הנוסח לעמיתיו, לשיטבונוס רק אחמול (14) ועד כה הצטרפו ארבעה מורשים ובהם ג'ק קמפי. הסנסור וילסון מקליפורניה מפיץ נוסח דומה.

ג. הצעת החלטה בלתי מחייב בוסה בהרבה, מטעם המורשה מד וייס (דמוקרט מניו יורק) ועוד תשעה חברים, המוכיחה את וולדהיים בשמו פעמים רבות, קודאות לתובע הכללי לבדוק המסמכים שהתגלו וקודא לקבוע האם, שייס הסטייפס הרלבנסטיים בחוק, וולדהיים רשאי לקבל אשרת בניסה או שלא תותר בניסתו לארה"ב.

2. בנו של וולדהיים ביקר לאחרונה גם בגובה, נפאש עם אנשי הסנסור וילסון והמורשה שומר (כואולי אחרים) באשר טענתו העיקרית שאביו לא היה מודע לנעשה.

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


מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

טובה הרצל==

תפ: שהח, רהמ, מונבל, ממנכל, ענוג, אידא, תפוצות, מצפא, אליאב,
ארבלו, ארבל2, סייבל, משפט

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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אכ: וושי, נר: 516, מ: המשד
דח: מ, סג: ס, תא: 160486, זח: 1900

מיידי/סודי

ארהב-לוב.


1. בשיחת הממנכל עם הריסון הנוקר, מסר הריסון כי הידיעות בידיו מצביעות על פגישות טובות במפקדות הקומנדו בנוגדי וטרופולי וכן שדות תעופה, נמלים ואוניות הצי הלובי. עד כה אין מידע על מצבו של קדאפי פרט לידיעות מדדיו דמסק ואלג'יר על שיחת טלפון עם אסאד. הוסיף הממנכל כי דווח על פגישה בין קדאפי לבין השגריר הסובייטי.

2. הריסון ביקש להביע הערכה ותודה על ביטוי התמיכה הרבים מצד אישים ישראליים. מסר כי התגובה האידוופאית למעט בריטניה, הייתה מאכזבת בצפוי. בהקשר בריטניה העיר בחיך שבודאי כמה מאנשי הפודאויף הוצאו מהזדו בעת שהסכימה תאצ'ר לשחרר פעולה.
3. הממנכל הביא לידיעת הריסון תגובות מעיתונות גרמנית ובריטית וכן תוכן הדימדש של סגן שר החוץ הדומני לשגרירנו בנוקרטס נראה בנפרד ממציא.

לשכת בד-און

77

חפ: שהח, דהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן, מצפא, ממד



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3916

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בלמים

מל: 110, נר: 541, מ: המשדד
ת: ד, ג: ב, תא: 170486, זח: 1530

בלמס/זחוף

מל: 110שינגטון

דע: מצפיא

10מת מרפי. להלן פרשנות שבאמ' נסעודיה 14 אפריל 1954:
א. ההצעה שמביא מרפי מודכנת מרעיונות ידועים:
1. ממשל עצמי לפלסטיונים בארץ הכבושה.
2. תכנית מארשל, כשם שקציע סאדאת לקרטור.
3. קשירת ישות פלסטיונית בירדן.

1. העמוי נבחר להצגתם מחדש כי:

1. לפי מוריס דרייפר מוכנים עדביי הארץ הכבושה יותר מתמיד לקבל כל פתרון, גם אם בעתיד משודפל.
2. המחלוקת הירדנית-פלסטיונית והפנימי-פלסטיונית מאפשרות שיבה לנוסחים שבעבר נידחו.

3. ההידדרות הכלכלית במוה'ית יוצרת נכונות רבה יותר לחשוב על נוספי פתרון חדשים.

4. המתיחות גברה במוקדי איראן-עיראק, ארה"ב-לוב ובמלחמת המנחה בלבנון.

5. ישראל בהנהגת פרס מוכנה לשנויים דרמטיים, ופרס מעוניין לנצט מהלך מרשים לפני מסירת תפקידו לשותפו שמיר.

6. 110שינגטון סבורה שבניה'מ' חוזרת בכוח לוירה, ורק בקידום פתרון נלסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי ניתן למנוע זאת.

7. לכן יצא פרס ל110שינגטון ומרפי בא למזה'ית. בהצעה האמריקנית יש כמה דעיונות קבילים על הערבים, ומשום כך מרפי הפעם אופטימי לגבי סכוייו.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

הטרה: במאמר נפרד, פרטנות על בעיות הקואליציה בישראל הכתובה
נצורה חיובית לרוה'מ' פוס, בלוי' דיוקנו נבלתי-קדיקטוריסטי
מאת צ'יר טרבי.

המרכז/ערב 3

דוד רוהר.

חפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנככ, ממנוכל, ד/מרכז, רס, אמן, מצפא, שמורק,
מעת, הסברה, ממד

תחילת:	כחלעת ה'אשר ניו-יורק	תאריך: 7
סוג מסמך:	סופס קובץ	מספר: -
תאריך: 18/63	א. ס. : לש'מנכ"ל, סעי"ח, ממנכ"ל אמית"ק, המכרה; מפס'אן, סמ"דו, יועץ רוה"ם לחקשורת, יועץ שוב"ס לחקשורת, לע"ס, דו"צ.	
בר: 0526		ר. ע. : רושינגטון
136-211		מסמך : עזרנות, ניו יורק

news Summary April 18, 1986

Editorials

NY "Talking Out of Both Sides of His Mouth" Khadafy says he is not calling for the killing of innocents, but he did say: "I am calling for revolution, and he who stands in the way of revolution must be annihilated." Khadafy's purposes justify whatever killing may be required to carry them out. It's obvious that the strikes were not as surgical as the Navy would have liked. But the death of innocent Libyans was not the purpose of the attacks. Provocation has been established, neither law nor morality requires a nation to let murderers go unpunished.

NY "Drawing Together Against Libya" Murder is loose upon the world. Vicious reaction to the US raid was expected. The raid was intended to deter state terrorism, the sort directed by the Libyan gov't. The US would be wise to show patience now. There will be time to hit Tripoli again if Khadafy hasn't mended his ways. The Europeans are finally showing signs they understand they must fight back. Khadafy must learn that if he doesn't back off, he will face not only further military attacks but economic stangulation.

WSJ "Freedom of the Skies" The International Airline Pilots Association announced that they had authorized pilots' boycotts against nations that promote terrorism against civil aviation or fail to make their airports safe. This is a good thing and may be important. Their activity reminds us why it is so hard for a modern gov't to fight terrorism by itself.

NYT "The Tempest Over Passover" A needless confrontation is building in New York's schools over the observance of Passover. The city will lose about \$4 million in state aid if it fails to comply with the required 180-day school calendar. Many teachers will be absent from school during the holiday but the Chancellor is correct, his job is to keep the schools open.

NY "Passover and the Schools" The Chancellor of Schhols is right. Anyone who wants to stay out of school on a religious holiday has the right. Passover is not an official school holiday.

מסמך: 18.486

אם השולח: סוכה ק"מ

א. ס. : רושינגטון, ניו יורק

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Columns

NYT-Wicker "After the Raids" An outburst of retaliatory actions suggest how high the ultimate cost of Reagan's bombing raids on Libya may go. Libya is small and weak, despite its Soviet weapons. Violence and death are seldom cause for celebration. That's why it's reassuring that much of the public support for Reagan appears to have been conditioned on Americans' belief that he had first taken all possible steps to avoid direct attacks on Libya--ample warnings, economic sanctions, the naval challenge in the Gulf of Sidra. Any other course would be unworthy of a great nation.

NYT-Safire "Vive le Pinprick" We should let the new French PM know what we think of his decision not to allow US planes to fly over France. The US Gov't and public should stop doing business with France. Let them make up the loss with Libya. The other night, at a dinner party, the French chief delegate to the UN, Claude de Kemoullaria indicated that the best way to stop Khadafy was not by bit-by-bit escalation and that if the US decided to hit decisively with its military might, "you would have found us on your side." Does the French really mean that?

WSJ-Parment "Start Treating US Intelligence As Vital Business" For many people intelligence is still an ideological plaything rather than the enterprise whose results matter intensely in the real world. Washington has heard the familiar whining of offended congressmen stating that they had not been consulted about the raids. We would be better off with fewer congressmen intimately involved in intelligence issues.

ND-John Davis (Prof. Harvard) "Wishful Thinking on Khadafy" It is not likely that a military move by the US would encourage the Libyan military to act against Khadafy, despite the desires of the Administration. The most likely consequence is that the military will rally behind Khadafy. Terrorism sponsored, supported and directed by Khadafy will continue as long as he is in power. Quiet encouragement of others who are anxious to see Khadafy out of power, especially Egypt and Libyan opposition groups now in exile, would be a better way.

ND-Robert Maynard "Who Will Pay for the Raid?" Khadafy has become the new hero of the lunatic left in the Mideast. Hostilities against Libya are not likely to halt terrorism. US power in Western Europe may be weakened. The US must face the fact that Libya is not the only source of terrorism in the Mideast region. What will our next response be to Syrian-sponsored or Palestinian terrorism? Our best course is still economic and diplomatic isolation of Libya. We are running the risk of isolating ourselves further from the Arab world.

NYP-Rabinowitz "TV's Hunt for Critics of Libya Raid" Again and again, TV news told the public that the US mistakenly struck at civilians. Talk shows scrapped the bottom of the barrel in order to find critics of the US raid.

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ND-Anderson "Concern Growing Over Plastic Pistol" The West German Interior Minister recently sent a report to Shultz about the Glock 17. The guns were able to slip by all airport security checks.

Press Reports

Bomb Found in Bag Taken Onto El Al Jet

NYT-special-A carefully concealed bomb was discovered at Heathrow in a bag carried by a woman who was about to board a flight due to leave for Tel Aviv with about 340 passengers. If the device would have gone off it is highly likely that everyone aboard would have been killed. The woman who carried the bomb is in custody and has not been named. It appears that she carried the bomb innocently for her boyfriend, an Arab. (see photo of Terminal 1; NYP; (photo of Nezar Hindawi) ND-AP)

3 Brits Slain

NYT-p.1-Hijazi-The bodies of three Britons kidnapped in Lebanon were found today near Beirut. A note found with the bodies said the three had been killed because of Britain's role in the American bombing raids on Libya. Hours later, another Briton and his driver were seized on the road leading to Beirut's airport; he was on his way out of the country because of the dangers there. And earlier in the day, gunmen attacked the unoccupied home of the British Ambassador to Lebanon. There was no word on the fate of the American hostages in Lebanon. A group calling itself the Omar al Mukhtar Organization took responsibility for the attack on the British residence. The Qaddafi Organization took responsibility for the kidnapping of the Briton McCarthy. (see ND-Bruning-headline "Terror Blitz"; DN-Goldschlag-headline "3 Brits Slain in Lebanon")

Shultz Expresses Hopes For Coup /Says Khadafy Not A Target

NYT-p.1-Cwertzman-Shultz said there was considerable dissidence in the Libyan armed forces and that a goal of the US raid was to encourage the overthrow of Khadafy. He also said that Khadafy was not a target, even though his home was hit. (see transcript of Shultz's news conference) (NYP-Latham; ND-Klurfeld)

ND-Wash Post-Wilson-Informed officials said that the US raid was planned with hopes that Khadafy would be killed when his command post was destroyed with four 2000 pound bombs.

Allied Ministers Play Down Split With US

NYT-Bernstein-West European foreign ministers, meeting for the first time since the US raid, played down the differences between the US and themselves and the US over the attack, vowing that Europe would press ahead with a new set of anti-terrorist measures. But they also called on the US to practice restraint and urged not to attack Libya again.

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Thatcher Criticized

NYT-p.1-Lelyveld-A backlash against Thatcher intensified with the killing of three Britons in Lebanon. Two-thirds of the British public were against the British decision.

7 American Planes Aborted Mission

NYT-p.1-Gordon-The Pentagon said almost a third of the Air Force F-111's aborted their missions and did not carry out planned attacks. Despite these problems, the Defense Dept. spokesman said the mission was "a near flawless professional operation under extremely difficult circumstances." The Pentagon did not mention the nature of the problems. (DN-Jackman)

Bill Would Give Reagan Free Hand on Terror

NYT-Greenhouse-A bill authorizing Reagan to respond to foreign terrorism without consulting Congress in advance was introduced by Republicans in both houses of Congress. The bill would permit the President to order the assassination of a foreign head of state in some circumstances.

Swiss Won't Send US Bill for Damages

NYT-Reuters-A Swiss Gov't spokesman, retreating from an earlier statement said there was no need to send the US a bill for damage to the Swiss Ambassador's residence in the US raid on Tripoli.

In Libya

NYT-Schumacher-There was renewed antiaircraft fire in Tripoli during the evening. The airport opened for a short time but was then closed. Khadafy's whereabouts have remained a mystery amid unconfirmed rumors that a power struggle was under way. Foreign residents were told to stay home. Western embassies are drawing up evacuation plans for their nationals. (see ND-Phelps)

Americans Told to Flee Sudan

NYT-Rule-The evacuation of nonessential staff and dependents of embassy personnel in the Sudan comes amid growing signs of anti-American sentiment. The wounded embassy employee that was shot has suffered severe brain damage and partial paralysis.

Italy-PLO Ties

NYP-Dan-Writer describes a terrorist mission thwarted by Israeli intelligence on Italy. "We close our eyes and turn our heads because we don't want to be involved" says one former senior officer in Italian military intelligence. The Italian Gov't may feel guilty because it has given Palestinian and Libyan terrorist agents a free hand in their country. Jerusalem, of course, never hesitates to take advantage.

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Soviet and East German Reactions

NYT-Barringer (Moscow) A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said it is a lie that the Soviet Union could have averted the terrorist bombing in West Berlin. He confirmed that an American diplomat in West Berlin had informed his Soviet counterpart that Libyan diplomats were planning terrorist acts, and had asked the Soviet Gov't to restrain them. But he said that "The American representative was unable to cite any factual evidence in support of his allegations."

NYT-Markham (East Berlin) With the leader of the Soviet Union looking on, the East German party chief, Erich Honecker, denounced the US for its "barbaric bombardment of peaceful Libyan cities." He said the action could lead to greater East-West tensions.

NYT-AP-East Germany denied that the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin had orchestrated the bombing of a disco in West Berlin.

Soviet Moves Hinted

DN-Rehm-Soviet officials have told the US ambassador to Moscow that the Kremlin considers waters and air space off Libya international-- a move the US believes may signal the beginning of large Soviet military maneuvers in the Mediterranean, a US official said. (see ND-AP)

Bush Cites Syria and Iran

NYT-Bush linked Syria and Iran with Libya as proponents of "state terrorism." He spoke to his supporters at a luncheon in NY.

NYP-Latham & Orin-Bush said terrorists "will pay the price for their actions." (Bush quote is NYP headline)

Anti-US Protests

NYT-AP-A firebomb was thrown at the US Marine headquarters in Tunisia and protests were held around the world. In Rome, the airport and the American Express building were threatened with bombs. Another threat forced a United Airlines jet to return to Australia after it took off for LA. In Washington, the White House, Capitol and State Dept. all received threats. Arabs protested in Warsaw and Czechoslovakia. The US Embassy in Lagos was closed after students there held a demonstration and students elsewhere in Africa protested. In Cairo, 100 lawyers burned British, US and Israeli flags.

WSJ-Nempe-US officials are concerned that a rash of anti-US terror acts will take place by groups that have nothing to do with Khadafy. "People are trying to outdo each other," said one expert on terrorism.

526/136 6/7

Nidal & Khadafy

NYP-Standard-Abu Nidal and his group have killed 181 people and wounded more than 200 in the past 2 years alone. Nidal says he plans to kill Reagan, Thatcher, Hussein, Arafat and Mubarak. One of the few Nidal calls a "true friend" is Khadafy. "We dream the same dream," he says.

Khadafy-A Nonentity With Oil and Power

ND-Reno-What makes Khadafy such a person of consequence is that he controls a significant share of the world's known oil reserves. He is an example of the worst that can happen when huge transfers of wealth from developed nations suddenly enrich states with vulnerable political systems. Lower oil prices are important to US interests.

Better Training Urged for Security at Airports

NYT-The President of the Air Line Pilots Association said that the work of an El Al guard in discovering a bomb at Heathrow proved "an appropriate level of security" could abort acts of terrorism.

NYT-UPI-Pan Am said it would seek a \$5 surcharge on trans-Atlantic flights to help defray extra security measures.

3 Indicted in Libyan Plot

DN-Havas-A Brooklyn federal grand jury indicted two Italian businessmen and a Libyan for scheming to smuggle more than \$30 million in exotic military equipment from the US to Libya. (see ND-Bowles; NYP)

Bombings in Syria

ND-combined-A series of bombings on 7 Syrian military buses, killing at least 27 army cadets and wounding many others occurred on Wed., Lebanon Radio reported. Syria had no comment.

Reagan Stands Behind Raid/Jimmy Carter Opposes

DN-Drake-Reagan believes the raid against Libya was "the right thing to do" despite a wave of new terrorist incidents, Larry Speaks said. Speaks said the shooting in the Sudan bore the mark of Libya and that the deaths of the Britons in Lebanon could be attributed to Abu Nidal.

NYP-Carillo-Carter said the US was wrong to bomb Libya and that if he'd lost a daughter as Khadafy did he would vow to get even for the rest of his life. Gerald Ford called Arab leaders "gutless" for not openly praising the raid and Nixon had no comment.

526/126 7/7

Saudi Arms Sale

NYT-Roberts-A debate over the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia is turning into a wide-ranging discussion of US policy in the region. Sen. Alan Cranston said it was strange that the US was willing to sell 2600 missiles to one of Khadafy's staunchest friends and supporters: Saudi Arabia. But Sen. Lugar said the terrorist threat posed by Libya was one reason why the US should sell arms to "moderate Arab states" like Saudi Arabia. Both Israel and AIPAC have decided not to work against the sale. Even so, the proposal has provoked widespread uneasiness on Capitol Hill.

Letters

NYT-Henry Siegman, the Exec. dir of AJC believes that the assumption of the Administration that all American Jews need to be told of anti-Semitism in Nicaragua is an insult to the political maturity and integrity of American Jews.

NYT-Qussama Romdhani, the Press Secretary, Embassy of Tunisia, writes that Tunisia should not be associated with the Achille Lauro affair. Tunisia has an unblemished record of denouncing terrorist acts--regardless of their origin and has an unwavering support for peace and moderation.

NYP-14 letters denouncing France and praising Thatcher.

DN-Writer is convinced that Reagan has lost his mind for bombing Libya while the US proceeds with nuclear tests.

Inquiring Photographer on Travel Plans

DN-5 New Yorkers discuss how terrorism has changed their travel plans. 4 say they will stay in the US.

Cartoons

DN-Rigby-The allies sit and drink tea as the US fights terrorists.

DN-MacNelly-An overseas tour guide tells tourists how to get to the airport bus as bombs explode.

ITONUT

28

קו פקס 5777

ד...1...מחור...2...דפים

סוג נשחוני שמור

דחישות רגיל

תאריך וזיחה אפר' 18 1430

אל: המשרד

503

אל:מצפ"א.

השבוע בקונגרס - 14-18 אפריל.

1. אם כי הארוע הציבורי הבולט השבוע היה המתקפה האמריקאית על לוב, הרי שמוקד ההתרוצצות הקונגרסיונלית היה סביב שאלת הסיוע לקונטרס הנקרא

2. פעולת ארה"ב נגד לוב זכתה לתמיכה דו-מפלגתית נרחבת, כאשר כמעט כל חברי הקונגרס מתייצבים מאחורי הנשיא. מספר שעות לפני הפעולה כינס הנשיא בבית הלבן מנהיגים בכירים משני הבתים ומשתי המפלגות כדי לעדכנם ולשמוע תגובתם וזו היתה כנראה חיובית. בעקבות הפעולה נשאלה השאלה לאן היא תוביל והאם היא ראשיתה של שרשרת תגובות ותגובות נגד, והיו ששאלו האם מדובר בהפרת ה- war powers act. אולם, פומבית לפחות, אלו היו קולות בודדים במקלה של תמיכה.

3. היו שציננו בציניות את סמיכות הזמנים בין הפעולה הנ"ל (אשר עוררה תמיכה בנשיא ובמדיניותו כלפי סכנות מבחוח) ובין מועד ההצבעה החוזרת בבית על הסיוע לקונטרס. בכל מקרה, ההצבעה לא התרחשהעפ"י התקדים הצפוי. ועדת ה- rules הצמידה את הצעת הסיוע לקונטרס לחוק הסיוע הנוסף. הרפובליקנים הסתייגו מכך גם בשל העיכוב המשמעי בהעברת הכסף וגם משום שהנשיא מתנגד לסיוע הנוסף ומן הסתם היה מטיל עליו - ולכן גם על הסיוע לקונטרס - וטו. כצעד נגדי ביצעו הרפובליקנים "תרגיל" פרלמנטרי משלהם כאשר, בהפתעה מוחלטת, הצביעו כאיש אחד עבור הצעת המילטון המאשרת 27 מליון דולר לפליטים באמריקה, ותו-לא. היות והצעה זו אינה מקובלת על רוב הדמוקרטים, אשר היו מעדיפים הצעת סיוע יותר נדיבה (שעמדה גם היא להצבעה אך לא נדונה אחרי שעברו הצעת המליטון), הסיירו את הנושא מסדר היום. כעה ינסו הרפובליקנים לשנות את ה- rule שנקבע להצבעה, אשר יסיר את ההצמדה לחוק סיוע הנוסף, כאשר הם סבורים שיצליחו לגייס תומכים מקרב הדמוקרטים להשגת הרוב הדרוש לשינוי. מועד היעד שהציבו לעצמם להצבעה חוזרת הוא 12.5 ופירושו של דבר ששאלת הסיוע לקונטרס מוקפאת ^{ממש} עד אז.

4. הקונגרס אחר השבוע את מועד היעד שהציב לעצמו (15.4) בחוק ל להעברת חוק תקציב. בהקשר זה מנהיג הרוב בסנאט קיים השבוע שיחה עם ג'יימס מילר, מנהל ה- OMB ופנה לדון רייגן מהבית הלבן לשוחח עמו ועם דומניצ'י (יו"ר ועדת התקציב) כאשר המטרה היא למצוא דרכים ופשרות שיאפשרו אימוץ חוק תקציב בסנאט. בבית הנבחרים טרם הוחל הטיפול בחוק זה.

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the word "מחור" and other illegible scribbles.

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 ד פ י ט ד פ י ט
 ס ו ג ב ט ח ו נ י
 ד ח י פ ו ת
 ת א ר י ק ו ז י י ח
 מ ס י מ ב ק

503

5. בנושאינו, השבוע (17) התקימה בסנט ההתדינות הפומבית הראשונה בשאלת עסקת הנשק עם סעודיה, כאשר פרפי וארמיטג' יצגו את הממשל בדיון בוועדת החוץ. נכון לעכשיו 63 סנטורים הצטרפו להצעת אי הסכמה, כלומר 4 פחות משני השליטים הדרושים לגבור על וטו נשיאות. בבית שעורב עדיין קטן ומספרם השושביים עומד על 210. אנחנו ממשיכים להשאל ומשיבים עפ"י הנוסחה הקבועה. מאמצי השכנוע של הממשל לפי הקו שישראל אינה מתנגדת לעסקה ניכרים: לדוגמה, משרדו של המורשה קריס סמית (רפובליקני מניו ג'רזי, שעמד בתחילה בראש המתנגדים אך הפסיק את פעילותו) נשאלנו האם נכון שישראל *Endorses* את העסקה. בנוסף, החקיקו השבוע שמיעות סביב נושא הסיוע ואלו דווחו בנפרד.
6. המורשה אדאבו, יו"ר ועדת המשנה להגנה בוועדת ההקצבות, ידיד מובהק של ישראל, נפטר בסוף השבוע שעבר ונקבר בניו יורק ביום ב'. כדי לאפשר למספר רב של חברי קונגרס להשתתף בלויה החלוכל פעולות הקונגרס באותו יום באיחור. הבא בתור לרשת אותו כיו"ר ועדת המשנה הוא המורשה *Bill Chappell* דמוקרט מפלורידה. עוד בטרם החמנה התפרסמה בעיתון כתבה המציינת להתאכסן בבית לוביטט מאחת חברות הנשק, ומטיל פגם בהתנהגותו. הרקורד של צ'אפל בנושאינו היה מעורב בתחילת דרכו אולם בשנים האחרונות הוא טוב מאד.

דאגן - הירא

ט ו ט ס
 ד...1...מחור...2...דשים
 סוג בסחוני...1997...
 דחיות...רגיל...
 תאריך וז"ח, 18.4.1986
 מס' מברק

הסמך
 362

י
 137

אל: המשד 500

מ' מנכ"ל, מצפ"א/מע"ת,

דע : יועץ רה"מ לחקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, מנהל 'ע"מ, ניו יורק.

דו"ח חקשורת 18.4.86 - 12

1. ארה"ב, לוב, סורר בין לאומי וישראל.

לאחר ים המלל וטונות הניר שנכתבו על פעולת ארה"ב בטריפולי ובג'זי, להלן כמה הערות בשולים לתארת חזוית הישראלית כפי שהיא נתפשט בתקשורת כאן.

א. מהצהרות התמיכה שהשמיעו רה"מ, שה"ח ושהב"ט עבדנו לעצמנו נוסח הודעה אותה הקראנו לכל מי שפנה אלינו לקבל את תגובתנו. כלי התקשורת, במיוחד על רקע תמונות ההפגנות באירופת, תקפידו לציין כל העת שרק 3 מדינות תמכו בארה"ב : בריטניה, ישראל וקנדה.

לקביעה זו, הנשמעת כל העת, חשיבות רבה על רקע התמיכה המאסיבית (75-80%) לה זוכה הממשל והנשיא בארה"ב בעקבות הפעולה.

ב. די התלבטנו בשלבים הראשונים של המשבר האם לנקוט עמדה סבילה של הזדהות או ליזום כלפי התקשורת. האפשרות השניה נראתה מסתה מאד נוכח העבדה שכל העיונים והרשתות דחקו הצידה כל נושא אחר לטובת דווחים ארוכים וממושכים על הפעולה ונוכח חיפושים אחרי כל מי שמוכן להתראיין או להופיע שהפכו לתחרות כמעט פרועה בין הרשתות. החלטנו כאן מתוך שיקול קר שעניננו אינו מחייב חשיפת יתר וכי שרוב שמנו - מעבר להבעת התמיכה - יגרור אחריו בהכרח התעסקות בנושא החביב על דוברי הצד שכנגד ה- *Root Causes*, דרום לבנון, הבעיה הפלסטינית וכו'. לא כולם מסתבר חשבו כמונו.

ג. אשר יגרנו אכן הגיע: לאחר גל האופוריה וההתלהבות מלאו המרקעים בתמונות ההרס בלוב ותמונותיהם של ילדים שנפגעו בהתקפה ובו זמנית ולאחר התגובה המאסיבית ברחבי העולם נגד מטרות אמריקאיות בעקר - החל כאן הדיון

ב- *Root Causes* לטרור ו"התנהגותה הברוטלית של ישראל בלבנון" ו"דכוי העם הפלסטיני" הפכו מטבעות לשון מתגלגלות על מרקע הטלוויזיה. הרגשנו הלא נוחה היא שעם חלוף פרץ הפטריוטיזם האמריקאי תשקע בסופו של ענין ההכרה שישראל ממשיכה להיות אחת הסיבות למעגל האלימות שארה"ב הוכרחה להכנס אליו.

ד. הצהרתו של האלוף בן-שומרון ב"מבט" כי קדאפי חי וקיס באה על רקע מבוכה רבתי וחרושת שמועות לגבי מצבו של האיש. הרשתות לא הפסיקו לקטוע שדוריהם

10321 2

ס ז ס ט ז ר ה
 דפוס.....מחון.....דפים
 סוג בטחוני.....
 דחיות.....
 תאריך וז"ח.....
 סעיף מס' מברק.....

2/2

362/137/500

ב-Special Reports. מאוחר יותר כאשר התראין קדאפי בטלויזיה והביא קץ
 לגל השמועות, קבלנו, לצד הצער על כך שהאיש עוד חי וקים, גם מחמאות על
 "היכולת המודיעינית האדירה" שלנו (אחד השדרים המפורסמים תוך כדי נסיונו
 לברר עמנו אם קדאפי חי או מת אמר לנו כי "הישראלים הרי יודעים מה אכל
 היום קדאפי לארוחת בוקר").

ה. נסיון הפיגוע במטוס "אל על" בלונדון הביא בעקבותיו דווחים חיוביים על
 רמת הבטחון והערנות של גורמי הבטחון הישראלים. "אל על" תמשיך אולי לטוס
 במלוא התפוסה אך ההשפעה על חיירות יוצאת מארה"ב היא דראמטית, והמעבר לחיירות
 פנים הוא חד מאד - הוואי והקריביים הן בשלב זה הנהנות העיקריות מן המצב.

2. נושא גאזי דבאגיה עליו דווחנו בנפרד ירד בינתיים לחלוטין מסדר היום כאן.

3. גם בשבוע שכזה נהננו לקטוף כמה מפרוח עמלנו כמו מאמרו המצויין של קראוטהאמר
 על האפיפיור וישראל, ו"השדיר השרות" של ריצ'רד כהן לאל-על במארו בפוסט
 (שני המאמרים הוברקו במלואם).



יוסי גל

Handwritten notes at the top of the page, including a large number '1' and some illegible scribbles.

Main body of handwritten text, appearing to be a list or series of notes, with some lines starting with 'The' and 'The'.

Second section of handwritten text, possibly a continuation of the notes or a separate entry.



מגזרות ישראל - ווענינגטון

3728 - 8218
...דעם... 3...מחור... 1...97
...טווג בעמחוני גלנג...
...דעם... 777...
...מגזרין ווענינגטון...
...מגזרין ווענינגטון...

אל:

המסרד. בעמחון. ניו-יורק

1/3

132 352 493

אל:הסברה, מעי"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח
דע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY - FRIDAY - APRIL 18, 1986

EDITORIALS

THE SUN - 18/4 - "The Most Useful Weapon" When it came to explaining the U.S. strike against Libya, Reagan and his advisers faced a dilemma. To the extent that they wanted their accusations against the Kadafi regime as convincing as possible, they would have to reveal highly classified intelligence information derived from eavesdropping on Libya's communications. We have no quarrel with Reagan's disclosures. The meaning and value of the U.S. air strike would be lost completely if the reasons for it were left open to unnecessary dispute. However, his disclosures are not without cost. In the aftermath of the U.S. reprisal raid, intelligence officers will have to swallow hard and understand why sensitive information may have been compromised for necessary larger policy purposes.

COLUMNS

***WASH. POST - Charles Krauthammer - "The Pope And The Jews"
The pope's visit to a synagogue in Rome was a gracious visit and gesture of reconciliation and friendship. But something was missing from his speech, something very large. There was not a word about the central reality of Jewish life today: not a single mention of Israel. John Paul's speech, and particularly its denunciation of anti-Semitism, was timeless. The pope did not mention Israel because it is a touchy subject for the Vatican because Israel's borders are not internationally recognized. But of the 90 countries the Vatican fully recognizes, many have disputed borders. It was right and good of the pope to denounce anti-Semitism. But anti-Semitism is the "Jewish problem" of yesterday. Anti-Zionism is the Jewish problem of today. The pope addressed the wrong Jewish problem because he implicitly took the view in his synagogue speech that Jews are exclusively a religious community. Jews have always considered themselves a people. To address Jews purely as a religious community is to deny their peoplehood. Something more is needed in the pope's speech. That something is recognition of Israel, now the hinge of Jewish life and hope. The least one can do for a "dearly beloved brother" is recognize what is most dear to him.
(This article was cabled in full this morning.)

24 אפריל תמוז ה'תשנ"ו שבת ארבעה עשר

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1110
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 132 352 493

THE PRESS REPORTS

Bomb Found At London Airport

WASH. POST - DeYoung - A bomb set to explode in midair was found by Israeli security guards at London's Heathrow airport this morning in the baggage of a woman about to board an El Al flight to Tel Aviv. Police said the woman, an Irish national who was taken into custody, may have been duped into carrying the bag by her boyfriend, a man "of Arab origin." They said the man, who arrived with her at the airport but disappeared before the bomb was discovered, was "known to her" by the name of Nezar Hindawi, but they did not provide his nationality.

Shultz Says Coup Would Be 'Good'

WASH. POST - Oberdorfer - Shultz said yesterday that the overthrow of Qaddafi by military coup would be "all to the good" and that the targets in Monday's U.S. raid were selected to make an impression on Libya's armed forces. Shultz, meeting with reporters at the State Dept, denied that Qaddafi was "a direct target" of the raid, but his remarks approving of a coup and describing the target selection process left no doubt that toppling the mercurial Libyan leader was, and still is, a prime objective of official U.S. policy.

Qaddafi Was A Target Of U.S. Raid

WASH. POST - Wilson - The U.S. bombing raid on Libya was planned with hopes that Qaddafi would be killed when the principal target, his command post, was destroyed with four 2,000 pound bombs, informed officials said yesterday. "We hoped we would get him," said one U.S. official involved in planning the raid said, "but nobody was sure where he would be that night." National Security Council officials had even drafted a statement for administration use that described Qaddafi's death as "fortuitous," another administration official said yesterday, but no statement was made after it appeared Qaddafi survived the raid Mon. night. White House spokesman Larry Speakes and Defense Dept. spokesman Robert Sims refused to comment yesterday on whether Qaddafi's house was targeted.

Terrorists Kill 3 Britons In Lebanon

WASH. POST - Boustany - Three kidnaped Britons were found shot to death near Beirut today, a British journalist was seized by gunmen and the British ambassador's vacated residence was shelled in a new outbreak of violence apparently in retaliation for Britain's support of the US raid on Libya. The attacks came two days after Abu Nidal declared that the act would be answered.

הנה-ת

10 משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

טופס מברק צפון

אל: וושינגטון

דפים 3 מתוך 1

סיווג בטחוני סודי

דחיפות: מלידי

תאריך וזמן רישום: 18/3/86
מס מברק: 78

לשימוש
מח
הקשר

השגריר,

נא העביר הרצ'ב לתעודתו.
מקור בדיפ' יום א'.

(קשר: אנא העבירו הרצ'ב)
לשכת בר-און

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השוח: ח.בראון אישור מנהל המחלקה אישור לשכת המנכ"ל: _____
(לציון תאריך וזמן הלברה לקשר)

תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח) 18 באפריל 1986

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem

April 16, 1986.

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Dear George,

I read with both intellectual delight and literary pleasure your speech on "Freedom in the Age of Information".

I admire the manner in which you encapsulated the central issue of the relationship between the Information Revolution and the advance of liberty.

I find myself in complete agreement that it is only where principles of personal liberty are preached and practiced that the Information Revolution can take place, and in turn, this very Revolution generate greater liberty. There is no better evidence for this truism than the pioneering and senior role played by the U.S. in this Revolution, testifying to America's leadership in the promotion and practice of basic human freedoms.

I share your hope -- indeed confidence -- that sooner or later, closed societies, too, will be 'infected' by the inevitable drive for progress. Availing themselves of the enormous potential unleashed by this Revolution, their conduct on social and political issues may undergo the change their peoples deserve.

Your reference in this context to our Free Trade Zone -- an accomplishment we are grateful for and proud of -- underlines yet another layer of the ever-deepening unique relationship between our two countries. Your role and that of President Reagan in bringing that about will be enshrined in the annals of our nation.

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Secretary of State
George Shultz
Washington DC
United States of America


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As this is the first communication between us since your second demonstration of resolve vis-a-vis Libya's Quaddafi, may I take this opportunity to reiterate our unequivocal support for this act of self-defense. Only a "Four-C-Policy" can tame patrons of terrorism and contain the problem: Consistency, Constancy, Comprehensiveness and Cooperation. Your policy represents the initial three pre-requisites for success. We join you in the effort to attain the fourth.

With warmest regards

Sincerely,



Shimon Peres



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TEL AVIV

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May 1, 1986

His Excellency
Shimon Peres
Prime Minister
of the State of Israel
Jerusalem

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been asked to convey to you the enclosed
message from Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Handwritten signature of Robert A. Flaten

Robert A. Flaten
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

May 1, 1986

His Excellency
Shimon Peres
Prime Minister of the State of Israel
Jerusalem

Dear Shimon:

Thank you for your kind and warm letter of April 18, 1986. I hope that the "information revolution" will inspire closed societies to respond to the universal human need for personal freedom and civil liberties. Diplomacy takes many forms, and new technology has the potential for strengthening a passion for democracy in the hearts and minds of those who yearn for it most. This is one of America's proudest achievements -- the proof that civil liberties sustain and enhance healthy societies.

I share your excitement for the free trade agreement. Together we will achieve great economic benefits from this bold initiative. It is indeed an important new strand in the many ties between our two countries. I am sure it will strengthen us both.

Finally, I welcome Israel's support for our actions in Libya. Israel knows only too well the tragic results of terrorism and the destruction that its perpetrators have unleashed on innocent people. Our recent actions were essential as a sign of our dedication to stopping terrorism and terrorists. Let us hope that other friendly nations join us in that effort.

Again, thank you for your thoughtful letter.

Sincerely yours,

George

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Initiative. It is a false reading to say that terrorism springs from the impasse between Israeli and Palestinians. It springs from deeper social, economic and political pressures within Mideastern society.

NYT-Flora Lewis "The Concern Is Results" It is hard to swallow European reluctance to take economic and political measures to isolate Khadafy. It is true that Syria and Iran have just as bad a record. Nobody suggests reprisals against those countries because it implies too great a danger. But the Europeans, whose safety depends on clear and sober US judgement, worry more about results than principles. Even Reagan says that the attack won't stop terrorism.

NYT-Anthony Lewis "A Real Evil" The Libyan action emphasizes the responsibility of the US to seek solutions to the underlying problems of the Mideast--problems that, unsolved, breed support for Khadafy. But we must recognize that the US action did have its reasons. To oppose state-terrorism is a price of civilization in these ugly times.

WSJ-Cockburn "Reagan Tosses Aside Reason in His Bullying of Libya" In the face of negligible threat posed to US interests--and to the world--by Khadafy we now witness the US tossing aside elementary dictates of law, evidence, morality, compassion, common sense, logic, self-interest and proportion; all discarded in a gust of national self-congratulation. Is terrorism the main enemy as opposed to famine, disease, underdevelopment?

ND-George Will "Libya's Oil Would Be A Better Target" Reagan's most important words were "if necessary, we shall do it again." Khadafy is a problem that cannot be tamed. He must be removed. Libya is a military caste floating on a sea of oil. Devalue the latter and you destabilize the former. The targets hit by the US were appropriate but inadequate. It is well to wonder whether the world would not be better off if, in 1982, Israel had been encouraged to sweep through the Beeka Valley, a source of Syrian terrorism. Among sources of terrorism, Syria is worse than Libya.

ND-Kempton "US Raises Voices, Not Hands, For Khadafy" It can already be surmised that the dreary exercises in the Security Council will have little consequence beyond providing one more proof that Khadafy is short of weight wherever he really needs it.

ND-Richard Goodwin "Europe's Refusal To Outlaw Libya Led to US Raid" Diplomatic and economic sanctions by all western nations would be far more likely to arrest terrorism and disable its sponsors. That course, however, was tried. The leaders of nations like France and West Germany echoed the blasts of bombs in their own capitals with feeble, almost whining disavowals of any form of common action against a common threat. That is the great lesson of Libya. It illuminates the almost total disintegration of the international institutions and alliances established after WW II to keep peace and defend the West. The countries of Europe are now enfeebled nations, struggling to make a back, devoid of great aspirations, satisfied to survive and dependent for that survival on the nuclear power of the much-maligned US.

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US Stepping Up Rebuke To Allies on World Terror

NYT-D. I. Boyd-The Administration stepped up public criticism of what it said was the failure of US allies to combat international terrorism and the US will make the issue a top priority at the economic summit meeting in Tokyo.

Mubarak Put in Tough Spot

WSJ-Seib-Mubarak is probably the second most nervous man in the world after Khadafy. Mubarak is in an extremely awkward position. He is under pressure at home to condemn more vigorously the US raid. The raid has stirred up serious anti-US sentiment in Sudan, an important neighbor of Egypt. Yet Mubarak cannot afford to criticize the US too openly, for he desperately needs the \$2.3 billion in US aid that Congress is considering. This quandary doesn't represent a serious threat to Mubarak but it adds to a long list of problems he must control.

Soviet Union Supports Libya

NYT-Taubman-The Soviet Union announced that it had promised the Libyans to strengthen their defenses in the wake of the US attack.

US Blames Soviets

DW-Rehm-Reacting to sharp Soviet condemnations, the State Dept. insisted the US raids could have been avoided if the Kremlin has moved to "restrain the Libyans" from attacking Americans in West Berlin. Kolb said the State Dept. had delivered "hard evidence" that the Libyans were planning attacks in West Berlin before the disco was bombed. (see NYP; ND)

US Aides Worried Over Libyan Cables

NYT-Engelberg-The public disclosure of decoded Libyan cables has caused US intelligence analysts to lose a valuable source of information that may take weeks or months to replace, Administration officials said. The NSA vigorously resisted the decision to make public the highly classified information that was the basis for Reagan's decision to strike.

US Official Reports Contact With Khadafy Foes

NYT-Gelb-A senior White House official said that the Administration had made periodic contact in Libya over the last several years with opponents of Khadafy. The official indicated that the efforts had not gone far but were continuing.

Assessing the Air Raid Militarily

NYT-Mohr-Military officials concluded that two Air Force aviators missing after the strike died when their plane crashed, and reported

ND-Excerpts from newspaper editorials in Europe.

ND-Mark Green "Jerry Falwell and US Jews" Despite his recent posturing and rhetoric, Falwell's courting of the Jews is unlikely to win many adherents, for several reasons. He sees Israel and Jews as pawns in the final countdown of human history. After his theory of nuclear Armageddon, there will be no more Jews, they will be converted or dead, but there will be peace on earth. Fundamentalist support of Israel can smack more of a deal than a belief. The Moral Majority wants US Jews to take "account of evangelical support for Israel" before condemning the religious right. Falwell is an enemy of so much that American Jews value.

Press Reports

Khadafy on TV-Possible Coup Attempt Reported

NYT-D.1-Schumacher (photo of damaged living quarters of Khadafy) Khadafy spoke for 20 minutes on Libyan TV and condemned the US attack and Britain's role. He tanked France for refusing to take part. He called Reagan a "murderer of children." Khadafy did not repeat the threats of reprisal he made before the raid. "We do not bomb children like the US does," he said. A bus full of reporters pulled into Khadafy headquarters to inspect damage and fighting broke out. The Libyan authorities said a US plane was flying overhead but a BBC report suggested that the fighting was part of a coup attempt. In an unconfirmed report, ABC News said from Washington that US intelligence sources were saying that a mutiny occurred at Tarhounah army base and that Libyan jets attacked the mutineers. Libya said US planes attacked the town. (see NYP-Latham; DN-Goldschlag) (Headlines-NYP "Alive But Willing to Die" DN-Khadafy Defiant: VOWS Fight to Death)

DN-Rehm-Khadafy's worst enemies are his own countrymen. His 17-year rule has hurt national interests; his adventures in Chad and Uganda have only exacerbated the damage of falling oil prices.

77% in US Approve of Raid

NYT-Clymer-The American people overwhelmingly support the bombing of Libya, despite widespread fears that it will lead to more international terrorism and even to war with that country, a NYT/CBS Poll shows. A poll in Britain found very heavy disapproval. The American public is also dissatisfied with the response of our European allies.

Syria and Iran are Big Bosses in Terror

DN-Hokes (AP) As a source of terrorism, Syria and Iran are widely regarded as far more dangerous than Libya. But experts doubt the Reagan Administration will risk striking them as it did Libya. Schultz is said to have urged action against those two countries but has been overruled on grounds that the risks were too great. Although the Reagan Administration blamed Libya for the airport massacres in Rome and Vienna, the Israelis said their evidence showed the terrorists were trained in Syrian controlled areas of Lebanon and that Syria was probably most responsible.

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that several of the 33 American attack aircraft never dropped their bombs. (see ND-Minerbrook, DN-Jackman)

Libyan Plot on Italian Defense Minister

NYP-Dan-Khadafy's terrorists have targeted Giovanni Spadolini for ~~murder~~, according to top NATO personnel and intelligence sources. The Defense Minister has been Israel's best friend in Italy and an advocate of close ties to Washington.

Bonn Links Libya to Attack

NYP-DPA-West German officials said they had proof that Libya was involved in the explosion at a disco on April 5 and two other terrorist attacks in their country.

Protests Over Raid

NYP-wire-There were a number of large demonstrations in Germany protesting the US raid. There were also demonstrations in Stockholm, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Italy, England and Spain. (NYT-photo of protesters in London)

Reagan Hopes Khadafy Learned Lesson

DN-Drake-Reagan expressed hope that Khadafy "will not mistake us again" on US resolve to strike back against terrorism.

Bombing Called Racist

Amsterdam News-Noel-p.1-A Harlem preacher speculated that Reagan may have surpassed the theory that racism, not terrorism, was the reason behind last week's bombing on a West Berlin nightclub frequented by Black GIs. The Rev. Charles Kenyatta said the attack on Libya was a political scheme to digress from the real issue--a homeland for the displaced Palestinian people. "It is the Palestinian question. It ain't about Khadafy," he surmised.

Lost Fliers' Families Voice Doubt and Support

NYT-Blau-The mother of one of the two lost pilots said her family supported Reagan's decision on the raid. The family of Capt. Ribas-Dominicci was more unsure about the worth of the raid.

US Firms in Libya

DN-AP-US oil companies continue to operate in Libya because an immediate withdrawal could mean as much as \$1 billion windfall for Khadafy, a Reagan administration official said. Murphy did say that the companies were winding down operations. An immediate closure of operations would give Khadafy equipment and revenues for broken contracts.

European Trip Cancellations Growing

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NYT-p.1-James-Officials in the travel industry across the country reported a surge of cancellations after the raid on Libya. Would-be tourists are afraid of reprisals. Agents reported cancellations of up to 80%.

US Plans Partial Pullout From Sudan

NYT-Gwertzman-The US has ordered the evacuation of the 200 dependents of American Embassy personnel in the Sudan because of concern over Libyan-directed violence there. There have been increasing signs of Libyan influence over the Gov't of Sudan. There is a serious concern of "another Teheran."

NYT-Rule-(Khartoum) Several hundred demonstrators twice tried to storm the US Embassy to protest the US raid on Libya. About 100,000 people demonstrated in the capital.

Abu Nidal Responsible for Hit on American in Sudan

NYP-Lathem & Standora-Abu Nidal was behind the shooting of an American Embassy worker in the Sudan, US intelligence agent said last night.

2 Israelis Switch Jobs Ending Crisis

NYT-special-Two Israeli Cabinet ministers exchanged portfolios officially ending a political crisis that had threatened the coalition gov't.

Maale Adumim/El Azariye-Divided by a Gulf of Distrust

NYT-special-The two towns are about a mile away from each other and each has a population of about 10,000, but that's where the similarities end. The Jews of Maale Adumim say their home was a desert when they first settled in 1974. The Arab mayor of El Azariye says that "It was fertile land" where corn, barley and peas were grown where the Jewish town now stands. People in El Azariye speak of Israelis with sullenness and in Maale Adumim, said Micha Bar-On, an administrator at Hebrew U., many Jews hate the Arabs "like fire." (cabled to Yael Vered)

Waldheim

NYT-Markham-Waldheim spurned the idea of abandoning a bid for the Austrian presidency and said he was "quite confident" of being elected. Waldheim conceded for the first time that as a lieutenant in the German Army he was aware of atrocities committed against Yugoslav partisans, but he insisted he had not been implicated in them. He said he was unaware of the deportations of Greek Jews and of Jews from Vienna, where he often visited during the war. Most polls show Waldheim leading.

French Report Letters From Lebanon

NYT-UPI-The French Gov't received handwritten letters from four French hostages in Lebanon.

Bonner Warns of "Flood of Disinformation"

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NYT-McQuinnston-Yelena Bonner was honored by the Overseas Press Club for her advocacy of human rights. She warned about a "flood of disinformation" about her husband. She said films are intended to deceive the US public.

\$1 Million Fine in Kosher Scam

DN-Marcano-A Brooklyn retailer was hit with a record \$1 million fine for selling 50,000 pounds of non-kosher meat that was labeled kosher.

Letters

NYP-A number of letters putting down our European allies for not cooperating with the US on Libya.

WSJ-3 letters from US Foreign Service officers who say that overseas life is dangerous and that they are generally underpaid.

Cartoons

ND-Lord-AUS General says "We've rethought this issue of complying with the Salt II Treaty. It might not be such a bad idea to dump those Poseidon submarines..." The US Air Force then drops the subs on Libya.

NYP-Rigby-Libyan troops send up missiles and hit birds. A soldier says "OK...so they weren't F-111's." Another says "It's a good thing the boss isn't around to see this!"

DN-Rigby-At a travel agency, an agent says to a couple "I was just saying to myself, now here's your typical courageous travellers who aren't going to let their vacation be spoiled by little details like mad dogs, airport security, hijackings, bombings, near misses..." The woman says "We came in to get out of the rain."

Amsterdam News-Tabley-Reagan and Khadafy are fighting while onlookers do nothing. Khadafy says "Why don't they stop us?"

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מזכיר הממשלה ד"ר י. ביילין

דע: מצפ"א. כלכלית

אל-על

אני מפנה את חשומה לבך למברק של נציג האיגוד המכונאים שנשלח שלשום לעו"ד בלום והעתקים לראש הממשלה, לעמוס ערן ולפרלקליט "אל-על". על פי מברק זה נשאר רק נושא אחד קטן שנוי וחתלוקה והוא שאלת הותס המצטבר של השובתים בעת השביתה לצרכים לא כספיים (אפשרויות קידום והתור לפיטורים, אם יהיו). כידוע "אל-על" הציע בוורות, אך האיגוד עומד כעקרון על הסכם בטענה, שאינה מוכחשת, כי בזמנו הסכים לכך עו"ד בלום. לדעתי יש מקום ש"אל-על" תוותר בעניין זה, אך גם אם "אל-על" עומדת על בוורות, אני מציע להביא את כל ההסכם לאישורו של בית המשפט. יש לי יסוד להניח על סמך שיחות בלתי - פורמליות, שאם ההסכם כולו יאושר ככתבו וכלשונו ע"י בית המשפט ואך ורק עניין זה יישאר פתוח, ניתן יהיה להסכים לבוורות.

דני בלור

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the word "משה" (Moses) and other illegible text.



אל: אלטן כהן

בברכת

שגרירות ישראל

בושינגטון

ההמשך אמריקני 478 מ-17.4

יוסף אמר

STATEMENT BY SENATOR D'AMATO IN OPPOSITION OF THE ARMS SALES TO
SAUDI ARABIA BEFORE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE.

APRIL 17, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR GIVING ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY BEFORE YOUR DISTINGUISHED COMMITTEE TODAY ON AN ISSUE I FEEL VERY STRONGLY ABOUT: THE PROPOSED ARMS SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA. I COMMEND MY GOOD FRIEND, THE SENIOR SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA, FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF S.J.RES. 316, OF WHICH I AM AN ORIGINAL COSPONSOR. THIS LEGISLATION WILL PROHIBIT THE PROPOSED \$354 MILLION SALE OF MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA.

THE ADMINISTRATION HAS FORMALLY NOTIFIED CONGRESS THAT IT INTENDS TO SELL \$354 MILLION WORTH OF ADVANCED MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA, INCLUDING STINGER GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES, SIDEWINDER AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES, AND HARPOON ANTI-SHIP MISSILES. TO JUSTIFY THE SALE, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS CITED SAUDI ARABIA'S MODERATING INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ITS CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND THE DANGERS IT FACES FROM THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.

I FIND FAULT WITH ALL OF THESE ARGUMENTS. SAUDI ARABIA HAS CONSISTENTLY WORKED TO UNDERMINE THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS.

SAUDI ARABIA SUPPORTS TWO OF AMERICA'S MAIN TERRORIST THREATS, LIBYA AND SYRIA. SAUDI ARABIA HAS NOT ONLY PROVIDED SUBSTANTIAL MONETARY ASSISTANCE TO THE P.L.O, BUT ALSO HAS PROVIDED SANCTUARY AND LOGISTICS FOR P.L.O MILITANTS.

I DO NOT THINK WE CAN TRUST THE SAUDIS WITH SUCH ADVANCED MISSILES. SAUDI ARABIA HAS NOT EVEN LIVED UP TO THE AWACS AGREEMENTS. CONGRESS WAS ASSURED AT THE TIME OF THAT SALE THAT FUTURE DELIVERIES TO SAUDI ARABIA OF AWACS AND OTHER ADVANCED ARMS WOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY IF PEACE EFFORTS IN THE REGION HAVE THE "SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE" OF SAUDI ARABIA. SUCH ASSISTANCE HAS NOT BEEN RENDERED.

BECAUSE OF THE SIMPLE FACT THAT WE HAVE SUPPLIED THE SAUDI'S WITH OVER \$44 BILLION IN ARMS SINCE 1971 -- \$22 BILLION DURING THIS ADMINISTRATION ALONE -- I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS ADDITIONAL SALE IS NECESSARY TO PROVE OUR FRIENDSHIP. ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACT IS THAT SAUDI ARABIA DOES NOT TRULY NEED THE MISSILES. MOREOVER, THIS IS JUST A PRELIMINARY SALE. I EXPECT THE ADMINISTRATION TO COME BACK IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND ASK TO SELL EVEN MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY IF WE DO NOT STOP IT NOW. I ALSO QUESTION THE URGENCY OF THIS SALE IF THE MISSILES ARE NOT GOING TO BE SENT TO SAUDI ARABIA UNTIL 1989.

PART OF THIS PROPOSED SALE INCLUDES ADVANCED HAND-HELD STINGER MISSILES. THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAS A LIMITED NUMBER OF PLANES CAPABLE OF FLYING. SAUDI ARABIA, WHICH ALREADY HAS STINGER

MISSILES, HAS MORE THAN ENOUGH MISSILES TO DEFEND AGAINST THIS SUPPOSED THREAT.

OUR TOTAL ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA SINCE 1950 ARE LARGER THAN THOSE TO ANY OTHER NATION. NO OTHER NATION HAS EXCEEDED \$12 BILLION IN TOTAL ARMS PURCHASES DURING THIS TIME PERIOD. IN FACT, TOTAL ARMS SALES TO ALL OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES COMBINED AMOUNTED TO JUST \$50 BILLION DURING THE LAST THREE-AND-ONE-HALF DECADES, BARELY MORE THAN SAUDI ARABIA'S PURCHASES ALONE. LAST YEAR SAUDI ARABIA, BY PURCHASING \$3.5 BILLION OF AMERICAN ARMS, PURCHASED 25% OF ALL U.S. ARMS EXPORTS. THESE FACTS, COUPLED WITH THE RECENT PURCHASE OF ADVANCED FIGHTERS FROM GREAT BRITAIN, MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR ME TO BELIEVE THAT THIS SALE IS IMPORTANT TO THE SECURITY OF SAUDI ARABIA. THERE ARE OTHER, LESS LETHAL AND LESS DESTABILIZING GOODS WE CAN SELL TO SAUDI ARABIA.

IT IS NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PARTICULARLY ISRAEL, THAT THIS SALE GO THROUGH. SAUDI ARABIA STILL HAS TO PROVE THAT IT TRULY STANDS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PROVIDES BILLIONS MORE IN MILITARY SALES.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE FACT THAT SO MANY OF MY COLLEAGUES HAVE JOINED SENATORS CRANSTON, PACKWOOD, DIXON, LAUTENBERG, AND MYSELF ON THIS RESOLUTION SHOWS THE TRUE CONCERN OF THIS BODY OVER THIS PROPOSED SALE. I HOPE THIS COMMITTEE WILL FAVORABLY REPORT

S.J.RES. 316 TO THE FULL SENATE, AND THAT IT THEN WILL BE ACTED UPON QUICKLY.

THANK YOU, ONCE AGAIN, MR. CHAIRMAN FOR ALLOWING ME TO SHARE MY VIEWS ON THIS MATTER.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALAN DIXON
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SAUDI ARMS SALE RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL

April 17, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN, I REGRET THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR US TO INTRODUCE S. J. RES. 316. HOWEVER, THE ADMINISTRATION, AFTER A LONG DELAY, HAS INSISTED ON PROCEEDING WITH THE PROPOSED SALE OF SIDEWINDER, STINGER AND HARPOON MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA. IT IS NOT, IN MY OPINION, A WISE COURSE OF ACTION.

THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF PUBLICITY ABOUT THIS SALE, AND WHETHER OR NOT IT IS IN ISRAEL'S BEST INTERESTS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, IT IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES OR THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST REGION!

ALTHOUGH SAUDI ARABIA IS PERCEIVED TO BE A MODERATE ARAB NATION, THERE ARE VERY DISTURBING FACTS WHICH LEAD ME TO BELIEVE THAT THIS SALE IS VERY ILL-ADVISED AND THAT SUCH A PERCEPTION IS INACCURATE.

FIRST, THE ADMINISTRATION MAINTAINS THAT THIS SALE IS NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE ESCALATION OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. ACCORDING TO THE ADMINISTRATION, HOWEVER, THE SALE IS NOT SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY UNTIL 1989 AND WOULD STRETCH TO 1991. GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE REGION, IT WOULD SEEM UNWISE TO MAKE SUCH A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO A NATION WHICH HAS REPEATEDLY SCORNED BOTH AMERICAN AND ISRAELI INTERESTS.

SECOND, A MAJOR PART OF THE PACKAGE CONSISTS OF 200 PORTABLE STINGER GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES. THIS WEAPON WOULD

NOT ENHANCE THE SAUDIS' DEFENSES AGAINST IRAN, WHOSE REAL THREAT TO SAUDI ARABIA IS TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION. FURTHER, IN THE HANDS OF TERRORISTS, THIS WEAPON COULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES. IT CAN BE CARRIED BY ONE PERSON AND HAS ENOUGH DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY TO OBLITERATE CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT -- AN ACTION WHICH IS ALL TOO POSSIBLE IN THESE TIMES OF INTERNATIONAL TURMOIL AND TRAGEDY.

THIRD, THE SAUDIS HAVE REPEATEDLY ACTED AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THEIR SUPPORT OF LIBYA BY CONDEMNING AMERICAN EFFORTS TO CONSTRAIN THE OUTLAW AGENDA OF QADHAFI AND HIS CORHORTS IN BRUTALITY. SAUDI ARABIA HAS PUBLICLY STATED ITS ALLEGIENCE TO THESE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALS, IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN POLICY AND INTERESTS.

FOURTH, THE SAUDIS CONTINUE TO SERVE AS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR TO THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. LAST YEAR ALONE, THEY PROVIDED YASSAR ARAFAT AND HIS FOLLOWERS WITH \$28.5 MILLION SO THAT THEY COULD CONTINUE CARRYING OUT THEIR AGENDA OF TERROR AND DESTRUCTION LONG AFTER OTHER ARAB STATES HAVE ABANDONED FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF THESE EXTREMISTS.

FIFTH, SAUDI ARABIA DOESN'T LIVE UP TO ITS AGREEMENTS AND THE ADMINISTRATION APPARENTLY IGNORES THIS. THE 1981 AGREEMENT TO SELL AWACS TO THEM WAS BASED UPON SEVERAL CONDITIONS, ONE BEING THAT A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES IN THE REGION WAS TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED OR SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD THAT GOAL WAS TO HAVE BEEN

ACCOMPLISHED WITH SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE FROM SAUDI ARABIA. THIS COMMITMENT WAS MADE BY THE SAUDIS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN NEARLY FIVE YEARS AGO, AND I DARESAY, THAT NONE OF IT HAS COME TO PASS.

THE SITUATION IN THE REGION IS, IF POSSIBLE, MORE UNSTABLE THAN EVER, AND THERE HAS BEEN NO POSITIVE ACTION BY THE SAUDIS TO BRING PEACE TO THE AREA. IN FACT, THE SAUDIS CONTINUE TO LEAD THE ARAB BOYCOTT AGAINST ISRAEL. THEY ARE SEEKING TO GAIN ADDITIONAL ALLIES IN AFRICA TO CONFRONT ISRAEL. THEY CONTINUE TO REINFORCE THE ISOLATION OF ISRAEL AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY.

FOR THESE AND MANY OTHER REASONS, THIS SALE IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF ANY NATION WHICH ADVOCATES PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND DEPLORES TERRORISM AGAINST INNOCENT CIVILIANS. SAUDI ARABIA IS IN A DECLARED STATE OF WAR WITH ISRAEL. THIS SALE WOULD GIVE HER ADDITIONAL WEAPONS WHICH COULD BE USED AGAINST OUR CLOSEST ALLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AMERICA HAS ALREADY SOLD MORE MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES TO SAUDI ARABIA THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. OUR SALES TO THE SAUDIS EXCEED \$50 BILLION, INCLUDING \$20 BILLION REMAINING TO BE DELIVERED. TOTAL SALES TO ALL OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AMOUNTED TO JUST \$50 BILLION.

WHAT SHOULD WE BE GETTING FROM SAUDI ARABIA IN RETURN? IF THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH THIS SALE, AFTER POSTPONING IT FOR OVER A YEAR, IS BASED ON A REAL

MILITARY AND STRATEGIC THREAT TO OUR INTERESTS, THEN NOW IS THE TIME TO EXACT MORE COOPERATION FROM SAUDI ARABIA.

THE SAUDI DEFENSES ARE STRONG, AND THE IMMEDIATE NEED, OTHER THAN "SENDING A MESSAGE TO IRAN" DOES NOT SEEM TO THIS SENATOR TO BE SUFFICIENT. INSTEAD, WE SHOULD SEND ANOTHER MESSAGE, WHICH IS THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ARMS TO SAUDI ARABIA, A DECLARED ENEMY OF OUR CLOSEST ALLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ISRAEL, AND A DECLARED SUPPORTER OF QADHAFI AND ARAFAT, BOTH OF WHOM HAVE PERPETRATED ATROCIOUS ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND MANY INNOCENT CIVILIANS TRAVELING ABROAD.

BEFORE WE CONSIDER SENDING ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTS OF WAR TO SAUDI ARABIA, WE NEED TO ELICIT FROM THEM A COMMITMENT TO WORK FOR PEACE WITH ISRAEL, AS WELL AS THEIR CONCURRENCE WITH POLICIES WHICH ARE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE EVERYWHERE.

Frank Lautenberg

United States Senator
for New Jersey



For Immediate Release
April 17, 1986

For Further Information
David Lawsky 202-224-9708
Christopher Walsh 224-5885

LAUTENBERG WARNS AGAINST SAUDI ARMS SALE

WASHINGTON -- Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg, D-N.J., warned Thursday that a proposed arms sale to Saudi Arabia opens the possibility that some of the weapons could end up in the possession of the Palestinian Liberation Organization or other terrorist groups based in the Middle East.

Lautenberg noted that the Saudis will get Sidewinder and Stinger missiles, among other weapons, in the sale.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the proposed Saudi arms sale, the Senator noted that delivery of the proposed weapons would not even begin until 1989, and therefore the sale could not be justified by an immediate military threat to the Saudis from Iran.

"Saudi Arabia already has over 3,000 Sidewinder missiles to knock out less than 100 Iranian planes," he told the Committee in testimony prepared for delivery.

"This sale cannot help the Saudis deal with any near term threat from Iran," Lautenberg said. "But, should it be approved, it would give the Saudis at least 36 missiles per aircraft, a ratio far higher than either the United States or Israel. I think that is excessive and unnecessary."

Given those extra missiles and the Saudi record of support for the PLO in the past, Lautenberg said he was concerned where surplus missiles might end up.

"I have a real concern about where the weapons we sell today may end up tomorrow," he said. "The Saudis allow Palestinians to train with their army. They support the PLO financially. They already have enough Stingers for their own needs."

"With this history of Saudi-PLO cooperation, there is a real possibility that Stingers could end up in the PLO's hands."

He said the new weapons also would increase the possibility that Saudi stockpiles "will serve as an arsenal for other states attacking Israel, because of Saudi Arabia's participation in past wars against Israel."

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WHAT HAS THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA DONE TO ADVANCE
"BASIC AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES" IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

The government of Saudi Arabia has worked closely with the United States and other countries for a peaceful resolution to the dispute and problems of the region including the Iran-Iraq war, the Afghan war, the Arab-Israeli conflict and crises elsewhere.

IRAN-IRAQ WAR

In terms of human and financial costs and possible strategic implications, by far the most pressing dispute in the Middle East is the Iran-Iraq war. Saudi Arabia has sought to arrange Islamic, U.N. or other mediation of the Gulf conflict, and it has been in direct contact with both sides. Since the outbreak of the Gulf war, the Saudis have particularly sought to hasten development of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes the states on the western rim of the Gulf, from Oman to Kuwait. The Saudi initiative has included forming a Gulf rapid deployment force as well as pursuing a number of other security measures. As a further deterrent, the Saudis also have entered into a mutual assistance pact with Kuwait and have increased their own defense capabilities to help keep the Iran-Iraq conflict from spreading lower across the Gulf.

The Saudis demonstrated both their enhanced military effectiveness and commitment by shooting down one and possibly two Iranian jets approaching Saudi oil fields through the middle Gulf in June, 1984. Since then, they also have turned back other Iranian probes.

AFGHAN WAR

In the Afghan War, the Saudis have worked closely with Pakistan, providing important support for those resisting the invasion as well as in the refugee camps in Pakistan. As with the Gulf war, the Saudis have sought to prove the futility of the invasion and to wind the war down or get the underlying dispute resolved.

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, after approval of the AWACs sale in 1981, Saudi Arabia led the way in getting the only Arab summit since then - at Fez, Morocco, in early September 1982 - to adopt the 8-point Fahd plan. And that was done unanimously. It was accomplished as an immediate and positive response to President Reagan's basic Middle East policy statement of September 1, 1982. The Saudis specifically welcomed the Reagan initiative and called it constructive. The Fez declaration was adopted three days later. Israel, in contrast, rejected the President's approach less than 24 hours after it was announced and has maintained that position since.

Differences remain to be worked out between the Fez and the U.S.

position. But "[t]he President expressed his appreciation for the Fez consensus, positive elements of which have been recognized by the United States," as was said in the joint statement issued by President Reagan and the King of Saudi Arabia at the conclusion of the latter's visit to Washington in February 1985.

The Fez declaration calls for secure borders and the security of all the states and people in the area, including Israel. Particularly important is the fact the Saudis have repeatedly made clear the Fez declaration is an opening, not a final position. It thus has moved the Arab world importantly along and is open ended. It will be viewed as a major turning point in the history of the region, even though still minimized somewhat here for later negotiation purposes.

Since Fez, the Saudis have consulted closely with U.S. officials, trying to encourage greater flexibility both in the area and in Washington. Parallel with that, they have provided important aid to Jordan (reportedly about \$600 million a year, plus deeply discounted oil, plus remittances from Jordanian workers in the Gulf) as well as to other important Arab states, and to the more moderate elements in the loosely confederated Palestine Liberation organization. The Saudis have condemned terrorism from any source and have no tolerance for it and have made this policy clear in their own handling of terrorist acts.

THE PALESTINIANS

Saudi Arabia is upfront that it does not believe an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict can be brought about without recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. It bases that conclusion on both human justice and realism. The Saudis are also bound by the unanimous 1974 Arab Summit mandate that the PLO is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Even with the difficulties involved in these matters, Saudi Arabia remains the most important factor at work for moderation in the Arab world. That is essential for bridging and helping to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as for furthering America's own distinct interests in the Middle East.

There are a number of other disputes in the area in which the Saudis have worked with the United States and others to make headway. And they have provided important assistance to Morocco, Tunisia, the Sudan, Pakistan and elsewhere. Stability and peace in the Middle East are not going to come easily or simply but require working on a number of problems at the same time. The Saudis have amply demonstrated their commitment to that essential course of action.

LIBYA

How about Libya? The Saudis and Libya's Qadaffi have a long record of difficult relations despite efforts to paper them over. Saudi Arabia has been a key leader of moderate Arab states over the years;

Qadaffi has been the most vocal figure against the Arab moderates.

Saudi Arabia is a conservative monarchy. Qadaffi came to power in 1969 by overthrowing the Libyan monarchy which was closely aligned with the Saudis. Qadaffi has continued his radical rhetoric ever since.

Diplomatic relations have continued between the two countries to the extent that they have at all, because both are Arab, Muslim, and oil-producing states. But they have repeatedly disagreed on a wide range of subjects. In the Gulf war, for example, Qadaffi has consistently sided with Iran, while Saudi Arabia has supported Iraq.

In OPEC, the two have taken sharply differing positions, with the Saudis the main advocates of assured global supplies and moderate pricing which seeks to reconcile producer and consumer interests as well as short and long range considerations. Qadaffi has championed the highest attainable price regardless. Even as to Islam, the two have different approaches, with the Saudis adhering to very traditional views, while Qadaffi has issued a so called "Green Book" with his own personal interpretations.

The Saudis have repeatedly taken a firm, unyielding stand against terrorism and have dealt with it sternly, even harshly, themselves. Qadaffi, in contrast, has justified, excused, harbored and sponsored it over the years.

In both the Arab world and the international community as a whole, Saudi Arabia is viewed as an important friend of the United States, even when that is counterproductive to the Saudis in their sector of the globe; Qadaffi is unabashedly against the U.S. government and U.S. interests.

Earlier this year, for example, Qadaffi tried to get the 21-member Arab League to take countermeasures against the announced U.S. embargo of Libya. The Saudis successfully led the fight against them.

A January 31, 1986 Washington POST article states the following:

Saudi Arabia, according to Arab sources, refused to send its (foreign) minister (to the Arab League meeting) until Libya backed down on its demands....These sources said Saudi Arabia's minister, Prince Saud Faisal, had told the Libyans last week that his country would not attend if Libya insisted on 'unrealistic' proposals against the United States, a Saudi ally and its main military supplier...(The Libyan Representative) negotiated by phone with Prince Saud, and Libya withdrew its proposals.

Only then did the Saudi foreign minister fly from Riyadh and join the Arab league meeting, which unanimously went on record against the embargo but without the Libyan-proposed countermeasures against the U.S. After the recent U.S. exercises at the Gulf of Sidra, the Arab league again unanimously went on record on behalf of Libya but the resolution again was without Qadaffi's anti-U.S. countermeasures.

Members of Congress are well acquainted themselves with the "legislative course" the Saudis thus took. They maintained their Arab world membership while removing the only possible operative provisions against the United States. Effective efforts like that and sophisticated - not simplistic - understanding of them here are essential if the U.S. is to handle the complexities of the real world and provide leadership in the highly diverse situations facing us.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 11, 1986


Dear Representative:

The Administration formally notified Congress on April 8 of its intent to sell air-to-air, air-to-sea, and ground-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia. The Administration attaches high priority to this \$354 million sale. We previously sent your office a packet of material explaining the Administration's rationale for our proposal.

Opponents of the proposal have repeatedly and in various fora made a series of allegations about the sale and the U.S.-Saudi defense relationship which do not withstand scrutiny. The attached White Paper lists the most frequent charges and provides the facts that refute them.

We believe you will find the information contained in this paper useful. Should you have additional questions or wish to receive a detailed briefing on the sale, we would be pleased to arrange for a briefing team to meet with you or your staff at your convenience. To arrange a briefing, please contact David Rundell of my office at 647-4255.

Sincerely,



James W. Dyer
Acting Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

Enclosure:

As stated

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REPRESENTATIVES

WHITE PAPER

SAUDI ARMS SALE

APRIL 1986

SAUDI ARMS SALE

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THE MISSILE SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA: BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

SUMMARY

President Reagan has notified the Congress of his intent to sell Saudi Arabia a limited quantity of air-to-air, air-to-sea, and ground-to-air missiles. The provision of these defensive arms advances U.S. security interests -- by demonstrating continued U.S. reliability as a security partner for Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states and by sending a clear message to Iran that the United States will oppose any expansion of the Gulf war and Iranian-backed radicalism in the region. The proposed sales do not add new systems to the Saudi inventory; they either augment or upgrade equipment currently in Saudi stocks.

The President had planned to announce this sale later this year. But recent events in the Gulf, urgent consultations with Saudi Arabia, and a direct, high-level request from the Saudi leadership have convinced the Administration of the need to move immediately. The Iranian success in moving troops near the Iraqi border with Kuwait raises the threat of expansion of the war to the Gulf states to the highest point since the conflict began almost six years ago. Our friends in the region are urgently looking to the United States for an affirmation of our oft-repeated commitments of military assistance and support. If this sale is not approved and we are unable to respond to Saudi Arabia's legitimate defensive needs at this critical juncture, our credibility will be seriously eroded and our message of deterrence to Iran undermined.

WEAPONS TO BE SOLD

The sale we have notified has a total estimated cost of \$354 million and is composed of the following items:

- 995 AIM-9L Air-to-Air Missiles
- 671 AIM-9P4 Air-to-Air Missiles
- 100 HARPOON Air-to-Sea Missiles
- 200 STINGER Manportable Ground-to-Air Missiles Systems with 600 Reload Missiles

The sale of these items responds to long-standing Saudi requests. The Administration's Middle East Arms Transfer study, which was briefed to Congress last year, validated the need for these arms and the fact that they do not threaten Israel. These items do not introduce new weapon systems or new capabilities into the Saudi inventory. The Saudis already have the AIM-9L and the AIM-9P3 (an earlier version of the AIM-9P4), as well as limited quantities of the STINGER. Additionally, Saudi Arabia currently possesses the surface-launched version of the HARPOON missile. Sale of a small number of the air-launched variant will assist the Saudis better to counter naval threats in an area larger than their small navy can patrol.

The Saudi Government will pay for these defense articles and related services over a period of at least four years on a "dependable undertaking" basis, meaning that the Saudis will commit themselves to making payments in such amounts and at such times as specified by the U.S. There is no "grant aid" or "forgiven credits" in connection with this sale.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SALE

U.S. Strategic Interests

The United States has vital strategic interests at stake in the region. We strongly support the security and stability of the moderate Gulf states. We are committed to maintaining the free flow of oil from the Gulf. We oppose radical forces in the area and the expansion of Soviet influence into the region. The sale of these follow-on missiles to Saudi Arabia will advance our interests without threatening Israel.

For over forty years the United States and Saudi Arabia have been close partners in strategic military cooperation. This cooperation has served both nations' interests and contributed to regional stability and security. Since the 1970s, the U.S. has become the major outside supporter of the other Gulf states as well. These countries have received assurance from a succession of U.S. presidents that the United States will stand by them in their defense.

Through our military assistance and training programs we have established strong relationships of mutual trust and reliance. We wish to maintain these interests. With the long lead times required for delivery of modern U.S. weapons, any prudent defense planner -- American, Israeli, or Saudi -- has to look far into the future. A security relationship demands consistent planning, updating, and procurement. It makes no sense to wait until the shooting starts to seek approval for sales we agree are necessary for the defense of a friend.

It does not serve our interests -- or Israel's -- to allow others to replace the U.S. as the principal supplier of arms to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. U.S. arms sales carry safeguards and assurances that no other country requires, safeguards that ensure these sales pose no threat to Israel. Western European and other arms suppliers do not impose such conditions on the disposition of their sales. The recent British Tornado sale lost the United States over \$12 billion in sales and support and tens of thousands of American jobs without advancing either our interests or Israel's security.


The Increased Military Threat


The greatest current military threat to the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia is an expansion of the Gulf war to the Arabian Peninsula. With Iran's recent crossing of the Shaat al-Arab River and occupation of Iraqi territory near the border with Kuwait, this threat has dramatically increased. Kuwait and the other Gulf states look primarily to Saudi Arabia, and to the U.S., for their support and leadership in the collective defense of the region.

Saudi Arabia's greatest need is improved air defense. The Royal Saudi Air Force, with only 60 modern fighters, must protect an airspace equal to that of the entire Eastern United States. Its population centers are widely separated, rendering air defense more difficult. Cities of the Eastern Province, the Kingdom's vital oilfields, and extensive petrochemical complexes are all highly vulnerable to attack from Iran. It requires only a single successful penetration of Saudi air defenses to inflict incalculable damage to Saudi oil facilities; accordingly, we have concentrated our military assistance on enhancement of air defense. The AWACS sale was an essential element in increasing warning time. The AIM-9 air-to-air missiles will increase Saudi ability to counter the



Middle East





TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE SALE

AIM-9L SIDEWINDERSs

Description: Nine hundred ninety-five air-to-air missiles and associated spare parts, thirty training missiles, training, technical assistance, and support equipment.

Estimated value: \$98 million.

Comment: Like all SIDEWINDER missiles, the AIM-9L is a short-range air-to-air missile. It is an advanced variant currently being replaced in the U.S. inventory by the more advanced AIM-9M. The AIM-9L is needed to make the Saudi F-15s fully effective in air combat. Sale of AIM-9Ls to Saudi Arabia was in a notified in a previous case (1981) and a limited number have already entered the Saudi inventory.

AIM-9P4 SIDEWINDERS

Description: Six hundred seventy-one AIM-9P4 air-to-air missiles, spares, and support equipment.

Estimated value: \$60 million.

Comment: The AIM-9P4 is a recent variant of the SIDEWINDER family of short-range air-to-air missiles. While its capabilities approach those of the AIM-9L presently in the U.S. (and Saudi) inventory, it can be fired effectively from aircraft such as the F-5 with less advanced electronics than those in U.S. force structure aircraft. The Saudis have predecessor variants, including the AIM-9P3.

STINGERS

Description: Two hundred Basic STINGER manportable air defense guided missile systems (launcher with missile), an additional six hundred reload missiles, support and training equipment, spare parts, technical support, and training.

Estimated value: \$89 million.


Comment: STINGER provides close-in defense of key installations, including those in the oil fields, against air attack. This increase in the number of Saudi STINGER launchers is needed in view of the dispersed nature of these installations. Unless imminent threat requires deployment, the STINGERS are warehoused under stringent security controls.

HARPOON

Description: One hundred air-launched HARPOON missiles with containers, spare parts, technical assistance, and support equipment.

Estimated value: \$107 million

Comment: The surface-launched HARPOON anti-ship missile is already in the Saudi inventory. The air-launched version will extend the range and shorten the response time against naval threats in the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea.



MYTHS AND REALITY

As Congress reconvenes, one of the issues awaiting it is the Administration's proposal to sell Saudi Arabia air and sea defense missiles worth \$354 million.

This sale will allow Saudi Arabia, a friendly moderate state with which we have had close and mutually beneficial ties for over 40 years, to meet military threats in the future. These missiles will be delivered in 1989 - 1991 to meet future threats. The Administration has gone forward with the sale now, however, to achieve important political objectives: to send a clear signal to Iran not to expand the Iran-Iraq war to the moderate Gulf states and to bolster the resolve of these states, with whom we share important security interests.

Reaction to this sale has been generally positive because most observers see it as supporting U.S. interests. Opponents have tried to project a different view, using allegations and unrelated assertions designed to confuse the issue. For instance, they argue that these missiles are not needed because they would not protect Saudi Arabia against Iran's current offensive. This is not the Administration's rationale for the sale. To repeat, the timing will send important political signals; the missiles themselves will meet future threats. Let's look at some other frequently made allegations and the realities.

1. Allegation: Iran's air force is weak; it is no threat to Saudi Arabia.

The Facts: Given the long lead time for acquiring modern weapon systems, prudent defense planners must evaluate future as well as current needs. For example, five years ago no one would have predicted that the Iran-Iraq war would rage on in 1986. Saudi military planners now see a number of potentially hostile neighbors in the early years of the next decade in addition to an Iran which is capable of rapidly rebuilding its air force in a post-war situation. Saudi Arabia's wealth, its limited manpower, and its more active and populous neighbors make its position vulnerable unless it has a credible deterrent.

2. Allegation: The sale provides more missiles to Saudi Arabia than it needs.

The Facts: Using a rigorous assessment of the potential threats to Saudi Arabia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have confirmed the need for the types and quantities of missiles we are proposing to sell to Saudi Arabia. These requirements were calculated using the same criteria the U.S. Air Force uses, with adjustments for factors unique to Saudi Arabia, such as lack of an industrial base and ready sources of resupply.

3. Allegation: Delivery of these missiles will result in a Saudi Air Force missile-to-aircraft ration of 37 to one.

The Facts: The missile-to-aircraft ratio argument is irrelevant and misleading, as air defense missile requirements are based on the number of potential threat aircraft, not on the number of aircraft available to carry the missiles. The Defense Department nonetheless has concluded that after the missiles in the proposed sale have been delivered in 1991, with appropriate adjustments for obsolescence, training, and attrition, the Saudi inventory available for air defense measured as a "missile-to-aircraft" ration would remain less than ten-to-one. The Saudi figure is roughly comparable to that of our own air force and Israel's -- which, unlike that of Saudi Arabia, have the advantage of indigenous sources of resupply.

4. Allegation: Over the years, the U.S. has supplied military equipment in excess of Saudi Arabia's legitimate defense needs, creating a massive Arab arms cache which will fuel further Middle East conflict.

The Facts: From 1953 through 30 September 1985, the U.S. Government sold Saudi Arabia just under \$50 billion worth of defense articles and services. But only \$4.8 billion, less than ten percent of the total, went for weapons and ammunition. A far larger portion, \$33.7 billion, was for support services, such as construction, repair, supply operations, and training. Construction alone accounted for more than \$20 billion -- the Saudis, with U.S. assistance, have built from scratch a modern military infrastructure for a country the size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi River.

5. Allegation: The Saudis have failed to support U.S. strategic interests in the region and worked to frustrate the peace process.

The Facts: This sale promotes important U.S. interests. By the 1990's, Gulf oil will become more critical to the U.S. and our allies. We cannot undermine our relationship with our principal friend in the Gulf now and expect to rebuild it later. Strengthening Saudi air defense capabilities will help ensure that Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab Gulf states do not become victims to an expansion of the Iran-Iraq war and the spread of Khomeini-type radicalism. It will complement our own regional security objectives and reduce the probability of future direct U.S. military involvement.

The short-term economic advantages to the U.S. of the missile sale are obvious; the longer-term benefits, even more important. Saudi Arabia is one of the few countries with which we enjoy a favorable balance-of-trade. If we force the Saudis to reevaluate their reliance on the U.S. and look elsewhere for advanced weaponry, as they did when we were unable to provide additional F-15s, American industry will feel the pressure as more and more commercial orders go elsewhere.

While the missile sale is unrelated to the peace process, we believe the Saudis, within the context of the Arab consensus, have made constructive contributions to the search for peace. We wish they would do more, but the critics are wrong to denigrate what they have done. Moreover, U.S. interests in the Middle East extend beyond Arab-Israeli issues, and friendly relations with moderate Arab states like Saudi Arabia are compatible with our support for Israel. The United States remains firmly committed to maintaining Israel's security and qualitative military superiority. This sale will not modify that commitment.

6. Allegation: Saudi Arabia has opposed American peace efforts, including the Reagan plan and the Hussein initiative, has frustrated U.S. policy in Lebanon, and assisted in the isolation of Egypt.

The Facts: Saudi Arabia has worked within the Arab world to shift the consensus away from confrontation with Israel to constructive efforts to achieve peace. Saudi policies have often complemented our own even when not supporting our positions completely because of its commitment to Arab solidarity. For instance, despite their reservations, the Saudis scrupulously avoided opposing the Reagan Plan and the Hussein initiative. In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia played a constructive role, attempting to end the fighting and assisting the U.S. in extricating our forces. Saudi Arabia has taken a number of steps to move the Arab consensus back toward recognition of

Egypt -- including working quietly to ensure Egypt's reentry into the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

7. Allegation: Saudi Arabia has worked to obstruct the U.S. strategic presence in the Gulf and, with Kuwait, attempted to bribe Oman into curtailing its military cooperation with the U.S.

The Facts: Saudi Arabia has not blocked U.S. security cooperation with area states, nor has it objected to Oman's cooperating with the U.S. In fact, Saudi Arabia currently hosts a USAF AWACS detachment, a sizeable U.S. military training mission, and regular USN ship visits to ports on the Gulf and the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia has worked with Kuwait and Oman and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council to establish a collective defense which complements our strategy in the region.

8. Allegation: The sale of additional missiles to Saudi Arabia poses an increased threat to Israel.

The Facts: Our commitment to Israel's security and qualitative military superiority remains firm. This sale of defensive equipment will not erode this advantage nor change the force equation in the region. We are confident that the Saudis have no intention whatsoever of using the weapons against Israel.

9. Allegation: Saudi Arabia continues to aid Syria and the PLO and recently agreed to provide financial support to Libya.

The Facts: Senior Saudi officials have categorically denied agreeing to provide financial assistance to Libya. Saudi Arabia does, however, make payments to Jordan, Syria, and the PLO in accordance with commitments made at the Bagdad Summit in 1978. We would prefer that Saudi Arabia stop its payments to Syria and the PLO, but recognize that they believe these payments provide leverage and channels of communication they consider important.

10. Allegation: The real threat to Saudi Arabia is internal instability.

The Facts: Saudi Arabia has a relatively homogeneous society and the government enjoys a broad and stable political consensus. The regime carefully cultivates its traditionally close ties to the religious establishment. Despite the recent drop in oil prices, Saudi Arabia remains well-off economically and is not subject to unrest motivated by bread-and-butter issues. The value of the current sale -- \$354 million -- is relatively small and will not strain Saudi Arabia's ability to pay.


11. Allegation: Saudi Arabia has worked over the years to keep oil prices artificially high.

The Facts: Saudi Arabia believes its long-term economic interests are best served by stable or slowly rising prices, not the wide price swings of the past decade. Saudi Arabia has sought to balance external demand for low oil prices with domestic demand within major oilproducing countries for development and higher living standards. The Saudis have employed their enormous production capacity on several occasions to moderate price fluctuations with varying success.

12. Allegation: There is a real danger that this advanced weaponry will fall into the hands of terrorists or could be compromised to the Soviets.

The Facts: The Saudis have a spotless record of safeguarding American technology and the weapon systems we have sold them. No allegation to the contrary has ever withstood investigation. Normal Saudi security procedures are extremely tight and, for certain sensitive systems such as the AIM-9L and STINGER, the U.S. has insisted on additional, even more stringent security precautions. The STINGER missile itself is stored separately from its launcher and is a rather cumbersome terrorist weapon in that it is five feet long and difficult to conceal through airport security.

In summary, the case for the sale of additional air defense and anti-ship missiles to Saudi Arabia is strong. It advances important U.S. national objectives. Continued U.S. - Saudi security cooperation enhances prospects for cooperation in other areas, including the quest for an equitable resolution of the Arab - Israeli conflict. To erode the foundation of a relationship nurtured over forty years, by every Administration since Harry Truman, would be folly -- not policy.



WASHINGTON POST 13 MARCH 1986

The Saudis' Defense

A CURIOUS INCONSISTENCY marks the response of Israel and some of its American friends to the administration's decision to sell some \$350 million in missiles and other munitions to Saudi Arabia.

The Israelis are never happy to see arms flowing to the hands of Arab states with which they are at war, but here they are prepared to countenance the sale. It is not just that the Israelis realize they have been treated with great generosity and understanding by the Reagan administration. They also realize that Washington has reason to make this gesture of American support for a friend in need. The Saudis are friends of the United States, and, threatened as they are by a rampant Iran, which has just bitten off yet one more piece of Iraqi territory and brought its forces near the border of a trembling Kuwait, they do need a timely and relevant showing of American constancy.

Rather amazingly, however, some of Israel's American friends are taking another view. These include the Israel lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and a number of members of Congress, including Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.). The considerations that incline Jerusalem to go along with the sale do not impress them. Nor are they fazed to find themselves expressing more anxiety for Israeli security than the Israelis do. It seems to trouble them scarcely at all that the predictable

result of blocking an American arms sale to a friendly Arab state is to have that state turn to another supplier, one that is glad to have the business and that makes no effort to impose the policy cautions that routinely accompany American arms.

What is going on in this particular instance has little to do with Israel's security. It has much to do with a test of wills. There is reason to wonder if those fighting the sale regard a contest with the administration over an ammunition package as something of a necessary warm-up for the campaign they intend to mount later this year to block delivery of the five early-warning AWACS aircraft that Congress agreed to sell in 1981—and that, incidentally, the Saudis have already paid \$6 billion for.

Their success in either the small campaign or the large one would be a defeat for the national interest, which lies in helping friendly Arab states defend themselves against the real dangers in their region and in building thereby the sort of relationship with those states that works for, not against, Arab-Israeli peace.

Another Arabian arms sale

President Reagan and Congress are suiting up again for battle over the sale of military hardware to an Arab country, and the consequences could be as severe for the United States as for any Middle East contestant in the arena.

At issue is a \$345 million package in anti-aircraft and antiship missiles for Saudi Arabia, which along with neighboring Kuwait has come under a military threat from Iran. Substantial combat victories over Iraq have put the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's army within sight of Kuwaiti territory, a development that has alarmed the Gulf oil producers and raised concern in the Western nations depending on them for energy products.

President Reagan has notified Congress that he intends to sell the weapons to Saudi Arabia, and Congress has 50 days to block the sale by a majority vote in the House and Senate. Opposition by Israel and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee [AIPAC] lobby blocked an earlier \$4 billion sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia and a \$1.9 billion sale of aircraft and missiles to Jordan. AIPAC has told Congress that though the additional weaponry involved will not enhance Saudi security, it could make it easier for the kingdom to transfer missiles to countries hostile to Israel.

Unlike AIPAC, the Israeli government—while opposing the sale on principle—does not plan to campaign against it. The current package, Israeli officials indicate, does not pose enough of a threat to Israeli security to risk a political showdown with a friendly Reagan administration.

But Israel's lack of excitement over the issue has not made an impression on American lawmakers already responding to AIPAC by organizing opposition to the sale. And their haste to please the powerful lobby blinds them to a crucial factor: Saudi Arabia needs the weapons not only to defend its own oil fields and Kuwait's—which they are pledged by a security pact to protect—but as evidence of a vital U.S. resolve to support its allies in the Persian Gulf during a time of danger from the forces of a fanatic. Iran must be convinced beyond doubt that the price of an attack on a friendly oil producer will be infinitely greater than any of its benefits.

At peril is Washington's waning image as a friend worth having in the Arab world. Capitol Hill's opposition to the earlier Saudi and Jordanian arms packages in effect told the Arabs that though we would like to do business with them, we couldn't trust them. But the nations of the Middle East have proved repeatedly that what they cannot buy from Washington they can acquire easily on the world's arms markets.

AIPAC and its supporters on Capitol Hill appear to be overlooking a vital benefit to Israel that accompanies the sale of U.S. arms to its neighbors—the usage restrictions the American government builds into its arms sales to the Arabs and its resolve to enforce those restrictions.

Put another way: There are benefits to U.S. resolve for both sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Saudis and missiles

Milton Viorst

Providence Journal,
16 March 1986

WASHINGTON — That the fight over the sale of anti-aircraft missiles to Saudi Arabia comes at the moment when Iranian forces seem poised to break through Iraqi defenses is surely a coincidence. That the pro-Israeli lobby in Congress is leading the fight against the sale is pure Pavlovian reflex.

For as long as one can remember, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee has ferociously spear-headed opposition to the sale of arms to Arab countries — any country, any kind of arms. To do so, under our system, is surely its right. The exercise of that right, however, is not in Israel's interest, or America's.

The open question in dealing with the Saudis is not whether they will use their arms against Israel, but whether they are prepared to use them to defend themselves and their neighbors.

The Saudis know whence the danger comes, and it does not come from across the desert in Zion. The enemy is Iran, across the water to the east. Iran is a culture hostile to the Arabs; its people are Shiites, a rival branch of Islam; its society is medieval, aspiring to establish a modern-day theocratic empire. The prospect grows more menacing daily.

Though poorly fed and ill-equipped, Iran's troops, according to the evidence from the battlefields to the north, are driven by a zealotry that the Iraqis simply cannot match. Iraqis have been promised a better life by their government. Iranians have been promised a better death, and they surge relentlessly forward in the face of machine guns, tanks — even poison gas.

Strategists do not know whether Iran, having largely overrun Iraq's defenses where they meet the border of Kuwait, is planning to turn next toward Baghdad or south into the Arabian peninsula. The region is watching the battle with apprehension.

The Saudis have no tradition of defending Arabia from outsiders. They are a desert people who still think in terms of tribal confrontation. Though never colonized, they let Britain defend them as long as the empire lasted, and, afterward, accepted Washington's advice to rely on the shah. Now the shah is gone, the United States has not filled the gap, and the shah's successor makes no secret of a desire to swallow them up.

At the start of the Gulf war, the Saudis were roused from their insularity to organize the neighboring principalities — Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, United Arab Emirates — into a loose alliance called the Gulf Cooperation Council. To avoid offending Iran, the GCC said its goals were economic, but it is the Saudis' opening effort to confront the need for collective security in the region.

The Iran-Iraq war also pushed them to embark on an expensive program of defense — but of defense alone. Their early warning system is first-class. But the regime remains essentially inward-looking; it fears that if it establishes a strong army, the monarchy may find itself challenged. The dilemma for Western interests is not whether the Saudis will attack Israel, but whether they will fight for their homeland and their neighbors.

One need not be a strategic genius to recognize that the threat to Israeli security from the east is not from lethargic Saudis, even less from the much-bloodied Iraqis. The danger is heavily populated, frenetically motivated Iran. Does anyone doubt that the road from Tehran to Tel Aviv passes through Baghdad, barring a detour through Kuwait and Riyadh?

Yet old habits among Capitol Hill lobbyists — including the American Israel Public Affairs Committee — die hard. The lobby is more anxious than Israel itself to stop the missile sale. Part of the explanation is that Israel's coalition government has competing foreign policies — the official policy of the prime minister and the hard-line policy of the foreign ministry. The lobby's ties, traditionally, are with the foreign ministry.

Lobbies also tend to acquire vested interests of their own, apart from those of their clients. Thus the measure of the fight over the sale to the Saudis becomes its own image of invincibility. As much as anything, however, the explanation is habit. Organized for a certain job, a lobby does it automatically.

Israel scarcely needs to adopt the Arab maxim that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Saudi Arabia is not Israel's friend. But the ayatollah's Iran is, and is likely to remain, a more menacing enemy for some time. Israel must set priorities, and the first is to stop Tehran from establishing domination over the Persian Gulf. Its friends would do well to help it.

• • •
Milton Viorst is a Washington writer who specializes in the Middle East.

19 Mar 86

Don't help the ayatollah

Congressional opponents of the administration's plan to sell \$350 million worth of missiles and munitions to Saudi Arabia are missing the point. The issue here is not whether the arms will be used against Israel, as some friends of the Jewish state would argue. Rather, the question is whether the Saudis will be willing and able to use arms to defend themselves against Iran.

The newly submitted administration package, which takes effect unless Congress votes against it during the next six weeks, was expedited due to the current Iranian offensive against Iraq. Western observers have tended to get dulled by the endless brutal battles in this 5½-year-old war, but the latest Iranian moves hold especial dangers for the Persian Gulf.

Iranian forces are now occupying the mouth of a key waterway in Iraqi territory almost on the border of Kuwait. Tehran is threatening such Arab states as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with military action unless they cease supporting Iraq — and agree to raise oil prices. Kuwait is already beset with terror attacks that its government lays at Tehran's door.

The White House has greatly scaled down the Saudi arms package, which it says contains no new types of arms nor any that provide a direct threat to Israel. But these weapons, which won't be delivered for two years anyway, offer more symbolic than real support to the Saudis. They represent a U.S. commitment to back Saudi efforts to repel any Iranian incursions, as the Saudi air force did when it bested two Iranian planes in a dogfight in June 1984. The administration believes the Saudis are far less likely to ask for direct U.S. intervention, from which both countries shy away for domestic political reasons, if Saudi leaders know they have American support.

Top Israeli officials understand this reasoning. They, as much as Washington, have no desire to see Iraq, or Kuwait, fall under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's sway. That's why there's less protest against this sale coming out of Jerusalem than there is from overzealous Israel supporters in the Congress or in the pro-Israel lobby. That's also why Israel's friends should think twice before they shoot down the Saudi arms-sale bill, thereby providing a victory for Ayatollah Khomeini's campaign to intimidate the Persian Gulf.



THE CONSERVATIVE ADVOCATE

William A. Rusher

Arms to the Saudis

By William A. Rusher

It is hard to imagine what, aside from a purely Pavlovian reflex, is behind the opposition of the powerful pro-Israeli lobby in Washington to President Reagan's proposed sale of \$551 million in defensive munitions to Saudi Arabia. Not even the Israeli government itself seems so exercised.

Israel has every right to feel sure of this country's basic good will, and of our determination never to permit the Jewish homeland to be destroyed by Arab fanatics. But there is much more to the Middle East than the problem of Israel, important and intractable as that is, and Israel's friends are unnecessarily risking vital American and Western interests in the region when they try to pressure our wobbly Congress into rejecting Mr. Reagan's proposal.

After all, the arms in question are essentially defensive: 200 ground-to-air missiles, 100 air-to-sea missiles and a total of 1,666 air-to-air missiles. How could such weapons seriously threaten Israel? By being used in support of a ground attack? The notion of a Saudi invasion of Israel would cause

genuine amusement among Israeli officials not widely noted for their sense of humor.

No, these arms are obviously intended to assist in defending Saudi Arabia (including its vital oil reserves) against potential aggressors in that increasingly unstable region of the globe. Iran has already threatened Kuwait, and the growing possibility of an Iranian victory in its war against Iraq raises questions of the gravest kind concerning the Ayatollah's intentions elsewhere.

Nor is there any serious prospect that the arms in question would wind up in terrorist hands and perhaps ultimately be turned against the United States itself. Saudi Arabia is one of this country's staunchest friends in the Middle East, and recently refused even to send a representative to an Arab League meeting in Tunis until Libya withdrew proposals for "retaliatory" measures against the United States.

No, what we are seeing is simply yet another demonstration of the unwillingness of many members of Congress to look beyond the politics of a subject to its geopolitical merits. The

Israelis themselves, as already noted, are only perfunctorily opposed to the sale. But Congress, tempted as ever by an opportunity to inflict a "defeat" on President Reagan, may reject the proposal anyway in an effort to look marginally better than the president in the eyes of a key constituency.

In so doing, the members would know very well that they weren't even in fact denying such defensive weapons to the Saudis: Other missiles like them can readily be purchased elsewhere. But American business and labor will be deprived of a valuable contract — as happened on a much larger scale just last year, when America dithered over selling F-15 fighter planes to the Saudis until they tired of waiting around and gave the huge order to a rival British plane-maker instead.

Our Saudi friends are ruefully aware of the power of the pro-Israeli lobby in American politics, and of the solid and unchanging reasons for it. But they nonetheless humanly resent evidences of U.S. partiality toward Israel *vis-à-vis* friendly Arab states. Why, for example (they wonder), does Israel get huge quantities of U.S. arms free of charge, while Saudi Arabia — if it gets them at all — must pay hard cash? To refuse to let the Saudis even buy this relatively small quantity of wholly defensive arms would send a profoundly negative signal to the entire Arab world. Can't Congress suspend its fascination with domestic politics just long enough to do one statesmanlike thing?

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Saudi Missile Deal Is a Last Shot for U.S. Role

By GERALD F. SEIB

Early every afternoon, a visitor strolling among the old mud buildings in the heart of the Saudi Arabian capital of Riyadh can look up and see the West meeting the Mideast.

At that time, a giant American Awacs radar plane rumbles in low over the city, heading for a landing at the Saudi air base in Riyadh. The Awacs plane, on loan until the Saudis receive similar radar planes they have bought, has been out doing guard duty over the world's largest oil fields, which lie on the edge of the Persian Gulf, a half-hour flight away.

The Awacs plane is a symbol of the delicate military relationship the U.S. and the Saudis have managed to piece together since the oil-price explosion of the 1970s. But the Saudi-American military relationship is growing frayed around the edges, and it could begin unraveling if congressional opponents manage to kill the \$354 million sale of advanced air-defense missiles to Riyadh that the Reagan administration has proposed.

Though the sale of Sidewinder, Stinger and Harpoon missiles has little immediate military significance, America's handling of it will send loud political signals bouncing all around the Middle East.

Iran, which seemed a spent military force a year ago, is resurgent in its war with nearby Iraq. It has taken Iraqi territory along a wider front than ever before, and is crudely threatening Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Arab gulf states that support Iraq. A sale of the missiles to Saudi Arabia is a cost-free way—indeed, it may be the only way—for the U.S. to signal that it won't let radical forces swirl around the gulf unchecked.

But there's a broader question wrapped up in this sale as well: Is the U.S. still politically able to provide a security blanket for Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia that badly want one? Kuwait, Jordan and Oman all have wanted American military gear in the past two years. But the political flak in Washington over arms sales to Arabs is so heavy that they either have been flatly rejected or felt compelled to turn elsewhere.

Similarly, it isn't true that Saudi Arabia automatically gets whatever high-tech equipment it wants from the U.S. inventory. Just last year, the Saudis were interested in buying more F-15 fighters but had to resort to buying several dozen British jets instead.

In fact, the U.S. may be on the verge of removing itself from the business of secur-

ing moderate interests in the Persian Gulf, and a rejection of this sale could push the U.S. over the edge. That's especially true if, at the same time, the pro-Israel lobby in Congress manages to interfere with the scheduled delivery of Awacs planes the Saudis bought five years ago.

In conversations I held with Saudis during a recent trip to their country, strikingly many Saudis of all stripes expressed basic pro-American feelings, despite bitterness over what they see as recent U.S. rebuffs to the Arab world. Most of Saudi Arabia's technocrats and many of its young princes were educated in the U.S. Saudis admire the American economic model, and most are fervently anti-communist and generally anti-Soviet.

In the case of the missiles, the Saudis could fill their needs by turning to Britain and France. But that would cause training and logistical headaches, since existing Saudi stockpiles are American. More important, Saudis like the political vibes that go along with buying American.

Even if the Iranian menace hadn't reared its head now, the Reagan administration was planning to propose the sale this year, because the Saudis need new missiles to replace those used in training or rendered unreliable because of age. And while scheduled deliveries of the weapons wouldn't take place until the end of this decade, there is a short-term reason for making the sale now: Once a sale has been agreed upon, President Reagan has the legal authority to draw missiles out of U.S. inventories and ship them to Saudi Arabia immediately in an emergency.

And unlike so many arms exports, the missile sale would represent an inflow rather than an outflow of cash for the U.S. The Saudis would pay cash, deposited in a trust fund and drawn down as deliveries are made, U.S. officials say. While plunging oil prices are making a shambles of Saudi budget plans, there seems little doubt the kingdom can pay for the missiles; defense remains the top Saudi priority, and the missiles represent a small purchase compared with the recent British plane deal valued at more than \$5 billion in oil and cash.

The objections to the sale heard in Washington are the familiar ones heard over every Saudi arms proposal floated in recent years. Opponents say the Saudi regime is unstable, it has plenty of arms already and its weapons pose a threat to Israel. There are kernels of truth in each of those objections, but they are overblown in this case.

First of all, the air-defense weapons

proposed for the Saudis all are the types of missiles sold before to Saudi Arabia. The sale wouldn't represent a leap forward in the export of military technology.

The immediate threat to Saudi Arabia is Iran. It's true that the Iranian air force isn't much to brag about these days—perhaps 70 functioning jet fighters and attack aircraft. But it takes only a handful of planes to create havoc at Saudi oil installations that lie within easy striking distance of the Iranian air base at Bushehr.

At the same time, constructing an adequate air-defense network against even a minimal threat to Saudi Arabia is a nightmarish task. Saudi Arabia has a land mass larger than Mexico's. Key strategic points are scattered all around the edges of this desert giant. The distance from the oil fields in the east to Jeddah, the kingdom's second-largest city on the west coast, is greater than the distance from New York to Chicago. The distance from the northern border to the troubled southern border with Marxist South Yemen is roughly the same as the distance from New York to Oklahoma City.

As far as the Saudis' attitude toward Israel is concerned, there's no pretending the Saudis are blazing trails toward peace. They aren't and probably never will, though the U.S. must keep prodding the Saudis. Saudi Arabia is more a follower than a former of Arab consensus.

But it's easy to overrate the military challenge the Saudis could pose to Israel. A summary of Middle East militaries published by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, a think tank at Tel Aviv University, concluded: "The Saudi Armed Forces are too small, too weak and too widely scattered to defend their country against the major military powers in the Middle East." Besides, who is the bigger threat to Israel: the Saudis or the Iranians, who talk of the road to Jerusalem cutting through Baghdad?

Finally, there is the longstanding fear among some in Washington that the Saudi royal family could crumble someday, leaving American weapons in the hands of a radical new government. But the fact is, there isn't any discernible internal threat to the Saudi royal family right now. Indeed, if the U.S. wants to help create one, the best way is to make the royal family look foolish for its reliance on America.

Mr. Seib covers the Middle East from the Journal's Cairo bureau. He is to return to Saudi Arabia to cover a visit by Vice President Bush later this week.

**Deterrent Action
by The United States
for Protection of
The Oil-Critical
Persian Gulf Area
Through The Sale
of Military Equipment
to Saudi Arabia**

**A Background Paper for Members
of The United States Congress**

Deterrent Action by The United States for Protection of The Oil-Critical Persian Gulf Area Through The Sale of Military Equipment to Saudi Arabia

A Background Paper for
Members of The United
States Congress

President Reagan's request to
sell \$354 million in defensive
missiles to Saudi Arabia:

A deterrent step and signal in the
face of developments in the Iran-Iraq
war, for protection of a sector of the
globe essential to the Free World's
prosperity and security.

President Reagan's pending
certification for delivery of the
AWACS sold to Saudi Arabia
in 1981.

The President's certification
requires no congressional action and
constitutionally none is appropriate.
An additional consideration is the \$6
billion already paid by the Saudis for the
AWACS. These funds would have to be
returned should the sale be cancelled
or indefinitely delayed.

PRESIDENTIAL INTERVIEW

As reported by the *N. Y. Times* March 23, 1986

Q. Are you concerned that Kuwait or Saudi Arabia may be in jeopardy by
Iran?

A. Oh, I think we have to be concerned about that...yes, the potential for
throwing a match in the powder box is there in the Middle East, and I believe
Saudi Arabia has been particularly responsible for helping continued stabil-
ity there in the Gulf.

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
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Saudi Arabia is now key to U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf area. It is part of the broader Middle East but is set back from the eastern Mediterranean, where the Arab-Israeli conflict is focused. It is important to keep in mind the distance and difference between the Gulf and eastern Mediterranean theatres of interest for U.S. purposes. It is critical that we understand that the United States has not one but a number of distinct interests in that part of the world, just as it does in other major regions.

The Middle East and Surrounding Areas

Saudi Arabia's oil fields contain 25 percent of the entire planet's proven oil reserves – a third of the Free World's oil.

The Gulf area as a whole contains 55 percent of the planet's proven oil reserves – almost two-thirds of the non-communist world's oil.



Iranian-Iraqi war along a number of points of their shared border

Iranian 1986 Fao Peninsula assault, threatening Kuwait and bringing it within artillery range

Oil tankers from various noncombatant countries hit in this general area.

Saudi shoot down 1 and possibly 2 Iranian fighters approaching Saudi oil installations, June 1984


Iran attacks Turkish tanker off Qatar and Saudi frontiers, making direct hits and killing part of crew, March 1986

Repeated Iraqi attacks on Kharj Island, Iran's main oil exit, as 258 sorties in 1 day in March

Iran repeatedly threatens to close Strait of Hormuz, a key global choke and essential to Free World security.


Iranian gun boat sorties in this general area

U.S. President Taylor boarded by Iranian naval personnel and check ship's cargo, January 1986



Flash points on this map are only illustrative of thousands of air attacks on international shipping in the Gulf from 1980 to spring of 1986 by Iran and Iraq, and combat sites in the Gulf war.

Scale 1:18,000,000



U.S.	Western Europe Bases	Saudi Arabia	U.S.S.R.
8000 Miles	2500 Miles	1000 Miles	

President Reagan's Proposal to sell \$354 Million in Defensive Missiles to Saudi Arabia

1. President Reagan informed the Congress March 11, that he intends to authorize the sale to Saudi Arabia of:

671 AIM-P4 Air-to-Air Missiles	for \$60 million
995 AIM-9L Air-to-Air Missiles	for 98 million
200 Stinger Manportable Ground-Air Missiles and 600 reload systems	for 89 million
100 Harpoon Air-to-Base Missiles	for 107 million
Total Sale	\$354 million

2. Saudi Arabia already has both versions of the AIM missile, Stingers and surface-launched Harpoon missiles, in its inventory. The pending sale would add air-launched Harpoon missiles for added defense against naval threats. The sale would have negligible impact on the number of similar missiles already in the region. Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria have thousands of SA-7s, as do other states in the area.

3. The number of additional missiles to be sold to Saudi Arabia is calculated in accordance with U.S. Air Force doctrine to correspond to current threats—that is, potential targets. The quantity is unrelated to numbers of Saudi aircraft. The sale allows dual-launch firing and provides a re-arm capability from assets in storage.

4. Saudi Arabia has a long record of effective protection of American technology purchased from the U.S., to insure that nothing falls into the hands of unauthorized persons, nor access is allowed to third parties. The Saudis have entered into necessary agreements concerning security for U.S.-supplied equipment, and agreed to U.S. Defense Department inspections to confirm continuing compliance. U.S. Air Force studies verify the combat capability and commitment of the Saudis to defend their country. The downing of one and possibly two Iranian fighter planes that invaded Saudi airspace in June 1984 demonstrates that capability.

5. The current sale is a strictly defensive step—for both the United States and the Saudis. It is also a minimum step. More substantial and costly action has also been recommended by U.S. Defense Department and Air Force studies as well as by the Saudis. These include additional helicopters, an upgrading of 60 F-15 interceptors, additional F-15s and other purchases. Those recommendations have not yet been acted upon by the President.


6. The objective of this sale is preventive: to anticipate and discourage hostile action against Saudi Arabia by other countries or by martyr-seeking individual pilots from Iran or elsewhere.

7. The sale is designed to deter a widening of the Iran-Iraq war into the middle and lower Gulf, where oil supplies and shipping lanes essential to the economies and security of major Free World countries would be directly threatened.

8. The sale is also a signal that the United States encourages moderate Arab states to defend themselves. It reinforces the point that the main responsibility for defense in the Middle Gulf lies with Saudi Arabia.

9. The sale provides a constructive alternative to letting events in that part of the world deteriorate to the point that U.S. personnel and equipment have to be used there. The course of action being taken should appeal to not only those who are security-minded but those who want to stave off direct U.S. involvement in the Gulf. It should also appeal to those who want to keep defense costs down and have international security burdens carried more fully by others.

10. The proposed sale presents a fair test of the sophistication and responsibility of the Legislative Branch on a modest but important foreign policy step. This is true for both the outcome and the process. Congress must be able to give due consideration to foreign policy matters without needlessly sending negative political and psychological signals that negate the deterrent purpose of this sale.



The sale provides a constructive alternative to letting events in that part of the world deteriorate to the point that U.S. personnel and equipment have to be used there.

President Reagan's Pending Certification for Delivery of The AWACS Sold to Saudi Arabia in 1981

Background

President Reagan in 1981 authorized the sale of five American-manufactured AWACS and related refueling planes and equipment to Saudi Arabia for \$8.5 billion. The Senate, after detailed consideration, voted to support the sale. (Under law, the House then did not have to take action.)

President Reagan volunteered at the time of the Senate action that before delivery of the planes he would certify Saudi Arabia had: (a) entered into adequate arrangements with the U.S. to protect the AWACS technology; and (b) provided substantial assistance toward making significant progress on disputes in the area.

The sale agreement is government-to-government. Manufacture of the first of the five planes has been completed, and delivery is scheduled for June 21. Saudi Arabia has already paid approximately \$6 billion of the \$8.5 billion total purchase price...more than the cost of the first AWAC and other equipment already delivered. The Kingdom has already entered into the required agreement for protection of the technology. An in-country examination by the U.S. Defense Department has found that the necessary Saudi steps to meet U.S. requirements have been completed.

The new AWACS planes will be phased in to replace those currently being flown there by the U.S. The planes are helping to guard Saudi Arabia's eastern frontier, where the country's oil fields are located.

American AWACS were rushed to Saudi Arabia at the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. Expansion of that conflict and incidents attendant to it have reinforced the wisdom of sending the planes. Recurring air attacks on shipping in the area, the invasion of Saudi Arabia's airspace by Iranian planes and the boarding of a U.S. ship by Iranian naval personnel are all dramatic reminders of the need for vigilance by the Kingdom and others in the area.

Even after the Saudi AWACS replace U.S. AWACS, it is anticipated that American military and civilian personnel will be needed to help maintain the Saudi planes until at least the late 1990s.

The White House and State Department have made it clear that Saudi Arabia is committed to, and working for, advancement of stability in the region and resolving major conflicts there.

All that is required to conclude the AWACS sale and transfer the planes is for President Reagan to certify that Saudi Arabia has met the necessary requirements for delivery. The White House has said this will be done before the scheduled June 21 delivery date.

Congressional Perspective on The AWACS Delivery


1. The Constitution vests in the President responsibility for carrying out U.S. foreign policy. That is the stage reached on the Saudi AWACS after the Senate's authorization of the sale in 1981. The remaining steps are executive and administrative in nature.

- American foreign policy cannot work effectively if the Legislative Branch intrudes in executive and administrative matters. Such an attempt would take the U.S. back to the unacceptable situation under the Articles of Confederation.
- America's reliability would be at serious issue if the Congress undertook to obstruct a step which has been approved

by the President and Senate pursuant to applicable law, then six billion dollars paid by a friendly country important to the U.S. and that country's defense preparations carried forward during the subsequent half decade based on obtaining the U.S.-made aircraft, subject only to issuance of the Presidential certification — not a substantially broader legislative uncertainty.

- That is particularly so for a country faced with a conflict — the Iran-Iraq war — on a defense front for which the U.S. purchase was made.

- It is also relevant that this exclusively defensive equipment was first requested in consultation with and on the recommendation of the United States — in this case, the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lt. Gen. David Jones, in a personal trip to Saudi Arabia immediately upon the



outbreak of the Gulf war in September 1980, and then with the specific approval of President Carter, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. Their decision to send U.S. AWACS and authorize the sale of 5 AWACS to the Saudis, was then reviewed in full and affirmed by President Reagan in 1981. The sale has thus gone forward on a bipartisan basis.

2. If the AWACS sale were cancelled, the U.S. would have to repay six billion dollars already received from Saudi Arabia. In effect the U.S. would then be purchasing for itself planes which do not meet requirements now insisted on for American use.

- To hold the aircraft in the U.S. and not promptly return the Saudi funds could put U.S. commercial and financial reliability in question internationally, as well as undermine America's credibility on security arrangements.

3. Delivery of the Saudi AWACS will allow the United States to move its own AWACS now in Saudi Arabia to other assignments or to reserve status for possible emergencies elsewhere in the world.

- That serves American security interests.

- It also serves America's own most basic interest to encourage, even require, other nations to pay for and accept responsibility for their own defense to the maximum extent possible. This Saudi purchase should be supported as an example for other countries to emulate — not subjected to petty harassment.

4. Delivery of the Saudi AWACS so they can be promptly placed on-station there will save American costs, manpower and possibly even lives.

- Delivery of the Saudi AWACS provides American policy with needed flexibility and discretion in the strategically critical Persian Gulf area. Increased flexibility is gained by having Saudi rather than American AWACS and personnel on the front line. That would allow U.S. forces to remain in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, and out of the Gulf itself, giving American decision-makers more time and greater options. Minimizing U.S. ships in the Gulf also reduces the excuse for a more credible Soviet emergence there.

American policy has long explicitly recognized a major long-term U.S. interest in Saudi Arabia, as indicated by Presidential statements over the years.

"I hereby find that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States."

— President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1943

"The future of Saudi Arabia and the future of the United States are tied together very closely in an irrevocable way."

— President Jimmy Carter, 1977

"Consummation of the sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 enhancement and aerial surveillance (AWACS) items is of vital importance to the national security of the United States and is, therefore, a matter of highest priority for this administration."

— President Ronald Reagan, 1981

• U.S. policy concerning Saudi Arabia was summed up in testimony January 28, 1986, before the House Foreign

Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, by Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia, Richard Murphy:

"As I have stressed before, the Administration has an important security relationship with Saudi Arabia, the maintenance of which directly supports our interest in the free flow of oil and the stability of the Arabian Peninsula. This relationship, and the deterrence created by a strong Saudi defense, has been a major factor in keeping the Iran-Iraq war from spreading across the Gulf.

"Our security relationship with Saudi Arabia, the cornerstone of our bilateral relations, has enabled us to work closely with Saudi Arabia in addressing events such as the continuing strife in Lebanon and the Gulf war. We have carefully avoided viewing all Middle East issues through the prism of the peace process. We believe a strong and ongoing defense relationship with Saudi Arabia enhances prospects for regional peace and a stability quite apart from the Arab/Israeli dispute.

"By failing to address Saudi Arabia's legitimate defense requirements, we weaken this important relationship, detract from Saudi Arabia's ability to defend itself, and reduce Saudi confidence in the value of continued cooperation with the U.S. on regional peace and security issues. At the same time, we forfeit to suppliers less mindful of the security concerns of Israel sales of military equipment worth billions of dollars and thousands of high-tech jobs."

Saudi Arabia is strategically important to the United States for a number of basic reasons, including:


The Kingdom contains one-third of the Free World's proven oil reserves. Saudi oil supplies are critical to America's global strategic interests even though the U.S. itself is not dependent currently on Saudi and other Gulf sources. America's present domestic situation should not distract from the reality that U.S. prosperity and security objectives worldwide are closely tied even now to the international availability of Saudi oil. That will be increasingly true in the decade ahead and likely long beyond that.

- Saudi Arabia shares a critical self-interest with the United States and most of the world in moderation in the pricing of oil. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to work for that moderation.

The record shows the Saudis tried to moderate the major price increase by OPEC in 1973 (which was spearheaded by the Shah of Iran) and again even more strongly in 1979-81, despite being a major beneficiary of both price hikes. After the '73 increase, Saudi Arabia built in major new production capacity to help meet any future supply shortage and slow possible future price increases. During 1979-81 the Saudis raised output to their maximum of 10.4 million barrels a day—to help curb soaring prices and meet the U.S. and

global supply shortage. They also sold Saudi oil below the OPEC price level for many months, losing billions of dollars in revenue as a result. Most recently, the worldwide consensus has been that higher Saudi production has been the final factor leading to the lower oil prices now prevailing.

Because of the massive Saudi reserves (now generally expected to last nearly a century), the country has a basic self-interest in keeping the price of oil down to a level to insure its long-term use. Saudi Arabia shares




Saudi Arabia faces a defense challenge bigger in area than NATO's—and from multiple directions.

with the U.S. an interest in pricing which (a) will help sustain the international economy (and thus maintain oil requirements); (b) takes into account both consumer and producer needs (just as the U.S. does because of our diverse interests); and (c) promotes political stability and conservation worldwide. Oil is the Saudis' only major natural resource. Prolonging its worldwide availability is very much in the country's long-term interest.

The Kingdom's ability and willingness to work to restrain price increases could become critically important again as the current oil glut comes to an end. This is particularly true in the face of a projected decline in reserves in the 1990s in the United States, North Sea, USSR, and a number of OPEC countries (including Venezuela, Indonesia, Nigeria, Algeria, Ecuador and others), and as Mexican production is retained more and more for domestic use by the middle of the next decade. U.S. oil production, which peaked at 11.3 million barrels a day in 1971, has declined to about 9 million now and is expected to continue to fall in the decades ahead. Proven reserves declined 25 percent over the same period despite a three-fold rise in real prices and highly subsidized exploration. Despite the giant reserves there, discomfort over the Gulf has led the U.S. to put in place a "drain America first policy" that will almost surely have to be reappraised in the decade ahead. As far back as 1942,

President Franklin Roosevelt came to the conclusion that America's long-term interests would best be served by conserving Western Hemispheric oil sources and drawing more on the huge Persian Gulf reserves.

Since at least the very early 1970s, Saudi Arabia has sought to encourage international cooperation that would reduce the roller-coaster pattern of global oil prices and the alternating worldwide supply shortages and gluts. Assured international supplies and greater price stability have been the objectives. This is reflected in the comments of the Saudi Petroleum Minister, as reported by the N.Y. Times March 24, 1986: "Shaikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Arabian oil minister, warned today that the world faced a fresh round of oil price shocks in the 1990s, similar to those that jarred the world economy in the 1970s, if persistently low prices eliminate high-cost oil production and the incentive for new energy exploration... 'You are putting the whole world into a situation where you will have an energy crisis, like 1973 and 1979,' he said, his voice intensifying with emotion, 'but by a serious shortage in the supply of energy.' ..Shaikh Yamani said that according to one set of figures available to him, average prices of \$15 for a barrel of oil would eliminate 1.8 million barrels a day of crude oil in the United States, not including Alaska, because the high cost of extracting the crude would make it unprofitable... 'What disturbs me is that some cuts will be forever,' he said. 'Once you shut down stripper wells, you are not going to reopen them again unless the price of oil goes to \$50 or more.'"



From Wall St. Journal March 17, 1986

The Kingdom has a long record of working for political moderation in both the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Saudi Arabia also seeks as much cohesiveness as possible in both, so as to reduce polarization and divisiveness leading to instability and conflict, and breeding international terrorism and recurring threats to world peace. The Saudis' two-pronged approach is important for America's own interests. Moderation has to be broadly based if it is to be historically viable.

The Saudis have also worked to prevent polarization against the United States in the Arab world. A recent example as reported by the *Washington Post* January 31, 1986: "Saudi Arabia reportedly was at the forefront of the moderate states' resistance to" moves by Libya to have the 21-nation Arab League take countermeasures against the U.S. embargo of Libya. "Saudi Arabia, according to Arab sources, refused to send its minister to the special Arab League meeting until Libya backed down on its demands" for action against the U.S. Only after the Libyan proposals were withdrawn did the Saudi foreign minister leave Riyadh to attend the meeting and acquiesce in a unanimous but already emasculated motion opposing the embargo. The Saudis thus maintained themselves within the Arab world (now with a population nearing 200 million) and at the same time played a highly constructive role for the U.S. The aftermath of the recent Gulf of Sidra episode followed approximately the same pattern.

As guardian of Islam's two most holy places — Makkah and Medina, the Saudis also have particular importance in the Islamic world. This is of growing importance because Islam now contains nearly a billion people...20 percent of the world's population. The Saudis' special role is relevant, too, as the Muslim population in the Soviet Union approaches 50 million people and shows a deepening sense of its own identity.

- Saudi Arabia's geographical location at the convergence of Europe, Asia and Africa and as the principal country on the Arabian Peninsula, is also strategically important for America. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that the Saudi oilfields are only two hours flying time from the Soviet Union. The Soviets have already demonstrated an ability to make major airlifts across the Arabian Peninsula, to as far as Ethiopia.

Saudi Arabia's development and emergence on the international scene is one of the great success stories of the last several decades.

It is a success story in which the United States has played a key role and can usefully point to for its own purposes. It was just over 50 years ago that the founder of present-day Saudi Arabia — King Abdulaziz ibn Saud, or "Ibn Saud" as he came to be known in the United States — made the key decision to develop his country's petroleum resources in partnership with America. Today Saudi Arabia is one of the real leaders of the developing world and the international community as well. This has come about to an important extent through a close working partnership with America's private economy, its educational institutions and its defense sector.

- A full-time U.S. military mission in-country was established by mutual agreement almost 30 years ago. The United States became the prime source for modernizing Saudi air defenses, particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s. The American military presence is headed by a U.S. Air Force Major General, who has over 1,500 American military personnel in his command. An even larger U.S. civilian

group is there working for American defense contractors. In all, more than 60,000 Americans are now in Saudi Arabia on business and U.S. government projects.

- Over 80 percent of the tens of thousands of Saudi students who have undertaken university and post-graduate studies abroad in the last 25 years have come to the United States. One of the mutual benefits of that is reflected in the fact that that group includes the country's Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, Petroleum Minister, Planning Minister, Commerce Minister, Agricultural Minister, Industries Minister, and hundreds of other key officials. The great majority of the country's Air Force pilots, the head of the largest university and thousands of top people throughout the private sector are also included in this group.

- On the economic front, the United States has been the Saudis' largest trading partner every year since World War II with the exception of the last several years when Japan edged ahead in the private economy there. Saudi imports from the U.S. reached almost ten billion dollars a year before falling back somewhat with the decline in oil revenues. But the country continues as a major American export market. The Saudis, in addition, have always marketed the bulk of their oil internationally through American companies; and over 80 percent of their new, world-scale petrochemical plants and export refineries have been built as 50-50 joint ventures with U.S. companies.

- Saudi Arabia — listed in a UN study as recently as 1948 as one of the world's poorest countries — has become an important financial as well as oil power. It has been second only to the United States during the last ten years in providing additional capital for the World Bank and a number of other development agencies.

The Saudis now have one of the finest infrastructures in the world,

including major new health care systems, higher educational and primary and secondary school systems, desalination and industrial complexes, communications systems and ports, airports and highway networks. Fortunately, almost all of the major new infrastructure projects were completed before the recent decline in oil revenue.

With lower oil prices, some pending development projects have been stretched out. But the Kingdom accumulated well over a hundred billion dollars in capital invested abroad. That money was specifically committed for return home as needed. This Saudi surplus is generally expected to be sufficient, with current income, to meet the country's financial requirements until the oil market recovers. Saudi Arabia has no significant public debt and could borrow on its huge oil reserves if that were ever required.

- The present period is seen by many as a positive change from the rapid development pace of the last 12 years. The current phase is, in a sense, a self-disciplining opportunity such as the U.S. and most other developed nations experienced in their own earlier development process. Because of its surplus capital accumulation, a large foreign work force that can readily be reduced and the economic advantage of Saudi oil, the country's economy is expected to come through the current slowdown in good shape and emerge appreciably more cost-effective and firmly based for the future.

In all, Saudi Arabia continues resolutely on its development course: modernization consistent with the society's basic traditions and values. Study after study for American companies doing business there has concluded that the Kingdom is one of the most stable of all the developing nations. Hundreds of U.S. firms now have long-term investments there — generally in joint ventures with Saudi partners.

Clearly Saudi Arabia is one of the real success stories in the second half of the Twentieth Century. And that has been accomplished with a commitment to free enterprise both at home and internationally. Another of the Kingdom's basic strengths results from its adherence, as a Muslim society, to the family and a deep religious belief which looks to the same Almighty God, the same line of prophets and an ultimate higher judgment as do Christianity and Judaism. Further, Saudi Arabia has a demonstrated commitment to a just and lasting Middle East peace as inseparable from and indispensable to world peace.

Saudi Arabia is firmly committed to strengthening stability in the Middle East

and helping to make headway on solving major disputes in the area, as President Reagan's 1981 AWACS letter to the same broadly stated.

- The Iran-Iraq war is the most pressing dispute in the region in terms of human and financial costs, as well as possible strategic consequences. Saudi Arabia is almost continuously seeking to help bring that dispute to an end through Islamic, UN and other alternatives, including direct contacts with the two belligerents.

The long-term intractability of the conflict and the serious danger of the war spreading lower in the Gulf is the compelling reason for stronger Saudi defenses and why delivery of the Saudi AWACS is a pressing matter. To delay delivery of the Saudi AWACS, despite the major combat situation close by,

will prolong the time that American AWACS and crews must remain on-station. Delay could also undermine Saudi confidence and that of other allies in the value of U.S. commitments.

Since 1981, the Saudis have made significant progress in augmenting command and manpower skills, as well as operational effectiveness. That has been of substantial assistance in keeping the Gulf war from expanding. This is an essential precondition to resolving the present conflict and achieving peace in the region.

- Another Middle East dispute on which the Saudis have been working and consulting closely with U.S. officials and others is the Arab-Israeli conflict. It's worth noting what has occurred since 1981, when the AWACS sale was approved.

Saudi Arabia immediately welcomed President Reagan's basic September 1, 1982, Mideast policy statement.

Saudi Arabia helped lead the way at the Arab summit at Fez on September 4, 1982, to adopt the previously proposed 8-point Fahd peace plan. This action moved the Arab world closer to solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, even though differences from the U.S. approach still remain to be worked out. The Fez resolution nevertheless made necessary progress toward a Middle East peace settlement.

The Saudis have also made it clear that the action taken at Fez is an opening — not a final — position.

Israel, in contrast, rejected President Reagan's Mideast peace proposal less than 24 hours later. Its position remains the same today.

From 1982 to the present, Saudi Arabia has repeatedly been in close contact with U.S. officials seeking to move the peace process forward and at the same time has worked for Arab cohesiveness so that any headway will be broad-based. The Saudis have consistently supported the more moderate sector within the loosely confederated Palestinian Liberation Organization, as have the bulk of the international community, including America's key allies in western Europe and the Far East. The Saudis have provided critical funding for Jordan and have worked closely with the U.S. to improve regional stability and prepare the basis for a just and lasting Middle East peace.

The Middle East has a number of deeply rooted disputes in which America has important strategic inter-

ests. U.S. and Saudi officials have been working in close consultation on a number of these. Progress toward Mideast peace requires a close, working relationship with moderate Arab countries in the region. Foremost among those is Saudi Arabia.

Helping to assure that moderate Arab states can adequately defend themselves is a prerequisite to furthering peace in the region and safeguarding America's interests there.

I believe the Saudis have contributed significantly to the peace process.— Secretary of State George Shultz, in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee's Foreign Operations Subcomm., March, 1986.

America's own economy and security interests are undercut when a key country like Saudi Arabia is forced to turn to other nations to meet its legitimate defense needs. Israel's security interests suffer as well.

The reality is that every nation will seek what it must for its own defense. Saudi Arabia can readily afford to buy elsewhere — and will — if it cannot purchase what it needs from the U.S. That was made very clear again within the last few months. Opposition by some in and around the Congress to the Saudis buying additional F-15s (as recommended by U.S. Defense Department studies) led the Kingdom to make a seven-billion dollar purchase of Tornado fighters, NATO's most modern plane, and other aircraft, from Great Britain.

As a result, the U.S. lost well over 100,000 jobs, major business income and tax revenues...all at a time when the U.S. badly needs help with its trade deficit.

The Saudi purchase from Britain also significantly helped the British and their West German and Italian partners in the Tornado project, to move into a major international market long dominated by American companies. The Saudi buy, in fact, provides the Western European consortium with significant resources to produce a new generation of fighter aircraft competitive with the U.S. for the world market anticipated in the 1990s.

In basic security terms, forcing the Saudis to turn to European procurement erodes the U.S. military presence and predominance with the Saudi Air Force. That relationship has been the key link in America's ties with the Kingdom and in U.S. planning for protection of the strategically critical Gulf.

For Israel, the implications of forcing the Saudis to buy elsewhere are similarly unfortunate. The American-built F-15, which was the Saudis' clear first choice, is an interceptor, a defensive plane. But 48 of the British Tornados will be attack bombers, another 24 are interceptors, and 60 trainers were bought, 132 in all. The Saudis were seeking only 48 F-15 interceptors, had the arrangement been with this country.

It's also relevant to note that delivery of the U.S. F-15s would not have taken place until 1989 through the early 1990s. Delivery of the British Tornados began in late March 1986, only months after the order was placed. Twenty Tornados will be delivered this year, with the rest in the coming several years.

Further, the latest state-of-the-art technology would not have been included in the U.S. planes but is in the British-provided aircraft. And as with past Saudi purchases from the U.S.,

restrictions would have been insisted on as to basing and access. The British have placed no such restrictions on the Saudi-bought Tornados. In all these matters, Israel is substantially worse off.

It is also worth noting that, in addition to the \$7 billion being paid to Britain for the planes, another estimated \$7 billion will be paid by the Saudis for maintenance of the aircraft in the coming decade and a half. **Fourteen billion dollars in all.**

This major U.S. business loss is not an isolated incident. Opposition to Saudi purchases recommended by the U.S. Defense Department has caused a loss of over 20 billion dollars in other Saudi orders. Using U.S. Commerce Department criteria, that is a loss of over 350,000 jobs, significant business income and substantial tax revenues for America.

When multiple, high-quality international procurement sources are available and the purchasing country can afford to pay, the United States should not forfeit the economic opportunity at hand. That is certainly so when U.S. defense officials find the sale serves U.S. interests.

The importance of U.S. military business with Saudi Arabia is reflected in the fact that Saudis have entered into foreign military sales agreements with the U.S. totaling almost \$50 billion, including \$20 billion in construction and design services \$13 billion for services and training, \$8 billion for non-lethal equipment, \$3.6 billion for spare parts and modifications and \$4.8 billion for weapons. In all, an estimated \$20 billion of the total Saudi orders, including the AWACS, remains to be delivered.

FOR THE RECORD: It was U.S. Defense Department studies that first recommended the United States should sell F-15s to Saudi Arabia — just as it was the U.S., not the Saudis, that first concluded the Kingdom needed AWACS for defense of its oil fields and related facilities.

The Defense Department survey actually proposed the Saudis acquire not just the 60 F-15s which were authorized by President Carter and the Congress in 1978, but 110. The Saudis themselves decided to buy the lesser number on the grounds that was all they could absorb at the time. U.S. Defense Department and Air Force studies have continued, however, to conclude that 110 F-15s are needed there. It is U.S. interests and officials that have repeatedly sought the upgrading of Saudi air defenses and U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation. The initiative has come from Washington — and primarily for U.S. purposes.

VIEWED FROM any angle, this week's £5bn arms export deal between Britain and Saudi Arabia is a remarkable affair.

Involving the sale of 132 military aircraft as well as support services, it is the biggest deal of its type Britain has ever concluded. Won against strong competition from France, it has important implications for the country's aerospace industries.

Since it is also the biggest trade transaction to have been paid for almost wholly with oil, the aircraft sale could also have important implications for a glutted oil market, where prices are at their lowest levels for years.

For Saudi Arabia itself, the purchase is also of major military significance. It will increase the kingdom's combat airforce by 50 per cent and give it the capacity to launch bombing and missile attacks on long-range targets. As such, the Saudis believe the new aircraft will greatly increase its ability to deter attacks on its own territory.

The deal has also provided its fair share of drama. President Mitterrand, President Reagan and Mrs Thatcher have all been personally involved and, as is normal with such transactions, the deal has been struck in an atmosphere of great secrecy.

Britain's Chief of Air Staff was told only two days before the contract was initialised in September that Riyadh had decided to buy not only 48 of the strike (or attack) version of the three nation Tornado fighter bomber, but 24 of the air defence variant as well. Also included in the deal are 30 advanced Hawk jet trainers, made by British Aerospace, and 30 basic Swiss-built Pilatus trainer aircraft.

In fact, Saudi Arabia's decision to award the contract to the UK owes as much to Washington politics as anything else, although yesterday some American analysts argued that, in the event, the Saudis have got more effective equipment for their money than the US would have been prepared to sell them.

The Saudis' first choice was a combination of US-built F15C interceptor (defensive) aircraft and F15-E ground attack aircraft, which would have been compatible with the Saudi airforce's defensive system of US-built Awacs and the \$4bn Peace Shield command, control and communications system.

But in early 1984 it became

THE UK-SAUDI ARMS SALE

A deal in a different dimension

Bridget Bloom and Richard Johns
report on the background to Britain's biggest-ever arms export agreement

AT GREAT COST TO AMERICANS

clear that pro-Israeli sentiment in Congress would not permit such a deal, at least not without tight restrictions on the stationing of the F15s.

As a matter of policy Saudi Arabia has sought to diversify sources of arms procurement and even, to an extent, to use purchases as a political favour. It also endeavoured to look closely at all options and tried to obtain the best—hence its dogged determination to obtain the Leopard tank from West Germany despite the political obstacles.

In 1980 Prince Sultan, the Saudi Defence Minister, chose France to build up the Saudi Navy and opted for its Shahine surface-to-air missile. The Saudis have also bought equipment from Italy, Austria, Switzerland and Brazil.

Since the first Tornados will be off-the-shelf units originally destined for Britain's Royal Air Force, delivery can start next month. The Tornados will also offer the Saudis both a level of strike power and advanced radar and missile technology not available from

either the F15s or the French Mirage 2000, which at one stage appeared a strong contender for the order.

Through the purchase, the Royal Saudi Airforce will acquire the advanced aerial attack capability which it has sought for a decade or more. Nor will there be any restrictions on the ability of the aircraft operating in the north west of the kingdom or from the Tabuk military base which, the Saudis fear, could be the target for a pre-emptive attack by Israel in the event of its going to war with other Arab states.

For the UK the industrial implications, particularly of the Tornado sale, are considerable. More than 800 Tornados, Nato's latest fighter bomber, are being jointly built by the UK, West Germany (each with a 42.5 per cent work share), and Italy with 15 per cent. Production lines were to have closed in late 1989, leaving a gap of at least two years before production of the new European fighter aircraft was to begin. The new orders, with the virtually

certain addition of another 40 from Germany for new reconnaissance squadrons and between 40 and 70 for replacement buys for the three nations, will keep production going at least until 1991.

The knock-on effect for BAE's sub-contractors, supplying 50-60 per cent of the whole deal, will also be substantial, particularly in the UK. Britain will supply almost all the weapons for the Tornados, including Hunting Engineering's runway-cratering weapon JP 233 and British Aerospace's own new anti-radar Alarm missile. Probably less than 10 per cent of contract value of some £50m for the Swiss built Pilatus PC9 will accrue to Britain. And BAE's Hawk advanced jet trainer is a wholly British aircraft.

However, the deal goes beyond the production of aircraft. It includes a large maintenance and spares programme, construction to modernise airbases in Saudi Arabia and a very large training programme. BAE estimates that a 1960s deal with the Saudis centering on

the sale of Lightnings and Stribemasters, will ultimately prove to have been worth 10 times the original aircraft sale, of £150m. The company is more cautious about the current deal, but expects at least a doubling of its worth, to £10bn plus over the next decade...

(That is 14 billion in U.S. dollars.)

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TESTIMONY BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
PROPOSED SALE OF ADVANCED WEAPONS TO SAUDI ARABIA
April 17, 1986

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning on the Saudi arms sale.

It is no secret that I oppose this sale. I joined Senator Cranston as one of five original sponsors of the resolution to disapprove it. I commend him for his leadership.

This sale is a bad idea. The Saudis do not need these weapons. They should not have them. I disagree with the Administration that this sale will help advance our foreign policy in the Middle East. In fact, it is my view that the sale would more likely exacerbate anti-Americanism and terrorism than lessen it. The weapons proposed for sale to the Saudis could fall into the wrong hands, further threatening the security of innocent civilians from our country and others.

The military justification for this sale cannot withstand close scrutiny. The delivery of Sidewinders, Harpoons, and Stinger missiles proposed for sale to Saudi Arabia, as a buffer against the Iranian air force, will not even begin until 1989. Saudi Arabia already has over 3,000 Sidewinder missiles to knock out less than 100 Iranian planes. This sale cannot help the Saudis deal with any near term threat from Iran. But, should it be approved, it would give them at least 36 missiles per aircraft, a ratio far higher than either the United States or Israel. I think that is excessive and unnecessary.

Mr. Chairman, perhaps because the military rationale for this sale is weak, the Administration has not emphasized it. Instead, it has emphasized the need to signal our determination to back the Saudis against the revolutionary fundamentalism of Iran. I share this goal. But, I do not believe that selling the Saudis weapons effectively serves this goal.

We have already signalled our determination to support Saudi Arabia in ways that will actually help her. By stationing 4 U.S. Air Force AWACs in Saudi Arabia to assist the Saudi Air Force in the Persian Gulf. By sending combat units to Saudi Arabia, including F-15 fighters, when they were needed. We have sold Saudi Arabia \$50 billion worth of military goods and services, more than any other country in the world.

Mr. Chairman, it has been argued that if we don't make this sale, our credibility with the Gulf Arab states and Saudi Arabia will be undermined. But U.S. arms to Saudi Arabia equal our sales to all our European allies ~~combined~~. Our Saudi sales are higher than to any other country. How often must we prove our credibility? How many sales must we make until each one stops being a litmus test of our friendship?

Mr. Chairman, America should stop submitting to Saudi litmus tests and administer some of our own. Saudi Arabia would not pass. She has not supported our foreign policy interests

in the Middle East, but supported our enemies. Saudi support for Muammar Qaddafi is the most recent example.

When the United States stood up to Libya following the terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna's airports, Saudi Arabia took Libya's side. She supported an Islamic Foreign Ministers statement condemning U.S. economic sanctions, expressing solidarity with Libya. That statement also promised to make good on any Libyan economic losses caused by the U.S. boycott.

After Libya's attack on the U.S. in the Gulf of Sidra, Saudi Arabia supported an Arab League Council statement expressing full solidarity with Libya. The statement labelled the U.S. a threat to the safety of Arab countries, denounced U.S. aggression, and called on the Arab countries to provide Libya with assistance to confront it.

The Saudis continued their support of Qaddafi this week, calling President Reagan's retaliation against Libyan terrorism "counter to all international norms." Saudi support for Muammar Qaddafi is a direct slap at American foreign policy and our attempts to eradicate terrorism.

Saudi support for Muammar Qaddafi is consistent with the Saudis' past record. The Saudis have bankrolled PLO terrorists to the tune of \$114 million a year since 1979. And their financial support for Syria, another U.S. enemy, is reported to be \$500 million annually.

Saudi Arabia is not only a supporter of terrorists but an opponent of peace with Israel, our most reliable and steadfast ally in the Middle East. Israel provides the United States with valuable intelligence on the Middle East and Eastern Europe. And Israeli military experience tests the performance of American and Soviet equipment in battle. Our alliance enables America to count on the use of Israeli air bases and seaports in a regional or greater conflict. Her security contributes directly to our own.

GIVING UP VALUABLE INFORMATION

Saudi Arabia has consistently worked against American efforts to make peace in the region. She has opposed the Camp David process, the Reagan plan, and the Lebanon-Israeli Accord of 1983. Recently, Saudi Arabia refused to support King Hussein in direct negotiations with Israel. Instead, the Saudis reportedly offered Jordan free oil as an inducement to repair relations with Syria. The Saudis have led the effort to impose sanctions on American companies doing business with Israel and have tried to bribe Oman to deny the United States access to its military facilities.

WREN THAT LITTLE HELP WOULD HAVE BEEN SO MEANINGFUL

Saudi Arabia has voted for a series of U. N. resolutions which condemn Israel. These resolutions lay the groundwork for expelling Israel from the United Nations and making her into an international pariah. They also criticize the American alliance with Israel as encouraging Israel to pursue so-called aggressive and expansionist policies.

Saudi Arabia remains in a state of war with Israel, and shows no sign of changing that status. Saudi forces took part

in the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars with Israel. We should not reward such a record.

Mr. Chairman, I also have a real concern about where the weapons we sell today ~~may~~ end up tomorrow. The Saudis allow Palestinians to train with their army. They support the PLO financially. They already have enough Stingers for their own needs. With this history of Saudi-PLO cooperation, there is a real possibility that Stingers could end up in the PLO's hands.

And Saudi Arabia's participation in past wars against Israel increase the chances that Saudi stockpiles will serve as an arsenal for other states attacking Israel. Since Stingers can shoot down commercial as well as military airplanes, the sale of these weapons would pose a real threat to air travellers of all countries.

Mr. Chairman, when the Saudi's lack of support for U.S. foreign policy interests is added to the lack of military justification for this sale, a strong case is made for this Committee, and then the Congress, to tell Saudi Arabia: No Sale.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, for this chance to express my views.

OPENING STATEMENT (KADSAUD)
SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
HEARING ON SAUDI ARMS SALE
APRIL 17, 1986

Mr. Chairman, it's strange.

Three days ago--at the orders of President Reagan--30 American bombers and 100 support planes struck at Libyan fighter jets, cargo planes, airport hangars and other military targets in the port cities of Tripoli and Benghazi in a blow at Libyan-directed terrorism.

We lost one of our F1-11 bombers and its two-man crew in the operation--including my fellow Californian, Capt. Paul F. Lorence of San Francisco.

Yet here we are today, discussing another President Reagan initiative--a proposal to sell 2,600 missiles to one of Colonel Kaddafi's staunchest friends and supporters: Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia, which has repeatedly supported Kadaffi at Pan-Arab conferences,

--Which reportedly has offered to make good Libya's economic losses because of the American boycott,

--Which bankrolls other terrorists in the PLO and Syria,

--And which has sided with Libya against the U.S. in every confrontation--including this latest one.

What's more, here we are literally in a war against Middle East terrorism and we're considering sending into the Middle East 800 Stinger missiles and reloads.

Stingers, those shoulder-fired missiles with which a terrorist could shoot down an American aircraft from five miles away,

(more)

--And which have variously been called "the ideal terrorist weapon", "the terrorist's weapon of choice", and "the terrorist's delight".

As the principal sponsor of the resolution against this sale--a resolution now co-sponsored by 63 of my colleagues--I want to outline briefly my reasons for pressing this issue.

I also want to state again, as I have on previous occasions, that my disagreement with the Administration is over means, not ends. Our dispute is not partisan. I opposed a President of my own party when he proposed an arms sale to the Saudis.

Nor is our difference personal. We simply have a fundamental disagreement over how best to pursue U.S. interests in our relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Over the past 32 years, the United States has sold to Saudi Arabia \$50 billion worth of arms and defense services. Each time the Saudis have made such sales a "test" of American friendship. Once again the pending sale of missiles is being characterized as a "test" of American friendship.

I must ask you in all sincerity, Mr. Secretary: When does America pass the test? When do we earn the right to ask from the Saudis more sensitivity to America's basic concerns?

The Saudis keep wanting us to prove our friendship.

When do they prove their friendship?

From the 1981 AWACS sale, to the Reagan Plan, to the Murphy shuttle, to the more recent Bush mission, Administration leaders have met with rejection when they sought Saudi cooperation in pursuing three crucial American interests in the Middle East.

Republicans and Democrats and the legislative and executive branches are absolutely united on those objectives:

(more)

1. We seek to combat terrorism and deny terrorists any support or safe harbor;
2. We seek to expand the peace process begun at Camp David;
3. We seek to enhance the economic and military security of our key allies in the region, Egypt and Israel.

But the Saudis have failed to help us in any meaningful way. Worse yet, they have actively opposed us.

I know, Mr. Secretary, that the Administration asserts that the Saudis are doing a lot "in private". I've read the State Department's White Paper on how "the Saudis, within the context of the Arab consensus, have made constructive contributions to the search for peace."

That is not good enough. In exchange for \$50 billion in military arms sales, we have a right to expect from the Saudis more than the lowest common denominator of the "Arab consensus".

Mr. Secretary, I have a number of questions this morning. But let me first add a personal word.


I do not relish the confrontation ahead.


I am not happy over the necessity of sponsoring resolutions barring an intended Presidential action.

The Administration's confrontation should be with Riyadh, not with American senators.

I have urged for two years that the Administration not proceed with this sale--at least until we had some meaningful concession from the Saudis on their support for proponents of terrorism, or on progress on the peace process (as the President pledged would be the case in his AWACS letter to Senator Baker in September of 1981).

I urge it again.





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אל: טפ"א

סנט: נשק לסעודיה

1. היום (17) קיימה רועדת החוץ **HEARINGS** בנדון בחשתתפות רחבה וערה של החברים

ברועדה.

התבטאו מהרפובליקאים לוגר, כושביץ, הלמס, וקאסבאוס; ומהדמוקרטים פל, קרנסטוד, בייזדן, קרי ואיגלטוד, כאשר נטלו חלק טכני להתנוא אחדואם, ארוואס, טרול, וסרונס. העידו נגד העסקה הסנטוריים ד'אסטור (רפ') ולאוסנברג (דמ'), רבעד העיסקה מטעם המטשל מרפי, ארמיטג' ופלטר.

2. למעשה, היתה זו ההתמודדות הפומבית הראשונה בין סנטורים לבין אנשי הממשל בנושא המכירה

ואם יש מקום לשפוט לפי היעות שהושמעו ברועדה המאזן חרולל אזור לחורת העסקה. כל הסנטורים שהתבטאו הביעו הסתייגות, אם לא הרבה טעבר לזה, למימוש המכירה - להוציא לוגר שלקראת תום הישיבה חש להגנת המטשל והקריא קטעים מההתבטאות הכתובה של מרפי שהוגשה בפני הרועדה בפתיחת הישיבה אך לא הושמעה. מתוך זה לוגר שט את הדגס על תרומתן של מכירות נשק אמריקאיות למכירת התרחבות השמעה סובייטית וכן על העלות הגבוהה של אובדן מכירות אלה לכלכלת ארה"ב.

הוא ציין ששוחח ביום ב' עם הנשיא והיום עם מזכיר הפדינה ושניהם, לדבריו, נחושים בדעת לבצע את המכירה שהיא חיונית לאינטרסים הבסיסיים של ארה"ב. ברור כבר עכשיו שתקיים הצבע בנושא במליאת שני הבתים, ושהנישא יטיל וטו על כל החלטח של אי-הסכמה. הגיע זמן שהסנטורים המתנגדים לעסקה יחשבו לא רק על אסטרטגיה בשני שלבים (לא פירט), אלא גם קאאינטרסים האמריקאיים בסעודיה, בעלי השלכות לאיראן ולתימן וכן למסורת בת 40 שנה של אספקת נשק לסעודיים. מדון מקריאה נרגשת זו שלהערכת לוגר, נציגי המטשל לא הצליחו להביש טיעונים ששיכנעו את הסנטורים שהיו לדבריו **'UNANIMOUSLY SKEPTICAL'**.

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3. הישיבה ארכה כשעתיים וחצי, והשאלות הרבות נסבו על המוקדים האלה:-

- הממשל מציג את העסקה כמבחן של ידידות ארה"ב לסעודייה; מדוע אנו תמיד הנבחרים

ומתי יגיע הזמן לבחון את סעודייה ואת ידידותיה ותמיכתה באינטרסים אמריקאים?

- מה הרמה סעודייה לתהליך השלום וכיצד, באופן קונקרטי, מלאה סעודייה אחר התחייבויות

שניתנו בעת עסקת ה-AWACS?

- מדוע יש למכור נשק למדינה שמטמנת את אש"פ ואת סוריה, ולמדינה שלאחר ההתקפה האמריקאית

על לוב הודיעה שתפצה את לוב לנזקים שנגרמו?

- מדוע חייבים לספק כמזירות עצומות של טילים לסעודייה שעה שמחסניה רוויים בטילים אלה?

- אם הכוונה היא לחזק את סעודייה מול התורחש בלמחמת הספרץ, כיצד המרכיבים בחבילה

עונים על צרכיה?

4. באמור, התשובות של אנשי הממשל לא היו משכנעות במיוחד. מרפי לא התייחס כלל לשאלה מתי

תגיע השעה להעמיד את הסעודים במבחן. לדבריו, הסעודים תרמו "תרומה גיכרת" לקידום

תהליך השלום, בעיקר בתכנית פחד שבאה ליצור קונסנסוס ערבי חדש אחרי שלושת הלאוויס

של תרטום, קונסנסוס שהתקבל בפאז ושעיקרו לא היה באם לעשות שלום עם ישראל, אלא כיצד

לעשות כך. עם זאת טען מרפי שתרומת סעודייה לקידום השלום בטכסור הישראלי-ערבי, אין זו

קנה המידה הנכון. לשפוט את העסקה המוצעת; יש לשקול אותה במסגרת המלחמה בספרץ והסכנות

המטונות במלחמה זו לסעודים בפרט ולאינטרסים האמריקאים בכלל. בהקשר זה התרעס מרפי נגד

הזיקה שנעשית יותר ויותר בין אספקת נשק למדינות ערב לבין תהליך השלום. עוד אטר שאומנת

סעודייה קבלה על עצמה התחייבויות כספיות כלפי ירדן, סוריה ואש"פ בפסגה בבגדד ב-1979 /

מכבדת אותן, כוונתה היא לכרוך את הכספים "לאש"פ המתוך" ולא לפלגים הקיצוניים, ואף

למטרות "ההומניטריות" של אש"פ זה (טיפול בשפחות שכולות וכדומה) וכן לקידום יעדי

הפוליטיים. באשר לכמויות של הטילים שאוגרת סעודייה, ארמיטג' טען (א) איזלהעריך את הכסו

לפי מספר המטוסים הסעודיים אלא לפי מספר הטרות האפשריות; (ב) עד 1991 (מועד אספקת

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הטילים) יחס הטילים מדגם סיידרווינדר לכל מטוס סעודי כ-10:1, מאחר וחי המדף ("SHELF LIFE") של הטילים הקיומים מוגבלים.

5. ישראל כמעט לא הזכרה במהלך הישיבה. הסנטור הלמס הציג תמונות מהעתונות שהתפרסמו ב-1982 (בעת מבצע שלג) ושהראו נשק אמריקאי שהתיימר להיות נמכר בזמנו לסעודיה ונמסר לידי אש"פ. ארמיטג' הודה שתמונות אלה הדאיגו אך, לדבריו, פנינו לידידינו הישראלים שעד כח לא סיפקו הוכחות שאכן דובר בנשק אמריקאי שנמכר לסעודיה. חלק מהכלים בתמונות ניתן היה למכור בשוק החופשי. בהקשר אחר, טען ביידן שכל עסקת נשק עם סדיונות ערב מטילה מעמסה על ישראל, וספק אם ישראל, במצבה הכלכלי כיום, מסוגלת לשאת מעמסות נוספות. מרפי חלק על טיעון זה באומרו שהישראלים אינם רואים במכירה המוצעת איום לבטחונם (ולכן היא איננה מהרוח מעמסה נוספת).

6. רע"ב ההתבטאויות הכתובות של מרפי ושל ארמיטג'. כ"פ רע"ב הצעת ההחלטה של אי-הסכמה (S. J. RES 316) בשם 61 סנטורים ש"ל. לאלה נוספו שלמס ועזילס בסוף חייב שער.

7. אלא אם תורונו אחרת, נשלח בדיפי' ההתבטאויות של הסנטורים קרנסטון, דלאטטו ולאוסטנברג וכן של הסנטור דיקסון (שנעדר מהישיבה אך הגיש התבטאות כתובה).
 8. נשלח "ספר לבן" בעניין המכירה שהוכן ע"י הממשל ונשלח לכל חבר בסנט ובבית הנבחרים, ובנוסף חומר הסברה וחוברת ציורית שהופצו בישיבה הבודקת ע"י נציגי חברת הנפורד שחיא רשומה כסוכן זר המייצג את הסעודיים בווינגטון.

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II

99TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. J. RES. 316

Prohibiting the sale to Saudi Arabia of certain defense articles and related defense services.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 9 (legislative day, APRIL 8), 1986

Mr. CRANSTON (for himself, Mr. PACKWOOD, Mr. DIXON, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. METZENBAUM, Mr. HEINZ, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. KERRY, Mr. HECHT, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. DANFORTH, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. MATTINGLY, Mr. SIMON, Mr. TRIBLE, Mr. PELL, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. EXON, Mr. SASSER, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. FORD, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. HART, Mr. BORCHWITZ, Mr. JOHNSTON, Mr. WILSON, Mrs. HAWKINS, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. DODD, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. GORE, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. HEFLIN, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. INOUE, Mr. MATSUNAGA, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. ROCKEFELLER, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. GLENN, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. BOREN, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. GORTON, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. ROTH, Mr. BYRD, Mr. DURENBERGER, and Mr. PRESSLER) introduced the following joint resolution: which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JOINT RESOLUTION

Prohibiting the sale to Saudi Arabia of certain defense articles and related defense services.

- 1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
- 2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled.*
- 3 That the issuance of a letter of offer with respect to any of
- 4 the following proposed sales to Saudi Arabia (described in the

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1 certifications transmitted to the Speaker of the House of
2 Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on
3 Foreign Relations of the Senate pursuant to section 36(b) of
4 the Arms Export Control Act on April 8, 1986) is hereby
5 prohibited:

6 (1) The proposed sale of AIM-9L Sidewinder mis-
7 siles, and related defense articles and defense services
8 (Transmittal Numbered 86-29A).

9 (2) The proposed sale of AIM-9P4 Sidewinder
10 air-to-air missiles, and related defense articles (Trans-
11 mittal Numbered 86-29B).

12 (3) The proposed sale of basic Stinger air defense
13 guided missile svstems, and related defense articles and
14 defense services (Transmittal Numbered 86-29C).

15 (4) The proposed sale of air launched Harpoon
16 missiles, and related defense articles and defense serv-
17 ices (Transmittal Numbered 86-29D).

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REMARKS BY
RICHARD W. MURPHY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

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SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
APRIL 17, 1986

I welcome this opportunity to join you again to discuss Middle East issues which concern us all. Today, rather than review recent events that have occurred throughout the region since our last session together, I would like to share with you some thoughts and observations about broader trends in the region and how they affect U.S. interests. I would particularly like to address the relationship between such trends and our arms sale policy to friendly Arab states such as Saudi Arabia.

U.S. Policy over the years

Since the 1940s, the U.S. has been the crucial external actor in the effort to establish and maintain peace and security in the Middle East. This fact reflects the depth of our political, economic, and strategic concerns in the region, which eight Administrations, both Democratic and Republican, have consistently sought to protect.

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A fundamental commitment to Israel's security and well-being has long been a constant in our Middle East policy. At the same time, throughout the post-World War II period we have maintained close ties with pro-Western Arab states. We have worked hard to build these links in order to promote several important U.S. strategic objectives: to deny opportunities to the Soviet Union in this critical geographic region; protect free world access to the world's largest reserves of oil -- a long term interest, I might note, which is in no way diminished by the current surplus of oil; check the growth of radical anti-Western movements, and promote the process of building peace between Israel and its neighbors by relying on our relations with both sides to the conflict.

Friendship with one party to the Arab-Israeli dispute has not diminished -- nor should it -- the reliability of U.S. ties to the other. There are those on both sides of the Arab-Israeli dispute who assert that U.S. policy is a zero-sum game; that ties with one side preclude friendship with the other; that by aligning ourselves exclusively with one side, we can compel the other to make concessions. These notions are wrong, and our experience proves that they are.

We have sought to maintain close ties to both Israel and Arab states. For this reason, we are the only superpower

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trusted by both Israel and the Arabs. By establishing friendship and confidence on both sides, we have made it possible to help move both Arabs and Israelis toward greater peace and security. We have brokered six peace agreements serving Israeli, Arab, and western interests.

In recent years there has been a growing sense of realism and pragmatism in the Arab world concerning Israel. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was the first breakthrough on this. The political and diplomatic initiative by King Hussein, which continues, is further evidence. This sense of realism is based in part on recognition of the strength of our relationship with Israel, but it is also based on our close relations in the Arab world and the interest we have shown in Arab security and welfare. Our influence as a mediator in the peace process is based on the trust, confidence and friendship we have on both sides, as well as our ability to help support their needs.

In contrast to the role the United States has played, the Soviet Union, without diplomatic relations with Israel and with limited diplomatic ties and bilateral relations in the Arab world, has had only a peripheral role to play.

A major element in our relationship with both Israel and

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the Arab states is military security. Israel is, of course, the largest recipient of U.S. security assistance in the world. Egypt is the second largest. Both of those programs have been well understood and strongly supported by the Congress as major elements in our strategy of peace in the Middle East.

I am concerned, however, that there is less understanding of the importance of our military programs -- including training, assistance, U.S. personnel, and sales of major equipment -- elsewhere in the region. There is too little understanding of the strategic importance of such sales to the United States. Our close military ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, for example, have been a key factor in guaranteeing that our friends have the means to protect their own security, contain threats posed by the Iran-Iraq war and Iranian extremism, guard against Soviet inroads, and cooperate with the U.S. in ensuring free international access to oil supplies.

This point merits elaboration. Security assistance, arms and technology transfers have been an important instrument in constructing bridges to both parties of the Arab-Israeli dispute. We all take pride in the economic and military assistance we have provided to Israel over the years. We must

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also recognize the great value of the support we have given to the Arab states over the years. For thirty years Arab states friendly to the United States have also turned chiefly to us as a source of arms and technology -- to the near exclusion of the Soviet Union. Arab intelligentsia are schooled in American Universities; their technicians are skilled on our systems. Perhaps most important, members of their military learn our doctrine, train on our systems, and develop lasting professional and personal ties with American counterparts that they carry back to their own countries.

These relationships have worked to our mutual interest. "Mutual interest" is a two-way street. We make choices regarding our security partners and the commitments we make to them. They, too, make choices -- based on their perceptions of the long-term advantages and disadvantages of ties to the U.S. and the alternatives, including closer relations with the Soviet Union.

Impact of trends and events on the situation today

For the first time in three decades, Mr. Chairman, recent events threaten to undermine our balanced approach -- to challenge the long-standing policy which has worked so well for advancing U.S., Israeli, and Western interests. I am deeply

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concerned that the impact of events and trends could cost us dearly in the region. During my recent visits there I have been increasingly struck by questions about American motives and credibility.

For example, and allow me to speak frankly, our inability to gain congressional support for the Jordan arms sale is perceived in the region as a sign that the U.S. has unilaterally terminated a 30-year arms supply relationship with an Arab state with which we have a close and friendly relationship. The perception of withdrawal of U.S. support for King Hussein at a delicate moment in the King's effort to move the peace process forward was especially troubling. Opponents of the peace process are citing the withdrawal as proof that the King cannot count on U.S. politically or militarily.

At the same time that some Arab states are moving to a more realistic view of Israel's place in the Middle East, it would be a great irony if the United States did not take advantage of this trend in Arab thinking to maintain and develop our overall relations with the Arabs. In short, the history of U.S. involvement in the Middle East affirms the wisdom of our policy of maintaining close ties with both Israel and the friendly Arab states.

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U.S. Saudi relations: military sales

We now face a time of testing whether this successful policy of 30 years is relevant, or if we will turn around and pursue a more parochial, narrow, and in my view, extremist policy. Such a test now faces us with the issue of Saudi arms sales.

U.S. interests in the region are best served by continued strong, open and credible relations with moderate Arabs. In this business of diplomacy I am often struck by what is sometimes called the law of unintended consequences. Individual decisions and actions taken for good and just causes in one narrow context sometimes produce undesired results in a broader system, decisions which come back to damage even the original limited concern. It is, therefore, essential that both the Administration and the Congress are sensitive to the overall security system which is affected by U.S. actions -- and inactions. Otherwise, we cannot guard against negative consequences to U.S. interests, and those of our Israeli and Arab friends, caused by decisions taken for discrete purposes.

A case in point is the Administration proposal to sell arms to Saudi Arabia, which was formally notified to the Congress on

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April 8. The proposal consists of some standard follow-on items for support and upgrade of systems existing in the Saudi inventory. These arms would be part of an ongoing arms supply relationship which we have maintained with the Saudis for over 30 years. They represent no major enhancement of Saudi capability.

Our reasons for supporting this important friend are simple and cannot be overemphasized. They bear repeating. Maintenance of our longstanding arms supply relationship with Saudi Arabia strengthens defense of the Gulf, an area vital to U.S. interests. I would remind you that two administrations have pledged to use force, if necessary, to protect the free flow of Persian Gulf oil. We still stand by that policy. The Saudis have taken the lead, with other Gulf Cooperation Council states, in protecting the shipping and oil installations of the upper Gulf. It is important that we not lose sight of the fact that Saudi self-defense reduces the probability of direct U.S. military involvement to defend our interests. Further, our support for Saudi self-defense has been an important element of deterrence -- Iran has clearly had to take into account the fact that the Saudis have significant U.S. backing. If that perception is called into doubt, if it appears empty rhetoric, the costs to us could be substantial.

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Since the 1940's our mutual security ties with Saudi Arabia have been the foundation of the overall bilateral relationship--a relationship now under attack by radical and extremist forces in the region, some of whom exploit religion for political purposes. The continued sale of U.S. equipment to replenish and update Saudi forces responds to a clear need for the continuing defense of Saudi Arabia and strengthens our relationship.

Iran remains a formidable threat to the Gulf States. It is clearly in U.S., and our friends' interests, to see that moderate states such as Saudi Arabia are adequately equipped to counter potential Iranian aggression. The evidence is clear. Royal Saudi Air Force pilots flying F-15s and using American made equipment downed intruding Iranian aircraft in the spring of 1984. This single act of vigorous defense deterred further Iranian attacks on Gulf States. It was far preferable that this defense of the Gulf was undertaken by Saudi pilots in Saudi planes rather than U.S. pilots in U.S. planes.

Saudi Arabia is a major anti-communist power on the peninsula. Strenthening Saudi defensive forces, especially with equipment that is interoperable with our own, is a significant strategic advantage. The Saudis are, for example, the major deterrent against any adventurism on the part of the

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new and even more radical South Yemen regime. As I noted in the beginning of my testimony, our arms supply relationships with important strategic partners like Saudi Arabia are longstanding and mutually helpful. Severance of this key linkage would cause unintended and harmful costs to U.S. security.

Continued U.S. supply of arms to Arab states is in Israel's interests. Israel not only retains but is increasing its qualitative military edge over any combination of Arab forces. We are committed to the maintenance of the Israeli advantage, and insure it is kept by carefully reviewing all arms transfers to the region and obtaining appropriate safeguards whenever required.

If the United States cannot or will not continue this carefully calibrated arms supply relationship, Arab states like Jordan and Saudi Arabia seek other sources of arms. Whenever our friends seek alternative sources there are costs: security costs for Israel, political, strategic, and financial costs to the U.S. The recent Saudi purchase of long-range Tornado fighter aircraft, which we believe has not served any discernable U.S. interest, is a good example. Unlike the F-15s, an air defense aircraft, which we supplied to the Kingdom in 1979, there are no restrictive understandings on

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basing the Tornados close to Israel's borders. Additionally, some independent academics estimate that the Saudi purchase of Tornados, a ground attack aircraft, rather than the additional F-15s they preferred, cost the American economy from \$12 to \$20 billion dollars.

In short, the reasons for continuing our arms supply links with moderate Arab states are compelling and numerous. The United States provides arms to Saudi Arabia based on its defensive requirements and because a defensively sound Saudi Arabia is in our best interest.

I am disturbed, Mr. Chairman, by reports now circulating that would attempt to create a formal and direct linkage between our routine arms supply to Saudi Arabia and peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. This is a narrow approach to a complex set of issues. If followed, it would bring into action the "law of unintended consequences" I noted earlier. We, Israel, and the moderate Arabs would lose. In the final analysis, the Soviets would be the winners.

U.S. policy has succeeded in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East when it has differentiated between cases where linkages are appropriate and effective, and those where they are neither. Some arrangements, such as the U.S.

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contribution to peace between Israel and Egypt, have clearly benefitted from the explicit U.S. willingness to provide security assistance to the parties to the settlement. Such a relationship was fully consistent with U.S. interests and, in fact, inherent in the development of the agreement itself. In other cases, including Saudi Arabia, our security relationship is based on considerations of regional peace and stability that go beyond the specific Arab-Israeli issue. Neither we, nor the cause of peace, would achieve anything from an effort to compress U.S.-Saudi security ties into an Arab-Israeli mold.

AWACS

In 1981 when the Administration notified Congress of its intention to sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia, President Reagan sent a letter to Congressional leadership. In it, he provided assurances that certain conditions would be met before transfer of the AWACS. The required technical assurances either have or will shortly be completed. Additionally, the letter assured:

"That the sale contributes directly to the stability and security of the area, enhances the atmosphere and prospects for progress towards peace, and that initiatives toward the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region have either been successfully completed or that significant progress

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toward that goal has been accomplished with the substantial assistance of Saudi Arabia."

There is a good deal that can be said about Saudi Arabia's contribution to peace in the region.

Iran/Iraq War: The Saudis have supported every major diplomatic effort over the past five years to end the Iran/Iraq war, including mediation missions by the UN, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and individual third governments. The Saudis seek a just and quick resolution of the bloodshed. They have made clear their preference that the war end without effect on the sovereignty of either Iran or Iraq.

Lebanon: Saudi Arabia has made major, and often highly visible efforts to bring peace to war-torn Lebanon. For example, they played a major role in arranging the cease fire in the Shuf Mountains in September 1983 when Crown Prince Abdullah and Prince Bandar engaged in high profile shuttle diplomacy. Saudi observers were present at the Geneva and Lausanne talks and worked with the Lebanese and Syrians to encourage development of national reconciliation. Furthermore, they were supportive of Lebanese Government efforts to negotiate with Israel on security arrangements in southern Lebanon. The Saudis supported Lebanese efforts to win Syrian

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consent to proposed compromises and were active in exploring additional proposals for compromise between the parties.

Arab-Israeli Peace: Although the Saudis have only occasionally played a high-profile role in working towards resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, private Saudi efforts have had significant effect at critical periods. Notable Saudi initiatives are the Fahd Peace Plan and its successor, the Fez Communique. These declarations may not have gone far enough, but they are indeed a substantial assistance in the search for peace. Let me explain.

The Arab desire for consensus has been a central reality in the peace-making effort -- even though or perhaps because that consensus has so often proven elusive. Prior to the Fahd Plan and Fez Communique, the Arab consensus was the three "NOs" of Khartoum which rejected recognition, negotiation, or conciliation with Israel.

Saudi advancement of the Fahd proposal in November 1981, followed by ten months of active Saudi diplomatic effort achieved a significant new Arab consensus -- one that permitted negotiation. It turned the discussion from a rejection of peace to a debate on how to achieve peace. It is the largest step toward peace that the Arabs have taken as a group. Its

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existence provided an essential context for King Hussein's initiative. It was and remains a major and constructive step forward for the Arabs. Indeed, the Fahd proposal reflects language drawn from UN Security Council Resolution 242, that all states in the region should be able to live in peace.

We have often cautioned all who support peace in the Middle East not to expect dramatic progress in the peace process. Advance is made in incremental steps. Only through steady, dogged effort will the parties collectively move toward peace and security. Positive Saudi efforts must not be belittled. There are other examples.

Saudi Arabia's support for King Hussein's efforts have been substantial. The Saudis have assured Jordan that they would back any arrangement to which both Jordan and the Palestinians could agree. Over strong Syrian opposition, the Saudis sent official observers to the Amman Palestine National Council [PNC] meeting where they publicly stated their support for Hussein's decision to host it.

Political reintegration into the Arab world of Egypt -- the only Arab state to share a peace agreement with Israel -- is symbolically important to moderate Arab states. The Saudis have felt that an Arab Summit decision is required formally to

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reestablish Arab-wide relations with Egypt. Meanwhile, they have taken a number of positive steps towards integration. For instance, by supporting the essential motion for a secret ballot, they helped make possible Egypt's reintegration into the Organization of the Islamic States.

Peace is still in the making. The parties have made a good deal of progress already, but there is undeniably a long way to go. Achievement of our shared goal, Israeli-Arab peace, requires risk taking, good will, and hard work from all the parties. I am hopeful we will succeed. But I am certain that any campaign to denigrate the genuine efforts of one or some of the parties is counterproductive to achieving our objective.

Gentlemen, as you consider Middle East issues over the next several months, I ask that you examine them from the perspective of the overall political and strategic context of the region. In our system of government, decisions are perforce taken on discrete issues. But if we are to avoid unintended consequences for U.S., Israeli, and Arab interests, we must keep the overall context in view as we make those decisions. We must return to a policy of proven success. We must avoid moving down a road which excludes important security partners and which, however inadvertently, plays into the hands of Middle Eastern radicals -- the Cassandras who say real peace

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is not possible, that our interests are limited to the peace process, and that the U.S. cannot be friends with Israel and friendly Arab states alike.

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STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. ARMITAGE
TO THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
17 APRIL 1986

SENATOR LUGAR, SENATORS, IT IS A PLEASURE TO BE HERE TODAY IN SUPPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED SALE OF DEFENSIVE WEAPONS TO SAUDIA ARABIA. LET ME SAY FROM THE OUTSET THAT I AM IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY'S REMARKS. HE HAS MADE A COMPELLING POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR THIS SALE AT THIS TIME AND EXPLAINED WHY IT IS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES TO PROCEED WITH IT. ASIDE FROM THE POLITICAL SIGNAL WE WISH TO MAKE TO BOTH THE SAUDIS AND THE AYATOLLAH, THE SALE STANDS ON ITS OWN FROM A STRICTLY MILITARY VIEWPOINT, AND IT IS THAT RATIONALE I WISH TO ADDRESS BRIEFLY.

THE SIMPLE FACT IS THAT SAUDI ARABIA NEEDS THESE WEAPONS, WHICH ARE PURELY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE, TO MEET THE THREATS THEY -- AND WE -- PERCEIVE THEY WILL FACE IN THE EARLY NINETIES. NO ONE CAN PREDICT WITH CERTAINTY THE ENVIRONMENT THEY WILL FACE FIVE YEARS FROM NOW. CERTAINLY IN 1981 WE DID NOT PREDICT THAT THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WOULD RAGE ON INTO 1986. GIVEN THE LONG LEAD TIMES ASSOCIATED WITH MODERN WEAPONRY, ANY PRUDENT DEFENSE PLANNER -- AMERICAN, SAUDI, OR, FOR THAT MATTER, ANY OTHER NATIONALITY -- MUST LOOK INTO THE FUTURE AND MAKE CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE THREAT THAT ONE'S COUNTRY MIGHT FACE. BECAUSE OF THE TERRIBLE COST OF A MISTAKE, MILITARY PLANNERS ARE INHERENTLY CAUTIOUS. THE SAUDIS ARE LIKELY TO BE SURROUNDED BY ANY NUMBER OF POTENTIALLY HOSTILE NEIGHBORS IN THE EARLY

NINETIES; IRAN, CAPABLE OF REBUILDING ITS ARMED FORCES WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN TRIED IN BATTLE; IRAQ, FRIENDLY TODAY BECAUSE OF THE WAR, BUT WITH HISTORIC CLAIMS TO VALUABLE SAUDI AND KUWAITI TERRITORY AND WITH FORCES THAT OUTEQUIP AND OUTNUMBER THE SAUDIS; AN UNSTABLE, RADICAL MARXIST REGIME IN SOUTH YEMEN; MARXIST ETHIOPIA; EVEN LIBYA, ALL OF WHICH ARE SUPPORTED HEAVILY WITH SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE NUMBERS AND TYPES OF MISSILES WE ARE PROPOSING TO SELL SAUDI ARABIA HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY CALCULATED BY OUR MILITARY, USING OUR REQUIREMENTS FORMULAE AND OUR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, TO BE THE MOST APPROPRIATE AND THE MINIMUM REQUIRED TO MEET THE MOST STRESSING THREAT SCENARIO WE CAN ENVISION FOR 1991 AND BEYOND, WHEN ALL THE WEAPONS WILL HAVE BEEN DELIVERED. WITHOUT THIS FOLLOW-ON SALE, THE SAUDIS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MEET THAT THREAT. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR WEAPONS HAVE BEEN IN SAUDI INVENTORIES FOR YEARS -- WE ARE NOT INTRODUCING ANY NEW CAPABILITY IN THE REGION.

THERE HAVE BEEN ALLEGATIONS MADE THAT THIS SALE IS IN SOME WAY "EXCESSIVE," EITHER IN TERMS OF THE ACTUAL MISSILES THEMSELVES OR IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR OVERALL ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. LET ME ADDRESS BOTH POINTS:

- FIRST, THE CLAIM THAT THIS SALE WOULD RESULT IN THE SAUDIS HAVING 37 MISSILES FOR EVERY CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. THIS CALCULATION IS BOTH IRRELEVANT AND MISLEADING. WE DO NOT FIGURE AIR DEFENSE MISSILE REQUIREMENTS ON THE BASIS OF HOW MANY PLATFORMS WE HAVE,

BUT ON THE BASIS OF HOW MANY THREAT AIRCRAFT WE NEED TO SHOOT DOWN. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE PERFORMED THIS "MISSILE-TO-AIRCRAFT" CALCULATION AND DETERMINED THAT EVEN AFTER THESE MISSILES ARE FULLY DELIVERED IN 1991, THE SAUDIS WILL, AFTER APPROPRIATE ALLOWANCES ARE MADE FOR ATTRITION, OBSOLESCENCE, TRAINING CONSUMPTION, ETC., POSSESS A REASONABLE QUANTITY OF MISSILES PER AIRCRAFT, ROUGHLY COMPARABLE TO OUR OWN INVENTORIES AND THOSE OF ISRAEL, THE NUMBER REMAINS IN THE SINGLE DIGITS, NOWHERE NEAR 37:1. GIVEN THE FACT THAT SAUDI ARABIA, UNLIKE THE U.S. AND ISRAEL, HAS NO INDIGENOUS SOURCE OF RESUPPLY, WERE THAT RATIO RELEVANT, ONE MIGHT BE CONCERNED THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH MISSILES.

- SECOND, THE CHARGE THAT THIS SALE SIMPLY ADDS TO THE ALREADY EXCESSIVE AMOUNTS OF ARMS WE HAVE SOLD THE SAUDIS OVER THE YEARS, ADDING TO A MASSIVE ARAB ARMS CACHE THAT WILL FAN THE FLAMES OF THE NEXT MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. SAUDI ARABIA IS OUR LARGEST ARMS CUSTOMER. FROM 1953 THROUGH THE END OF THE LAST FISCAL YEAR, WE SOLD THE SAUDIS JUST UNDER 50 BILLION DOLLARS IN DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES. HOWEVER, THAT FIGURE CHANGES DRAMATICALLY IF YOU APPLY A LITTLE ANALYSIS. LESS THAN TEN PERCENT OF THE TOTAL, SOME \$4.8 BILLION, WAS FOR THE PURCHASE OF ACTUAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION. OVER TWO-THIRDS, SOME \$33.7 BILLION WENT FOR SUPPORT SERVICES SUCH AS CONSTRUCTION, REPAIR, SUPPLY OPERATIONS, AND TRAINING. CONSTRUCTION ALONE ACCOUNTS FOR OVER \$20 BILLION. IN THAT CONTEXT, OUR DECISIONS TO SUPPORT SAUDI ARMS REQUESTS CANNOT BE SEEN AS EXCESSIVE. THEY ARE

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CAREFULLY SCRUTINIZED, MILITARILY JUSTIFIABLE, AND CONTRIBUTE TO, RATHER THAN UPSET, REGIONAL STABILITY.

MUCH HAS BEEN SAID ABOUT THE DANGER OF U.S. WEAPONS, PARTICULARLY STINGER, FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF TERRORISTS. FIRST, LET ME SAY THAT SAUDI ARABIA'S RECORD IN PROTECTING THE WEAPONS WE HAVE SOLD THEM OVER THE YEARS IS IMPECCABLE. THE SAUDIS TAKE VERY SERIOUSLY THEIR COMMITMENT, WHICH THEY REAFFIRM IN EVERY ARMS TRANSACTION THEY MAKE WITH US, TO NOT TRANSFER THE EQUIPMENT OR INFORMATION TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT WITHOUT OUR PERMISSION. NO ALLEGATION TO THE CONTRARY HAS EVER WITHSTOOD INVESTIGATION. AS RECENTLY REPORTED BY THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OUR MILITARY TRAINING MISSION IN RIYADH FINDS SAUDI SECURITY CONTROLS OVER MUNITIONS AT LEAST AS GOOD AND FREQUENTLY BETTER THAN OUR OWN. FOR ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE WEAPONS, SUCH AS STINGER AND THE AIM-9L, THE SAUDIS HAVE ACCEPTED EVEN MORE STRINGENT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING U.S. ACCESS AND SURVEILLANCE AND SEPARATE STORAGE OF KEY COMPONENTS. THE STINGER MISSILE MUST BE STORED APART FROM ITS LAUNCHER, THUS MAKING UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO A COMPLETE, USABLE WEAPON THAT MUCH MORE UNLIKELY. WHILE THE BASIC STINGER IS AN EFFECTIVE POINT DEFENSE WEAPON AGAINST ATTACKING AIRCRAFT, IT IS NOT THE IDEAL TERRORIST TOOL THAT SOME HAVE CLAIMED. THE STINGER MISSILE ITSELF IS FIVE FEET LONG, MAKING IT RATHER DIFFICULT TO SNEAK PAST AIRPORT SECURITY CONTROLS. THE SAUDIS HAVE MANAGED NOT TO LOSE THE REDEYE MISSILE, THE PREDECESSOR TO STINGER, FOR NEARLY TEN YEARS. WHILE REDEYE DOES NOT HAVE STINGER'S FRONTAL

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ASPECT CAPABILITY, I SHOULD THINK IT MATTERS VERY LITTLE TO THE DEDICATED TERRORIST WHETHER HE SHOOTS DOWN AN AIRLINER WHILE IT IS LANDING OR TAKING OFF. THE REAL TERRORIST THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST COMES FROM THE THOUSANDS OF SOVIET SA-7'S, WHICH ARE READILY CONCEALABLE.

IN CLOSING, I WANT TO PUT THIS PARTICULAR SALE INTO CONTEXT. IT IS IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST THAT WE CONTINUE OUR TRADITIONAL ROLE AS THE PRINCIPAL ARMS SUPPLIER TO SAUDI ARABIA. THAT ROLE HAS, OVER THE DECADES, GIVEN US A SPECIAL POSITION WITH THE SAUDI MILITARY: THEY HAVE LARGELY COMMON EQUIPMENT, TRAIN AND GO TO SCHOOL IN THE STATES, FOLLOW OUR MILITARY DOCTRINE, SEEK OUR ADVICE. A U.S. GENERAL OFFICER CARRIES THE TITLE OF "SENIOR MILITARY ADVISOR" TO THE SAUDI MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION. I SEE NO BENEFIT TO THE U.S. IF WE ABDICATE THAT SPECIAL POSITION TO EUROPEAN OR OTHER ARMS SUPPLIERS. I WILL NOT PRETEND THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE EVER AGREED TO BUY WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION FOR USE BY OUR MILITARY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT I AM CONFIDENT THAT THEY WOULD BE AVAILABLE IF REQUIRED. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST, SHOULD GENERAL CRIST EVER HAVE TO DEPLOY HIS CENTRAL COMMAND FORCES TO THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, THAT THE SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS BE COMPATIBLE. MORE IMPORTANTLY, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST THAT THERE BE A STRONG SAUDI ARABIA CAPABLE OF DEFENDING ITSELF, BECAUSE THAT MAKES IT LESS LIKELY THAT WE EVER WILL HAVE TO DEPLOY AMERICAN FORCES TO THE REGION.

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אל: המשד

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אל: טעפ"א

פנט: סיוע חוץ

ב-17 העידו בפני ועדת המשנה לעולות זרות בוועדת ההקצבות בסנט בראשות בוב קסטן נציגי ארגונים ושדולות אליקאיות שהעניין שהם מייצגים כפוף לוועדת המשנה. זוהי שמיעה מקבילה לזו שהתקיימה בבית ב-10 (שלנו 258) ורשימת העדים דומה. נכחו קצרות הסנטורים ג'ונסון ודאמטר.

עזריותיהם הכתובות של איפא"ק ו- NAAA דומות בעיקרן לעזריות בבית ולכן אינן מועברות.

בדבריו עמד טום דיין על תמיכת ישראל בפעולה ארה"ב בלוב (בהשראה לעמדת מדינות אחרות) שערור הצבעותיה עם ארה"ב באר"ס, אשרדי קול אמריקה, שת"פ אסטרטגי, העלחת הפעולה המשותפת להעלת כלכלת ישראל. חודה לוועדה (ולקסטן במיוחד) על תאמציה. קסטן השיב שימשיך לעבוד עם איפא"ק להשיג חמטרות המשותפות.

דיינד סעד דיכר מטעם NAAA, לא ביקר במיוחד את ישראל אלא עדין שנכח ג"ר הסיוע לישראל, מערים ומדינות ה- base right אינו מותר הרבה לאחרים, וחשוב לארה"ב לאפשר סיוע למדינות אחרות, לרבות מדינות ערב.

קסטן השיב שאומנם אילוץ ג"ר שהידידים היעוץ ולארה"ב יש התחייבויות למדינות ק.ד., זאת ועוד, שלוש מתוך מדינות ה- base right (ערמן, סודן וסקורו) הם מדינות ערביות. גם סגן נשיא ה- Robert A. Basil, American Lebanese League שיבח את פעולה ארה"ב נגד לוב, סבור שרוב תושבי לבנון חושבים כמוהו אלא שאינם יכולים להתכסא כך, גינה את הרדיקליזם שפשוט בלבנון וציטט כהרחבה מבסיר המנוח.

טובה הרצל
טובה הירד

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אל: משרד

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סוג בטחוניסטר
מיידי
דחיות
תאריך וזי... 17.12.1966
מס' פנק...

כתב

אל: נוביק, לשכת רוה"מ
רע: ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, כלכלית

תכנית מרשל

האמריקנים קיימו בענין זה שיחות לא פורמליות עם שרי האוצר של המדינות המתועשות ששהו כאן לרגל וועידת הביניים של קרן המטבע והבנק העולמי. לשרי האוצר לא היה מידע מוקדם על התכנית אך הם הנסחו להיוועץ בממשלותיהם.
וייטהד הנמצא באירופה לרגל מושב של ה-OECD מחכוון לקיים "שיחות פרודור" בענין עם עמיתיו סם. רוזאן רידג'ואי, עוזרת המזכיר לענייני אירופה במחמ"ד, הנימנת על הצוות המכין של הפיסגה, נתבקשה לשוחח עם עמיתה על הנושא.
מעניין סדווקא אלן וואליס העומד מטעם ממארה"ב בראש ההכנות לפיסגה, אינו עוסק בתכנית מרשל ויתכן ותדבר נובע מכך שהמזכיר רואה בנושא זה עניין פוליטי-מעשי ולא נושא מקרו-כלכלי.

הלפרין

מס' 3333
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מגזר החדשות
מגזר החדשות

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מלך

המספר, בטחון, ניו-יורק

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אל: הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לט' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח

NEWS SUMMARY - THURSDAY - APRIL 17, 1986

EDITORIALS

THE SUN - 17/4 - "Pope At The Synagogue" Of all of his travels, Pope John Paul II journeyed farthest when he crossed Rome this past weekend to visit the central synagogue in the ghetto where, from 1555 to 1848. Millions of Catholics and Jews and others will join in the pope's expression of joy "for the rediscovered brotherhood and for the new and more profound understanding between us here in Rome and between the church and Judaism everywhere, in every country, for the benefit of all." The question of the Vatican's lack of diplomatic relations with Israel can now be discussed and dealt with as a political and diplomatic matter unencumbered with suspicion.

WASH. TIMES - 17/4 - "The Colonel's Due" Qaddafi put Libya on the map. His place in world affairs remains large and unmistakable, and it offers important lessons for the West. That he has been able to waltz from outrage to outrage without impediment says much about his adversaries. He also illuminated problems among the Western nations, giving Americans a good example of why we should pay less mind to the wishes of our allies. The European reluctance underscores a vital aspect of Qaddafi's power. Qaddafi's effectiveness has been undeniable, and he has reminded the world that you don't have to be big to be deadly.

THE PRESS REPORTS

Raid Called Example Of Israeli Method

WASH. POST - Claiborne - Two of Israel's leading experts on international terrorism said that the US appears to have adopted the Israeli method in dealing with terrorism, and they urged further US military strikes against Libya. Urging continuous US pressure on Qaddafi, Ariel Merari, said, "The most important statement Reagan made was that if necessary he would do it again. Qaddafi has to know that this is more than public relations." Haim Sahked also called for continued US pressure on Libya, saying, "I think the US has adopted Israeli tactics. These are not perfect, but they have an impact."

מגזר החדשות - ירושלים - 17 באפריל 1986

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454

Welcome To War, Israel Says

CHICAGO TRIBUNE - Broder - Senior Israeli officials and security experts said Wed. the US attack on Libya is the beginning of a war that has placed the US squarely alongside Israel in the struggle against terrorism. Israel was one of very few countries to applaud the US raid, calling it "an act of self-defense" and "a blow against state-supported terrorism."

Bonn Sites Own Proof Of Libyan Bomb At Disco

WASH. POST - Drozdiak - Kohl announced that his govt. had announced that his govt. had acquired its own conclusive proof that the Libyan People's Bureau in East Berlin bore responsibility for the bombing 11 days ago of a West Berlin discotheque. Kohl warned against the resurgence of "primitive anti-Americanism" and contended that the discotheque bombing "caused more injuries than were caused by the US" in its air raid against Libyan military targets. In contrast to Bonn's expressions of support for the Reagan administration, anti-American protest rallies have swept West Germany in the wake of the raid.

Qaddafi Pledges To Defend Country

WASH. POST - Dickey - Qaddafi appeared on TV tonight for the first time to speak about the US attack on Libya early yesterday, ending speculation in Libya and abroad that he had been killed in the raid or had left the country. He said "we are ready to die for our country if attacked," "Put back the lights in the streets," Qaddafi told his people. "Even if the US hits us with nuclear weapons, we will face America because Allah is stronger than the US," Qaddafi told his people. "It is a great honor for a small country like Libya to stand and fight US aggression and Britain and the countries of NATO."

Soviets Vow To Keep Libyan Arms Flowing

WASH. TIMES - (AP) - Gorbachev promised Qaddafi in a letter published yesterday that the Kremlin would keep its commitments to strengthen Libya's defenses. Gorbachev also gave Qaddafi solid support in his clash with the US. "The US stands for all to see as the main culprit of the escalation of international tension, irresponsibly playing with the fate of millions of people for the sake of satisfying its imperial ambitions," he said in the letter. Gorbachev said, "I would like to assure you that the Soviet Union firmly intends further to fulfill its commitments in terms of further strengthening Libya's defense capability." The letter did not make clear what military commitments Moscow had made to Libya.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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** ** נבנס

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מסודי ביותר 2 מתוך 30 1 קף 1 עותק 8

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
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מסודי ביותר/מיידי

אלו: ממנכ"ל, מנהל מצפ"א

אאוואקס

א. עתה, בשהעמדות בענין העיסקה הסעודית הנוכחית הובהרו, לדומה שפלינו לתת את דעתנו כבר עתה לנושא העומד נשער, של הטברת ה'אואקס' לבעלות הסעודים.

1. תמונת המצב שלנו בנושא הסעודי אינה יינחמדה: בתוך אפ"אייק היו דעות שונות בקשר לעיסקה הסעודית הנוכחית. היו שסברו כי יש מקום למאבק ובי הנצחון יהיה קל יחסית פוליטית אם בירדן הושג הישג, על אחת כמה וכמה באשר לסעודים. אחרים שדעתם גברה - היכו לקראת הממשל מטעמים דומים לאלה שעליהם הוחלט בירושלים בקשר לעמדתנו. לשנות המתנגדים לגישה זו, הממשל מכבד עוצמה, והיה מקבל עובדת הנסחה של העיסקה (מה גם שהסעודים לא תרמו דבר לשלום מזה, ולעומת זאת מסירת המילים מתה'ה ב-1989 בין שאין לה גם קשר למלחמת איראן-עיראק שבה מסביר הממשל את הדבר, לכן חבל, לדעתם, שלא נערך המאבק. מכל מקום - דבר זה כבר מאחורינו.

ג. השאלה היא עתה במבט צופה פני עתיד כלפי הנושא הנב לאישור עסקת מסירת האיוואקס. ישנו לגביה ההיבט הכלכלי הרגיש - אפשרות להפסד מדונה (ביליוני) לארה"ב אם לא תאושר. אך ישנם גם דיבורים בפי שדווח על מכירה חילונית.

ד. הנשיא בנראה, בהמלצת יועציו, נחוש לתת את האישור הנדרש ובאשר לסעודיה השאלה היא האם לצאת למאבק ולעודד אחרים נשוחלקם וראי יעמידו פנים וועמות בקשר לפעם האחרונה. טפציפית פנה אלינו הקונגרס היהודי האמריקני ושאל מה

ידיעות לעתונות

ץץץ

01# (לעמ עשת) פגישת רה"מ עם משלחת נשים מנהיגות

(נמסר ע"י יועץ רה"מ לענייני תקשורת)

ירושלים, ז' בניסן תשמ"ו, 16 באפריל 1986 (לעמ עשת 7)

רה"מ נפגש היום עם משלחת נשים מנהיגות מארה"ב ומקנדה המבקרות בישראל ובמצרים.

רה"מ אמר שהיינו רוצים לראות יתר התקדמות ביחסים עם מצרים, אך על כולנו להעריך את העובדה ששנים רבות אין עוד חזית מלחמתית בין שתי המדינות. יש וניתן להגיע לסיכום מהיר של המו"מ במגמה לשפר את היחסים הבילטרליים בין שתי המדינות, עלינו להתקדם יחד בתהליך השלום וכן לעבוד למען הפיתוח הכלכלי של האזור.

רה"מ אמר עוד כי ישראל תומכת תמיכה מלאה בארה"ב בפעולתה נגד הטרור בלב. כמו שיש לפעול נגד פושעים בתוך המדינות, יש לפעול נגד ראשי הטרור במישור הבינלאומי.

לעמ עשת (דף מס. 5)

שמ 18.30

תנתת

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#21 PERES MEETS WOMEN DELEGATION

(COMMUNICATED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEDIA ADVISER)

PRIME MINISTER SHIMON PERES MET TODAY WITH A DELEGATION OF WOMEN LEADERS FROM THE U.S AND CANADA VISITING ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE PROGRESS IN RELATIONS WITH EGYPT, BUT THAT WE MUST ALL APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT FOR MANY YEARS THERE HAS BEEN NO MILITARY FRONT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE ISRAEL-EGYPT NEGOTIATIONS CAN, AND MUST BE, RAPIDLY CONCLUDED IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. WE MUST PROMOTE THE PEACE PROCESS TOGETHER, AND WORK FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGION.

THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO SAID THAT ISRAEL FULLY SUPPORTS THE U.S. IN ITS ACTION AGAINST LIBYAN TERRORISM. IT IS JUST AS NECESSARY TO ACT AGAINST TERRORIST LEADERS ON THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AS IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ACT AGAINST CRIMINALS WITHIN A COUNTRY'S BORDERS.

LV/HB
#0

20:30 HOURS

GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

תאריך: י"ד באדר א' תשמ"ו
23 בפברואר 1986
מספר:

אל: לשכת ראש הממשלה
מאת: ס/מנהל המח' לאורחים רשמיים

הנדון: משלחת נשים מנהיגות מארה"ב וקנדה
Jerusalem International Forum

בהמשך למכתבנו מ-18/12/85, ר"ב דף רקע על הארגון וכן רשימה ראשונית של המשתתפות. נודה על אשור הפגישה עם ראש הממשלה ביום ד' 9/4/86 בשעה 09.00, כפי שבקשנו במכתב הנ"ל אשר העתקו רצוף בזה.

בברכה,
א. אגרון



JERUSALEM INTERNATIONAL FORUM

A PROJECT OF
AMERICA-ISRAEL FRIENDSHIP LEAGUE, INC.

JERUSALEM INTERNATIONAL FORUM..PARTICIPANTS...APRIL, 1986

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NY State—Department of Commerce
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(Childrens Television Workshop)

ALTOVISE DAVIS, LOS ANGELES..Visitor and Convention bureau goodwill
ambassador...wife of Sammy Davis, Jr.

La Rae ORULLIAN, DENVER, National President, Womens Bank,
influential in Denver, Colorado business circles

Honourable Louis Renne, Board of Supervisors, City of San Francisco

Sister Helen Marie Burns, Vice President, Sisters of Mercy, Detroit

Renee Pouissant, Washington D.C. WJLA-TV...award winning journalist
(ABC affiliate)

Muriel Fox, New York. Senior Consultant, Carl Byoir Assoc, Public
Relations. Founder and past chair of National Organization of
Women.....she is listed in "Whos who in America" and
"Whos Who in the World"

Mariam K. Chamberlin, President National Council for Research on
Women

Dolores Bernadette Grier, Vice Chancellor for Community Relations
Archdiocese of New York

Evelyn Cunningham, New York, Consultant, Rockefeller Centre, Inc.

Dr. Joan Wallace, Administrator, U.S. Gov't Dept of Agriculture

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JERUSALEM INTERNATIONAL FORUM

A PROJECT OF
AMERICA-ISRAEL FRIENDSHIP LEAGUE, INC.

JERUSALEM INTERNATIONAL FORUM

PURPOSE AND GOALS

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Managing Editor
Glamour Magazine

Margaret Adams
Senior Editor
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University of Pennsylvania

Gail Sheeny
Journalist/Author
In Formation

COORDINATORS

Elaine Dubow-Harris—Founder
Mona B. Kneader

INTRODUCTION:

The Jerusalem International Forum (JIF) was originally conceived as a response to the need to promote greater dialogue and understanding among women in the Middle East, and women in North America. The program is designed to structure an arena for women in which they can meet with their professional counterparts to stimulate an ongoing dialogue. Women from North America, of high intellectual and professional achievement, and women from Egypt and Israel, through these meetings can discover their common goals and needs, and work together to help achieve their ends. Through this dialogue, a spirit of understanding and compromise can grow.

With the establishment of an international network based on confidence and trust, women can play the crucial role as initiators in the establishment of peace, equality and development. The JIF holds as one of its basic tenets the belief that women meeting together in a non-partisan forum can transcend political barriers, and find the common ground and common interests that unite humanity today. Face to face dialogue opens the door to understanding political, social, cultural and economic motivations of different peoples and governments.

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES:

The objectives of the JIF can be summarized as follows:

- to establish an international network of women opinion makers and leaders who will play crucial roles in promoting understanding, equality, and development in the Middle East.
- to create an interchange that gives the North American participants the opportunity to share ideas and experiences with leading women in Egypt and Israel.
- to provide educational meetings with political, religious, academic and cultural leaders, and extensive tours of the host countries designed to increase awareness of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in each region.
- to bring to light the international nature of women's issues and of ways in which the women can support each other in solving common problems.

2/...

AMERICA—ISRAEL



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Jack D. Weiler
Elie Wiesler

JERUSALEM INTERNATIONAL FORUM
PURPOSE AND GOALS (CONT'D)

STRUCTURE:

Originally called the Jerusalem Women's Seminar (JWS), this program was established in 1980 in response to needs that had been articulated at the June 1979 World Conference of Women Leaders, that took place in Jerusalem. It was clearly recognized at that time, that there were no effective channels for dialogue and cooperation among women of the Middle East.

Since its inception in early 1980, there have been four missions to the Middle East. Meetings are organized to provide participants with the opportunity to listen to and talk with individuals representing a wide range of interests and activities.

Con-

Highlights of past seminars have included: conversations with the First Ladies of the region, a two hour dialogue with the Prime Minister of Israel, a similar dialogue with the Foreign Minister of Egypt, a presentation by the Mayor of Jerusalem, a discussion of local politics and women's issues with the female members of the Israeli and Egyptian parliaments, and an interfaith dialogue with representatives of the major religious groups in the city of Jerusalem.

IMPLEMENTATION:

The JIF is a program of the America-Israel Friendship League, (AIFL). The AIFL has, over the past ten years, emerged as a viable and growing force in the field of United States-Israel relations. It has maintained a commitment to providing unique people-to-people activities for the improvement of cultural bonds between the two democratic nations.

The JIF is directed by a committee largely composed of past participants, and also containing representation from the AIFL. The JIF is responsible for the majority of its funding, but has access to most of the benefits provided by the AIFL, such as reduced travel costs, administrative services, and other "in-kind" contributions.

CONTRIBUTIONS:

All contributions are tax-deductible, as long as checks are made out to:

A.I.F.L./JERUSALEM INTERNATIONAL FORUM

ו' בסבת תשמ"ו
18 בדצמבר 1985

אל: לשכת ראש הממשלה
מאת: אריה אגרון, ס/מנהל המח' לאורחים רשמיים

הנדון: משלחת נשים מנהיגות מארה"ב וקנדה
Jerusalem International Forum

משלחת של עשרים נשים מנהיגות מארצות הברית וקנדה תבקרנה בישראל, בסיוע משרד החוץ מ-4/4/86 עד 17/4/86.

בתוך תקופת זו (10-14/4/86) תבקר המשלחת במצרים בחסות הגברת סוזאן מובאראק. המשלחת הנוכחית הנה פרויקט שנתי ממוסד של אגודת הידידות אמריקה-ישראל, ומהווה המשך של 'סמינר ירושלים לנשים מנהיגות', אשר בשנים קודמות ערך ארבעה סיורי לימודים ועם שובן המכו לשגרירות למען ישראל.

כל אחת מן המשתתפות משתייכת לצמרת שבמחוז עסוקה: ספרות, עמונות, קהילות אחניות מסדריב דתיים, ומקצועות חופשיים.

יום אחד מן הביקור יוקדש לדיאלוג עם עמיהותיהן למקצוע.

חברות העמותה בישראל אשר מסייעת בהכנת הסמינר הן: גב' רות דיון, גב' פנינה הרצוג, גב' רות הקוע, גב' ויויאן דיניץ וגב' שרה מלצר.

כלממשלחת בעבר נפגשה לשיחה עם נציג המדינה וראש הממשלה.

מארגנות המשלחת מבקשות להספיר פגישה עם ראש הממשלה, ופניה זו הנה על דעה כל הגורמים המטפלים בנושא.

המועד המוצע הוא: יום ד' 9/4/86 בשעה 09.00.

נודה על אישורכם.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

א.אגרון

מדינת ישראל

אוריאל
חאריך

אוריאל אוריאל

אל:

מאת: לשכת ראש-הממשלה.

אוריאל

אוריאל

אוריאל אוריאל

גלוביה
א"י - 235621
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אוריאל
אוריאל

קאז
אוריאל

אוריאל אוריאל

אוריאל
26/2/86

10.4

מדינת ישראל

26.3.86 תאריך

~~החלטה~~
היה

אל:

מאת: לשכת ראש-הממשלה.

~~החלטה~~

מלבד מקרה

לתיכנס אל

למטה הולכי

בדרכי הממשלה

היה (עם) את המטה

מאז ש

המטה מוכן ?

למה

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

תאריך: ו' בטבת תשמ"ו
18 בדצמבר 1985
מספר:

אל: לשכת ראש הממשלה
מאת: אריה אגרון, ס/מנהל המח' לאורחים רשמיים

הנדון: משלחת נשים מנהיגות מארה"ב וקנדה
Jerusalem International Forum

משלחת של עשרים נשים מנהיגות מארצות הברית וקנדה תבקרנה בישראל, בסיוע משרד-החוץ מ-4/4/86 עד 17/4/86.
בתוך תקופה זו (10-14/4/86) תבקר המשלחת במצרים בחסות הגברת סוזאל מובאראק. המשלחת הנוכחית הנה פרויקט שנתי ממוסד של אגודת הידידות אמריקה-ישראל, ומהווה המשך של "סמינר ירושלים לנשים מנהיגות", אשר בשנים קודמות ערך ארבעה סיורי לימודים ועם שובן הפכו לשגרירות למען ישראל.
כל אחת מן המשתתפות משתייכת לצמרת שבתחום עסוקה: ספרות, עתונות, קהילות אחניות מסדרים דתיים, ומקצועות חופשיים.
יום אחד מן הביקור יוקדש לדיאלוג עם עמיתותיהן למקצוע.
חברות העמותה בישראל אשר מסייעת בהכנת הסמינר הן: גב' רות דיין, גב' פנינה הרצוג, גב' רות תקוע, גב' ויויאן דיניץ וגב' שרה מלצר.
כל משלחת בעבר נפגשה לשיחה עם נשיא המדינה וראש הממשלה.
מארגנות המשלחת מבקשות להסדיר פגישה עם ראש הממשלה, ופניה זו הנה על דעת כל הגורמים המטפלים בנושא.
המועד המוצע הוא: יום ד' 9/4/86 בשעה 09.00.
נודה על אישורכם.

בברכה
א. אגרון

STUDY GUIDE

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Date

Name

Class

1. The first step in the scientific process is to ask a question.

2. A hypothesis is a testable prediction about the outcome of an experiment. It is often written in an "if-then" format. For example, "If I water a plant every day, then it will grow taller than a plant that is not watered." The hypothesis should be based on prior knowledge or observation.

3. The next step is to design an experiment to test the hypothesis. This involves identifying the independent variable (the factor being changed) and the dependent variable (the factor being measured). It also includes setting up a control group and an experimental group, and ensuring that all other conditions are kept constant.

4. After the experiment is conducted, data is collected and analyzed. This may involve calculating averages, creating graphs, or using statistical methods to determine if the results are significant. The results are then compared to the hypothesis to see if it was supported or refuted.

5. Finally, a conclusion is drawn based on the results. This may lead to a new hypothesis or a deeper understanding of the phenomenon being studied. The scientific process is iterative, and experiments are often repeated to verify results.

that is the only response. There will be consequences, but this demonstrates the U.S. cannot be pushed around.

D.N. - "The lines are drawn by the Libya, not the U.S.": America is at war, by Libya's choice. Khadafy's is an outlaw nation without precedent. Nations cannot be allowed to mount formal attacks on the U.S. and get away free. Europeans have a differing opinion. It is possible the U.S. will have to attack again. If it comes to that the U.S. must put forward for worldwide consumption convincing evidence of Libyan offenses.

N.D. - "A Necessary Response, a Powerful Message": If the administration had irrefutable evidence that Khadafy was responsible its attack was justified. For years the U.S. has tried to get the Europeans to go along with sanctions. Since they would not respond Monday's raid was inevitable. But the question remains did the raid accomplish anything. It almost certainly will not deter terrorism, but it does make the price higher. The raid also delivered a message to the European community that the U.S. will do what it has to with or without their support.

Columns:

Post - Feder - "Lesson for Khadafy - and his allies": In the air strikes on Libya, we kicked a dog that bit us once too often. It is unlikely that this will deter him from his past. Most Americans must understand Khadafy is a small part of the picture. If you want to strike a blow at Libyan sponsored terrorism, aid the contras. Khadafy has given \$400 million to the Sadinistas. Remember that the first link of terror is forged in the Soviet Union. They pour \$25 million in armaments into Libya. Now it is time to teach Libya's master a lesson he won't forget soon.

Post - Evans/Novak - "In the long run, we may regret it": The road ahead is going to be rough. Some say that the American retaliatory action may be viewed as anti-Islamic. Although Arab moderates would welcome permanent annihilation of Khadafy, to believe that can be done is to dream. The moderates fear the feedback throughout the Middle East from a cycle of anti-American terror and U.S. retaliation. It may be that the once close ties between the U.S. and the Arab Islamic M.E. will be corroded, a result never planned or intended by Reagan.

Post - Kaplan - "Round One with the N. African pirates": Monday's mission is strikingly similar to 200 years ago when the Barbary Pirates of Tripoli were reaking havoc on the high seas. In the end after attempts to negotiate and begging other European nations to join the fight failed. the Americans sent a powerful fleet, along with the British who decided to join them, and bombed the Algiers all along the Barbary Coast. The thieves were forced to

renounce their pirate ways. Then as now the Americans id what they had to do.

D.N. - Caldwell - "War of words in the Security Council": There was another mismatch in the Security Council. A diplomat spoke for the Libyans and a military man for the Americans. The meeting began at 12:30 the Libyan spoke, he fumbled and constantly called the U.K. Tel Aviv by mistake. The Gen. Walters spoke in a booming voice. He laid all the evidence on the table and by 1:10 it was all over. Gen. Walters had one the first round. A new American foreign policy is in place. The dollars went into the military and now the military is ready.

D.N. - Nelson - "When it's too late for diplomacy": The raid against Libya is a slap in the face for men of goodwill everywhere - and a well deserved one, they should day thank you I needed that. The Soviet Union's protests ring hollow. The allies who complain could easily have prevented the raid had they enforced effective economic sanctions. The only sensible reply to this current evil is "Bombs Away".

WSJ- House - "Mideast Standing Rises, but U.S. is asked for More": While much of the world reacts with fear and anger Israeli officials laud the air strike as a potential watershed in the fight against international terrorism. What worries Israeli and Arab officials who share a distaste for Khadafy is whether the U.S. will repeatedly "stand up" to him without ever bringing him down. Although only Israel is vocal about it, after speaking with officials in Egypt and Jordan indicates that other moderate Arabs are as happy to get rid of Khadafy. Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin worries that Libya could now strike a new deal with Iran whose hatred for the America runs deep. For many in the Middle East Khadafy is just a side show. They worry about Syria's instability.

WSJ- Collmer - "Papandreou Doesn't Speak for Greece on Libya": The bombing gave the Greek Prime Minister a chance to expouse more anti-American rhetoric but the Greek public breathed a sigh of relief. Mr. Papandreou's statements is taken as evidence that most of the Greek population is anti-American, this is not true. A mere 20 Greek leftists protested outside the U.S. embassy. the silent majority stayed home.

NYT- Reston - "Unanswered Questions": Why was the President on the air a week before the raid warning Libya of an attack if this was suppose to be a surprise. If the administration thought this would end terrorism why are all our embassies on alert. We can't know if the raid was a success this earlier, despite such proclamations. What is beginning to be debated is if the President really assessed the effect the bombing raid would have on relations with our allies and the Soviets. There are clearly doubts here that are not being expressed in public.

Post - Fallon - "Libya paid a price - and so will we": The next terrorist strikes may well be here on American soil. but doing

nothing has had its consequences too. The French given their own experience would have been wiser to let us fly through their air space. Trying diplomacy before acting is rooted in American history i.e. the pirates on the Barbary coast. Khadafy was caught this time with the smoking gun.

N.D. - Beeman - "Attack on Libya Really Targeted Syria, Iran, PLO": What are Reagan's real reason for the attack since he must know it will not really curb terrorism. He would really like to make a military strike in the Middle East. This has been a warning to Syria. The U.S. knows it can only rile Assad at Israel's peril and Lebanon. Washington would also like to attack Iran but has no immediate reason. He doesn't know where to find the PLO. He is hoping anyone of the three will now make a move giving him reason to act. Americans may regret that Reagan has acted on such flimsy reasoning and made it easier to escalate action in the area at the drop of a hat.

N.D. - Kahn - "The Tool We've Forgotten: Law": Military power has regained a powerful place among the tools of U.S. diplomacy. Western civilization has struggled with the problem of subjecting the international use of force to a legal order. Deliberate killing was not an acceptable means of achieving political objectives. The UN charter prohibits threats of force in international relations. The Reagan administration has lost sight of the fact that wars kill individuals not political abstractions. Law has been the voice of reason the new Reagan realism is not realism but the most profound ignorance, an ignorance of history.

N.D. - Anderson - "How U.S. Bombs Help Keep Khadafy in Power": Left alone disgruntled Libyans might soon have taken care of Khadafy. High civilian casualties will likely lend support to the Col. He is ripe for a military coup. Khadafy has lost popularity year by year. Khadafy's declaration of a "state of the masses" has led to a spread of disaffection, particularly among the well educated. . . However patriotism and national pride have not been eroded. This campaign of intimidation might well prolong Khadafy's rule.

Press Reports:

NYT- Weinraub - pg. 1 - "U.S. hails Libya Raid a Success": The Reagan administration said that the american bombing has damaged Libya's ability to direct and control the export of international terrorism.

N.D. - Bell- The Pentagon reported today that because of heavy cloud cover they were not sure how precisely accurate the bombing raids wre. Perhaps civilian targets and European embassies were hot. Preliminary reports say that attacks on five military

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targets were successful.

N.D. - The streets of Tripoli were ghostly quiet today. Libyans seemed generally shocked. Despite American warning of the attack no precautions were taken. (NYT, WSJ)

WSJ - As many as a dozen Soviet MIGs were damage in the air raids.

NYT - pg. 1 - Schumacher - "Wide Damage Seen; Daughter of Qaddafi Is Said to Have Died": A number of military targets were reportedly hit including the compound of Col. Khadafy. Among those reported dead was Khadafy's 18 month old daughter and two of his sons were injured.

NYT - A doctor that treated the family said that Khadafy's wife was in shock. The Col. according to most reports was not injured. the doctor said there was terror among the family. (N.D., Post, D.N.)

D.N. - Colvin - The whereabouts of Khadafy were not known and he has not been seen or heard from since the attack on his capital. Libyan television offered footage of what they said was a meeting between the Libyan leader and the Soviet ambassador. It is not known whether Khadafy survived the raid on his compound.

Reaction:

N.D. - Many young children in the states are reportedly frightened that Libya might attack the U.S. Teachers across N.Y.C. introduced the discussion in classroom of the current events.

NYT - Sciolino - At a meeting of the U.N. Security Council American representative Walters called the bombing of Libya an act of self-defense. The Soviet delegate condemned the act. The meeting was called at the request of Libya, Syria, Oman and Burkina Faso. The Libyan representative said that American planes had attacked residential areas. He said the attack was unprovoked.

West Europe Critical

NYT - Dionne - Most allies in Western Europe criticized the attack on Libya and France defended its decision not to allow American planes to fly over its territory, saying that European countries themselves should respond to the Libyan terrorist threat in Europe. Britain stood alone in supporting the US. However, many Western European leaders linked their criticism of the US with condemnations of Libya.

Americans Back Bombings

WSJ - Americans gave Reagan broad initial approval for ordering military action against Libya, but they voiced deep misgivings over whether the assault will deter terrorism. A WSJ/NBC News Poll said that 40% of Americans think the US action will cause more terrorism, 23% believe it will stop terrorism, 23% say it will make no difference and 14% are unsure.

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Soviets Cancel Meeting With Shultz

NY-AP (Moscow) The Soviet Union canceled a planning meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze to arrange a summit and accused the US of threatening world peace by attacking Libya. The Soviet Foreign Minister was to visit Washington May 14-16. The Soviets warned that such actions "cannot but affect relations between the Soviet Union and the United States."

US Aides Provide Details on Paris Plot Tied to Libya

NYT-special-US officials said that Libyan agents had planned a daytime grenade and machine-gun attack on the American visa office in Paris that could have killed or wounded dozens of people. US intelligence officials said Khadafy was probably enraged by the attack, which Libyan officials said killed one of his children and wounded 2 others. "We can expect Khadafy to go all out in seeking revenge. We have not seen the end of this," an official said.

Parley in India Condemns Bombings

NYT-Weisman-The foreign ministers of 21 nations espousing non-alignment joined with P.M. Gandhi in sharply condemning US bombings in Libya, and likening them to acts of terrorism. Gandhi said the non-aligned movement "extends its firm support and solidarity to Libya in this critical hour."

China Condemns Raid

NYT-special-China officially condemned the US attack on Libya, but the wording of the statement and balanced coverage of the attack in the official press suggested at least some understanding for the American decision to strike.

Lawmakers Say US Failed to Consult Them Properly

NYT-Roberts-Congressional leaders from both parties asserted that the Administration had failed to consider their views adequately before ordering the air raid against Libya and that Congress should be consulted more closely before any future counterterrorist actions. There was widespread support on Capitol Hill for the attack.

Pilots' Group Votes to Boycott Nations Promoting Terrorism

NYT-Witkin-The International Air Line Pilots Association has authorized boycotts of countries that promote terrorist acts against civilian aviation or fail to provide adequate airport security, the 60-nation group announced.

Latest Military Equipment Used in Libyan Attack

NYT-Hohr-Clouds over Libya seriously hampered bomb damage assessment by US reconnaissance satellites, the Pentagon said. Despite that, the Dept. of Defense said the US raids had damaged 3-5 medium Soviet

built bombers and 5-12 MIG-23 fighter planes and destroyed three hangars filled with MIG spare parts. Fire from Libyan surface-to-air missiles were said to be heavy. The US is still unsure if the missing aircraft was struck by antiaircraft fire. (see explanation and drawings of how the F-111's hit Libyan targets)

Raid Seen As Short-Term Risk With Long Term Gain

WSJ-p.1-Kelley & Merry-The US raid exposes the US to considerable risks including threats of increased terrorism, worsening relations with the Soviet Union and divisions within his own alliance. But Reagan calculates that the display of US determination to retaliate against state-sponsored terrorism will advance his security goals by showing the world that the US will defend itself rather than acquire an image of helplessness. Many experts believe that the diplomatic benefits will accrue to the president over time. In any case, Syria has more control over a large terrorist training area. Attacking Libya has addressed only part of the terrorist problem. A senior administration official ruled out a like attack on Syria. Syria's ability to influence the Mideast peace process and its closer ties with the Soviet Union require "a more subtle approach," he said.

Bomb Threats Disrupt Day in Washington

NYT-Franklin-Bomb threats to offices of Gov't agencies and news organizations disrupted activity around the capital. The police said the telephone threats had been the work of cranks rather than terrorists. But a police officer said there are many bomb threats every day. Due to the Libyan affair the threats got more coverage than usual.

Business Travel

WSJ-scores of businesses with operations abroad say they have already stepped up precautions against terrorism before this week's events, and say that there is little more they can do short of forsaking the markets abroad.

Pro-Israeli Militia Reported to Mistreat Arab-American

NYT-Shipler (Washington) The State Dept. and the Israeli Embassy said that an Arab-American was mistreated after his arrest in southern Lebanon by the SLA in February. Ghazi Dubaja said he had been tortured with electric shocks and lighted cigarettes. The State Dept. expressed "strong concerns" to Israel about the incident, a spokesman said. Dubaja said that an Israeli supervised the torture. Yossi Gal said that the SLA used methods unacceptable to Israel. He said that there was no Israelis involved in the torture and that when Israeli officers intervened, they transferred Dubaja from militia custody to a detention center and was then turned over to US officials. Gal provided unusually detailed intelligence reports to support an accusation that Dubaja had acted as an agent of a Shiite Moslem guerrilla movement, and at the time of his arrest was plotting to kill four SLA officers. (cabled)

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American Aide Shot in Sudan

NYT-Gwertzman-p.1-An American communications specialist at the US Embassy in the Sudan was shot in the head by an unknown assailant while driving in his car. State Dept. officials said the Sudan was one of 10 African nations that the White House said has been chosen by Libya recently as locales for attacks on Americans and American installations. But the dept. declined to blame Libya officially for the attack.

US Companies Still in Libya

NYT-Feuer-A Treasury official said that 10 or 11 American companies were operating in Libya under special licenses granted in Feb. after Reagan severed economic relations with Libya.

OPEC

NYT-Daniels-Oil analysts said that because of important changes in the oil market over the last decade there was virtually no threat of an oil embargo in retaliation for the American actions against Libya. Libya's call for such a response was immediately rejected at an OPEC meeting in Geneva. (see NYT-Tagliabue)

Catholics Laud Pope's Visit to Synagogue

NYT-p.1-Berger-Roman Catholic leaders in the US believe that the Pope's visit to a synagogue will foster important changes in Catholic attitudes about Jews and undermine lingering anti-Semitism. Some ecumenical officials suggested that the visit might subtly affect the future of Vatican recognition of Israel.

War Crimes Trial in Yugoslavia

NYT-Kaufman-Andrija Artukovic, the Croat accused of being a war criminal, said that when he was Interior Minister in the Nazi puppet regime, he never knew that Serbs, Jews and Gypsies were being killed, and he denied ever visiting any death camps established by the Gov't he served. Artukovic showed none of the senility ascribed to him by his defense lawyers. To this day there is no consensus among Yugoslavs about the extent of the barbarity or the context in which persecution took place.

Letters

NYT-New Yorker who was in Gaza last year adds to Friedman's article on the area. He says that a high proportion of Gaza licensed automobiles were Mercedeses and Volvos, with a fair mix of Subarus, hardly like Soweto.

NYT-Two authors describe articles they wrote about Waldheim and Army Group E many years ago.

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אל: מצפ"א.

בית הנבחרים: סיוע חוץ

היום (16) הופיעו מרפי, גאסט וגרינליץ מא.י.ד בפני ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות בוועת
 ההקצבות בראשות המורשה דיויד אובי. עדויותיהם (אשר לא הוקראו אלא סוכמו) במלואן
 בדיפ'. נכחו המורשים אובי ולסירוגין מקהיר, לואיס ומוזק.

בפחה הישיבה הביע אובי אי-נוחות רבים מכך ששליש מסך בקשת הסיוע מיועדת לישראל ולמצרים,
 וההשלכות לגבי תוכניות אחרות. אשר לסיוע למדינות ק.ד., הוא מיועד לקיים הבטחות למדינות
 הללו וגם לתח לארה"ב גישה הנחוצת לעודד התקדמות. אובי אינו משוכנע שציפיה זו התממשה.
 אשר ללוב, אין חברים המפקפקים בצדקת הפעולה אך השאלה היא: מה מדיניות ארה"ב כלפי לוב
 ומה מטרתה.

בפחה דבריו התייחס מרפי לביקור האחרון במז"ת, ולו שתי מטרוח: א. להחלוח לטגן הנשיא
 בביקור שנועד להפגין תמיכת ארה"ב במאמצי ההגנה העצמית של מדינות המפרץ וב. זוומסקו
 ביחסי מצרים-ישראל, הפועלות מזה חודשים באינטנסיביות לטפר יחטיהן (מנה דוגמאות).
 הדגש בביקור היה הנושאים הנוחרים לרבות טאבה. ההחלטה על בוררות היתה חיובית ויש סיבה
 לקוות שבקרוב נראה בעיה זאת מאחורינו.

תהליך השלום: רוב 85 הוקדשה לשאלות נוהל עד שהמלך הגיע לקץ דרכו עם ערפאת ב-2.86. המלך
 החבטא צבוח והיטב (נאומו בבית הלבן ובעצרת) אך הדגיש בכל העת שלא יוכל להתקדם בלא
 פלשתינאים. כעת ארה"ב, ירדן ישראל והפלשתינאים בשלב של REFLECTION. אין חוכנית
 אב לקידום התהליך אך יש שיחות. מתמקדים בתוכנית המזכיר לאיכות חיים בשטחים, אשר אינה
 התחמקות מהתהליך הפוליטי אלא נועדה לטפר את האוירה לקראתו. קהיר נקטה צעד חשוב בק.ד.,
 בהבנה שלא יהיה פתרון נפרד ולכן היא מוטרדת ממצב העניינים. אי לכך היא פועלת כלפי
 ירדן והפלשתינאים לעודדם להתקרב. המלך עודנו מעוניין מאד בתהליך. הפלשתינאים מחולקים,
 אינם יודעים כיצד לפעול יש הרואים את אש"פ כמנהיגם אך מאוכזבים שלא פעל באופן החלטי
 כאשר היתה הזדמנות. לשאלת מרפי של "מה יוצא לארה"ב מההשקעה", הרי שיש שלום בין ישראל
 למצרים. האם ארה"ב פשוט going through the motions? לא. היא נכונה לסייע
 לצדדים אך כדברי המזכיר, לא תכפה פתרון.

לוב: לא יכול להוסיף הרבה מעבר לנאמר. ארה"ב אינה מנסה לחסל את קדאפי או לבחור עבור
 הלובים מנהיג אלא מנסה להבהיר לו עמדתה הנחושה כלפי טרור. יש עדויות שהוא נחלש,
 ושהמודעות בעולם לצורך להתמודד עם טרור, גוברת. אובי הרבה לשאול אל המטך מעורבות

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חברות נפט אמריקאיות שם. מרפי ישיב לוקרד

המורשה לואיס שאל על מצרים. לדבריו, על ארה"ב לחדול לסייע כלכלית למשטרים טוטליטריים. גרינליץ מנה קטייה והצעדים שנקטה לאחרונה. לואיס: בשש השנים האחרונות לא ראה שיפור, אנשים עודם רעבים והסיוע ממשיך לזרום. בנוסף, הוא מוטרד שמצרים הביעה - *alarm and strong resentment* כלפי פעולת ארה"ב בלוב, כלומר תמכה באויב ותיק מול הירידה המסייעת. מרפי לא שמע החגובה הנ"ל אולם מדובר בחגובה ריטואליסטית של הליגה הערבית למדינה קטנה המותקפת על ידי מעצמה. לואיס: החגובה הריטואליסטית אינה מקובלת עליו. זוהי הזדמנות לדרוש ממצרים התייחסות אחרת. מרפי: קדאפי, אף שהוא שנוא, נשאר במשפחה הערבית. לואיס בכ"ז כדאי לבדוק את תועלת הדולרים המוזרמים למצרים ולישראל. מרפי וגרינליץ יבינו על טבעי מצרים לחגביר שתיים הסקטור הפרטי והציבורי.

עוד שאל לואיס על הלבאי והערכת מחירו. גאטט השיב ששתי הממשלות פועלות באוירה טובה לפטר בין הערכות המחירים. ארה"ב הביעה *concern* לגבי השלכות העלות הגבוהה על תקציבי ישראל אולם על ישראל להחליט וארה"ב לא מנסה להשפיע. בהמשך ביקש אובי הדרכת הממשל לגבי הלבאי-בניקורו בארץ לפני שנה שמע מישראלים ספקות לגבי כדאיותו.

מרזק שאל על מצב תהליך השלום והשפעת רצח אל-מצרי. מרפי: אל-מצרי, שאושר על ידי ישראל, ירדן ואש"פ, היה האובייקט האידיאלי לרוצים לחבל בתהליך. יש הוכחות שחוסל ע"י אנשי חבש. בכ"ז אינו סבור שהרצח *derailed* את העניין הפלשתינאי אם כי אין וודאות כיצד לקדמו. מנהיגים פלשתינאים אינם יודעים כיצד לסייע לעמם מבלי להתפס כמשתפי פעולה. ז"א נמצאים בפסק זמן. בו זמנית יש תוכניות שישראל יומה כגון החזרת שטחים שהיו בידי צה"ל לתושבים. הן ירדן והן רה"מ פרס מעוניינים בשיפור איכות החיים.

מרזק התעניין האם התהליך יוכל להתקדם אם סוריה תפעל לחסמו. מרפי: מדיניות סוריה היא תמיד גורם. מרזק: האם באינטרס שלהם שהפלשתינאים יהיו מחולקים ואלים? מרפי: סוריה מעוניינת להיות מעורבת בתהליך, לא יכול לשער מה תעשה לחסמו. היא היתה חשדנית כלפי הסכם חוסיין-ערפאת, אינו סבור שהתנגדותה תמנע ממישהו לבוא לשולחן. אך על כל הצדדים לקחת בחשבון את השפעתה.

מרזק ביקש לדעת האם יש אסטרטגיה לטווח קצר שתאספר יתו' אוטונומיה. מרפי: זה קורה בשקט ולאט. מרזק: מה דעת מרפי על העיסמות והאלימות שכופה מאיר כהנא בקיצוניותו. מרפי: הוא אינו מייצג הציבור בארץ. יש החושבים זגרוש ערבים יפתור הבעיה, יש החושבים שחזרה למצב 67, אך אף אחת מהאפשרויות לא תקרה. מצטער שצעירים אינם מתקרבים ויש סטריאוטיפים אך בישראל, ירדן ובקרב פלשתינאים יש המעוניינים בפתרון רציונלי.

440

0010 0000

3.97... מחור... 3... דפים

טווג בטחוני

דחיות

מאריך וז"ח

מס' פנר

אובי חזר שוב לרמת הסיוע: 92 בליון תחת הממשל הנוכחי, ומאז ק.ד. לא נחתם הסכם. היתה תקווה שהצדדים יסתדרו ביניהם אך זה לא קרה. שמא עלינו להציע אלטרנטיבות? האם נראה התקדמות בשנים הקרובות? טאדאח בא לירושלים כי "הפחידו" אותו שבריה"ם תצורף לתהליך. אולי הגיע הזמן שוב להפחיד משהו? מרפי: קיבלנו בברכה מאמצי חוסיין לא דיברנו על תוכן - השארנו זאת למו"ם. חוסיין עשה מאמץ כן בינואר, חשבנו שאשיף יענה על דרישותנו (החלטות או"ם, הכרה, אלימות) אך לא עשה זאת. את הפרמטרים לעמדתנו הגדרנו ביוזמת ריגאן (1.9.82), אינו שש לפרט מעבר לכך. סיני לא הווה לישראל את הבעית שמהווה יו"ש, לכן אין וודאות לגבי תוצאות מו"ם, כך אמרנו לחוסיין. מנסים לבדוק מה ניתן לעשות אך תחילה על אנשי האזור לרצות התקדמות. אובי: מבין החשש לנטות שניה אחרי דחיית תוכניות ריגאן ע"י העולם הערבי (מרפי - ירדן לא דחתה) אך לאור הסיוע הנכבד, אינו רואה מה ישראל או מצרים עושות - האם נראה התקדמות? מרפי: יש התקדמות צבאית וכלכלית. שיפור הכלכלות יצמצם הצורך בסיוע.

אובי שאל האם סגן הנשיא ביקש מהסעודים דבר לגבי תהליך השלום. מרפי התייחס לתוכנית פז, אמר שסעודיה תסכים למה שירדן והפלסטינאים יסכימו ביניהם אך לא תוכל בהתהליך. טרב לפרט תוכן השיחות מעבר לכך.

כלכלת ישראל. אובי הזכיר מאמר פיישר בוול סטריט ג'ורנל, שאל על התקדמות והאם הישראלים יעמדו בהתחייבותם ש-1.5 בליון היה חד פעמי. מרפי: מנה השיפורים, אמר שתוכנית הייצוב עדיין פגיעה, הוצאות הממשלה עודן הבעיה המרכזית, אין סימנים שישראל תבקש טוב סיוע מיוחד.

העסקה הסעודית - אובי מעוניין לדעת האם לאור עיתוי אספקת הציוד הטיעונים בדבר היותה אות לתמיכה תופסים. מרפי: בנוסף לצורך הצבאי (גאסט מאשר) זהו איתות חיוני של תמיכה פוליטית בסעודיה נוכח הצלחות אירן.

נשק לירדן. אובי: אשתקד אמר המלך שהיחסים הצבאיים חוסלו. האם לממשל כוונות לגבי העסקה שנדחתה? מרפי: אין תוכניות להחיות את העסקה. ברור שהמלך יחפש את צרכיו בנשק אצל אחרים, כנראה אירופאים, אשר להם אין עניין ביציבות האזור כמו לארה"ב. כ"כ דחיית העסקה סיבכה מגעי חוסיין בהתהליך - נוצר רושם שארה"ב אינה רצינית.

התכנית הטריטרלית למחקר ארה"ב-ישראל-מצרים: אובי אמר שנתבקש ע"י ווקסמן להעלות הנושא. גרינליף השיב שהתוכנית אמנם קוצצה ב-86 אך ל-87 שוב ביקש א.י.ד 508 מליון. התכנית מתבצעת לשביעות רצון כולם.

אגה היצ
טובה הרצל

ס ל ק ס
ד 97 מתוך דפים
סווג בשחוני...? ד?
דחירות...? ל?
מאריך וז"ח... א... 16. 1900
ס ל ק ס

אלו המשרד

439

אל: מצפ"א. ערב ו.

ירדן ודחיית עסקת הנשק

לדניס ניל חברת שדולה הפועלת מטעם מדינות ערביות אחדות. ב-16 שוחחתי עם אחת מעובדותיו (שמה אינו זכור לי) אשר חזרה לפני יומיים מביקור בירדן, ולדבריה נפגשה עם "כולס" חוץ מהמלך שהיה גיוויל.

לדבריה הכעס והאכזבה כלפי ארה"ב בגלל דחיית העסקה עודם קשים. הרחיה היתה הטעון המרכזי של הסובייטים כאשר שכנעו את ערפאת שלא להענות לדרישות ארה"ב והמלך בנושא התהליך המדיני-אם ארה"ב אינה מקיימת הבטחותיה ליריד ותיק כמו חוסיין, אין סיבה שתהיה אמינה כלפי ערפאת. המושא העיקרי לכעס הוא איפא"ק אשר פועל לא לקידום תהליך השלוש באזור אלא מטרתו העיקרית היא להוכיח מי שולט במדינות החוץ של ארה"ב. בכל פעם שהמלך התקדם עוד צעד, העלה והגביר איפא"ק את דרישותיו מהמלך בטרם יסכים לאישור העסקה. גם לו הסכים לאי-לוחמה היה איפא"ק עומד בשלו.

לא גילתה בירדן אופטימיות לגבי אופן המשך התהליך, כאשר לחוסיין אין שותפים. הסכימה שמוטב שהמלך יטפח מנהיגות פלסטינאים מתונה ואמת שעושה כך. שוחחה למעשה משעה עם שה"ח, שעדיין נתון תחת השפעה קשה של קצח קרובו, ר"ע שכס. לא פרטה. חזרה וביקשה שתוכן השיחה ועצם קיומה יישאר ביננו...

טובה הרצל

מ"מ 2
מ"מ 3
מ"מ 1
מ"מ 3
מ"מ 1
מ"מ 1
מ"מ 1
מ"מ 1
מ"מ 4
מ"מ 4

ס ז ר כ

דך.....פתוך.....דפים

סווג בסחונני סודי

דחיסות...מיידי

תאריך וזיחה...אפר' 16 1730

436...מס' פתח

אלו המשרד

אל: מצפ"א.

הארועים בלוב

- א. הצטרפתי לציר שזומן אל סודארט לפגישה בה נכח גם וילקוקס. סודארט הסביר הרקע לפעולתם ואמר שחזרכו במקביל שגרירי ערב ומדינות OECD וכן שלחו לשגרירותם בת"א תדרוך בהתאם.
- בדבריו ציין שזה 1. צעד מדוד כתגובה על 10 שנות פרובוקציה, כאשר סנקציות כלכליות, תפרונים צבאיים ועוד, לא סייעו.
- 2. תגובה על פעולות שהיו וכאלה שתוכננו ולא בוצעו.
- 3. המטרה הייתה להעביר מסר ברור
- 4. שומרים על אופציות
- 5. אין בכל הני"ל חידוש.

לערבים, אמר סודארט, הם מדגישים שאין זו פעולה נגדם אלא נגד מישהו מסויים. הציר שאל וסודארט אמר שתגובתם LOW KEY (הסורי למשל שאל על נפגעים אזרחיים). הציר הביע עמדתו הידועה בקשר לפעולה ושמע על התגובות בעולם הערבי (ללא חידוש מצד סודארט) אך אמר שהמטרים המתונים היו רוצים לראות בנפילת משטר קדאפי.

ב. וזינו ג'צל ווודמנרת לסארל על מפגש אסד - מרסי וסודארט אמר שהעבירו ה- CONCERNS שלנו לגבי הבקאע. כן שב ועלה כללית נושא טאבה ובמסגרתו מכלול הקשרים שלנו וציפיותינו מהמצרים.

תכנית כלכלית למזי"ת

ג. בעניין זה אמר סודארט שהנושא הועלה במסגרות שונות עם האירופאים ועם היפאנים. טרם הייתה בידו התגובה היפאנית אך האירופיות שעמן דיברו הסכימו עם הניתוח, ידונו בנושא ויעבירו תשובתם. לא היתה דחיה על הסף אך העירו שתי הערות: יש להן תוכניות קיימות כבר עתה במזי"ת - כיצד ישראל תוכל להכלל בתוכנית פיתוח אזורית כל עוד הערבים אינם יושבים עמה לשיחות שלום.

הגורמים שדובר עמם היו: הצרפתים (באלאדור) - האיטלקים והקנדים (וייטהד וסודארט) הגרמנים (שולץ), הנורדיות ושווייץ (מקפרסון) המזכיר גם שוחח עם אבה מיפאן. טרם דובר עם הבריטים.

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אל: המשרד

ס נ ק ס
ד... 2... 1...
סודי
סווג בסיוני
מידי
דחיות
אפר' 16 1745

435

אל: מצפ"א. ממ"ד

משיחה עם פיטר רודמן

א. לוב

(1) בעקרון כבר משנערכה פעולת מפרץ סידרה, שבעיני אישום מסויימים בממשל היה ברור כי אינה מספקת, היתה ההנחה כי אין זה הסוף, כיוון שתגובה לובית תבוא ובהכרח תגרור תגובות נגד אמריקניות. הפנטגון, שבמשרד תקופה ארוכה היסס בקשר לתגובות צבאיות, השתכנע אט אט והפיצוץ בדיסקוטה בברלין שפגע באנשי צבא אמריקנים אולי תרם לשכנוע הסופי הנשיא, שכבר היה ב"מצב הרוח" המתאים.

(2) מכל מקום, כאמור, היה ברור שהדברים הולכים לקראת המשך מיד עם פעולת סידרה, כך שתהליך קבלת ההחלטות ברגע שנתברר כי ידם של הלובים מאחורי המעשה בברלין - היה מהיר למדי. היתה קבוצת עבודה קטנה למדי בראשות פורטיר (ובהשתתפות טייכר) עם נציגות מחמ"ד (ארני רפאל) והפנטגון. הקושי היה איתור היעדים. במקביל הוחל בהכנת ההתבטאויות הפומביות הנחוצות. כשלב מאוחר יותר צורף גם ייעוץ משפטי (כנראה סופר) ואז הוכנס טיעון ההגנה העצמית, הפרופורציות וכ"ו. אגב, תאוצר ייחסה חשיבות להמנעות מפגיעה באזרחים כגורם מפתח בתמיכתה.

(3) תגובת הסובייטים כלשעצמה (ביטול מפגש שרי החוץ) אינה מובנת עד תום לאיש שיחי, שכן אינו סבור שיש להם אינסרס כלשהו לתמוך בקדאפי. יש לראות זאת אולי כצעד זול, שגם יסייע להם במפגש הצלחתי יותר בניו-דלהי.

(4) אם משטר קדאפי ייפול כתוצאה מהעניין (ושרות אלה נכתבות בשעות של שמועות על מותו, אך מחמ"ד אמרו לנו כי אין שום אישור ויש גם שמועות על היותו במדינה אחרת) - תהא זו יתוצאת לוואי לא רעה של הפרשה.

(5) המצרים פרטיח⁶⁷ ביוכו על הפעולה האמריקנית (דבר לא בלתי צפוי כמובן). ערבים שונים אמרו לאמריקאים שכלל שהפעולה תהא קטלנית יותר כך ייטב.

(6) השאלה היא העתיד. בכך אין הערכות ברורות. יש הסבורים כי הפעולה לא היתה חזקה די, אך כמובן גורם האזרחים היה גורם חשוב בקביעת היעדים.

(7) הערה: כדאי לשים לב לנקודה שלא הודגשה כאן רבות - זוהי הפעם הראשונה מזה שנים רבות

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סו ל ס - ס נ ר כ
ד... מתוך... דפים
סוג בסחונני
דחיות
תאריך וז"ח
435
סס' מברק

שארתי"ב נקטה בפעולה צבאית ישירה מסוג כזה.

ב. תהליך השלום

אינו רואה סיכוי רב למפגש "קבוצות עבודה" (ממקור אחר אני שומע כי סניורה שהיה כאן אמנם עשה רושם אישי חיובי על ערביסטים במחמ"ד ונראה כמאמין בתהליך של שלום, ואף טען שהוא פועל למען מפגש כזה, אך אין תולים בו רוב תקוות).

רונישטיץ

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ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח קט"ח. ניו יורק

WED - APRIL 16 - חדר דובר ממ"ד ליוה

Q On the Middle East. Did Israel offer the United States an apology in the case of the torture of an American of Arabic heritage from Detroit, Michigan and did Israel also give the United States any assurances that this violation of rights of an American citizen would not be repeated in the future?

MR. KALB: What I have is that the government of Israel acknowledged that this is a serious matter and promised to undertake a full investigation and advised the United States of its findings.

Q Can you offer more on the story, on the issue, more than it was in the papers from your perspective?

MR. KALB: Really not more than I had yesterday and one of the elements in that position is that we have no privacy waiver for Mr. Dabaja and so there is really nothing I can add beyond what I said yesterday, registering our strong concerns with Israel, based upon evidence of of serious mistreatment including Mr. Dabaja's sworn statements and personal observation of his

physical condition at the time of his release observed by embassy officials. When I was asked --

Q Bernie --

MR. KALB: Just a moment, if I may. When I was asked yesterday, well, if you're talking in these terms, why can't you be specific about what, in fact, was observed -- and I tried to get some information on that, and the reply is that because there is no privacy waiver, I'm not in the position to be able to provide the details that are being sought.

Q To the knowledge or recollection of the State Department, is the first American of Arabic heritage who was tortured by the Israelis or are there other cases?

MR. KALB: I'm not accepting the premise of your question and I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Can you look into the cases?

MR. KALB: I'll take a look and see what's possible without any certainties of replies.

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the name "Bernie" and various numbers and symbols.

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מל: המשרד | בסחון, | ניו יורק
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אל : הסברה, מעיית, מצפייא, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לשי רוחיים, לעימ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קטי"ח

NEWS SUMMARY - WED. - APRIL 16, 1986

דע : ניו יורק

EDITORIALS

CHRISTIAN SCI. MON. - 16/4 - "Jewish-Catholic Relations: A Reconciliation In Rome" In the first papal visit to a synagogue, Pope John II last weekend made an important gesture of reconciliation between the Roman Catholic Church and Italian and world Jewry. Discrimination requires ongoing vigilance. In America, where Jews, especially since WWII, have found particular haven, there remains concern over fundamentalist Christian efforts to promote a "Christian America" doctrine. Given such exclusivist tendencies in quite different cultures and traditions, it is important to embrace the distinctness and fraternity of the several Christian, Jewish and other religious traditions.

WASH. TIMES - 16/4 - "Storm Over Auschwitz" A year and a half ago a handful of Carmelite nuns, a cloistered order of Catholic sisters who devote their lives to prayer, took up residence near the Auschwitz-Birkenau Nazi death camp in Poland. Now demands have been made that Auschwitz be preserved strictly as a monument to the Jewish Holocaust and that the Caremlite sisters be removed. Auschwitz-Birkenau was a tragedy that affected humanity as a whole. But it must never be forgotten that millions of non-Jews also died at the hands of the Nazis. Rather than seek the removal of the nuns, the Jewish groups may wish to construct a synagogue similar to the one at Cachau. What better way to honor the memory of each and every victim.

WASH. POST - 15/4 - "The Morning After" The morning after the U.S. raid on Libya, people around the world began taking up what turned out to be rather predictable places in the spectrum of opinion on these matters. But what caught our special attention yesterday was the reaction of France and Britain. Libyan terror is a tough one for Europeans. They have long feared that the mutual repulsion of Reagan and Qaddafi has taken on the aspect of a personal duel. Owing can be the debt of a lackey. It can also be the free offering of a friend who understands the purpose of alliance. The moment is something of a lonely one for the US. It is good to have British company.

WASH. TIMES - 16/4 - "Reload" The U.S. has taken a shot at the point man of terrorism. Ignoring him would have betokened our unseriousness about this threat. The "root cause" of Mideast terrorism is said to be the Palestinian problem, but the Qaddafis and the Assads and the Khomeinis will not give up terrorism so long as Israel exists. And even if Israel disappeared tomorrow, terrorism against the US would not

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Terrorism is a way to attack the West, and the political benefits are obvious. Terrorism is not a one country phenomenon. The enemy is numerous and widely dispersed. This will be a long and costly war, and a just one.

THE SUN - 15/4 - "What Next?" Having a bash at Kadafi, for all the military skills required, was the comparatively easy part. Now comes the hard task for US policy, which is to achieve gains in combating terrorism, and to contain the inevitable anti-American backwash. Libya obtains Arab rhetoric against the US easily, but meaningful policies are something else. The US should make every effort to dissuade any country from severing ties with us - as Libya, Syria and Iran advocate - or even recalling an ambassador. The US confrontation must not be allowed to degenerate into an American quarrel with the Arab world, which it never was. Effective reduction of world-wide terrorism, will require greater international cooperation than was necessary to conduct the bombing raid.

COLUMNS

* WASH. POST - Richard Cohen - "An Israeli Example" The US may have to follow the example of Israel to ensure the safety of its own citizens and those of any country who choose to fly U.S. airlines. It may have to insist, as the Israelis do, that you arrive at the airport two hours before departure and that security agents go slowly and methodically through your luggage. When it comes to terrorism, thought one gauge has to be the airline you choose to fly, Given a choice, I would pick El Al. It's because I know that every one of my fellow passengers has been searched down to the toenails. And I know, too, that the job has been done by security agents who have been trained for the job - not rent a cope who were guarding a warehouse the week before. The fight against terrorism cannot be conducted by fighter planes from the air; it must be conducted by dreary, routine work on the ground. (This article was cabled in full today.)

WASH. POST - Evans & Novak - "Qaddafi's Shadow" Although danger signals from Ambassador Vernon Walters' talks with US allies did not divert Reagan from Air Force reprisals against Qaddafi, they carried a warning: the future cycle of antiterrorist retaliation could drive the US out of the Islamic world. IF rising terror against Americans produces more retaliation, pro-Western Arab leaders will soon be faced with pressures from political and religious activists to pull away from the US connection. One European leader suggested to Walters that US retaliation could soon mirror the long and counter-productive cycle of Israeli reprisals against the PLO. The president's envoy was told that the Arab and Islamic worlds would view the US-Israel partnership as even closer. Moderates admit privately they would welcome a swift blow that could permanently inoculate the Mideast from Qaddafi

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THE PRESS REPORTS

***U.S. Protests Alleged Israeli Torture Case (Article from April 15 - Tuesday

WASH. POST - Ottaway - The US has protested to Israel the alleged torture of an Arab American who contends he was brutally mistreated during five weeks in an Israeli-supervised detention center after he was arrested in early Feb. in south Lebanon. The allegations of torture, including beatings, electrical shocks and burning with a cigarette, are contained in an affidavit filed with the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv by Ghazi Dabaja of Dearborn, Mich. The Israeli Embassy last night said Dabaja's allegations that an Israeli officer was involved in his torture were "totally baseless." Spokesman Yossi Gal said Dabaja had been arrested on suspicion of involvement in the planned assassination of four officers of the SLA. During Dabaja's interrogation, the Israeli army intervened to halt "improper treatment" by an SLA officer, Gal added. (This article was cabled in full yesterday.)

Ethiopians Moved To West Bank

WASH. TIMES (Wires) - Israel has quietly moved hundreds of Ethiopian Jewish immigrants into the West Bank despite US opposition to settling them in Israeli occupied Arab land. Some 400 Ethiopian Jews live in govt. housing in Kiryat Arab and make up about 8% of the settlement, according to an official at a Hebrew language school in which many of the immigrants study.

Libyan Missile Fire Protested By Italy

WASH. POST - Jenkins - Libya, in apparent retaliation for US raids on its territory early this morning, reportedly fired two missiles today at a US Coast Guard navigation station on the Italian island of Lampedusa, about 200 miles off the Libyan coast. The incident was taken as a serious threat by the Italian govt. which had opposed US military action against Libya on grounds it would increase terrorism in the Mediterranean basin, especially in Italy.

Arab Nations Condemn Air Raids

WASH. POST - Randal - Normally pro-West Arab govt. that play key roles in the Middle East today joined radical states in condemning the US raid on Libya. That such key US regional allies as Egypt and Saudi Arabia spoke out promptly, along with traditionally hostile Iran and Syria, marked a major step in moderate Arabs' distancing themselves from the Reagan administration and a further indication of waning US influence in the Middle East.

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Israeli Foreign Minister Supports US Air Strikes

WASH. POST - Claiborne - Israel lined up solidly today behind the US air strikes against Libya, suggesting that the Pentagon was at last following examples set by the IDF in conducting preemptive raids on terrorist centers. Shamir said he hoped that the bombing raids would not be the last against Libya by the US, saying that the attacks had shown that "clear results in the fight against terrorism can't be gained in one operation alone."

Jet Believed Lost, 5 Sites Damages In RAID On Libya

WASH. POST - Hiett The Defense Dept. yesterday said an F111 bomber and its two man crew apparently were lost at sea in the massive 12-minute Monday night raid on Libya, which officials otherwise characterized as a successful and complex mission involving 30 bombers and about 100 support planes.

Reagan's Use OF Force MARKS Turning Point

WASH. POST - Cannon & Woodward - Monday's military strike against Libya marked a turning point in administration policy after five years of internal debate about how to respond to international terrorism. Officials said yesterday that the attack is likely to prompt further terrorist attacks against US targets that could require additional military operation. "For the first time we weren't debating whether to use military force against state-supported terrorism but the best way to use it," said an official who participated in the deliberations preceding Reagan's decision to launch the attack.

Brussels Says Top Libyan Official Requested An End To Hostilities

WASH. POST - Dryden - A high ranking Libyan Foreign Ministry official contacted the Belgian ambassador in Tripoli during the night of the American raid on Libya to transmit a request to the US for an "end to hostilities," a Belgian Foreign Ministry spokesman said today. The request was forwarded immediately by the ambassador to the Belgian Foreign Ministry which relayed the request to the Belgian Embassy in Wash. where it was delivered to the State dept. according to Foreign Ministry spokesman Frans van Daele.

US Argues Self Defense Before UN Council

WASH. POST - Berlin - Responding to sharp attacks today in the Security Council, the US said its air strikes against Libya were a necessary action "in exercise of the inherent right of self defense" recognized by the UN charter. Walters was the lone voice in support of the attack. The Soviet Union, Libya and other Third World countries denounced the raids.

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TELEVISION: NIGHTLY NEWS

The major networks focused their main stories on the aftermath of the US air attacks on Libya and damages in Libya, State Dept., White House and Pentagon reaction, activity in the U.N. concerning the U.S. attack, Britain's support of the U.S. action, the Contras and a possible change in leadership. Most of the morning news shows focused on U.S.-Libya as well.

מסוק

אל - מצפ"א, ממ"ד

סיור סגן הנשיא בחצי האי ערב ובמפרץ
משיחה עם פלטר

1. פלטר שהשתתף במשלחת סגן הנשיא ב-4 מדינות סיפר שדנוקא הביקור בתימן היה החשוב והמעניין ולא יכול לבוא בעיתוי טוב יותר (א) גילוי הנפט. התימנים מפיקים עתה בעזרת חב' האנט כ-6,000 חביות ליום ויגיעו בשנת 1988 לכדי 10,000 ח.י. שהם כ-40% מההצרכים הפנימיים שלהם. המעניין הוא שחב' האנט שוענת שתימן היא אולי המדינה היחידה שבה עדיין משתלם להמשיך ולעסוק בחיפוש נפט אמנם אין להפריז בכך שתימן תהפוך ליצרנית נפט אך בנסיבות והנתונים הקיימים במדינה זו אין ספק שגילוי הנפט הינה מהפכה כלכלית בזעיר אנפין העשויה לשנות יחסית את פני המדינה ומעמדה האזורי. התימנים שהעלו את נושא הסיוע האמריקאי לא הסתירו מגמתם להדק את שה"פ הכלכלי עם ארה"ב. בוש הודיע בשם הנשיא שארה"ב תגדיל ב-1986 את הסכום בעוד 5 מ' דולר המיועד לרכישת מזון. זה אמנם סכום לא משמעותי במונחים אבסולוטיים אך בהתחשב במגבלות התקציביות כאן ובקיצוצי סיוע החוץ בשל חוק ג"ר זהו מחווה שהתקבל ע"י צנעא בעין יפה. (ב) המעורבות הסובייטית במרד בעדן. ישנם הרהורים באשר ל"קשר הסובייטי" אם כי אין לכך תוצאות מוחשיות. המבט הצפוני על הדרום הוא שהפרשה שם טרם הסתיימה. המשטר טרם התייצב שלא לדבר על גיבוש ועוד צפויים זעזועים כולל אלימים. יש לזכור שמבין 6 המחוזות רק 2 התייצבו במלואם לצד המשטר. החיכוכים המסתמנים הם בין ההנהגה הנוכחית לבין הצבא, ובעיקר שכבת הקצינים הצעירים שהם למעשה שהכריעו את הכף והדורשים עתה חלק ונחלה בשלטון. הצפונים טוענים (בניגוד לעומאנים) שאין לעשות הבחנה בהתייחסות לברה"מ בין גורמים רדיקליים יותר לפחות רדיקליים ושבנושא הסובייטי ישנה הסכמה בין החלקים השונים. אמנם לא אותרו מעשי חתרנות מצד הדרום וכך גם שמעו בצנעא אך בעיית הפליטים קרי השבטים הדתיים השוהים בצד השני של הגבול מהווים מקור לכך ונתפסים כסכנה בטחונות לטווח ארוך. בעיקר מודאגים התימנים ממינוי שרים חברי N.F.P בקבינט בעדו הרואים עצמם כמייצגי שבטים אלה. טרם נוצרו מגעים מסודרים בין שני חלקי תימן אך הצפונים מתכוונים להעלות נושא זה על סדה"י משיוחל בדיאלוג כלשהו. מאידך, מניותיו של הנשיא בירידה תלולה. הלה נע ונד בעיקר בין אדיס אבבה, שם הוא אורח רצוי למגינת לבם של הסובייטים, לבין מקום מושבו במחוז להאג' שבקרבת הגבול עם הצפון. נסיונותיו לארגן כוח צבאי נכשלו והוא חסר כל בסיס לשנות פני הדברים בעדן.

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ס ו ק
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סווג בסחונני
דחיסות
מאריך וזי"ח
סעיף 51 בברית

אל:

החלטה אחת מטייבים בידו אך ללא תועלת מיוחדת. מכל מקום מדגיש פלטרו נושא איחוד
התימניות, לפחות מבחינת הצפון שבק חיים בעקבות התהפוכות בעדן. בהקשר זה סיפר
שהתימנים העלו גם את נושא הסיוע הצבאי האמריקאי, אמנם מדובר בסיוע "פרמיטיבי" במושגים
של מדינה אחרת אך התימנים הדגישהו במיוחד. בקשה ראשונה שהעלו נוגעת לרכישת 2 מטוסי
C-130 להעברת כוחות, בנוסף ל-2 שבידה, אך מבלי שתימן הצפונית תוכל לממנם
ממקורותיה. דא עקא נושא זה גורם לחיכוכים מסויימים עם סעודיה. פלטרו גילה שעד הקשר
האמריקאי עם תימן "עבר דרך" סעודיה. הרגשת החשיבות העצמית של תימן גם בשל גילוי
הנפט הולידה דרישה תימנית ל"עצמאות" בניהול קשר ישיר ובלתי אמצעי עם ארה"ב שאינה
מתקבלת בעין יפה ע"י ריאדי. פלטרו אינו מפריז בחשיבות הקשרים עם תימן ומדינה זו גם לה
היא סמוכה על שולחנה ברה"מ בעיקר בכל הנוגע לסיוע צבאי אך האמריקאים מלאי תועלת שתימן
תנקוט במדיניות אוהדת יותר יחסית כלפי ארה"ב כשהיו לכך גם סימנים מוחשיים. סעודיה
כקוצר ראייתה אינה רוצה בחיזוק יתר של השלטון בתימן - סלטן עבד אלעזיז כידוע לחזיק
בחיק התימניות-וממשיכה לגלות יחס של פטרוניות ולכן על ארה"ב להלך בזהירות מירבית ע"מ
שלא ליצור רגישות סעודית. מכל מקום מסכם פלטרו האמריקאים יצאו בהרגשה נוחה מהשיחות עם
נשיא תימן שהוא עצמו לא מרשים במיוחד אך בעל נטיון רב, לשאלתי בקטר למגע כלשהו בין ארה
והמטרו החזש ברדתי השיב שטרם נוצר והוא מניח שאם יש מקום לכך. דבר המוטל בספק, יהיה
זה במסגרת המשלחת הרד'תית לאו"ם, בעיקר בעת התכנסות ראשי המדינות למושב העצרת.

2. סעודיה. עיקר הדיונים עם פחד וסלטן (עבדאללה נעדר לרגל ניתוו לא מסמעותי בשוויץ)
וכן ימאני. (אגב, מרפי כידוע לא נטל חלק בביקור ויצא למצרים וישראל. קריקמור סגן עוזר
המזכיר המופקד על הנושא הכלכלי יצא במקומו). נסובו בנושא המלחמה, האיום האיראני ומחירי
הנפט. הסעודים מודאגים לגבי כושר עמידתה של עיראק וכוונותיה של איראן, בעיקר כלפי
כווית המשווה אחת החוליות החלשות במערכת. הסעודים זרזו את האמריקאים להחמיד במאמציהם
למניעת נשק מאיראן אך בנשימה אחת ניתן היה להתרשם מנימה מסויימת של ביקורת שבצבחה
על אופן ניהול המלחמה בידי עיראק והמעמסה הכלכלית הרובצת על סעודיה בשל כך. מאידך,
ניתן היה להבחין בהרפייה מסוימת מהחשש המידי של אפשרות הרחבת המלחמה בידי איראן,
בהשוואה למועקה שהשתררה בעקבות השתלטות איראן על פאו. התדמית הצבורית של התייבבות ארה
ב) אספקת הנשק הועלה בידי הסעודים אם כי לא נערך דיון מפורט. הדגישו שחשובה להם בהקשר
זה סיפר פלטרו על תקרית בה היה מעורב הליקופטר איראני שתקף ספינה סעודית בדרום ממפרץ
מבלי שרשת מטוסי האיוואקס גילתה זאת. הדבר מהווה פירצה ברשת בטחון זו ומסתבר בנידון
שאינה חסינה מפני שימוש בהליקופטרים מנמיכי טוס. מגעים בין המעצמות להפסקת המלחמה.

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אל:

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3. בנושא הנפט שעשה כאן כותרות בשל התבטאות סגן הנשיא הסבירו הסעודים שלא יעברו את מכסתם שנקבעה ע"י אופ"ק והעומדת על 4.3 מ' חביות אך בשום אופן לא ירדו מרמה זו. עד עתה סעודיה הייתה בבחינת "ילד טוב" שבשעה שכולם העלו את רמת הפוקתם הם פנו לסעודיה שתקצץ בכמות שמפיקה. מצב זה הסתנה כל עוד מדינות אופ"ק לא יגיעו להסכם שיעמדו מאחוריו ומאחר והסעודים אינם מעריכים שניתן להגיע לכך בתנאים הנוכחים הרי יפעלו כפי שמבינים את האינטרס הסעודי. המדיניות הסעודית הבנויה, כפי שידוע, על עקרון ה- *Back As I* דהיינו שמחיר חבית נקבע לאחר שיווקה ע"י בתי תזיקוק, מיועדת גם לאפשר להם רמת ניהול תקינה של משק הנפט והגו לתצרוכת פנימית ועבור התשלובת הפטרוכימית (70% ממנה ליצוא ו-30% לארמקו ופטרומין).

פלטרו סיפר שהפגישה עם פהד, שהתקיימה בדהראן לרגל סיורו בפרובינציה המזרחית, כולל פגישה עם נכבדים שיעים שם מלמדת על התעסקותו בנושא פנים בה הוא מקדיש חלק ניכר לסירוב במחוזות השונים. במסגרת זו הוא מנסה לאזן במקצת את פעילותו הרבה של עבדאללה בכניית כוחו הפנימי. כידוע, היחסים בין השניים אינם משופרים ופהד חותר להבטיח מינוי יורש עצר לאחר שעבדאללה יתמנה למלך, מבני משפחתו והבחירה הזויה בין סלטן לחלמן מושל ריאדי. באשר למצב הפנימי הכללי פלטרו ציין שלא עמדו על בעיות מיוחדות וגם לא דווח להם על אירוע חריגים בתחום בטחון הפנים בשל המלחמה עם גורמים אחרים.

4. בעומאן הביקור היה קצר יחסית. קאבוט ציין בעיקר שני נבשאים (א) לארס"ב חייב להיות אינטרס לשמור על "אופציות פתוחות" לאיראן (דעה שפלטרו תומך בה אך כיצד ניתן ליישמה זוהי שאלה אחרת). (ב) מסתמנות קבוצות שונות בהנהגה ברדת וניתן להבחין בין רדיקלים למתונים יותר.

5. מאעיש. נערכו דיונים בקשר למפגש המשפ"ח הבא שיעסוק, בין השאר, ב-2 נושאים המשך פעולה התיוון לסיום המלחמה ומאידך, הערכות לקראת אפשרות שאיראן תממש איומה על כווית כולל שיגור ה- *RDF*, הקיים על הנייר כפי שפלטרו הדגיש במקרה כזה.

6. ברה"מ. הסעודים הדגישו שמדיניותם כלפי ברה"מ לא השתנתה ושאלת כינון היחסים אינה עומדת על הפרק שכן שתי המדינות מכירות האחת בשניה עוד מימי ההסכם חיג'אז ומפעם לפעם אף מתקיימים מגעים דיפ' במדינות שלישיות, בעיקר באו"ם אך לכלל הקמת נציגויות המלוטרים הגיע, בייחוד בשל פרשת אפגניסטאן. מאידך, במאע"ם מתנהלת פעילות דיפ' ומשלחת סובייט העושה שם עתה דנה בפתיחת שגרירות סובייטית באבו ד'אבדי. פלטרו העיר שלא יופתעו באם זו אכן תקום.

7. טרור. בכל המדינות הודגש הנושא ועמדת השליטים היתה בגנות מעשי הטרור אך הוסיפו כמובן שלא יתנו לכך כל ביטוי פומבי. בהקשר זה שסיפר שהפעולה בלוב נועדה, כפי שכבר הופיע במקומות אחרים, לגרום לזעזועים פנימיים שם בעיקר בין קד'אפי והצבא. חידוש פעילות הועדות המהפכניות עשויה לבטא מגמה זו אם כי אין בידי האמריקאים כל מידע בכיוון זה.

8. סוריה. פלטרו סבור שהבעית האסטרטגית מסו של ישראל ושהיא חייבת להתייחס לכך בכל הרצינות, הינה האיום הסורי. אמנם הוא מבחין בין פוטנציאל מלחמתי שלדעתו ולדעת חוגים בפנטגון הוא כבר "בשל", לבין תרגום הפוטנציאל לשפת אופרטיבית החורגת מעבר לתחום הצבאי המצומצם אך המציבה בפני הסורים בעיות רבות בעיקר בתחום הפוליטי - אסטרטגי - ברה"מ, מדינות ערב שלא לדבר על היבטי פנים למיניהם. בשלב זה אין למיטב דעתו האישית סימנים המעידים על המענו, לשלב גבוה יותר. הוא גם מתקשה לתת הטורים חד משמעיים למלל הסורי בתחום זה והדבר קשור לתמונת מצב רחבה יותר על נתוני הזירה המצטיירת מעבר לשולחן עבודתו של אסד בעיקר ראיית ישראל. התמונה /הערכת פלטרו, המתקבלת אצל נשיא סוריה בסה"כ די מורכבת ולא דווקא בעלת קווים חדים וברורים, אין לו ספק למשל, שלהתנהגות הסורית מתלווים גם סימני שאלה באשר לקריאה את המפה הישראלית.

באשר לביקור מרפי בדמשק^ב היה ביוזמת ארה"ב, בהמשך למגעים השוטפים בשני נושאים מרכזיים הטרור ובעיית החטופים האמריקאים בלבנון. מהדיווחים המקוטעים שראה טרם שובו של מרפי ("התלונן" שמחמ"ד אינה מכניסה אותו בסוד העניינים כבעבר) חזרה ועלתה נוקשותו של אסד בכל הקשור לישראל. הבליט כוונות "התוקפנות הצבאית" שלה כלפי סוריה. לשאלתי, מה הניע את אסד להסכים לקבל שליח אמריקאי השיב שאסד רוחש אמון "מסויים" למרפי ושבין השניים קיימים "יחסים עבודה". הוסיף שלאסד יש גם אינטרס להפגין כלפי ברה"מ, שהיחסים עמה ממשיכים להיות מורכבים, שיש לו "ערוץ פתוח" לארה"ב. בהקשר זה סיפר שטוריה ולוב קיימו חילופי דעות בעניין טילי הטאם-5 כאשר המסקנה המשותפת אליה הגיעו שאינם יעילים ויש לדרוש מברה"מ החלפתם בסוג משופר וחדש יותר.

אלי אבידן

l.k

ט ו ק ס
 ד...ל...מחור...דפיס
 סוג בסחוני...סנדי
 דחיות...מלידי
 מאריך נזיחמנ. 16. אפר 86
 ...מסי פני

אל:

המשרד

417

1/3

אל :- מצפ"א, אירופה 3, ממ"ד בינ"ל/1

משיחה עם גרי קרוקר. ברה"מ/צבאי/INR

1. בברה"מ מתרחשת למעשה מהפכה שקטה אך מורגשת שהחלה אמנם טרם עליית גורבצ'וב אך שנתן לה דחיפה חשובה מאז והיא זה צנטרליזציה בפיקוד העליון של הצבא הסובייטי כאשר ל-4 מפקדי ה-THCAFCOM, כולל מפקד ברית ורשה, נחננו סמכויות רחבות בניגוד לתפיסה הנוקשה בעבר של ריכוז סמכויות בידי שר ההגנה (עד לאוסיטנוב היה זה בדרי"כ איש צבא) והרמטכ"ל שביחד עם גורבצ'וב כמפקד עליון של הכוחות המזוינים מהווים בעיתות שלום את מועצת ההגנה שהופכה ל"סטרוקה" בימי מלחמה, אבלוציה זו נודעת בעיקר מחולשתם הפוליטית של שר ההגנה סוקולוב והרמטכ"ל אכרומייב, שקרוקר מגדירים כ"דמויות מעבר" עד לחילופי גברי שטרם נערכו בפיקוד העליון. במסגרת הדרג הבא אחריהם הוא מציג לשים לב בעיקר ל-2 דמויות המרשל אוגרקוב, מיודענו, מפקד המערך המערבי הנכיר בדרגתו מבין ה-4 וגנרל זייצב מפקד המערך הדרומי החולש בין השאר על המזח"ת ואפגניסטאן. הנ"ל בצרף המרשל קוליקוב מפקד ברית ורשה נחשבים כעונודה ממנה יבואו שר ההגנה והרמטכ"ל הבאים. מבחינה מעשית הוא נוחן מירב הסיכויים לזייצב כרמטכ"ל וקוליקוב, בהעדר אישיות אזרחית בולטת כשר ההגנה הבאים. אוגרקוב הבעייתי ש"שוחרר" מתפקידו כרמטכ"ל אמנם נושא עיניו למשרח שר ההגנה אך נחשב כסמכותי מדי ע"מ שגורבצ'וב יפקיד בידו המשרח.

2. קרוקר משייך את "המהפכה השקטה" במידה רבה לאוגרקוב הנחשב לאסטרטג הסובייטי המעולה ביותר והפרשן המוסמך ביותר של הדוקטרינה הצבאית המערבית ובעיקר זו של נאט"ו. קרוקר, כרבים אחרים, מבחין בהדחתו של אוגרקוב בשעתו, שאגב עד היום לא ברורה די צרכה, אקט פוליטי בעיקר בשל מאמר ביקורת בעל "נימה מלחמתית" שכתב בשעתו על המערך הצבאי הסובייטי אך בוודאי לא אי אמון בכושרו חשיבותו הצבאית. עם מינויו למפקד האקדמיה הצבאית בפרונזה הוטל עליו באופן לא רשמי להעלות על הכתב את תפיסתו בתחום ההערכות הצבאית החדשה המיושמת למעשה עתה. החידושים בתפיסה זו נוגעים לשני תחומים (א) "מאזן האימה הגרעיני" יוצר מיקו בין שתי המעצמות בצורה זו שגם אם אחת מהן תיטול את ההפתעה לא יהיה בכוחה להכריע את זולתה שעדיין תהייה בכושר תגובה גרעיני. המסקנה היא שגם להבא ממערכה תתנהל לפי כללי המלחמה הקונבנציונלית של טילים טנקים היה"א וים ולכן יש להפנות את המשאבים מהחימוש הגרעיני לעבר החימוש הקונבנציונלי, כנ"ל כאשר הכלים

2 3 1 3 1 1 1 4 4
 2 3 1 3 1 1 1 4 4

סניף 001
דפים 97... מחור 3... דפים

מל:

סוג בסחובי

דחיות

מאריך וזיה

מס' מבק

2/3

417

הללו יזכו למירב הטיכוליים לחיכום גבוה יותר. (ב) יש לנטוש את התפיסה של ריכוז מסות צבאיות אדירות אשר בתנאים של מלחמת מחשבים וקרני לייזר עלול להנחית שואה על מסות כניל ובמקום זה לעבור לקיום לחץ מהמיד ע"י שימוש מבוקר בכ"א וכלים, דהיינו ביזור המסות על פני זמן ושטח.

3. קרוקר המחזיק בדעה זו ועל כן עוד נטוש ניכוח באגף הצבאי - פוליטי ב- INR טוען שאוגרונב מצא לו שותף לדעה זו לא אחר מאשר גורבצ'וב, אם כי מזווית שונה. הרפורמות עליהן מדובר השליט הסובייטי במסגרת ה"ויכוח" שהתנהל בוועידת המפלגה יכולת להתבצע אך ורק כתוצאה מקיצוצים דרסטיים בתקציב הסובייטי, כאשר ההוצאות בתחום הצבאי מהוות מקור ראשון ועיקרי לכך. סכומי העתק בהם מדובר יכולים לבוא כמעט בלעדית מקיצוצים בכוחות הקונבנציונאליים - כ"א וכלים, ולא בתחומי פיתוח נשק גרעיני עד כמה שהדבר ישמע מוזר. לדוגמה ההחזקה השנתית של כ-200 אלף חייל על ציודם וכליהם בגרמניה וכח דומה בגבול הסיני, עולה לאין ארוך על התקציב המיועד לפיתוח נשק גרעיני.

4. אליה וקוץ בה. קרוקר מדגיש שלשם יישום הדוקטרינה של אוגרונב בתחום תכנון בכח אדם והפנייתו מהמערך הצבאי לתחום האזרחי - כלכלי ושכלול הנשק הקונבנציונלי גורבצ'וב זקוק לפרטנר אמריקאי (וסיני) לכך. נוכחן מסקנה בלתי נמנעת לדעת קרוקר, שכאמור דעתו טרם אומצה אם כי הולכות ומצטברות הוכחות לכך, שגורבצ'וב חותר למעשה ליעד של צמצום עם ארה"ב בתחום הקונבנציונלי כאשר פרוק הנשק הגרעיני הוא במידה מסוימת ביטוי סימבולי ותחנת מעבר לכך.

5. קרוקר טוען שאם ראייתו זו אמנם תוכח כנכונה הרי התנופה שניתנה בדברי גורבצ'וב בוועידת המפלגה הקומוניסטית הסובייטית לעולם השלישי קרי לנושאים אזוריים מהווה רק ביטוי חיצוני אך הנגש הוא על הרובד הבינמעצמתי - הגדרת המשותף (אם ניתן להגיע אליו) והמפריד בין ברה"מ לארה"ב. הגדרת כללי המשחק ואולי מעבר לכך בסכסוכים אזוריים כגון באירופה (הגרמניות) במזרח הרחוק (סין ויפן) במזה"ת-יותר ויותר בכל הקשור למלחמת עיראק - איראן ופחות לפי שעה בנושא המזה"ת-הטהור - ובאמרכ"ז עשויות לדעת קרוקר לפוליר, במקרה הטוב, לבדיקה הנושא הקונבנציונלי.

6. קרוקר העוסק גם בנושא הנשק הכימי - בקטריולוגי של ברה"מ מדגיש הרמה הגבוהה אליה הגיעה הרחק מעבר לכל מדינה אחרת. הפיתוח הסובייטי בתחום זה הגיע לרמה כזו שברה"מ עברה לשל פיתוח נשק כימי בקטריולוגי קטלני המסוגל להשמיד מסות של בני אדם, הנשמר באריזות קטנו ושאינן נזקקות למקום אכסון גדול במיוחד. בהקשר זה סיפר שהסובייטים הוציאו לא מכבר את

סניף

97...מחוק...דפי

100 בשחוני...קנד?

דחפוח...גלל

מארץ וז"ח 16.0950. אפר 86

משרד המטרה

1/2

המשרד

416

אל :- מצפ"א, ממ"ד

משיחה עם גרי קרוקר / INR/PMA / ברח"מ (השתתף בשיחות הצבאיות בארץ, לא מכבר).

1. לוב. אין עדיין תמונת נזקים בצד הלובי (מקורה לקבל) מקלארק) אך כל המטרות שנבחרו נפגעו. המדובר בשני סוגי מטרות צבאיות (א) מפקדות ומתקני אימון למחבלים. ההחטאה המרכזית שברשמה כאן היחה במחקן (בריכה) ששימש לאמון מחבלים צוללנים. (ב) בסיסי צבא. הושמדו מקדוח אך בעיקר טילי SIRM-5 ומספר בלתי ידוע עדיין של מטוסי 76-L ומיג-23. ההערכה היא שטייטת לובית הוצאה מכלל פעולה. השגרירות הצרפתית לא נפגעה מפגיעה ישירה אלא מהדף התפוצצות קרובה.

2. במבצע השתתפו 20 מפציצים F-111 מבריטניה ו-12 מטוסי קרב מ-2 אניות המערכה האמריקאיות במפרץ סידרה. חלקם פעל כמערכת כיסוי למפציצים. חלוקה למשימות אם כי לא בצורה חותכת היחה שמטוסי הקרב פעלו באיזור טריפולי ואילו המפציצים בבנגזי. קרוקר מציין עי"פ הדיווחים עד כה הפעולה המושלמת מבחינה צבאית ובעיקר מצד המפציצים על כל המבצע המסובך הכרוך בטיסה מבריטניה כולל התידלוקים בדרך. ניכר שוני בין פעולת מטוסי הקרב למפציצים שעיקרו הוא שטייטי הצי נחגלו מאומנים יותר למשימות כגון אלו בעוד שהמפציצים מיושנים קמעה וטייסייהם חטרי בסיון לסוג שונה של פעולה ובעיקר כיסוי שטח. (בעומק ברה"מ) המטוס שאבד נפל ליס, עפ"י כל הסימנים כתוצאה מירי של הגנ"א. המטוס שהוא המלוכלל בסוגו מבחינת מערכות המכ"מ והמחשבים יכול לטבש כמעט כל פעולה של מכ"מ וטילים משוכללים, אך חסר אונים והגנה נגד יירי פשוט של הגנ"א. בעיקר בשל טיסחו הנמוכה ביותר, כמעט בגובה פני הים כפי שהיה בפעולה בלוב. קרוקר טוען שלא מובן לו מדוע הוכנסו מספר כה רב של מפציצים. בתכנון המקורי דובר על 8 מטוסים בלבד.

3. הלובים הגיבו באיחור והפעולה באה להם בהפתעה גמורה. מצורת הירי של טילי הסאם-5 הובהר שהם טרם למדו להפעילם. הכינון היה גבוה מדי ונפל בזווית אנכית חדה מדי, הרחק מהמטוסים. בבוקר הגיבו הלובים בפעולת נפל של שיגור שני סירות טילים לעבר האי קאן אפנונג שבין סיציליה ליבשת איטליה המשמש כנקודה של משמר החופים האיטלקי (כולל אמריקאים). נזק לא נגרם.

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including the name 'משה' and various initials.

סווג בסחובי
 דפי... 2... מחור... דפים
 דחפוט
 מאריך וז"ח
 מס' מברק

מל:

2/2

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4. קרוקר מדגיש שמעבר למשמעות הצבאית של הפעולה המנותחת עתה כאן בזהירות ושמוצאותיה טרט מחוררים, יש לה משמעות פוליטית לא פחות חשובה (א) היא מותחת קו בין ההתנהגות האמריקאית הפאסיבית בעבר לבין הנכונות והמוכנות לנקוט באמצעים צבאיים בעתיד. יש בכך, הוסיף, השתחררות מסויימת ממשקעי וייטנאם אך בעיקר מאז פעולת הנפל של ההליקופטרים האמריקאים באיראן, להוציא "הטיול" לגרנדה. מבחינה זו יש בהחלטת הנשיא משום "החלטה היסטורית". עם זאת קרוקר מציין שהמבחן בדעת הקהל כאן יהיה בנושא הפגיעות באזרחים שמעיב על המבצע. איש לא משלה עצמו, המשיך, שבכך יושם קץ לטרור אך מדינות כלוב, סוריה ואיראן חייבות להכניס עתה מרכיב חדש למערכת שיקוליהן. (ב) מסר לאירופאיות להוציא בריטניה. הפעולה באה במידה רבה לנוכח הסרוב האירופאי לקחת חלק בסנקציות, כלכליות ואחרות, שארה"ב לחצה עליהן, במשך זמן רב, ומכאן שהעמידו למעשה את ארה"ב בפני חוסר כל בחירה אחרת. שכן לו היו מצטרפים אליה שמא פני ה דברים היו שונים. ההרגשה היא שארה"ב נאלצה בסופו של דבר לעשות את ה"עבודה המלוכלכת" גם עבור האירופאים שנפגעו בעבר מהטרור הלובי. יעשה הכל ע"מ למנוע הרחבת חילוקי הדעות עם האירופאיות, אך ארה"ב לא תחזור בה מהחלטתה לעמוד בתקיפות מול הטרור. אין ספק שגם הגורמים הנ"ל יצטרכו עתה לערער היטב בנושא ש"פ בין ארה"ב ובעלי בריתה.

5. ברה"מ. ביטול פגישה שני שה"ח היא צעד משמעותי ובמידה מסויימת הפתיע לאחר הפרופיל הנמוך שנקטה, אך האפשרות שברה"מ תגיב בצעד פוליטי ולא צבאי נלקחה בחשבון. בטה"כ ההגובה עד כה סבירה. היו אמנם מגעים דיפי למניעת "טעות סובייטית" בהערכת פעולה ארה"ב אך בטה"כ מודים יש בפעולה נגד קדאפי משום העמדת ברה"מ במבוכה ולכן נתבקש ממנה מהלך הנ"ל. קרוקר שעיסוקו בתחום Soviet theatre) command operations מעיר שאת ביטול פגישה שולץ - שברנדזה יש לראות יוחר כדחייה מאשר הסתלקות מחלטת מתעניין שכן ברור לטובייטים שללא מפגש כנ"ל לא תחול כמעט התקדמות בנושאים אחרים שהסובייטים מעוניינים בהם. לא מעריך שהפיסגה הבוטל. אגב, הסובייטים הוציאו את היחידות שלהם לים הפתוח במטרה לעקוב אחר הפעולה ולאסוף נתונים לגביה אך אחרו את המועד שכן היא הסתיימה - נערכה כ-10 ד' - טרט שהיה סיפק בידם.

6. שאר נושאי השיחה בנפרד.

אלי אבידן
6/6

רשימות:	תחלפת הישר ניו-יורק	1
שם המחבר:	עופר זנב	6
מס' תיק:	לש' סגנ"ל; מע"ח; סגנ"ל אפי"ק; המורה; מצפ"א; ספ"ד; יועץ דו"מ לחקשורה; יועץ שד"ס לחקשורה; לז"מ; דו"צ.	א ל
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NEWS SUMMARY TUESDAY APRIL 15, 1986

Editorials

D.N. - "An act of morality": There can be no delight in the spilling of blood, but the attacks by the U.S. on Libya will be judged by responsible people as an act of profound moral commitment. The Soviets came as close to endorsing the action as possible: It dramatically withdrew its own forces from the area. There is no hope that a single purposeful act of force can turn back the full onslaught of insanity that international terrorism has become. Last night's strike was an important declaration of principle.

NYT- "The Terrorist and His Sentence": If there is such a thing as as due process in the court of world opinion, the U.S. has observed it, prosecuting and punishing Khadafy carefully, proportionately and justly. First came the crime, the bombing of the disco, then came the evidence, then the jury-the European governments. Only then did the U.S. pass its sentence. They evidently tried to avoid innocent casualties.

NYT- "A Reunion of Brothers": The Pope's historic visit to the Roman synagogue does much to bridge the chasm between Catholics and Jews for the past two thousand years. His visit cannot amend a long history of recurrent intolerance, or the Vatican's policies during WW2. Nor the Vatican's refusal to establish diplomatic ties with Israel. However this journey was momentous.

Post- "Pope greets 'our elder brothers'": Lets hope that this historic gesture of reconciliation will be followed by the opening of diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Israel, as predicted.

N.D. - "A Pope a Rabbi and a Meeting for the Ages": John Paul's visit was a turning point in the history of the two faiths. With astonishing candor the Pope took account of past misdeeds and errors. The Pope and Rabbi embracing on the synagogue's steps is a powerful message of reconciliation. There are still issues that divide them. If the Vatican were to recognize the State of Israel the message would warm encounters between Catholics and Jews for millennia to come.

Column:

מס' תיק:	15.2-83	מס' המחבר:	עופר זנב
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אנחנו נחכה לראות את התוצאות של המפגש בין האפיפיור לרב

Columns:

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N.D. - Solomon Handler - "The Yamulke Decision Erred": The saddest thing about the Supreme Court decision permitting the Air Force to keep Simcha Goldman, an Orthodox Jew, from wearing a yarmulke while in uniform, is that the case should never have reached the courts in the first place. For several years no one said anything about the yarmulke till Goldman testified in a court martial case. Was he subsequently being punished? Does the Air Force whose very aim is to protect religious freedoms really feel that that administrative fiat is more important.

D.N. - Nelson - news analysis - "Bombing carries risk of fallout": Possible results of the bombing are that clearly the U.S. is willing to use force under certain circumstances. Based on the history of military strikes, either by the U.S. or Israel against terrorists, they are likely to provoke new terrorist acts. Khadafy is not likely to declare defeat. The U.S. attack is likely to rally Libyans around Khadafy as to tempt them to abandon him.

D.N. - Breslin - "Just who is daffy? The Libyan or us?": A woman in Harlem commits suicide out of despair. A man on the street shouts we bombed Khadafy. He says we have to use all we've got against him. Another man asks what about East Harlem. Oh! that can come later. We have to think of the country first. I'll tell you what we should do, we got to send suicide squads in for Khadafy.

Press Reports:

The papers are packed with stories about the bombing raid on Libya. Some stories only vary slightly using different leads. The story was front page on ~~every~~ every paper.

NYT- Weinraub - pg. 1 - "U.S. Jets Hit Terrorist Centers in Libya; Reagan Warns of New Attacks if Needed; One Plane Missing in Raids on 5 Targets": In a nationally broadcast speech the President said that American forces had succeeded in their mission of retaliating against Libya for its "reign of terror". Mr. Reagan said the attack was in retaliation for what he asserted was the direct Libyan bombing of the disco in Bonn, Germany last week. (WSJ, N.D., D.N.)

NYT- Gordon - pg. 1 - "Pentagon Details 2-Pronged Attack" - Officials said that the bombing raids were a complex operation on five Libyan targets using both Air Force and Navy planes. They also used aircraft for refueling and intelligence and electronic jamming. The strikes were near Tripoli, port facility used for training Libyan commandos and some military barracks. Defense Sec. Weinberger said that all aircraft were accounted for except one. In one attack planes left England and in another they came from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. Administration officials have told Congressional leaders that Qaddafi has been known to stay at the military barracks that were attacked, but there is little chance that he would have been killed since he moves around a lot.

NYT- Schumacher - pg. 1 - "In the Skies Over Libya's Capital Planes Roar and Bombs Resound": The sky above Tripoli was ablaze with explosions from missiles and tracers. It was unclear what was hit or how many people might have been wounded. For nearly 10 minutes the sky was like a fireworks display.

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The cities lights were not blacked out till 20 minutes after the attack. Foreign reporters were confined to their hotel rooms. No Libyan aircrafts were seen taking off. Soon after the strikes Libyan radio began playing martial music. There is no general mobilization and no reserve call up. Civilian life continued as usual. (N.D., Post, D.N.)

N.D. - Bruning - "President Offers Proof of Libyan Link to Bombing": During his address to the nation last night Pres. Reagan gave specific proof that Libya was connected to the bombing at the disco in Bonn. March 25th intelligence sources say a message was sent to the Libyan Embassy in E. Berlin to conduct a terrorist attack against Americans. April 4 the embassy contacted Tripoli to say that the attack would be carried out the following morning. The next day they reported their success.

NYT- McPadden - "In U.S., Audiences Listen In on the Attacks" : Vivid reports of the American attack were broadcast live by network correspondents in Tripoli. Confined to their rooms reporters gave vivid audio reports and descriptions of the bombing raids. While all reports were transmitted by telephone it was possible to hear explosions in the background from time to time.

NYT- Saxon- Within an hour of the bombing raids the Voice of America radio was on the air with an editorial that the U.S. bore no enmity toward the Libyan people. Broadcast in Arabic and English it reminded the Libyan people that Qaddafi was their head of state and that they were therefor collectively responsible for his leadership.

NYT- Tass reported that the U.S. had committed state terrorism with its attacks on Libya. It said that American imperialism had perpetrated a new bloody crime.

NYT- Boyd - "Genesis of a Decision: How the President Approved Retaliation": Shortly after April 6th the President reportedly approved a plan by the Joint Chief of Staff for surgical bombing strikes against Libya. Although the approval represented an order for the bombing the strikes were, in effect, placed on hold while several steps were taken. Mr. Reagan would have called off the attack if the Libyan Government or European allies had been willing to make specific changes in their policies. The final approval for the attack was relayed to the Sec. of Defense this morning.

NYT- Apple Jr. - The military strike has erased any lingering doubt that America would use force to fight terrorism. For many months the President was criticized for his hard line rhetoric and failing to back it up with action. It remains to be seen if the bombings will persuade Khadafy to cease his attacks on American targets. Some experts expressed doubt that the the American action break the cycle of violence.

N.D. - Glurfeld - For the Reagan administration the attack on Libya was as much a psychological operation as a military one.

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The targets on the ground were secondary.

Post - " Pound Libya- Pres: "We have done what we had to do"

D.N. - "We did it in self-defense....President cites right under UN Charter lists Libyan plans for hit around the world"

D.N. - "Disco ignited response planning --- Ron and advisers started preparing within hours"

N.D. - Cocco/Bell - Key congressman were alerted to the attack on Libya before the strike but after the planes had already left bases in England. There was little official reaction from foreign governments last night. The briefing of congressmen was a "consultation" not an announcement of a fait accompli. There was fairly broad agreement that the President did the right thing. Some questioned whether the meeting was sufficient notice to Congress under the war powers act. Sen. Majority leader Byrd said that congressional leaders were not consulted but informed. (NYT)

NYT- Gwertzman -pg. 1 - "Plots on Global Scale Charged": Sec. of State Shultz said today that Libyan agents had been deployed around the world for attacks at U.S. embassies. Security at U.S. embassies was increased. At a news conference after the attacks Shultz said the attacks were necessary to deter Libya from future terrorist acts. Larry Speakes the White House spokesman said that Libyans were known to have been conducting surveillance and planning attacks against American diplomatic and commercial installations in Africa, Europe and the Middle East. (D.N.)

N.D. - After an emergency meeting of the European Economic Community ministers issued a call for restraint on both sides. the meeting of foreign ministers ended just before the attacks began. They renounced terrorism and decided to reduce and restrict Libyan diplomatic personnel in their countries. (NYT)

NYT- Lewis - "Paris Barred Jets": pg. 1 - Some European allies had assisted in today's attacks but the action was hampered by France's refusal to let planes fly over their airspace. The pilots had to use a more dangerous route to avoid countries that had not cooperated. (D.N.)

D.N. Initial reaction from European leaders ranged from embarrassment to horror at the American air strike. The government of Israel praised the attack. Britain's opposition leader said that people worldwide would condemn Pres. Reagan's decision.

Post - NYC beefed up it's security.

Post - Dan - Terrorist training camps were in the strike zone of American plans. Most are located near the coastal town of

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Benghazi. (N.D.)

D.N. - Libyan radio reported that three U.S. aircrafts that took part in the bombing were shot down and the crews killed by Libyans. In Washington it was confirmed that one plane was missing.

Post - The family of the American soldier killed in the disco blast said that they thought the President had done the right thing but that unfortunately it still would not bring back their son. (D.N.)

Post - Reports say that two of Khadafy's sons may have been killed or injured in the bombing raids. Bombs hit his heavily fortified compound.

D.N. - Backgrounder on Libya - Population: over 3 million, Capital: Tripoli. Ruled by Italy from 1912 and France and Britain after WW2.

D.N. - backgrounder on Khadafy - "Khadafy has oiled his way to infamy": Seized control in 1969. Used oil money to buy billions of dollars worth of arms from Russia. Has bankrolled terrorists around the world. Wanted to unite the Arab world under his leadership. Offered Mubarak \$5 billion to tear up the Camp David accord.

Transcripts provided by NYT of Reagan address, Shultz and Weinberger News Conference, Larry Speakes press statement

Middle East:

Post - Lathem - Khadafy reportedly has offered to buy the six Americans still being held hostage in Lebanon. Senior officials say they picked up hard evidence earlier this month that Khadafy had made overtures to Iran. He was willing to pay up to \$100 million.

NYT- TWA is planning to close down its Cairo-Rome-Athens route. As terrorist acts increase in recent months business officials have been reluctant to fly through Athens airport. Many travelers are also avoiding TWA. (Post)

NYT- Crude oil prices are expected to arise following the airstrikes. Fear of disruption of supplies pushed prices up. News of the airstrikes halted trading of oil. Libya accounts for 3 to 4 percent of world oil exports.

WSJ- Platinum and other precious metal futures prices are expected to rise today in response the the U.S. military action.

WSJ - Kaplan- "The Battle for N. Yemen": North Yemen is still a stronghold of xenophobic tribal traditions as compared to Marxist South Yemen. It is now under the shadow of a Soviet threat. The government began purchasing arms from the Soviets to counter the

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growing Saudi Arabian influence and intrigues of S. Yemen. At the same time the government has accepted aid from Western governments. Oil was discovered in N.Yemen in 1984. This should help keep N.Yemen out of the Soviet grip and strengthen the hand of the present government. The visit last week by V.P. Bush was an encouraging sign.

Post - Eisen - Passover is just a week away. At the New Jersey factory of Manischewitz they are busy working to fill the global demand for Passover goods. Manischewitz net sales have risen from 23 million to 24 million in two years.

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