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מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

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מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה



ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות*

חטיבה מס': 43.4
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סוג התעודה (סמן ✓ במקום המתאים):

תיק מס': 8
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מכתב

מברק

תזכיר או מיזכר

דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון

פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה

*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה; העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

שגרירות ישראל / רושינגטון

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מצבטו, מקטה, עטת מנאן אלכר
קוט תל דת דים - סואע חולס
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יחד עם המאמצים דגור
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(2) אט התקווה הלועזי אל קבאמ
דטמן היל. הילס המאצות
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המריטה אי המואלון דטמ וועט
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Committee on Foreign Affairs

March 20, 1987

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RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEES ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

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GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

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1. The subcommittee recommendations, pursuant to instructions from the committee, are to freeze the program totals for areas under the subcommittee's jurisdiction at the fiscal year 1987 totals which were \$6,505.8 million for Middle East and Europe programs and \$35 million for the centrally funded American Schools and Hospitals Abroad program.

This freeze represents a \$660 million cut from proposed fiscal year 1988 requests. The freeze is at fiscal year 1987 appropriation levels and assumes that the administration's \$382 million fiscal year 1987 supplemental request for countries under the jurisdiction of the subcommittee will be denied. The principal implication of this recommendation is to deny \$649.2 million in increased requests included in the fiscal year 1988 budget for the base rights countries.

Within a freeze, the subcommittee recommends the reallocation of \$24 million in order to allow slightly higher fiscal year 1988 funding for five small programs which were sharply cut in fiscal year 1987 allocations: \$4 million for the ESF program for Jordan, which includes funds for the West Bank and Gaza; \$5 million for the ESF program for Oman, a base rights country; \$6 million for the Middle East regional programs, which includes development activities on the West Bank and in Gaza, and regional cooperative programs promoting Arab-Israeli technological cooperation; \$7 million to allow for full funding of the ESF program in Spain; and \$2 million for MAP funding for Yemen. These program changes are justified in the report and three of them are closely related to the Middle East peace process and to efforts to prepare an enhanced environment for the peace process. It is recommended that \$24 million be reallocated from the ESF level for Turkey.

The subcommittee feels that if it is to comply with a fiscal year 1988

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recommendation of a freeze at fiscal year 1987 levels, it either has to break the earmarks for non-base right countries (Israel, Egypt, Northern Ireland and Ireland, the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad, Cyprus, the Cooperative Development Program and the Regional Cooperative Program) and reduce these programs to allow higher levels for base right countries, or freeze all program levels. These are difficult choices. The subcommittee chooses to stick with a near total freeze on all program levels.

Prior to the receiving instructions on a freeze amendment for the region, the subcommittee considered recommending an increase of \$470 million to cover some of the roughly \$1,031 million in increases for base rights countries proposed in the fiscal year 1987 supplemental and the fiscal year 1988 requests. These requests stem in part from the some 30 per cent cut the base rights countries had in fiscal year 1987 allocations compared to fiscal year 1986. An increase of \$470 million would have been distributed as follows: \$207 million for Spain; \$125 million for Turkey; \$88 million for Greece; \$45 million for Portugal and \$5 million for Oman. These increases for base rights countries cannot be proposed in a strict freeze but they could be justified as deferred fiscal year 1987 supplemental requests.

2. The fiscal year 1988 requests before the subcommittee include important requests for four NATO allies -- Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey -- that form a critical link across the northern edge of the Mediterranean Sea. These allies look to the United States for assistance to augment their own contributions to Western security. The subcommittee understands that the freeze in assistance to these NATO allies comes at a critical time when military base agreements with these allies are under negotiation or nearing the process of review.

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The subcommittee believes that the assistance provided to these countries is among the most efficient forms of national defense expenditures. Through the defense of their national territories and contributions to NATO, each of these allies in southern Europe can make a substantial addition to U.S. national security interests and to world peace. This southern flank, at the same time, is uniquely important for another reason -- as a bridge across Europe linking the United States and the Atlantic to the Middle East and Persian Gulf. These areas of interest outside Europe and the formal NATO treaty area affect the well-being of every member of the alliance. Thus, these programs are endorsed strongly by the subcommittee because of their importance both for NATO and for mutual interests in points east. The subcommittee is aware that the manner in which these requests are handled can affect our ability to complete successful base agreement reviews on renegotiations with these allies. Given the budget reduction process at work, the subcommittee had few realistic choices but to freeze these programs.

As negotiations with these countries proceed, and agreements are signed, the subcommittee expects adjustments to be made in requests for base rights countries. But it is clear that annual requests cannot, under present budgetary conditions, be fully funded. The subcommittee believes that additional means of security cooperation need to be devised in order to supplement declining security assistance levels.

3: The subcommittee supports the Administration's intention to provide excess military equipment to NATO southern flank countries, as provided in Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by Section 1101 of the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 99-661. The subcommittee does so because of its appreciation of the strategic importance of NATO's southern

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flank and its support for programs to strengthen the defensive capabilities of these important NATO countries. The subcommittee also believes that equipment provided under this amendment will help compensate the effect of reduced funding for military assistance because of budgetary restraints. In an amendment to Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the subcommittee defines the NATO southern flank countries as Greece, Turkey, Italy Spain and Portugal, but assistance under this provision is intended for NATO members which are integrated into NATO's military structure. The subcommittee wishes to stress in this amendment that defense articles made available, particularly to NATO countries, will be done so along lines established in Section 620C of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which supports maintaining the existing military balance in the Eastern Mediterranean. The subcommittee supports the view that the ratio of the value of excess defense articles made available to Greece and Turkey closely approximate the ratio of the amount of military assistance and financing provided to Greece and Turkey. The subcommittee amendment applies the standard definition of excess defense articles to this section.

The subcommittee also supports an amendment which will enable the transfer of excess defense equipment to Israel and Egypt, two major non-NATO allies which are on NATO's southeastern flank in the Mediterranean. Such assistance will complement U.S. assistance to NATO countries in the region.

The subcommittee expects an annual report by the President to the Congress on the transfer of such equipment as required in Section 8(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1971, as amended.

4. Close to 50 per cent of the fiscal year 1988 security and economic assistance requests worldwide is intended for programs in the Middle East. The

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high levels of military aid as well as economic aid provided for Middle Eastern nations are to meet the economic and security needs of friendly countries in that region. They are also provided in the hope that they will promote peace in the Middle East.

5. The subcommittee recommends that the economic reports required for countries with whom the United States has extensive programs — Israel, Egypt, Turkey and Portugal — continue to be submitted by January 15 of each calendar year. The subcommittee has amended section 1205(b) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 to require certain additional information in these reports which will be helpful to the Congress in reviewing the effectiveness of U.S. assistance programs to these countries. Specifically, among the information provided by the reports would be a description of how U.S. assistance helps these countries in solving their economic difficulties, an assessment of economic reforms and policies undertaken by each country, a listing and explanation of steps proposed by the U.S. to each country to help overcome economic difficulties, as well as other information which the Congress may request with respect to economic conditions.

6. The subcommittee is concerned about the increased use of offset arrangements in military sales by private companies to foreign governments when those sales are financed in part or in whole by the U.S. Government. Offset arrangements occur in a variety of fashions. In some cases U.S. companies agree to make a set amount of purchases from foreign companies; U.S. defense contractors also may agree to market non-military goods for the country; another arrangement is to have the U.S. company agree to build a military plant in the market country in order for part of the system to be built there. While

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offset arrangements in certain circumstances can be a useful instrument of foreign policy, and can further the objectives of a security assistance program, the subcommittee's concern about offsets rests partly on the fact that there is little coordination between the U.S. government and corporate representatives in developing these arrangements or overseeing their implementation. There is uncertainty whether there are commitments made by private companies in offset arrangements which could commit the U.S. Government to accept additional costs. Other questions exist on the impact of such arrangements on the U.S. trade deficit and the health of U.S. industries. The subcommittee believes it important for U.S. officials to develop better knowledge of offset arrangements through better coordination within the United States Government. U.S. officials also should review offsets before and during their implementation.

7. The subcommittee strongly supports the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) serving in the Sinai and for which \$33.1 million is requested for fiscal year 1988. The MFO has performed its role with distinction and to the satisfaction of the treaty parties, and it has been cost-effective. The MFO, funded equally by the United States, Israel, and Egypt, plays a critical role in helping to implement the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. The United States is currently \$3.1 million in arrears on its MFO payments. The subcommittee encourages the administration to allocate the funds to cover this shortfall, and to seek new financial contributors to the MFO.

The MFO serves as an important precedent which the subcommittee hopes can help in the implementation of future peace agreements between Israel and its neighboring Arab states. The subcommittee welcomes the participation of Canada in the MFO force and looks forward to the continuing participation of other

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governments. The subcommittee recognizes that any agreement to reduce the size or begin a phase out of the MFO presence or replace it with another peacekeeping force requires the agreement of the treaty parties. However, it hopes that discussions on this subject, and the improvement in the political atmosphere necessary for progress in these discussions, will soon occur.

The subcommittee also recommends that the annual report on the MFO become part of the annual congressional presentation materials for foreign assistance. This change in reporting requirements will aid the subcommittee in its oversight function.

8. The subcommittee is concerned that chemical weapons production and even use may be proliferating in several countries in the Middle East. Therefore, the subcommittee has an amendment to require a report not later than February 1, 1988 on the activities and capabilities of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya with regard to chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, including their sources of supply for such weapons, the technology, equipment, and material each possesses, and the extent to which such weapons could affect the balance of power in the region. This report shall include a United States plan for addressing this problem.

9. The subcommittee opposes the sale of M833 anti-tank shells, or any anti-tank shells containing a depleted uranium penetrator component to any country other than those which are NATO members or designated major non-NATO allies of the United States. The subcommittee opposes the export of this advanced ammunition to countries in the Middle East where it may have an adverse impact on the military balance in the region. The subcommittee believes that this weapon should only be made available to NATO or major

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non-NATO allies of the United States at this time.

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10. The subcommittee is concerned with the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics in the Middle East. The subcommittee requests that a complete report be made on the efforts by the United States to curb the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Turkey, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, Greece, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, North Yemen and South Yemen.

The report should include information on cultivation and trafficking in each country and information on the involvement of governmental authorities in each country in cultivation or trafficking. The report should also discuss the access of the Drug Enforcement Administration to each country, its activities in each country, and an explanation of the reasons for any restrictions on DEA's activities that exist. The report may be classified if necessary. The report should be jointly prepared by the State Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

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ISRAEL
(in millions of dollars)

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	<u>FY</u> <u>1985</u>	<u>FY</u> <u>1986</u>	<u>FY</u> <u>1987 *</u>	<u>FY 1988</u> <u>Request</u>	<u>Subcommittee</u> <u>Recommendation</u>	
					<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>
<u>Economic Assistance:</u>						
ESF	1,200	1,148.4	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
FY 1985 Supplemental	750	750				
Total Economic	1,950	1,898.4	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
<u>Military Assistance:</u>						
FMS	1,800	1,722.6	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800
TOTAL	3,750	3,621	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000

* No FY 1987 Supplemental Request

1. The subcommittee supports the fiscal year 1988 request of the administration for \$1.8 billion in FMS grant assistance for Israel. The subcommittee also supports earmarking that figure in the legislation and providing that same figure for fiscal year 1989. The United States has a historic commitment to Israel's security and U.S. assistance provides a tangible demonstration for the strength and durability of that commitment. The United States seeks to give Israel the confidence to take the risks necessary to pursue the peace process. Therefore, the subcommittee recommends that it be a continuing principle of U.S. security assistance to enable Israel to maintain a qualitative edge in military technology in the Middle East. This is especially important because of Soviet sales of sophisticated arms to other countries in the region, especially to Syria.

2. The subcommittee's recommended FMS authorization is the same as the 1986 and 1987 authorizations, although it represents a small increase over the actual 1986 allocation, since that allocation was subject to a 4.3 per cent Gramm-Rudman sequestration amounting to \$77.4 million.

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Like the funding provided since 1985, assistance this year will be provided as a grant. The change to grant assistance was made upon the consideration of the negative impact of the increasing debt service burden on the Israeli economy. The subcommittee continues to support an all grant military aid program for Israel, and believes that such a program will convey clear financial benefits to Israel.

The subcommittee supports the constructive work of the Joint Security Assistance Planning Group, which ensures consultation with Israel on appropriate aid levels and related security assistance initiatives.

3. The subcommittee recommends authorization of ESF assistance for Israel in fiscal year 1988 and fiscal year 1989 at the level of \$1.2 billion, the same level of economic assistance authorized in fiscal year 1987. The subcommittee recommends that this \$1.2 billion figure be earmarked in the legislation. The subcommittee notes that the total economic assistance package authorized for 1988 and 1989 will be reduced somewhat from the sum provided in fiscal years 1985 and 1986 because of the absence of a special economic assistance supplemental, which provided Israel \$750 million annually to encourage an economic reform program in 1985 and 1986.

4. The \$1.2 billion recommended by the subcommittee will be provided as a cash transfer to support Israel's balance of payments and to permit Israel to import necessary civilian goods and services from the United States without drawing down on its foreign exchange reserves. The subcommittee notes that repayments of FMS interest and principal will average \$1.165 billion for fiscal years 1988 and 1989, straining Israel's ability to maintain adequate foreign currency reserves.

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In this connection, the subcommittee expects that the Israeli government and the administration will work toward an agreement on arrangements to capitalize payments of certain amounts of interest on Israel's FMS debt, further relieving the short-term balance of payments problem and allowing for growth in the Israeli economy through the stimulation of the private sector.

The subcommittee emphasizes that the United States and Israel have an understanding that Israeli non-military civilian imports from the United States will exceed the amount of U.S. economic aid. This and other United States-Israeli agreements concerning Israeli imports of U.S. goods and services are important as are agreements relating to U.S. grain exports to Israel and procedures to assure that U.S. carriers receive an equitable share of the grain trade.

The subcommittee recommends that the ESF cash transfer for Israel be provided on an expedited basis. However, it recommends that it be made clear that the provision of such funding in the first 30 days of the fiscal year, as opposed to its provision in four regular disbursements during the year, costs the U.S. Government about \$35 million. This amount represents a significant reduction from the costs of expedited disbursements in previous years (was over \$60 million in fiscal year 1985) when interest rates were higher. Although these costs are not appropriated as part of the Israeli aid program, an awareness of the burden the arrangement imposes on the U.S. taxpayer is important.

5. The subcommittee regrets recent difficulties which have arisen in United States-Israeli relations relating to the Pollard case, the Iran arms sales initiative, other military equipment and technology cases before the courts, and potential difficulties concerning policies toward South Africa.

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The subcommittee expects United States-Israeli relations to remain strong and close. It hopes that the durability and strength of those ties will enable the U.S. to resolve problems with Israel and overcome current misunderstandings and tensions. It is important that Israeli officials understand the sensitivities of these matters for many Americans and many in Congress and the necessity to work out these problems in a mutually satisfactory manner.

6. The subcommittee supports strongly the concept of helping Israel with its economic difficulties but realizes, as do the Israelis themselves, that any reasonable level of economic assistance cannot alone solve Israel's current economic problems. Comprehensive reforms in Israel, which bring about structural changes in the economy, are necessary to improve the long-term economic outlook for that nation. It is the subcommittee's view that these changes are essential to avoid another economic crisis in Israel in a few years and an indefinite Israeli dependence on high levels of U.S. economic assistance.

The subcommittee notes that in July 1985 the Israeli government undertook a stabilization program designed to cut the budget deficit, cut real wages, devalue the Israeli shekel, and restrict the growth of the money supply. As a result, inflation was cut dramatically, from nearly 300 per cent in early 1985 to about 20 per cent in 1986.

Nevertheless, the Israeli economy is far from fully recovered. Real growth is still sluggish, with GNP increasing at about one per cent annually and the balance of payments deficit is increasing. But the Israeli government is beginning to take the steps necessary to achieve long term growth and stability. It is increasing the access of private entrepreneurs to the capital markets. It is considering a program of tax reform. It should follow through

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and expand these and other reform initiatives. At the same time, it should work to cut the still-continuing growth of the public sector and of private consumption, and implement reforms to encourage savings and investment. The subcommittee encourages continued forceful, sustained action by the Israeli government along these lines.

The United States and Israel established a joint economic development group in October 1984 to explore how the two countries could work together to promote improved economic conditions in Israel. Both countries see this framework as an important means to conduct frank and productive exchanges of ideas and information. The subcommittee strongly supports this dialogue, which has contributed to helping Israeli economic planners formulate those reforms which have already been implemented by the Israeli government.

7. The subcommittee supports continued United States-Israeli efforts to promote strategic cooperation between the two countries. It notes that the Joint Political Military Group formed in November 1983 has enhanced political-military cooperation. JPMG initiatives include combined planning, review of possible procedures for pre-positioning U.S. supplies in Israel, and joint exercises. Both the United States and Israel have expressed satisfaction with the progress being made to date in the area of strategic cooperation.

The subcommittee supports the designation of Israel, among other countries, as a major non-NATO ally of the United States. The subcommittee notes that members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs were named conferees on the legislation providing for that designation (the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, P.L. 99-661). As noted in the general recommendations, the subcommittee supports making available excess military equipment for Israel in its amendment to Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance of 1961. The

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subcommittee directs the administration to consult fully with, and keep the Committee on Foreign Affairs fully informed of, any initiatives to alter the major non-NATO ally status of Israel or of any initiatives to provide further NATO-like treatment for Israel or any other country in the region.

8. The subcommittee welcomes the enactment of the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement. The subcommittee requests that the administration continue to work for the implementation of this agreement and to bring to the subcommittee's attention any suggested changes in the legislation which experience suggests may improve the operation of the Agreement. The subcommittee is pleased that Israel is a strong opponent of apartheid and that Israel recently announced a significant reduction in Israeli-South Africa military ties, but the subcommittee remains concerned about the nature and extent of Israeli-South African relations.

9. The subcommittee notes that all economic assistance agreements with Israel contain a clause specifying that funds are to be used within the pre-1967 borders of Israel. The subcommittee expects that no U.S. economic aid will be used to help develop or to expand Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. This should and does apply to cash transfer agreements as well.

10. The subcommittee has supported efforts by Israel to develop the new Lavi fighter. It recognizes that the Lavi project is important to Israeli aspirations to stay at the cutting edge of military and aerospace technology.

The subcommittee realizes that the cost of the Lavi program has caused it to become controversial in the United States and also in Israel to some extent, where the Israeli government is currently reviewing alternatives to the Lavi

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which have been proposed by the United States.

The subcommittee recommends that present policy be continued and up to \$150 million of Israel's FMS funds be made available for the procurement of research, development, or defense articles and services in the United States for the Lavi fighter or an alternative fighter, and that not less than \$300 million be made available to be spent on defense articles and services in Israel, for the Lavi fighter, an alternative fighter, or other advanced weapons systems, if Israel wishes to use funds for that purpose. These funding amounts specified are consistent with the Israeli government's pledge to limit its spending of FMS funds for the Lavi through 1991.

The subcommittee has received testimony from the Department of Defense that termination costs associated with the termination of the Lavi, should the Israeli government choose some alternative to the Lavi, are payable out of FMS funding. The subcommittee supports the availability of FMS funds for Lavi termination costs if Israel decides to terminate the Lavi project.

The subcommittee supports Israel's need for a fighter aircraft in the 1990s. It is Israel's decision and Israel knows its needs. The implications of certain courses of action by Israel, however, must be seen by the U.S. Congress against ever tightening budget pressures and the likelihood that military aid for Israel will not increase in the foreseeable future. Israel needs to be aware of these severe budget constraints as it approaches its decision.

11. The subcommittee recommends earmarking \$5 million of the funds available under Section 106(d) to promote cooperative projects among the United States, Israel, and developing countries. Developing country scientists have long expressed interest in Israeli technology and collaboration with Israeli

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scientists who have broad experience in overcoming problems of limited natural resources through technological innovation. The United States -- in view of its technical leadership and its valued friendship with both LDCs and Israel -- is in a unique position to facilitate such international partnerships in research and technology transfer for the benefit of all.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) has undertaken a variety of substantive initiatives in this area. One of these developed by an initiative of the committee is the U.S.-Israel Cooperative Development Research (CDR) Program, which brings together Israeli and developing country scientists to tackle significant development problems while building developing country research capacity and expertise.

In just two years, the U.S.-Israel CDR Program has become a valued part of the international interchange between the scientific communities of Israel and developing countries. Over 500 proposals for joint research have been received, and almost 50 projects are already underway between Israel and countries in the Caribbean, Latin America, Asia and Africa.

12. The subcommittee notes that Israeli Arabs are frequently offered and accept scholarships to study in East bloc countries and that one result is the continued attraction of many Israeli Arabs to the communist parties. The subcommittee believes that if, for whatever reason, Israeli Arab students choose not to pursue educational opportunities in Israel, it would be appropriate, given the close relationship between the United States and Israel, that they be offered opportunities to study in the United States on roughly equal terms to those offered for possible study in the East bloc.

Accordingly, the subcommittee proposes legislation to direct that when a small amount of unexpended and unneeded Economic Support Fund appropriations

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from prior years (discussed in Middle East Regional Programs section starting on page 35) becomes available it be made available under reprogramming for a scholarship program for Israeli Arab students to study in the United States, at the undergraduate or graduate level. The U.S. Embassy in Israel can administer such a program. The subcommittee supports the availability of \$750,000 for this purpose.

13. The subcommittee recommends the continuation of a provision first enacted in P.L. 99-591, the 1987 Continuing Resolution, that permitted the United States to enter into a lease of U.S. equipment on a no-cost, reciprocal, one-time, one-country basis.

The equipment which the country in question (Israel) had hoped to lease was not available to it because of American mobilization needs. The U.S. has already leased 24 Israeli Kfir aircraft for use in "false flag" exercises by the Navy. The amendment extends this authority for the duration for fiscal years 1988 and 1989.

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נר 13 פר רוש בנפרד

ממקור כאן:

1. בעוד שחיל האוויר הירדני עדיין מוחזק כלקוח פוטנציאלי של מטוס הטורנדו נראה שהמטוס שיידרש על ידו יהיה המיראג' 2000. בפגישתם באחרונה של המלך חוסיין עם הנשיא מיטראן דובר על רכישת 40 מטוסים מסוג זה והזמנה ראשונית של 26 מטוסים. המלך ביקש ערבות ממשלתית צרפתית לרכוש זה אך בקשה זו טרם נענתה. הימצאות מספר ניכר של פריטים ממקור אמריקני בודאר של הטורנדו הנה נותן לווינגטון מיוזא מסויימת של בקרה על עיסוק טורנדו. מכל קום, התנגדות הקונגרס עד כה לאטפיקט מטוסים לוחם גרמה להסרת ה-F-16 מהתחרות.

התנגדות דומה צפויה להצעה אמריקנית טנטטיבית ש-14 סוללות ההוק המשופרות שסופקו לירדן ב-1977/78 יוטבו לסוללות נייזות. בזמנו הוצבו הסוללות בתוך בטון, אך עתה שומעים בפנטגון הזדר ושמוע שסוללות אלו חשופות יותר ויותר להתקפה ולחיסול. כזכור אטפיקט סוללות הוק

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ניידות נוספות היתה חלק מהעיסקה ולא אושרה ע"י הקונגרס
בשנה שעברה. ההצעה החזשה היא חלק ממאמץ המימשל לשפר
קשריו עם ירוך, בעיקר נוכח העובדה שהמלך חוטיין
ביקורתי ביותר כלפי ארה"ב על חלקה בפרשת איראן.
שני להקי הליקופטר טיקורטקי S-76A
שהיו בשימוש להטסת אחמדי הוחזרו ליצרן והוחלפו
בשני S 76 B

שהותאמו לאותם צרכים.

2. מצרים השלימה באחרונה ניצול כל ההסכמים שנחתמו
מכה האשראי בסך 230 מליון דולר שניתן לה ע"י מט.
ברטיטניה. בהודש שעבר, בעת שיחות השר הבריטי לרנש
טרמגריין, במצרים, חזרה מצרים על בקשה דומה לאשראי
רכש במסגרת ה- ECGD. הלורד טרמגריין
הבטיח עיון בבקשה אך הבהיר כי אין לצפות להיענות מהירה.

מתוך 150 מליון לישט' באשראי, 94 מליון לישט' נוצלו
ע"י המשרד המצרי לייצור צבאי, בעיקר לבידוד פרויקטים
באמצעות חברות בריטיות במתקנים צבאיים, ו-56 מליון
לישט' ע"י משרד ההגנה המצרי. ידוע שחברות בריטיות
מאיצות בממשלת בריטניה להעניק למצריים אשראי נוסף
למטרות מסוג זה.

ההנחה שרווחה עד לא מכבר שהמשלוח השלישי של מטוסי
F 16

40 Gd שהוזמן ע"י חיל האוויר המצרי יוסיף להיזדקק
לטורבו F 110-200 המיוצר ע"י פראט אנד וויטני מוזמת
ע"י הידיעה שמצריים מבקשת מארה"ב אישור עקרוני להסדיר
אופסט לצמצום טה"כ' ההוצאות לרנש ג
קן הכוח. ידוע שהן פראט אנד וויטני וג'נרל אלקטריק
נערכות להתחרות על אספקת צרכי המנוע של מטוסי ה
F 16 - האחרונים שהוזמנו ע"י מצריים, הגם שידוע שה
F 100 - נחשב שמאה מטו/ בעדיף על ה-F 110 של ג'
נרל אלקטריק.

נודע שמאה מטוסי אמון TVCANO מתוך
120 שהוזמנו במשך ע"י מצריים (40) ועיראק (80))
עם אופציה ל-60 נוספים) נמסרו למצמינים. מתוך מאת
הראשונים (פרט ל-10 מטוסים שהושלמו בברזיל) נולט
הורכבו ע"י מפעל קאזר בהליופוליס המנפק 4 מטוסים
בחודש).

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3. קולומביה נערכת לשינוץ 13 מטוסי מירג' SCOA

ושני מטוסי SCOR להטבתם לסנדרטים של הכפיר ע"י התקנת מחשב דיגיטאלי ועוד. קולומביה מתכוונת לאמן טייסים במטוסים משופצים אלה בישראל. כך נערכת קולומביה להטב אחד ממטוסייה למטוס תדלק באויר.

4. הצרפתים נערכים למלחמה ממושכת בצ'אד. 2500 צנחנים חיילי קומנדו, נחתים, לגיון זריט, מהנדסים ועוד נמצאים במקום. לפני זמן מה הרחיבו הצרפתים את נמל התעופה בנג'דמנה כדי לאפשר נחיתה והמראה בדאינג 747. נבנו צירים תת קרקעיים והוצבו טילי קרוטאל אנטי אוויריים. הובאו גם מטוסים להטסת גייסות. צפונית לבירה, במוסרו

בנו הצרפתים רצועת אויר והציבו בה מטוסי קרב ג'גואר. בשזה התעופה באבשה במזרח הציבו הצרפתים ראור מטוג קאנטור ונוכחו לדעת שהראור איננו עמיד בתנאי טמפ. גבוהה.

איתן בנצור.

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רס,אמן,מצמא,ממד

2. 1970-1971 SUPER MARKET OF FOODS (1971) 1970

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THIS REPORT.

NO: 1970-1971 SUPER MARKET OF FOODS (1971) 1970

דח"פנות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	דף: 1
סדרג כסחוכי:	טופס מברק	מחור: 3
תז"ח:	א ל: מנכ"ל מדינה, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, אמית"ק, מע"ת, מצפ"א, הסכרה, זמ"ד, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח	
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68 : גאין		מאת : עתונות, ניו-יורק

News Summary March 24, 1987

New York Headlines

Top story in the NYT reports on the Soviet Union cutting its staff at the UN, heeding an American order. Also on p. 1 of the Times: US offers protection to Kuwaiti ships in the Gulf (see Press Reports); Haig announced his plans to seek the Republican nomination for the Presidency; the US plans to expand the network of fragile coastal areas in which the Federal Gov't discourages development; NYC taxi fares could rise 22%; China and Portugal reached agreement on returning Macao to China in 1999; Quality-care reviews have hurt rural doctors; job opportunities for youths rise in NYC, Bernard Goetz's trial for attempted murder on a NYC subway will resume shortly and reports conflict in Harlem blaze (also p.1 Newsday) Headline story in the New York Post tells of the crash of Dean Martin Jr.'s fighter plane, he is missing. Page 1 stories in the Wall Street Journal report on the economies of Mexico and Brazil and the problems clients have with business brokers.

Columns

NYT-Anthony Lewis "Conspiracy to Defraud" It is possible that North and Poindexter will be charged with conspiracy in supplying arms to the contras at a time when Congress had barred such official military support. Looming behind all possible criminal prosecutions is the question of Reagan's role. Suppose North and Poindexter are given partial immunity and they testify that they were following the President's orders. At his press conference, Reagan said with emphasis: "I set the policy in this Administration." One thing is clear. We have been paying too much attention to such passing phenomena as press conferences. The greater engine for discovering the truth is the criminal law.

Press Reports

Israeli Jets in New Raid on Targets in Lebanon

NYT-special-For the second time in four days, Israeli jet fighters attacked areas in southern Lebanon that Israel suspects of harboring Palestinian guerrillas. The raids follow an increase in attacks against Israeli targets and pro-Israeli militiamen by Palestinian guerrillas and Shiite fundamentalist forces. A atah spokesman said 4 people were

אישור:

שם השולח: ע"י 24.3.87

תאריך: 24.3.87

אישור:

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wounded.

Israel's Envoy to US Expects to Leave Soon

NYT-special-Meir Rosenne, Israel's Ambassador to the US since July 1983, has said he expects to end his term by this summer. Rosenne said that his departure has no connection to the Pollard case. He said that the timing of his departure had been arranged under the agreement that set up Israel's coalition Gov't. and that the precise timing of his departure had not been set but that "as far as I am concerned, I am leaving this summer."

NYT-Reuters-Abba Eban rejected suggestions that he become Israel's next Ambassador to the US. He said he had no intention of accepting any offer, if one is made.

Nazi Trial Judges in Israel Refuse to Withdraw

NYT-special-The judges presiding over the Demjanjuk trial rejected a request from the defense that they withdraw from the case. Demjanjuk's Israeli lawyer asked the three judges to disqualify themselves because of hostility toward the defendant. Demjanjuk's attorney's may appeal the ruling to the Supreme Court. Legal experts have said the decision may be used to form a basis of appeal.

US Hostage Ill, Swap Offered

ND-AP-Pro-Iranian kidnappers said that American Hostage Alann Steen is so ill he may die soon and offered to trade him for 100 Arab prisoners held in Israel. Avi Pazner, the chief aide to Shamir said Israel would not consider the kidnapers' demands. "Israel does not negotiate with terrorists," he said. The White House said, "We hold the captors responsible for the safety of the hostages and we will not pressure any third parties into giving in to terrorists' demands."

Iran Radio Says Waite Is Being Held in Beirut

NYT-Hijazi-Iran said that Terry Waite was being held in Beirut by a group believed to be pro-Iranian. The report called Waite a spy. No group in Lebanon has claimed to be holding Waite.

NYT-special-A British Foreign Office official said that the Waite case would probably be discussed by British and Saudi officials during a visit to London by King Fahd and the Saudi Foreign Minister this week. Both the Gov't and church said there was no reason to believe reports from Beirut that Syria might try to secure Waite's release during King Fahd's visit to prompt a resumption of relations between Britain and Syria.

US Offering Kuwait's Ships a Naval Shield

NYT-Cushman p.1-The US has offered to extend military protection to Kuwaiti vessels traveling through the Persian Gulf to meet possible threats from Iran. The protection was requested by Kuwait, according to Administration officials. However, Kuwait was reported to have asked for both American and Soviet escorts. The American desire to be the only

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protecting force might lead the Kuwaitis to decline the offer, as they have turned down US protection in the past. But US officials said they expected Kuwait to accept the US plan. The American move was seen as an important diplomatic step, reinforcing its position with the pro-Western Arab countries of the Gulf.

Probers Set to Talk With Ghorbanifar

ND-Page -House and Senate investigators are to go to Paris next week to interview Ghorbanifar although he is considered such an unreliable witness that he may not be asked to testify at the committees' public hearings, congressional sources said. Ghorbanifar said in an interview to the Washinton Times that it will be proven that it was the CIA who got Reagan into such trouble. The interview will not be conducted under oath. Investigators will assess after the interview whether his account could be believed.

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שגרירות ישראל / זושינגטון

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אל :- מנהל מצפ"א

דע :- מקשי"ח

מכירות נשק למדינות ערב

להלן ממקור בסנט ששוחח אתמול (23) עם הגנרל גאסט.

א) ניוד החוקים בירדן.

חרף דברי שולץ (מברקנו STS) כן בכוונה הממשל לנסות ולחביא להשבחת החוקים האלה בירדן, ע"י ניודם עם גיבוש ההצעה, יפנה הממשל לקונגרס לצורך "CONSULTATION" (בהתאם להתחייבות שניתנה בעת הדיונים על מכירות נשק לירדן - י.ל.).

ב) מסוק מדגם בל לסעודיה

גאסט שאל מדוע מתנגדים לעיסקה זו. לענתו מסוק זה פחות מתוחכם ממסוקים אחרים, כגון הצפע (COBRA) שנמכרו כבר לירדן ולמדינות ערב אחרות (האמנם? - אבא הערותיכם - י.ל.).

ג. טנק מדגם M לסעודיה

בפנטגון שזקלים מכירת הטנק הנ"ל לסעודיה בשנת הבאה.

ד. תחמושת ח"ש 105 מ"מ מאורניום מדולל

(1) בין היתר, טוען גאסט שהסגז היחידי מהקוטר הנ"ל שמייצרת ארה"ב כיום נעשית מאוראניום מדולל. כ"כ הוא טוען שהיה וארה"ב לא תספק פגז זה, הערבים יקנו פגז דומה בעל ראש חודר עשוי מטונגסטן. פגז זה מיוצר ברפ"ג זכרון מישראל.

(2) המקור מבקש לדעת הייתכן. כ"כ מבקש לדעת אם הרפג"גים זכאים למכור את הפגז בלא רשותנו.

אמנטיא: אבא התייחסותכם בהקדם.

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המשרד

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אל :- מנכ"ל מדיני, לשכת מנכ"ל, מצפ"א, ממ"ד

פגישת המנכ"ל שמיר - ארמקוסט

נכחו : סודארת, ווילקוקס, סטיינפלד וסאטרפילד. מצדנו : השגריר, פרימור, קוריאל ונה"מ.

1. ארמקוסט פתח בדיווח על שיחותיו במוסקבה. זהו ביקורו הראשון בבירה הסובייטית וחזר עם חוויות קשות (SHOCKED) בין השאר, מרמת השלח במלון, ולמראה רחובות ריקים. שוחח עם ורונצ'ב כ-6 שעות אחר הגדיר כאיש שיח מעניין בעל כושר ביטוי שהתבטא שהיה רוצה לראות חידוש (INNOVATION) במדיניות החוץ הסובייטית. כ"כ נועד עם שברנדזה למשך 3 שעות, בה נכח דוברינין. בשיחות על המזה"ח השתתפו ורונצ'וב, פוליאקוב ומרפי. השיתה לא הביאה לשום דבר חדש (NEW GROUND) הסובייטים חזרו על נושא הועידה המכונה "נידבו" מרצונם שביעות רצון על כך שחלה התקדמות ביחסים עם ישראל. הזכירו פגישות שה"ח בניו יורק ופוליאקוב הזכירו פגישות השגרירים רוזן - דוברינין בוושינגטון. האמריקאים הדגישו שקידום אמיתי במזה"ח יבוא ע"י מו"מ ישיר (FACE TO FACE) על בסיס 242 ו-338 אך יסכימו לבדוק מה כולל פורום בינ"ל כשהקריטריון הקובע יהיה מה יושג בו. חשוב לקדם את התוכן ולא לטבוע בדיונים על סידורים טכניים. הזכירו לחיוב מאפצי חוסיין להוציא ויתורים מאש"פ ופגישת פרט - חסן. הסובייטים טפכו צוננים (DAMPED IT OVER) על משמעות המהלכים הנ"ל, והגדירו כבלתי קונסטרוקטיביים. תומכים באחדות אש"פ על בסיס מכנה משותף עם הסרוב. התרשם מדברי הסובייטים שהקשר עם לוב משונה (PECULIAR). הביעו שביעות רצון מהודעת השוק להצבעות באו"ם כביטוי לכך שהקהילה הבינ"ל תומכת בהצעותיהם. ארמקוסט חזר על כך שמבחינת ארה"ב יש חשיבות לתוכן והדגיש שלא היו-מסקנות מהשיחות. המשיך שהדגישו בפני הסובייטים שבנוסף לשיחות שהללו מקיימים עם ישראל, האמריקאים היו רוצים לראות התקדמות בנושא ההגירה ושבמה"מ צריכה לנצל מערכת קשריה עם סוריה ולוב התומכות בטרור במטרה TO CUT UP את התופעת בטה"כ נימת הדיבורים היתה חיובית וישירה. יש בכך משום פריצת דרך במובן אופי המגעים הדיפ. אם גם התוכן וחילוקי הדעות ACROSS THE BOARD נשארו בעינם. ארמקוסט מעריך שבקוותם בהליך ע"פ הצעתם נעוצה גם ברצון למנוע חילוקי דעות בין הקליינטים שלהם - סוריה ואש"פ. מכאן הטקטיקה של הצמדות לאספקטים פרוצדורליים ובניית קונצנזוס בינ"ל מבלי

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להביא לשינוי מהותי בתוכן, טכאמור עלול להביא לעימות עם ידידיהם הנ"ל. ארמקוסט גם לא נכח בנכונות חדשה מצד הסובייטים בנושא הביילטרלי כשטרבית השיחות עסקו בנושא ה- INF.

2. בסוגיית עיראק - איראן היתה זהות בשאלת הטכנה הכרוכה בנצחון איראני. האמריקאים לא הבחינו בדאגה סובייטית מאפשרות של התמוטטות עיראקית. אך כן התרשמו מהנוקשות האיראנית שבאה לידי ביטוי בביקור סגן שה"ח במוסקבה.

3. בנושאים אזוריים אחרים הזכיר דרא"פ - ביצוע החלטות או"ם לגבי נמיביה, אמרכ"ז ביקורת על מדיניות אוה"ב תוך שימוש בביטוי פולמיקה פושרת. קמבודיה - קוריאה - הסובייטים נצמדים לידידיהם באיזור למרות המחשבה לגבי פתיחות אפשרית כניכול באסיה. הם זהירים שלא לפגוע (OFFEND) בווייטנאמים. שברנדזה נכשל בביקורו האחרון בדרום מזרח אסיה במאמציו לשכנעם לנוע מעמדותיהם.

4. המנכ"ל טמיר, הבעיה בתהליך השלום אינה כיצד להתחיל בוועידה בינ"ל אלא איך לסתור הנושאים המרכזיים ע"מ לכנסו. חסין בזכור מתנגד לשיחות מכינות. במפגש קהיר היתה התקדמות בכך שאש"פ לא ישתתף בשיחות ההכנה אלא משלחת ירדנית - פלסטינאית כשהייצוג והנלטינאי יהיה בהסכנות ירדן וישראל. בפגישה עם חשג'יר הסובייטי באו"ם ב-23 עלו שני קווים מרכזיים (א) הסובייטים לא רוצים בזיקה בין נושא הגירה יהודים לתהליך השלום. שינוי במדיניות הסובייטית בעניין ההגירה הוא פרי החלטה הקשורה באסטרטגיה הסובייטית הפנימית. התרשם שיהיו לפחות איזה שהם שינויים במישור יציאת יהודים.

(ב) לגבי השיחות המכינות הנציג הסובייטי העלה רעיון חדש INFORMAL PREPARATORY TALKS בת שלושה שלבים (א) ועדת הכנה. (ב) שיחות ישירות בין הצדדים. (ג) שיחות בין 5 חברות מועבי"ט והצדדים. לשאלת ארמקוסט מי הצדדים השיב המנכ"ל שהבעיה היא אש"פ אבל לדעתו אפשר והסובייטים יגלו גמישות לגבי השתתפות אש"פ בשיחות ההכנה. המנכ"ל הטעים שאנו מטכימים כמובן לרעיון של השיחות הישירות וכן אין לנו בעיה שכל אחד מחברי מועבי"ט ידבר עם כל אחד מהצדדים ומדוע אם כן יש צורך ב"מטריה בינ"ל". ארמקוסט הגיב שהיבט סובייטי זה מעניין כשלעצמו לא עלה בשיחות במוסקבה. המנכ"ל טמיר השיב שהשיחות היו בעיקר בנושא ההגירה ובנושאים אומיים ע"פ יזמתם. לשאלת השגריר מה היחה התגובה ה-48/5 במוסקבה, הטעים ארמקוסט בחוטר כל חגובה מצדם. מאידך, שברנדזה נידב שידבר בנושא זכויות אדם עם שולץ. ארמקוסט הוסיף שאכנס נמצא כעת במוסקבה ובודאי יעלה הנושא.

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סוג בסחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/נו"ח

מס' מברק

באשר לועידת ההכנה ארמקוסט חזר שהחשוב הוא החוכן ולא התהליך, ולא מקובל על ארה"ב שחברות מועב"ט תחלטנה על מה הצדדים יכולים להסכים או לא להסכים. לסובייטים יש עדה"י משלהם. המנכ"ל טמיר; הכהוכת היא חוסיין. הוא עומד על ועידה בינ"ל בהשתתפות 5 חברות מועב"ט. אנו יכולים להתחיל כבר מחר בשיחות עם מטגרת אזורית כלשהי. במסגרת מאמצים באיזור ומחוצה לו חשוב להתחיל במשהו עוד השנה. ארמקוסט, אנו כמובן מסכימים עם כך ואף השקענו מאמצים בחיפוש אחר דרכים שיאפשרו זאת. קלבריוס בורק MODALITIES. מסקנתו מחוסיין שהוא שותף לשאיפה להתקדם ואינו מעוניין לחכות עד הוס מועד כהונת הממשל. הוא בדעה שהממשל איבד זמן יקר.

5. עיראק - איראן. המנכ"ל טמיר הסביר שהיעד האיראני עתה הוא כבר לא ראשו של צדאם חוסיין אלא השיפה וניצול נקודות תורפה עיראקיות - בדרום האוכלוסייה השיעית, בצפון שה"פ עם הכורדים. כל אלה יביאו ללחץ על הבעה', מה שלא קרה עד עתה. אין סיכוי שעיראק תתמוטט במלחמה ולכן ע"פ דרך מחשבה זו, ממקורות ששוחחו עם האיראנים הם מחפשים דרך לצאת מהמלחמה על בסיס סידורי בטחון שיבטיחו הסדר יציב. אחת הבעיות הכרוכות בכך היא כיצד יסבירו זאת לאוכלוסייה. ארמקוסט שאל האם האיראנים באמת ויתרו על צדאם חוסיין. ב-86 הושגה התקדמות במבצעי חי"א העיראקי, ירידה שער הדולר וכן השמועות על בריאות חימיבי, כל זה יצר לחץ על האיראנים. מאידך, עתה הגבירו שיווק הנפט ומחירו גם עלה במקצת דבר שישפיע על הכנסותיהם. הם גט לוחצים בחזיתות וקומבינציה זו יוצרת ריטון בקרב האוכלוסייה העיראקית ולכן המידע הנ"ל הוא בבחינת תדרוש שלא שמענו עליו. כל מה שאנו שומעים מצביע אחרת. המידע מצביע על המשך הלחץ בחזיתות כשהצטברות הכשלוניות יהיה אפקט על מעמדו של צדאם חוסיין. הסובייטים אינם מודאגים ובדעה שהעיראקים ייצבו את המצב בדרום. מעניין לשמוע דעה אחרת. המנכ"ל טמיר. זו גם לא הערכתנו הדומה לשלכם. הצגתי דעה שעלתה בוועידה האיטלאמית.

6. לבנון. המנכ"ל טמיר, הסורים והאחריט יודעים מה עמדתנו ושלא נתערב בכח צבאי למען העמיד הפוליטי של לבנון. יש לנו קווים אדומים לגבי הצבא הסורי - אי הצבת צבא בדרום, טילים ופעולות טרור ישירות או עקיפות, כלפי ישראל. נראה שהסורים מבינים כללי משחק אלה. השאלה מה יעשו בבירות. פועלים ע"פ אסטי לטווח ארוך. הם ישארו עד הבחירות לנשיאות ב-88' וישתמשו בכל הכלים והמאמצים הפנימיים להכוונת הבחירות ולשינוי החוקה. לבנון לא חסופח אך תשאר בשליטתם. חילוקי הדעות הם טקטיים - כיצד

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דף 4 מחוד 5 דפים

סוג במחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

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להשיג מטרת אלה. אלה שמדברים בשם הנשיא אומרים שיש להמתין ולפעול על בסיס דעת הקהל הקהל שם. הסורים לא יכנסו למזרח בירות, לא יתקפו את ג'זין ולא ינועו לדרום אך ימנעו קרבות פנימיים בין הפלגים. מאידך, הכח"ל בדעה שיהיו שלבים צבאיים נגד ג'זין, התקדמות למזרח ביירות והורדת צבא עד האוולי. ארמקוסט, גם ארה"ב עוקבת אחר הקווים האדומים. אין הוכחה שהחליטו להתקדם לדרום ביירות. הם זקוקים לצבא נוסף ויטכנו חיי החטופים. הסורים ערים לקווים האדומים. אך האם הסורים יודעים בדיוק מהם שלכם. המנכ"ל סמיר, מאמין שכן אך לא בטוח לגבי הורדת צבא לדרום יתכן וחושבים שיש להם מרחב מרון.

7. מצרים. המנכ"ל סמיר. האוירה השתנתה לאחר ההחלטה על בורות בשאלת טאבה. אין זאח אומרת שאין בעיות עם הנורמליזציה אך ללא לחץ של השנתיים האחרונות. אנו מתקרבים לתאריך היעד ע"פ כתב הקומפורטי. מנסים למצוא פתרון, זה לא בגלל בעית הריבונות. רובי סיבל בא עם רעיונות שהעברנו להם גם חוץ כדי הסו"מ - חלוקת השטח לשניים. המצרים לא רוצים בפשרה בנושא הריבונות.

8. אגו היס התיכונ. הרעיון המרכזי כשיחות באיטליה. בספרד ומלטה - הסמת ברית ים תיכונית או שותפות של דרום - צפון, רק עם מדינות שאינן בקונפליקט עם מדינות אחרות. בתיים מלטה שיש לפני גם מדינות כאלו ולנסות ולפתור הסכסוכים ביניהן. אנו חושבים ברעיון אך איננו בטוחים שהוא ריאלי. יש זיקה בין המצב באגן היס התיכון לבין המזה"ת.

9. אפריקה. מנכ"ל סמיר : המדיניות היא סלקטיבית. כינון יחסים דיפלומטיים או יחסים כלכליים הם כלי מרכזי לכן. אך ללא החנייה ביניהם וללא הבטחת. לא נבוא לאפריקאים ונאמר שאם העשו כך אנו נעשה כך. מסתבר שיחסים דיפלומטיים היא מילה יפה אבל הם לא מתאהבים בה וצריך להשקיע, יחסים כלכליים וסיוע טכני הם מכשיר עקרי לבניית יחסים דיפלומטיים. יש גם בעיה של אמצעים במיוחד בהקשר למצב הכלכלי בישראל. צריך לכוונן תשאת כלכלית עם אלה שאתם יש לנו יחסים. ליבריה, זאיר חו"ש ואולי קמרון. מדינות היעד במסגרת מדיניות זו הם ניגריה, סנגל, אחיופיה, קניה ואולי מוזמביק. הסמנכ"ל פרימור הצביע שבעידוד אמריקאי יצרנו קשר עם מוזמביק אך אנו נדחים בכך שש"יהיה לנו מה לאמר לכם נודיעכם". שני יעדים במדיניות החוץ (א) חהליך השלום. שיחות מכינות אם נפתור את בעיית הפורום. במקביל לחץ על חוסיין לנוע. (ב) יחסים כלכליים בינ"ל באמצעי לחהליך מדיני. בצפון אפריקה ישנה התחלה. מצרים, מרוקו ואולי גם עם מתונות אחרות. בחלקי עולם אחרים יש לנו שני כלים כלכליים, עסקים וסיוע טכני.

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70% מסחר החוץ של ישראל (יצוא, יבוא והשקעות) מיועד לאירופה וצפון אמריקה. אנו מנסים ליצור חשתית כלכלית במזרח הרחוק של כ-500 מ' דולר (מזכיר ביקורו הקרוב ביפן, האילנד, דרום קוריאה, פיליפינים והונג קונג), המכשיר השני הוא הסיוע הטכני לקריבים ובאוקיאניה בשי"פ עם ארה"ב. נרצה לדון עם מקפירסון על *JOINT VENTURES* הסמנכ"ל פרימור, מסביר שבאוקיאניה יש לנו נוכחות של אנשים טכניים ומנסים להפוך את פיג'י למרכז אזורי. ארמקוסט, נשמח לשי"פ עמכם באזורים הנ"ל וטוב שנדע מהם ההדגשים שלכם. התנכ"ל טמיר, יפן. ארמקוסט, השמוש ב- *AID* לחטרות אסטרטגיות במדינות מפתח ביחוד בשטחים שארה"ב לחוצה בהם בגלל הסדר משאבים. מתכוונן גם הוא לבקר בקרוב במזרח הרחוק. השגריר מזכיר נושא דרום קוריאה. ארמקוסט, נמשיך במאמצים. קניה-ווילקוקס מסביר שהנושא הישראלי לא עלה בשיחות עם ארפ-מוי. ארמקוסט, ביקורו לא עלה יפה סביב מספר נושאים. (זכויות אדם).

אלי אבידן

k.k

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ס ד פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 4 דפים

סוג מסמך סורי

דחיפות מיידי

0930 24 מרס 87 תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

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4

המשרד

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אל - : ממ"ד, מצפ"א

משיחה עם מייקל אסארי סגן עוזר המזכיר

1. כנסת השגרירים האמריקאים. המועד נקבע עוד בספט' 86 ומבחינה זו החזמן היה מצויין - חשיפת פרשת איראן, דו"ח ועדת טאואר וכד'. הסוגיה והשלוחה (רי להלן) עמדה במרכז הדיונים ולשגרירים שהיו מדווחים בכתב נתנה הזדמנות לעמוד מקרוב על הערכת גורמים שונים במחמ"ד את ההתפתחויות אך בעיקר להחליף דעות בינם לבין עצמם בנושאים שהם מתכתבים ביניהם כל ימות השנה דרך הצנורות המקבילים במחמ"ד.

2. המסקנה האופרטיבית המרכזית הייתה שיש לחזור מהר ככל האפשר לכללי המדיניות האמריקאית באזור המזה"ת המורחב טרם חשיפת הפרשה בהסתמך על כך שכלליה תקפים למעשה גם עתה¹ שינויים שהזמן גרמן".

3. היתה הסכמה בהתאם לדיווחי השגרירים שבשעה שאמנם לא ניתן, לפחות לא לפי שעה להצביע על נזק מוחשי (TANGIBLE) הרי נגרם כן נזק בנושא אמינות ארה"ב. המימד הזה ילווה כצל את יחסי ארה"ב עם מספר מדינות למשך חודשים ארוכים אם לא מעבר לכך וכל מהלך או התנהגות מצדה יושם החת זכויות מגדלת של ספקנות - האם זה כך. הגורמים שהוזכרו במיוחד היו לפי הסדר עיראק ירדן והמפרציות להוציא טעוניה.

הערכה לגבי עיראק למשל היא שהיתה נוקטת בתגובה חריפה לולא המלחמה עם איראן ואילו לגבי חוסיין שנפגע אישית ההערכה היתה שימצא מזור ככל ש"חמת המלך שככה" ואף חוזרים מדברים ביתר אופטימיות על ביקור שיערוך כאן "אי שם בחודשים הבאים".

הוחלט לאחר דיון וסדרי עדיפויות לפעול אופרטיבית לגבי קבוצת מדינות המפרץ. עיקר הפעילות האמריקאית תתמקד בהחדרת יתר בטחון למדינות הני"ל ע"י מספר צעדים שתנקוט ארה"ב (להזכירם הליווי לאניות כוייתיות ואזהרה לאיראן בנושא הטילים - א.א.). אליה וקוץ בה מגבלות הקציביות אינן מאפשרות לארה"ב להוסיף במידה משמעותית אמצעים על אלה שארה"ב כבר מפעילה באזור זה ועיקר המעש יהיה על כן בצורה דלקרטיבית ע"פ הכלל ש"הצדק חייב גם להראות ולא רק להעשות". לשאלתי לדברי וינברגר, הרחיב שארה"ב תתרכז בהבטחת השיט החופשי במפרץ ולא תמקד בשימוש באמצעים מתאריכים.

מה	הת	סגן	מזכיר	מ	מ	מ	מ	מ	מ
2	3	1	3	1	1	2	1	1	1
2	3	1	3	1	1	2	1	1	1

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היה ויעשה שימוש בסילים האיראנים נגד השייט הבינ"ל או נגד טריטוריה של אחת מהמדינות הנ"ל. לסוגיה יש ערך נוסף בהיבט על יחסי איראן - ארה"ב. הממשל כחלק מהחנערותו מפרשת הנשק מאותה לאיראן בבירור שיש כאן חזרה לכללי המשחק המקובלים, דהיינו ראית הפרשה כ"אפיזודה חולפת" אך בעת ובעונה אחת גם הוסכם על משתפי הכנס שחשיבותה האסטרטגית של איראן לא תפריע לארה"ב להמשיך ולחפש נתיבות אליה ע"פ הנסיון וע"פ הערכה שמדובר במדיניות ארוכת טווח שסיכוייה בהווה או בעתיד הקצר קלושים למדי. ההסכמה בדבר המשך המעקב האמריקאי אחרי כל שינוי בטראן מחבט על דיווחי השגרירים באיזור, שמדינות כהונחן אינן מערערות על יציבותן וזו ילווציא נמוגן וזו מוצאת לפועל הכלתי מקובלת. והוסיבה האסטרטגית במחמ"ד על הערכת הגורם האיראני אמנם לא השחנתה אך הלקחים שהופקו מהפרשה מספקים מימד אופרטיבי שונה בתכלית בעתיד.

4. ישראל - ערב. המזכיר ומרפי, כך הדגיש, בדעה אחת שהובאה בפני משתפי הכנס שאסור להשאיר "אבן בלתי הפוכה" בדרך לקידום מהליך מדיני ועל כך הייתה הסכמה כללית בכנס. השאלה שעליה לא ניתנה תשובה בפורום היא כיצד להגיע ליתר אקטיביות אמריקאית בתהליך השלום - מהו הכיוון ובאיזה נושא ספציפי, זאת מבלי "לשפורך את מי האמבטיה עם המיכונק". דהיינו, להגיע למשהו בלתי רצוי. שני הנושאים שהוזכרו - ועידה בינ"ל והייצוג הפלסטינאי הוגדרו כפרובלמטיים. לא הגיעו לסיכומים כלשהם אך הוסכם להמשיך ולחפש מה ניתן לעשות (הבינותי שהמשימה הוטלה על "כח מרפי" - א.א.).

5. סוריה. הוזכרו שני נושאים, גם בזיקה ללבנון. ארה"ב תמשיך להתנות כל דיאלוג במעשים סוריים קונקרטיים בנושא הטרור. הקביעה האמריקאית שהסורים טרם עשו דבר שיהיה בו פסוקיננו במדיניות הסורית בנושא הטרור ויאפשר החזרת השבירים איגלטון לדמשק. שיבת הצבא הסורי לביירות הוערכה כארוע "לבנוני פנימי" שמטרתה בהודעות המצב הבטחוני שם שהגיע עד כדי קו אדום לאינטרס הסורי. הערכה שהסורים לא ירחיקו לכת אך במצב המסובך בלאו הכי קיים פוטנציאל להסתבכות סורית.

6. מכירות נשק. מספר שגרירים (לא פרט) לחצו להענות לבקשות השליטים לרכישת ציוד צבאי אמריקאי מתוחכם. עמדת גורמי מחמ"ד היתה שבנושא בבדיקה מתמדה כשהנטיה ללכת על דברים בטוחים שלא יהיה בהם משום שינוי במאזן הצבאי במזה"מ. צויין שהנושא יעמוד בזיקה הדוקה לראיה האסטרטגית האמריקאית באזור. דגש מיוחד ניתן למפוצ

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ולהתפתחויות אפשריות כתוצאה מהמלחמה שם. מקורה לקבל דיווח מאד דרזיאן (מחליפו של ארני רסאל).

מגרב

7. מדינות כגון חוניסיה ומרוקו לא הזדעזעו כתוצאה מפרשת הנשק האמריקאי לאיראן ולארוע לא היתה השפעה על מערכת היחסים.

8. התקופה הנוכחית נחשבת לשקטה באשר להתרחשויות בצפון אפריקה. האמריקאים עוקבים אחרי שלושת בנושאים: (א) סהרה המערבית. (ב) ההתנהגות הלובית. (ג) ההיבט הביטחוני של מערכת היחסים בין מדינות המגרב.

9. מרוקו. בחודש הבא יטוכס כך מקווים, מועד ביקורו של חסן בארה"ב כשמדובר במועד החל מחודש יוני ואילך, דהיינו במחצית השניה של '87. האמריקאים בדעה שחסן הולך ו"מחליט" ממה שאסארי כינה הסתגרות אישית כתוצאה מאבדן בטחון עצמי בטל מערכת יחסיו על העולם הערבי בחדשים האחרונים. ההתפתחות המעודדת היא החלטתו למנות ממונה על האינטרסים בקהיר בשם TAZIZ שניהן בעבר בתפקידי שגריר. מבחינה מסויימת יש בכך העלאת דרג הקשרים בין שתי המדינות לשמחת לבם של האמריקאים. עפ"י אסארי אינם מודאגים בתוצאות הקרב בין הצבא המרוקני לאחרונה עם הפוליסרו ורואים בכך ארוע בודד ולא דווקא מאפיין המעיד על כושרם של המרוקנים. הערכה היא שבסה"כ המצב נמצא בשליטה של מרוקו.

10. אלג'יריה. אסארי מבחין בהחרפת המצב הכלכלי ובעיקר באי יכולתו של בן ג'ידיד לתרום דבריו על הצורך ברפורמות למעשים טובים, ובשלב זה לא ננקטו צעדים מעשיים להאבק בהתפתחויות השליליות בתחום זה. ההסבר אמנם נעוץ בהתנגדות מצד המפלגה, למרות תמיכת הצבא בו, אך האמריקאים סבורים שככל שהגברות נדחות כך יקשה על בן ג'ידיד לעמוד בפניהן. זמן רב לא עומד לרשותו לנוכח התגברות האבטלה וקיומה של אוכלוסייה צעירה בלתי מועסקת.

מסתבר שוולטוסטיס בביקורו שם לא נגע בשאלת העברת חיילים אמריקאים מבסיסים מספרד למרוקו משום שאין כוונה כזו. הביקור בא ביזוחח אלג'יריה כנסיון לאזן ביקורו במרוקו והוקדש ברובו לנושא אופי ההצבעות השליליות מבחינת ארה"ב, של אלג'יריה באו"ם. השיחות על חידוש משלוחי גאז לארה"ב טרם הסתיימו ועדיין דנים בנושאים טכניים, אף כי שתי המדינות הביעו רצון לכך.

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11. תוניסיה. ההתפתחות האחרונה קשורה למערכת יחסיה עם לוב. קדיאפי הביע רצון לשפר היחסים. התוניסאים שנענו עמדו על כך שיש לפצותם על גרוש 30 אלף הפועלים התוניסאים בסך של 250 מ' דולר. קדיאפי הסכים למחווה של רצון בדמות תשלום של 10 מ' דולר. האמריקאים עם כל חשדם במניעיו האמיתיים של קדיאפי רואים זאת במצב מכמה סיבות (א) תשלום הפיצויים באם יתברר שיש להם המשך יהווה הקלה על המצב הכלכלי בתוניסיה שאסארי (ואחרים) מגדירים אותו כחמור ביותר בצפון אפריקה. (ב) באספקט הפוליטי של המהלך יש בכך משום הודאה מצד קדיאפי אמת החיצוני הוא נותן כשמתלוות לכך הידיעה על אי שקט בזירה הפנימית ומפלוח בחזית הציאדאס אסארי שלל האפשרות של התקרבות בין שתי המדינות נוסח הסכם אושגוד בין לוב ומרוקו.

אלי אבידן

א.א.

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דחיסות מידי

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אל :- א. שר - החשב הכללי (אוצר)
א. דברת (אוצר)
דע :- מצפ"א, כלכלית
שמואל שטראוס (ניו יורק-בפקס)
ציר כלכלי (כאן)

סיוע חוץ במזומנים

למברקי דברת 624 ו-642

א. סוכנות ה- AID והצעת טוריסלי

- (1) באירוע חברתי במעון השגריר ניגש אלי היום פיטר מק-פירסון, ואמר שא.י.ד. מתנגדת להצעה זו היות ויש בה כדי לחסל את כל התכניות המיועדות להעברת סיוע אזרחי במזומנים שעה שיש לא.י.ד. ולמחמ"ד ענין בהרחבת חכניות אלה (הצביע על מצרים והאיטי).
- (2) שמח לשמוע שלבקשתנו הצעת טוריסלי הינה **ON HOLD** כעת. הציע שנחאם עמדות עם קצין הקישור הראשי שלו, קלי קמרר, וכך נעשה.

ב. הצעתו של הסנטור סימס (מברקנו 621)

- (1) שוחחתי היום עם סם ראוסן (מנהל משרדו של סימס - ביקר בארץ לפני כשנה עם הסנטור) ועם טרנט קלארק, עוזר לעניני חקלאות וסחר אצל סימס. לדבריהם, הצעת החוק שלהם כמעט התקבלה בשנה שעברה. ישלחו לנו כל החומר הנוגע (מכתבי חוזר של הסנטור, עמיתיו, דפי הסבר וכו').
- (2) כעת העניין רדום, הטיפול אצל ועדת החוץ, ובבוא העת בכוונת הסנטור הלמס (בכיר המיעוט בוועדה) לנסות ולהצמיד אותו לאחד מחוקי הסחר שבטיפול הועדה.
- (3) כפי שבוודאי שמתם לב, רק חלק 5 מהצעת סימס נוגע לנו, ולמיטב הנכתי הניסוחים לגבי סחורות במקום מזומנים (סעיף 5(a)) ולגבי הביקורת על ההוצאות, לא זו בלבד שהם עדיפים לעומת ניסוחיו של טוריסלי, אלא נוכל להסתדר עמם. לפיכך התרכזתי על נושא הספנות (לאור הסתייגותו של שטראוס) ובני שיחי הסכימו שהיה והתקבל ההצעה, נהייה חייבים להוביל 75 אחוזים הפסחורות באניות אמריקאיות. גילו הבנה לטיעוני שטראוס ובהכין שסימס יהיה מוכן להתחשב באינטרסים שלנו. הציעו שנמשיך את השיחה לאחר שקבל חוות דעת

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משפטיה:

- (4) אבקש איפוא שנפתור את המחלוקת בין דברת לבין שטראוס. האם השינוי טוב ליהודים או לא? ולאור זאת, אבקש הצעה קונקרטיה (ניסוחים) לשם תיקון הצעתו של סימס, *דגב הנחודף*
- (5) אם התיקון מקובל עליו, אזי נוכל להציע לטוריסלי לקבל ההצעה המתוקנת כולה (במגמה לחאם עמדות עם הסנס).
- (6) אנא התייחסותכם בהקדם.
- (7) לדברת: טובה חולה. רציב פרק A של חלק II מתוך חוק הסינע. גם טוריסלי וגם סימס מציעים חקיקתם כתוספת לפרק זה.

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ligations of the United States arising out of credit sales agreements entered into, and guaranties issued, under this part, prior to June 30, 1968. Any moneys in such special account in excess of the aggregate United States dollar amount of such liabilities and obligations shall be transferred from time to time to the general fund of the Treasury.

(8) ⁴³³ . . . [Repealed—1968]
Sec. 525. ⁴³³ Guaranties.— . . . [Repealed—1968]

Chapter 4—Economic Support Fund ⁴³³

NOTE.—Section 202 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 transferred the former Chapter 4 of Part I governing supporting assistance to its present location as Chapter 4 of Part II of the Act. Section 202(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 provides as follows:

"Chapter 4 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is hereby repealed. References to such chapter or any sections thereof shall hereafter be deemed to be references to chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as added by subsection (a) of this section, or to appropriate sections thereof. All references to part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall hereafter be deemed to be references also to chapter 4 of part II, and all references to part II of such Act shall be deemed not to include chapter 4 of such Part II."

In changing the title of chapter 4 from Security Supporting Assistance to Economic Support Fund, Sec. 10(b)(6) of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 (92 Stat. 735) stated that after September 30, 1978, any reference to security supporting assistance shall be deemed a reference to assistance provided under chapter 4 of part II of this Act.

⁴³³ Repealed by sec. 45(a) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, Public Law 90-629. The subject matter of par. (8), relating to arms sales credits, is now covered in sec. 23 of the Arms Export Control Act.

⁴³³ Ch. 4, which had been added by the FA Act of 1971 and had been titled "Security Supporting Assistance," was retitled as "Economic Support Fund" and comprehensively amended and restated by sec. 10(a) of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-864; 92 Stat. 783). Sec. 10(b)(6) of the same Act stated that after Sept. 30, 1978, any reference in any act to security supporting assistance shall be considered to be a reference to this chapter.

Sec. 201 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83, 99 Stat. 210), replaced secs. 581 and 582, amended and redesignated secs. 585 as 583, and repealed all other sections regarding earmarking of funds for specific regions or purposes. See pp. 282-285 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, (Public Law 99-83, 99 Stat. 210), for use of ESP funds for the Middle East, Cyprus, Portugal, agricultural commodities under commodity import programs, tied aid credit program, and restriction on use of funds for nuclear facilities. In addition, sec. 712 of Public Law 99-83 (99 Stat. 244) added a new section, designated sec. 534 to this chapter.

Sec also secs. 644-647 of the Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1983 (title VI of Public Law 98-166; which establishes a tied aid credit program in the United States Export-Import Bank in order to promote U.S. exports. This program is to be carried out in cooperation with the Agency for International Development and permits the AID Administrator to draw on Economic Support Funds allocated for Commodity Import Programs to finance a tied aid credit activity. See vol. II for complete text of secs. 644-647.

See also sec. 206 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (p. 285, sec. H) which authorizes not less than \$50 million in fiscal year 1986 and not less than \$100 million in fiscal year 1987 out of the commodity import program portion of the Economic Support Fund for use in a tied aid credit program.

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Sec. 531.⁴³⁷ Authority.—(a) The Congress recognizes that, under special economic, political, or security conditions, the national interests of the United States may require economic support for countries in amounts which could not be justified solely under chapter 1 of part I. In such cases, the President is authorized to furnish assistance to countries and organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, in order to promote economic or political stability. To the maximum extent feasible, the President shall provide assistance under this chapter consistent with the policy directions, purposes, and programs of part I of this Act.

(b) The Secretary of State shall be responsible for policy decisions and justifications for economic support programs under this chapter, including determinations of whether there will be an economic support program for a country and the amount of the program for each country. The Secretary shall exercise this responsibility in cooperation with the Administrator of the agency primarily responsible for administering part I of this Act.⁴³⁸

(c) As part of the annual presentation materials for foreign assistance submitted to the Congress, the agency primarily responsible for administering this part shall provide a detailed justification for the uses and the purposes of the funds provided under this chapter. Such material shall include, but not be limited to, information concerning the amounts and kinds of cash grant transfers, the amounts and kinds of budgetary and balance-of-payments support provided, and the amounts and kinds of project assistance provided with funds made available under this chapter.

(d) To the maximum extent feasible, funds made available pursuant to this chapter for commodity import programs or other program assistance shall be used to generate local currencies, not less than 50 percent of which shall be available to support activities consistent with the objectives of section 103 through 106 of this Act, and administered by the agency primarily responsible for administering part I of this Act.

(e) Amounts appropriated to carry out this chapter shall be available for economic programs and may not be used for military or paramilitary purposes.

Sec. 532.⁴³⁹ Authorizations of Appropriations.—(a) There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out the purposes of this chapter—

- (1) \$2,015,000,000 for the fiscal year 1986 and \$2,015,000,000 for the fiscal year 1987 for the following countries signing the Camp David agreement: Israel and Egypt;⁴⁴⁰ and

⁴³⁷ 22 U.S.C. 2346.

⁴³⁸ This responsibility, as it relates to the Administrator, was transferred to the Director of IDCA, pursuant to sec. 6 of Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1979 (establishing IDCA).

⁴³⁹ 22 U.S.C. 2346a.

⁴⁴⁰ The authorization under this chapter during recent years included the following: fiscal year 1979—\$1,902,000,000; fiscal year 1980—\$1,935,000,000 (plus an \$90,000,000 supplemental authorization for Central American Assistance); fiscal year 1981—\$2,065,300,000; fiscal year 1982—\$2,623,500,000; fiscal year 1983—\$2,723,500,000; fiscal year 1984—\$3,074,000,000; fiscal year 1985—no authorization.

Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, 1986 (sec. 101(j) of the Continuing Appropriations, 1986; Public Law 99-190; 99 Stat. 1299) provides the following:

"Economic support fund. For necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of chapter 4 of part II, \$3,700,000,000. Provided, That of the funds appropriated under this paragraph, not less

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than \$1,200,000,000 shall be available only for Israel, which sum shall be available on a grant basis as a cash transfer and shall be disbursed within 80 days of enactment of this Act or by October 31, 1985, whichever is later. *Provided further*, That not less than \$815,000,000 shall be available only for Egypt, which sum shall be provided on a grant basis, of which not less than \$115,000,000 shall be provided as a cash transfer in accordance with the provisions of section 202(b) of Public Law 99-88, and not less than \$200,000,000 shall be provided as a Commodity Import Program. *Provided further*, That it is the same sense of the Congress that the recommended levels of assistance for Egypt and Israel are based in great measure upon their continued participation in the Camp David Accords and upon the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and that Egypt and Israel are urged to continue their efforts to restore a full diplomatic relationship, including ambassadors, and achieve realization of the Camp David Accords. *Provided further*, That not less than \$250,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this paragraph shall be available only for Pakistan. *Provided further*, That any of the funds appropriated under this paragraph for El Salvador which are placed in the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador shall be maintained in a separate account and not commingled with any other funds, except that such funds may be obligated and expended notwithstanding provisions of law, which are inconsistent with the cash transfer nature of this assistance, or which are referenced in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference accompanying House Joint Resolution 648 (H. Rept. No. 98-1159). *Provided further*, That pursuant to section 660(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 up to \$1,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this paragraph shall be available to assist the Government of El Salvador's Special Investigative Unit for the purpose of bringing to justice those responsible for the murders of United States citizens in El Salvador. *Provided further*, That a report of the investigation shall be provided to the Congress. *Provided further*, That funds appropriated under this paragraph for Mozambique may be made available only for activities in support of the private sector. *Provided further*, That of the amounts made available by this paragraph for Mozambique, \$5,000,000 may not be made available until a democratic election has been held in Mozambique. *Provided further*, That of the funds provided under this paragraph only \$125,000,000 shall be made available for the Philippines. *Provided further*, That of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available under this heading, \$15,000,000 shall be made available only for Cyprus (except that any offshore procurement must meet Agency for International Development procurement source and origin regulations). *Provided further*, That not less than \$15,000,000 of the funds provided under this paragraph shall be made available only for Ecuador, which sum shall be disbursed within thirty days of enactment of this Act. *Provided further*, That up to \$20,000,000 of the funds provided under this paragraph may be made available to carry out the Administration of Justice program pursuant to section 554 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. *Provided further*, That not less than 85 percent of the funds allocated for the Human Rights Fund for South Africa shall be made available in accordance with section 802(d) of Public Law 99-88. *Provided further*, That the obligation of funds made available under this paragraph to finance tied aid credits shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations."

In addition to the regular fiscal year 1985 appropriation of \$3,826,000,000 provided under the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, 1985 (sec. 101 of the Continuing Appropriations, 1985 Public Law 98-478), to carry out the provisions of chapter 4 of part II, the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1985 (Public Law 99-88, 99 Stat. 322) provided the following:

"ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

"For an additional amount for the "Economic Support Fund", \$2,258,000,000: *Provided*, That of the funds provided by this paragraph \$250,000,000 shall be made available, and shall remain available for obligation for Jordan until September 30, 1987, only in accordance with the schedule of availability set forth in section 402(a)(1) and section 402(a)(2) of this Act. *Provided further*, That of the funds provided in this paragraph for Jordan, not more than 88 1/2 percent may be disbursed before September 30, 1985, not more than 50 percent may be disbursed before March 31, 1986, not more than 66 2/3 percent may be disbursed before September 30, 1986, and, not more than 85 percent may be disbursed before March 31, 1987. *Provided further*, That notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds provided in this Act for Jordan, if not utilized for programs, projects, or other activities in Jordan, must be returned to the United States Treasury. *Provided further*, That of the funds provided by this paragraph \$1,500,000,000 shall be available for Israel; \$500,000,000 shall be available for Egypt; and \$8,000,000 shall be available for the Middle East Regional Program. *Provided further*, That funds provided by this paragraph shall be made available notwithstanding section 10 of Public Law 91-672. *Provided further*, That the funds provided by this paragraph for Israel and Egypt shall be made available as cash grant transfers. *Provided further*, That not less than the Egyptian pound equivalent of \$50,000,000 generated from funds made available by this paragraph, or from any other source, shall be deposited into the Trust Funds established by the Trust Account Agreement of 1980 to be used for United States supported programs in Egypt pursuant to the United States-Egypt Economic, Technical and Related Assistance Agreements of 1978 which provide for local currency requirements for programs of the United States in Egypt to be made available to the United States in the manner requested by the Government. *Provided further*, That prior to depositing funds into the Trust Fund, the Secretary of State shall notify the Appropriations Committees of both Houses of the Congress fifteen days in advance as to how the endowment is to be managed where the funds will be deposited, the interest rate to be secured, and the procedures to be used in establishing, operating, and disbursing endowment funds. *Provided further*, That the funds provided by this paragraph shall be available for obligation until September 30, 1986."

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(2) \$1,785,000,000 for the fiscal year 1986 and \$1,785,000,000 for the fiscal year 1987 for assistance under this chapter for recipients or purposes other than the countries referred to in paragraph (1).⁴⁴⁰

(b) Amounts appropriated to carry out this chapter are authorized to remain available until expended.

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Sec. 533.⁴⁴¹ Emergency Assistance.—(a) Of the funds appropriated to carry out this chapter up to \$75,000,000 for the fiscal year 1986 and up to \$75,000,000 for the fiscal year 1987 may be made available for emergency use under this chapter when the national interests of the United States urgently require economic support to promote economic or political stability.

(b) Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter or of an appropriations Act (including a joint resolution making continuing appropriations) which earmarks funds available to carry out this chapter for a specific country or purpose, up to 5 percent of each amount so earmarked may be used to carry out this section.

Sec. 534.⁴⁴² Administration of Justice.—(a) The President may furnish assistance under this chapter to countries and organizations, including national and regional institutions, in order to strengthen the administration of justice in countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.

(b) Assistance under this section may only include—

(1) support for specialized professional training, scholarships, and exchanges for continuing legal education;

(2) programs to enhance prosecutorial and judicial capabilities and protection for participants in judicial cases;

(3) notwithstanding section 660 of this Act, programs to enhance investigative capabilities, conducted under judicial or prosecutorial control;

(4) strengthening professional organizations in order to promote services to members and the role of the bar in judicial selection, enforcement of ethical standards, and legal reform;

(5) increasing the availability of legal materials and publications;

(6) seminars, conferences, and training and educational programs to improve the administration of justice and to strengthen respect for the rule of law and internationally recognized human rights; and

(7) revision and modernization of legal codes and procedures.

(c) Not more than \$20,000,000 of the funds made available to carry out this chapter for any fiscal year shall be available to carry out this section, in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes.

(d) Funds may not be obligated for assistance under this section unless the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate are notified of the amount and nature of the proposed assistance at

⁴⁴⁰ 22 U.S.C. 2346d. Sec. 202 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-113, 95 Stat. 1529) added sec. 535. Sec. 201(b) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 replaced the years "1982" and "1983" with "1986" and "1987".

⁴⁴² 22 U.S.C. 2346c. Sec. 534 was added by sec. 712 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83, 99 Stat. 244).

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least 15 days in advance in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogrammings pursuant to section 634A of this Act.

(e) The authority of this section shall expire on September 30, 1987.

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אל :- ממ"ד/סוריה, בינ"ל ו, מצפ"א

משיחה עם דאג גרין (סוריה / NEA)

1. הנושא הסורי בכנס השגרירים היה שגרתי למדי. ארה"ב עומדת בתקיפות שלא שינוי במדיניות סוריה, שעדיין לא קרה, במדיניות הטרור אין לצפות להחזרת השגריר או לדיאלוג כלשהו. הממונה ראנסוס חזר לדמשק עם מסר ברוח זו והעבירו למש"ח הסורי. בנושא החטופים הובעה פסימיות בקשר לשחרורם המיידית. הדעה הייתה (א) לסוריה אין יכולת השפעה על קבוצת החיזבאללה, (ב) מאמצ סורי צבאי לשחרור החטופים הוא בגדר מבצע בלתי אפשרי כל זמן שדמשק לא תשנה מערכת יחסיה^מ איראן. דהיינו עליה קודם כל לקבל החלטה פוליטית שתקבע שהמחיר כדאי. אגב, גרין העיר שהעונאים כאן מרבים להקשות בשאלת שינוי היחס לסוריה ונענים שלפי שעה אין שינוי במדיניות האמריקאית. האיראנים במגעים האחרונים בדמשק הבהירו שפעולה סורית כנגד החיזבאללה בדרום ביירות היא נבחינת קו אדום ומוטב לסורים לא לחצותו. נוסף על כך גרין לא רואה גם שחצוץ כזה מעשי לו גם הסורים היו הולכים. בקו זה שכן הם עלולים לגרום לפגיעות בנפש בחטופים והדבר האחרון שהסורים רוצים הוא להחזיר גופות. המסקנה היא שאין לצפות למעורבות סורית ישירה בנושא החטופים.
2. גרין מעריך שמערכת הקשרים בין שתי המדינות חיונית לשתיהן והוא מטיל ספק בסצנריו שיביא לשינוי בסיסי בהם. גם אם יוצגו לסוריה פיתויים בתמורה בשלב זה, הקשיטי האם הדבר תופס גם במש"ח ארה"ב והמערב. גרין שלל גם זאת בכך (א) ארה"ב לא מוכנה לשלם מחיר הנדרש לכך שכן ברור שאסד, תיאורטית, יעמוד על שינוי מדיניות ארה"ב במזה"ת (ישראל) ופיצוי כלכלי וארה"ב לא תצעד כבדת דרך כזו. (בכרתי לא להגיב אך סבורני שטעון זה דורש בדיקה). (ב) לאסד יש תקווה שכל זמן שהמערכת הביטורלית הנוכחית קיימת, איראן תמצא דרך לרסן החיזבאללה בלבנון, בכל מצב אחר יותר הרסן (א) איראן חשובה לסוריה במערכת האיזונים של מפת יחסי הכוחות במזה"ת. כשהמשמעות עבור סוריה בלבנון ברורה, המאזן בצד האיראני מורה על היתרונות הבאים:
 - (א) יציאת סוריה מהמעגל האיראני זהפוך את המלחמה עם איראן למלחמת ערב - איראן.
 - (ב) הסכסוך בין עם סוריה ועיראק מתק כוחות עיראקים בגבול עם סוריה גם אם לא מדובר בכוחות משמעותיים אין ספק שהעברתם לחזית הייתה פסייעת לעיראק.

מס' 2
מס' 3
מס' 4
מס' 5
מס' 6
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מס' 9
מס' 10

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דחיות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

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ג) מנוף איראני על ברה"מ, בעיקר בנושא האמל"ח. האיראנים מעלים סוגיה זו בדמשק, כגון לנוכח קפריסות לוביות כל אימת שמחליטים להעזר בשרותיה הטובים של סוריה כלפי ברה"מ.

3. ביקור קרט, בזמן גרוע מבחינת ארה"ב והוא לצנינים בעיני הממשל (שלא להזכיר התבטאותו בקהיר) מכל הבחינות. הסורים מצדם משוכנעים שקרט בשליחות הממשל, בהסתמך על כך שהשגרירות טיפלה בכל סידורי הביקור. האמריקאים טרחו והסבירו שמדובר בנשיא לשעבר שהוא חיוס אזרח פרטי ולממשל אין כל נגיעה לכך. אגב, אורחה אמר שהאחראי על סידורי הבטחון הקשורים בביקור היה לא אחר מאשר ח'ולי, וזוהי לדברי גרין, הוכחה נוספת שמעמדו לא נסגע בשל מעורבותו בנושא הטרור. באשר לקרט, גרין סבור שפרט למניעי יוקרה אישית יש לראות הביקור על רקע התקרבות ציון שנת העשור לביקור סאדאת בירושלים. אגב, נושא זה היה היחיד כמעט שעודד חילוקי דעות בינו לבין אסד. מסתבר שבין שני האישים נוצרה כימיה אישית מאז פגישתם בג'נבה ב-1975. באשר לאסד עצמו, אין בסיס לשמועות על התערעות בריאותו באם לשפוט לפי הופעתו לעיני מצלמות הטלוויזיה בעת הפגישה עם קרט. (פניסימ דנינימ יגני אשמש אקלאוק)

4. לבנון. גרין בדעה שאין שום הוכחות שסוריה תרחיב נוכחותה מעבר למערב ביירות וגם אם היו לה כוונות כאלה היא לפחות בשלב זה נסוגה מהם, פרט למעשי פרובוקציה שיחייבו זאת. הוא גם מטיל ספק במשמעות התבטאות ג'אזי כנען לגבי צידון, פרט לנוכחות מודיעינית עכשווית. נכון שלטוריה ישנה יכולת צבאית לטפל באופן צבאי בחיזבאללה, ובוודאי היתה שמחה לכך במצב אחר, אך אין זה סביר לנוכח אילוציה הנ"ל, לשם כך היא גם זקוקה לכוחות צבאיים נוספים בשטח.

גרין בדעה שהסיכויים לסיכום חיובי של השיחות בין אסד וג'מיל התמעטו בתשוואה למצב שהיה בתחילת השנה מועד בו חזו שתן יגיעו לגמר טוב. המאמץ הנמשך בערוץ זה, שלושת ימי הדיונים האחרונים (19-21/3) בהשתתפותו של אילי סאלם שהיוו את המושב ה-9 של השיחות, הותירו חילוקי דעות בענין סמכויות הנשיא והממשלה על כנס. גרין מציין במיוחד את מצבו המסובך של אמין במחנה הנוצרי. יחסיו עם ג'עג'יע מעורערים לחלוטין ודי בכך כדי להרתיע את נשיא לבנון מהליכה לקראת אסד.

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דף 3 מחוד דפים

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5. אש"פ. גרין מאתר בסוגיה את אחד ממקורות החולשת הסורית. אין לו ספק שהמאמצים הבינערכיים (אלג'יריה) לאחות הקרעים באש"פ אינם מהקבלים בעין סורית יפה לנוכח חולשת הפלגים הפלסטינאים הנתונים למרותה, שקולם לא נשמע מעבר לגבולות סוריה, אמנם חילוקי הדעות הפנימיים באש"פ הם גדולים גם ללא השיקול הסורי, אך עצם ההתרוצצות הפנימית באש"פ בנסיון למצוא בסיס משותף לפלגים דייה ע"מ שדמשק לא תהיה שקטה. לסוריה אמנם חשוב, למשל, ביטולו הסופי והמוחלט של הסכם עמאן, אך זה עדיין לא מספק באם בתמורה ערפאת יסאר על כנו.
6. כלכלה. הדו"ח החודשי האחרון של השגרירות מורה על אינפלציה של 14% מתוך רמה שנתית של 140 אחוז. הסעודים אמנם מקפידים על שלומי בגדאד - שלושה תשלומים של 176 מ' דולר בשנה אך אין בכך כדי לענות על הבעיות הכלכליות והשאלה היא האם ומהיכן מגיעים כספים נוספים. יחד עם זאת גרין מדגיש שיש להבחין בין ירידה מתמדת של רמת חיי האזרח כתוצאה מאי עליית השכר ומהעדרת התדיר של מוצרי יסוד לבין השלכות ברמה הלאומית דביינו ליציאת האוכלוסיה לרחובות.

אלי אבידן
k.h

מגידור ישראלי - וויסנאטיון

מלך, המשרד, בטחון, ניו יורק

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170/24.03.87

אלו: מנכ"ל מדיני, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ח

דע: יועץ רח"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ס לתקשורת, רמ"ח/קט"ח, ניו יורק
ר/אמון. ע/ראש אמון למחקר.

24.3.87

חרוך דובר מחמ"ד ליום

Q Can you give us some sort of notion -- apparently, this week, the US and Soviets are meeting for bilateral talks here at the State Department. Is that correct?

MR. REDMAN: That's right.

Q Did they begin today or yesterday?

MR. REDMAN: That's called the Bilateral Review Commission, which is a mechanism that's been set up to talk about, as it says, bilateral problems. Those talks began on Monday, and I think they're scheduled to last for several days, although I think they're open-ended to some degree.

Q Can we have a detailed read-out on that when they're finished?

MR. REDMAN: I'll see what I can do.

Q Who are the chiefs of the two delegations?

MR. REDMAN: The head person on our side is Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Canadian affairs, Tom Simons. He will be backed up, of course, by Mark Peres, who is the Director of the Office of Soviet Affairs, as well as other people from that office. AND, on the Soviet side, we'll have to see if we can get you his name. I don't have his name. We'll see if we can get it.

Q Do these affairs include emigration of minorities, Soviet Jews and such?

MR. REDMAN: I believe that in this particular format, we focus, of course, on consular affairs, bilateral problems, but I think that these kind of human rights questions, including the one you specify, would come up. I could take a closer look at that, Jim, if you want, but we could certainly try to cover that in the context of a readout of what's happened in these meetings.

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including "24.3.87" and other illegible scribbles.

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Q You mentioned Soviet Jews. Have you got a status report on emigration from the Soviet Union?

MR. REDMAN: I stuck that in, just by chance. Let's see if I can dig that out. Just to start with January, there were 98 Soviet Jews who actually left the Soviet Union; and in February, 146. The figure for the first half of March was 214. In 1986, the average monthly figure was 75, and the highest monthly total, 126. There have been a number of Soviet statements indicating that emigration levels will rise in 1987, and we have consistently urged the Soviet government to live up to its commitments under the Helsinki Final Act and other international human rights agreements to permit freedom of movement. The 1987 figures we have so far represent progress, but there is still a long way to go.

Q This morning, the Secretary made remarks on this subject at B'nai B'rith. That wasn't on any of his schedules. Can you tell us why not?

MR. REDMAN: He has many functions like that which don't necessarily appear on his public schedule when he receives publications, as in this case they handed him a copy of a book that they had done.

Q But, as you understand, U.S.-Soviet relations right now are of great concern to us, and it might have been useful if we'd known about this particular event.

Q It was not reflected on the public schedule. What was secret about this meeting?

GOVERNOR ROBB: I'm not saying there was anything secret about it at all. I'm saying he has many appointments every day, some of very short duration, which don't necessarily appear on his public schedule. It's as simple as that. But you have the remarks.

Q We don't.

MR. REDMAN: Well, you do now.

Q Let's talk about the future. Do you

interpret the rise in Jews who are permitted to leave the Soviet Union as reflecting a basic change in Soviet policy, or is it too early?

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MR. REDMAN: I think the answer is the latter. I try to cover that by saying this represents some progress, but there's still a long way to go. That's where we stand right now.

Q (off-mike) some information about the UN staffing. They are now below the ceiling which was established for April 1. Does that mean there won't be any expulsions? Have the Soviets promised to keep it below the ceiling?

MR. REDMAN: I think I can only address that by saying that our numbers indicate that they are currently below the ceiling; that's the target which has been set. And, providing that's the case, then the issue is in order, as of April 1, at least.

Q Last week, Paul Bremmer's(?) said that the United States attaches special responsibility regarding Syria to Syria's role in Lebanon, vis a vis the hostages. In light of the Steen event, have you made any overtures to the Syrians to try to expedite his release or the release of any of the hostages in the past week?

MR. REDMAN: Once again, I don't have anything new on that one.

Q --say whether the US has discussed with Israel the -- yesterday's note about Steen?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have anything on whether there were any specific discussions. I've noted, as you probably have, that the Israelis have rejected that demand to make some sort of a trade.

Q Has President Carter been debriefed by American officials in the Middle East about his talks with Assad--

MR. REDMAN: I don't have any reports of any debriefings as of now.

Q --we have no reaction to anything President Carter has said while over there?

MR. REDMAN: No.

JH

סג'רית ישראל / רושינגטון

ט ז פ ס מ ב ר ק

דפ מתוך דפים

סוג בטהוני סור

דהיפות מידי

תאריך/ז"ח 16.30 24 מרץ

מס' מברק

המשרד

678

מנכ"ל מדיני, מנכ"א

הצהרות קארטר בסוריה, ועידה בינ"ל, פולארד

ה' סוגרים

בארוץ חברתי נשאל סווארז במעגל משוחחים (סם לואיס, הטל סונצרת, ביל קוואנדט, דון קרייג והח"מ) על הצהרות קארטר בדמשק בהם נוצר רושם של השוואה בין בני הערובה לבין העצורים הטיעום בדרוש לבנון. סודארה השיב כי אמנם קארטר הוא אזור פרטי אבל אין המושל יכול להסתיר דעתו כי החזקת העצורים סותרת לדעתם את אמנת ג'נבה הרביעית, וכי אף שחורמלית הט ביד: להאד הרי אין ישראל יכולה להתנער מאחריות והעובדה שמסרבים להתיר ביקור הצלב האדום מעוררת חשד לגבי מה שמחרחש שם. יחד עם זאת הוסיף שארה"ב אינה מכשפת מישראל להענות לדרישה כלשהן.

בנושא הועידה הבינלאומית אמר סודארה למשוחחים כי ארה"ב לא תסכים בשום פנים לועידה מכינה של רק חמש החברות הקבועות במועב"ט שכן העיקר הוא מו"מ ישיר בין הצדדים ללא הכתיבים. הוא סבור שהטובייטים חשים בטחון מופרז ברצון ארצות הברית והאירופאים לועידה בינ"ל ולהערכתו הם אינם מבינים שהתמיכה היא טחתית ולא נלהבת, ורק משום שחוסין טוען כי אינו יכול להכנס למו"מ ישיר בלא פתיחה בינלאומית. סודארת סבור שהדרך עוד ארוכה לועידה בינלאומית והשאלה שצריך לפתור היא בעייה הייצוג הפלסטינאי, טמכויות וסדריה, וכל זאת לפני שמגיעים למהות.

ווב המטוחחים התעניינו בהשלכות הפוליטיות הפנימיות של פרשת פולארד והאם בטופו של תהליך יחולו זעזועים בהנהגה הפוליטית סודארת ציין כי הוא וחבריו חזרו והזהירו אה בני שיחם הישראלים על ההשלכות הקשות בווישינגטון בקרב ידידי ישראל בממשל ובקונגרס גם לאחר מינוי איתן וגם לקראת מינוי סלע.

דני בלור

מח' המ' סה"ס גל גל גל גל גל גל גל גל גל גל
2 3 1 3 1 2 1 4 3 1

חוזם: 3,14591

אל: המשרד

מ-: לוטאנגלט, נר: 127, תא: 240387, חז: 1600, דח: ר, טג: ב

נד: @

בלמט / רגיל

אל: מצפ"א

אל: הטברה - וושינגטון -- נר 16 בנמרד

מאת: הטברה, לוטאנגלט

תקשורת

1) פרשת פולרד תומסת מקום נכבד בתקשורת היהודית כאן.
 ה"הריטג" יי והמסנג'ר הקדישו לה עמודים ראשונים
 המדגישים המתיחות בין ישראל ויהדות ארה"ב בנותרות
 כמו: POLLARD SPY / ADL LOCKS HORNS
 WITH ISRAEL / CASE SHAKES ISRAEL
 וכד' .

כרגיל במקרים כאלה עלה ה-JOURNAL JEWISH
 על כולם בעיטוק אובסטיבי נמעט בנושא. העתון יצא לבקש
 חוות דעת מאישי ציבור יהודיים באיזור והבליטו בעמודו
 הראשון תחת כותרת ענקית שחורה יי פולארד" . מאמר
 המערכת של העתון מפתיע לטובה. בצד ההתפלמסות עם
 מאמרו המפורסם של פרופ' אבינרי הוא מדגיש את תמיכת
 יהדות ארה"ב בישראל למרות ביקורת או אי הסכמה אפשרית
 עם מדיניות ממשלתה. העתון גם מביא כתבות מושינגטון
 המדגישות שהנזק ליחסי ישראל ארה"ב לא יהיה בהכרח
 ארוך טווח וכי הקשרים הצבאיים נשארו אמיצים.

2) בל.א טיימס ידיעה מיוהנסבורג על שדרא"פ מאשימה
 ארה"ב בשינוי במדיניות ישראל כלפיה.

משרד החוק-מחלקת הקשר

3) בל.א טיימס היום בעמ' אי גילויים על דו"ח ה
 F B I על נסיונות הייחזית העממית"י לגבש בטיס המיכה
 רחב בקהילה הערבית - אמריקנית ובקרוב ארגוני שמאל בארה"ב.
 הדו"ח הושלם ביוני 86. פרטים בדו"ח.

אלגר

חפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ממד, רט, אמך, מצמא, מטת,
 הטברה, לעמ, תמוצות

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE
FOR THE YEAR 1871

CHAPTER I

GENERAL STATE OF THE LANDS

AND THE PROGRESS OF THE REVENUE

IN THE YEAR 1871

BY

THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE
AND THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICTS
IN CONNECTION WITH THE LANDS OFFICE
AND THE PROGRESS OF THE REVENUE
IN THE YEAR 1871

LONDON: PRINTED BY RICHARD CLAY AND COMPANY, LTD.
BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.

THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE
AND THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICTS
IN CONNECTION WITH THE LANDS OFFICE
AND THE PROGRESS OF THE REVENUE
IN THE YEAR 1871

LONDON: PRINTED BY RICHARD CLAY AND COMPANY, LTD.
BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.

נכנס **
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שמור

חוזם: 3/13252

אל: המשרד

מ-: לוטאנגלט/נר: 119/תא: 240387/חז: 1000/ח: מ: טג: ש

נד: א

שמור/ מייד

נר 15 פר רוש בנמרד

אל: מצנ"א - הסברה

דע: שגריר+ נעים- רושינגטון

מאת: הסברה/ לוטאנגלט

הנדון: פרשת פולארד - השלכות

ניתן לחלק את השלכות פרשת פולארד לשלושה היבטים עיקריים המתלחים ביניהם להיבטי משנה. ההלוקה היא כמובן אנליטית גרידא ולהיבטים השפעות גומלין רבות.

1) הקשרים בין ארה"ב לישראל בתחום המדיני, כלכלי צבאי וכד' היבט זה, מן הדין שיכונה בושינגטון יותר מאשר בקונטרוליות והוא עתה רק בשלבי התפתחות ראשוניים.

2) השפעת הפרשה על תדמית ישראל בארה"ב. גם היבט זה הוא רק בשלבי התהוות, אך ניתן לצפות כרוני התפתחות אפשריים. התגובה הראשונית בתקשורת היתה חריפה ביותר. הקצף יצא לא רק על מעט פעולות הדיגול מצד אלא גם בהצטרפותה למכלול של פרשיות ואירועים. המעורבות בפרשת הנשק לאיראן, פרשת השבני, פרשת ימט, הקשרים עם זרא"ב, הכביסה הפומבית של מערכת היחסים בתוך הממשלה מצטרפים לתדמית הקשה שיצרה מלחמת לבנון. פרשת פולארד רק יכולה לחזק מה שעלול להתפתח כדגם יינורמלי להתנהגותנו כמדינה בלתי אחראית.

באשר לעתיד, אין ספק שהפרשה תדרוך אתנו הרבה שנים. די

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לראות אין פרשת יייליבורטי" מועלית באוב חזור והעלה זה עשרים שנה, פרשה שהתרחשה לפני ירח הדבש בין שתי המדינות והיא שולית לרקמה היהודים ביניהן. כבר בינואר שנה זו, העליתי את החשש שישראל עלולה להתפס יותר ויותר כמדינה שהפנתה עורף למשנתח העמים המתורבתים, לערכיהם ולטייגיהם. מדינה "מטורפת" קמעה (עפ"י הגדרותיו של ג'ורג' יחזקאל דורו). נזקה של פרשת פולארד הוא לא רק מעצם טבעה (וזוה די והותר), אלא גם בהצטרפותה למכלול של פרשיות ואירועים. המעורבות בפרשת הנשק לאיראן, פרשת השבני, פרשת ימט, הקשרים עם זרא"ב, הכביסה הפומבית של מערכת היחסים בתוך הממשלה מצטרפים לתדמית הקשה שיצרה מלחמת לבנון. פרשת פולארד רק יכולה לחזק מה שעלול להתפתח כדגם יינורמלי להתנהגותנו כמדינה בלתי אחראית.

3) השפעת הפרשה על יהדות ארה"ב בשלושה מישורים. א) בתוך עצמה. ב) ביחסיה עם החברה האמריקאית בכלל. ג) ביחסיה עם ישראל.

א) הפרשה אילצה יהודים רבים לערוך חשבון נפש אישי וקיבוצי שהודק עד עתה. חשבון נפש זה לובש אופי שונה מצל אנשים שונים. אם ניתן להכליל, נראה שסוגי התגובות נוטים להתחלק בחתך גילי. קרי: עפ"י דור ומידות ותק בארה"ב. אצל בני השישים פלוס, לעיתים קרובות דור ראשון בארה"ב העלתה הפרשה את תחושת הוטר הבטחון "המטורפת" והחשש מפני אנטישמיות. תגובות אמיניות לקבוצה זו הן הצהרות כמו: "אני קודם כל אמריקאי ורק אחר כך יהודי". הצהרות נאמנות לארה"ב וגינור מוגזם ומופגן של פולארד האיש (ראה מאמר של מייקל גורדיס מה-A J C) ובד'. התגובה בארץ, שאופיינה במאמר של ג'ורג' שלמה אבינרי ב"ג'רוזלט פוסט" התייחסה לעיקר להתנהגותה של קבוצה זו. קבוצת ההמישים פלוס / דור שני, מתאפיינת בגישה דואלית. נפשית היא נוטה לחששות ולחוסר הבטחון המופגן ע"י הקבוצה הראשונה. (מה שלא מפליא, שכן אלה הועברו עם חלב האם), אך אינטלקטואלית היא מתנגדת להפלת הקיבוץ על סמן פעולת היחיד. תחושה אחרונה זו נוטה לאמין את הדור הבא. של בני הארבעים (פלוס ומינוס) תגובות מענינות התקבלו מן הצעירים (טוף עשרה) תחילת עשרים), ברובם סטודנטים תומכי ישראל. היו ביניהם שאמרו, במפורש או במרומז, שהיו עושים כמעשה פולארד אם היו במקומו וזעמם מופנה כלפי ישראל, שזנחה את פולארד ואשתו - חיילים במערכות ישראל.

ב) השפעת הפרשה על מעמד היהודים בחברה האמריקאית גם היא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

עדיין בחיתולים ובשלב זה היא השפיעה בעיקר על אלה שבשרות הציבורי/ממשלתי או במתסד הבטחוני, לרבות תעשיתי/בטחוני. שמענו נאן על בחור יהודי, העובד בחברת המטוסים והאלקטרוניקה "נורתון", שקידומו בתפקיד היה כרוך בבדיקה בטחונית שגרתית. זו העלתה, שהאיש חנין תכונת נוער ציונית שהה כשנה בארץ. האיש לא קודם, למרות שבעבר לא שימש עברו הציוני והישראלי שהיה ידוע, סיבה לאי מתן סיווג בטחוני. שמענו גם מיהודים נאן, שקבלו הדים מחבריהם, המשמשים עוזרי סנטורים ומורשים בושינגטון. אנשים אלה מספרים, שלראשונה לא מקבלים חרות דעת נוספות. היו כאלה מהם שדווחו, שהם חשים כנתונים למעקב ולציתות. העיתונאי זאב בליצור, מ"ג'רוזלט פוסט" סיפר השבוע על חקירתו של פולארד, בה ניתנה לו רשימה של כמאתים ממנייגיו יהדות ארה"ב, הפעילים בנושאי ישראל והוא נדרש להצביע עליהם במעין מסדר זיהוי. בהרצאת בליצור נכחה ברבי ויינברג, שהיא ובעלה ביל הופיעו ללא ספק ברשימה זו. ניתן לשער את תגובתה.

ג) תגובות היהודים כלפי ישראל נעות מגט כריתות דרך זעם, תסכול וחוסר נוחות ועד להצוקת גירט פולארד והפעלתו. מרבית קריאות הטלפון והמכתבים. שהגיעו לקונסוליה היו מן הסוג הראשון - כולם הביעו זעם כלמינו, רבים הביעו שאט נפש, לא מעטים הודיעו שהיו תומכי ישראל אך לא עוד. כאמור, גם אלה המצדירים את פולארד, זועמים עלינו - על שזנחנו אותו. התחושה שלי היא, שמרבית היהודים נמצאים אי שם באמצע הרצף.

כפי שניתן להרוכח אף מהתושבות ראשונית ושטחית זו, מערכת התגובות היהודיות לפרשה מגוונת ומורכבת רבשום אופן אינה מתמצה רק ב"תפיסת המחסה" הגלותית, כפי שאולי מתרשמים בארץ.

עלי לחזור ולהדגיש, שהחלוקה לסעיפים ולטעימי משנה היא סכמטית גרידא ומובן מאיליו שמדובר באספקטים הנמצאים בהשפעות גומלין.

פרשת פולארד הציתה שרפה המורה במערכת היחסים שלנו עם ארה"ב. היא לא תנבה מעצמה ומכל מקום, הכוונות שתותיר יוטינו להנאיב עוד זמן רב. מן הראוי, לא להתכנס בתוך עצמנו עד יעבור זעם, אלא לצאת מהגדר ולנסות לאתר מוקדי אש.

טיכנס

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לפרשת פולארד השלכות רבות על מערכת יחסינו עם ארה"ב בכלל ויהודיה בפרט. אלה מתבטאות בצורות רבמישוריים שונים ותגובות ינו צריכות להיות בהתאם. אנו נטינו, עד עתה, להתעטף בשתיקה או להתריס על מנטליות גלותית של היהודים. בין שתי קיצונויות אלה משתרע עיקר תודת התגובה שלנו, שיש להתאימו לקהלים השונים. הפרשה פעה פצעים מסוגים שונים ויש להתאים להם תרופות שונות. בכל מקרה, מוצע ליטול יזמה ולא לכופף ראש עד יעבור זעם.

אלגר

תפ: שהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,מצמא,תמוצות,אביטל,הסברה

נכנס **
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טורי

חוזם: 3,13244

אל: המשרד

מ-: לוסאנגלס, נר: 110, תא: 230387, זח: 1530, זח: מ, טג: ט

נד: @

מידי/טורי

נר 14 פר נוש בנכר

אל: מצמא'

אל: המרכז

דע: שגריר, נוש

דע: ציר, נוש

מאת: קונבלי לא'

האתנה היהסי שבמלחמת אירן עירק מאפשר לשתי הממשלות להיערך לקראת השל הבא של המלחמה. עירק נזקקה להפוגה כדי לתחזק מוצייה, לרכוש מלאי מחודש של מצעות, בעיקר ממצרים, צרפת ופולין, ולהציב בשרות מלא את המטוס הסובייטי החדש, המיג 29. להק אחד של מטוסי קרב ומפציצים היכול לטוס בכל תנאי מזג אוויר ובכל שעות היממה יושלם בתוך זמן קצר.

באיראן נאלצו האיטולות להשלים עם העובדה שהיילי איראן לא יכלו לבקע הביצורים שבמאתי באצרה, ושהם איבדו כ-45 אלף חיילים בנסיון זה. עתה בוחנים הארנים 3 אומציות למתקפה: לאור הביצות אל עבר אל קורנא שעל הזרן בצרה - בגוד, או זרן מאנדולי שבגיזרה המרכזית או לנגוט מחצי האי פאו הנמצא בידי עיק. האיראנים שוקלים גם אפשרות של התקפה על האי הכווייה בוויאן המשמש לטענתם בסיס ימי ואווירי עירקי. ידוע שעירק

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

חידשה בקשתה מסיין לספק לה המהדורה הסינית של טילי הסקאד הסובייטים והאיצה בסיין שלא לספק נשק לאיראן.

חבר קונגרס שתוזרן באחרונה עיי בקידום עיראיק/עיק/עירקיים בבגדד למד שהשינוי בטקטיקה שיישמו לאבדן 40-50 מטוס מ עירקיים. המתזרנים ייחסו אבדן כ-10 אחוז מנוח התקימה העירקי למשלוח החדש של טילי הוק משופרים לאירן. ההתשה הערקית הרבה נגרמה גם כנראה בשל ריבוי ההתקפות האוויריות באותה עת.

עד למחצית פברואר תקפה עירק את קום 25 פעמים ואת טהרן 10, בתוך 4 ימים. רוב ההתקפות בוצעו עיי פורמציות גדולות שמנו 24 מטוסיים. תגובת הנגד האירנית - טילי הסקאד על בגדד, גרמו נזק מועד.

באחרונה נמטר על שינויים במבנה והפיקוד של חיל האוויר האיראני המקיס זרוע אווירית עצמאית עיי הכוחות המהפכנים (בסדראן) אשר בשליטתם 10 מטוקי קרב סינייים 6 F (כששנים נתוסקו קודם לכן באימוניים) ו-12 חדשים יתווספו בקרוב. צפון קוריאא סיפקה קודם לכן 6 מטוסי מיג 19 סובייטיים, אגב, סין מוסיפה להכחיש גם באזני האמריקנים שהיא ספקה מטוסי קרב לאיראן.

עריק מחיל האוויר האיראני ספר על תחושת אי שביעות רצון גוברת והולכת בחיל האוויר האיראני ושידוע לו על 180 טייסים שערקו בזמן האחרון.

י הנוחות המהפכניים טיים במטוסי תובלה כדי למנוע עריקות. ב-3 החודשים האחרונים הוטס לעירק מטוס 14 F שנשא AIM - 54 PHOENIX AAM

טהני הא' האירני עומד כיום על 34 אלף איש לעומת 70 אלף לפני המחמה.

ב-65 מטוסי קרב עדיין טוגליים לטוס. אלה מורכבים מאבעה או חמישה GRUNMAN F-14 TOMCATS

דעוד פנטום F-4 D/E ונורתון/ ונורתון/ נורתון/ נל הפנטום RF - 4 E במספר. רק 20 הרקולט 130 מצויים ביכולת מבצעים בבסיסם

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

במסחאד. שניים נתוסקו נחודשיים האחרונים. תחזוקה לקויה ומחסור בחלקי חילוף גרמו כנראה להתרסקות.

אי שביעות הרצון הכללית בחאי הארני שדעתו איננה נוחה משגיונותיו של משטר חומייני הביא לפיטורי מסקד חיל האוויר קול. טאויק, לבריחת סגנו קול. אבדי לחול, ולמינוי קול. מנסור למפקדו החדש של החייל.

איתן בנצור.

תפ: שהחירה, שהבט, ממנבל, ממנבל, מרנז, רט, אמן, ממד, מצמא

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COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
10/10/2000 10:00 AM

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תז"ח: 23/300	א ל: מנכ"ל מדיני, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, אמית"ק, מע"ת, מצפ"א, הסברה, גמ"ד, יועץ רח"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח	
כר : 0573	ד ע : רושינגטון	
87 - 211 65 - 1117	מאת : עתונות, ניו-יורק	

News Summary March 23, 1987

New York Headlines

Top story in the New York Times reports on Aquino's demand of a military victory over the insurgents. In a shift, she asserts that armed action, not reform, is the answer to terrorism. Also on p. 1 of the Times: 7 people died in a Harlem apartment tower fire. (also headline story in New York Post, daily News and Newsday); The US is considering imposing sanctions against Japanese semiconductor manufacturers in a move that could worsen trade friction between the two nations; Drunken driving has decreased in the US; The US will stress farm-aid issues in international talks on economic issues; In NYC, an effort to get welfare mothers get off welfare and into private jobs has had mixed results and the struggles of Burma. Top stories in the Wall Street Journal reports on the success of the Wells Fargo company and the differences between two West Virginia senators on the US trade problem.

Editorials

NYP "The Tel-Aviv-Pretoria Myth" The double standard at work is truly spectacular. Those in the UN and elsewhere most anxious to depict a sinister Tel Aviv-Pretoria Axis--the Afro-Arab bloc--are far more deeply implicated in trade with South Africa than is Israel. Israel has nevertheless taken major steps toward limiting its South African ties. South Africa's oil, which keeps the country alive, comes from the Arabs. But we never hear of a Riyadh-Pretoria Axis. Israel's total trade with South Africa amounts in volume to only 15-20% of that between Pretoria and Black Africa. Even on the military front, Israel's exports to South Africa pales by comparison with France. Italy and Jordan also supplies South Africa and no one knows what military hardware is sold by the Communist bloc. All this confirms the degree to which the whole issue is informed by moral hypocrisy.

ND "Getting It Together in the Iran-Contra Case" 3/21 It is noteworthy that the congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair decided to hold joint hearings. The committees' agreement with the independent counsel in the case on a schedule for granting two leading figures immunity from prosecution was also welcome. The White House has been singularly uninformative about the affair and the American people are entitled to some answers soon.

אישור: 23.3.87 שם השולח: פקדון ק"מ תאריך:

אשראי 23.3.87 שם השולח: פקדון ק"מ תאריך: 23.3.87

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DN-Nelson "Don't Block the Box on Israel" The US and Israel, staring at each other over the Pollard case, are unable to speak. Israel says it has nothing to answer for because the spying was unauthorized. On the other hand, some in Israel and the US suggest the operation was perfectly justified by US conduct toward Israel. Even if it did happen, so what? Thus Durenberger, Cranston and Sharon dismiss the case. This is a misjudgement. The damage done by Pollard is serious, and it gets worse with every attempt to dismiss it, justify it or hope it will blow over. The soothing arguments by Durenberger and Cranston simply undercut Jewish leaders to convince Israel that this time it made a bad blunder: It can't get caught spying on the US and then try to lie its way out of it.

Press Reports

Top Israelis Reject Word of US Spy

ND-UPI 3/21 Peres and Rabin denied a newspaper report that the US had a spy in Israel before the Pollard espionage affair. The report said discovery that a CIA operation was underway prompted a retaliatory spying operation using Pollard. The CIA declined to comment.

Pollard and Demjanjuk-The Talk in Kibbutz

ND-Phelps 3/22 In Kibbutz Zova, the talk among the residents is of Pollard and Demjanjuk. They are pleased that the Demjanjuk trial has captured the attention of all Israelis. Although the kibbutz is one of the last liberal bastions in Israel, the majority view about Pollard was that it was a shame that he got caught. Several ex-Americans were interviewed and they all said they would probably do the same as Pollard if put in the same position. They all agreed that the Israeli Gov't shouldn't be punished for the deed. On the subject of US Jewry, the conversation got heated. Some say that the Jews need to come to Israel, to finally take a stand. Others say that the Jews won't come to Israel no matter what, but that the political support of Israel in the US is important.

US Will Hit Iran Bases If Target is Gulf Shipping

NYP-Latem & Standora The US is ready to blast Iranian missiles if they're used to attack ships in the Persian Gulf oil corridor. Pentagon sources said contingency plans for military action have been drawn up, but declined to say how it would be carried out. A battle group recently steamed into the northern Arabian Sea and is within range of the Iranian missiles. The White House denied it was on the verge of a military action. Weinberger said that the US would not allow a disruption of the oil flow.

US Arms Aid Iran in War

ND-Sloyan 3/22 The \$6.5 million worth of spare parts Reagan sold to Iran has enabled the Khoemini Gov't to reactivate its American-made anti-aircraft system and halt Iraq's strategic bombing campaign against Iranian oil terminals. As a result, Iran has dramatically increased its sale of oil, obtaining cash to continue the war by purchasing new weapons from countries ignoring the US call to maintain an arms embargo against Iran.

Khadafy Warns US

NYT-Barron-Khadafy said in an interview broadcast yesterday that he was willing

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to permit Soviet nuclear missiles to be based in Libya. "Libya will in fact declare that it is a Communist country and join the Warsaw Pact and deploy Soviet missiles on the coast of the Mediterranean," he said to NBC News. There was no indications that the Russians would take him up on the offer. In the last year, the Kremlin has distanced itself from some of Khadafy's activities. (all NY papers)

Carter Met Twice With Assad

NYT-AP Carter met with Assad twice a day after he urged the Syrian leader to use his influence to free the 8 US hostages in Lebanon. Carter described his meetings with Assad as interesting, broad-ranging and pleasant. No details were given. (ND-phot of Carter in Cairo)

Shiites' Role in South Lebanon Grows

NYT-Kifner-The growing military strength of Islamic fundamentalists in southern Lebanon appears to be resulting in power struggles among Shiite Moslems there and increasing attacks on the buffer-zone militiamen who act as Israel's proxy. Israeli troops say they killed 2 guerrillas Saturday night in a clash near Hasbeya. On Friday night, a Katysha rocket slammed into northern Israel wounding 10 people. The recent violence has heightened speculation that Israeli troops might return to the area in significant numbers. The Shiites of the Party of God have been supporting, if not out-running the Palestinians in their desire to mount attacks against Israel. Israeli officials are increasingly worried about the growing strength of the Party of God and believe that Syria's presence in Beirut might force the fighters into the south.

Trial Near in Pakistan Hijacking

NYT-Weisman-4 men charged with hijacking a Pan Am jet last Sept. are expected to go on trial soon. Diplomatic sources said after a 6-month investigation the Pakistani authorities had established a link between the hijackers and Abu Nidal. It is unsure whether this link could be established in court. Little has been disclosed about the hijackers other than that they are Palestinians from refugee districts in Lebanon. It is clear that they were trained specifically for this type of operation.

Mubarak Seeks Stronger Mandate

WSJ-Seib (Cairo) Mubarak has liberalized Egypt's election laws, scheduled elections for the national legislature and begun laying the groundwork for his own reelection to a second 6-year term as president. All this maneuvering is designed to win an undisputed mandate that will allow him to rule decisively in the tough economic times ahead. But many are skeptical that Mubarak will give Egyptians a truly free voice. The opposition states that the new election laws are designed to guarantee Mubarak's party remains in power.

Soviet Refuseniks Remain Hopeful

ND-Sommer (2 page centerfold story) 3/21 Gorbachev's liberalized policies toward dissidents still haven't had any effect on Soviet Jews trying to emigrate, but their attitude is optimistic. Vladimir Slepak believes he will go to Israel. The Jewish chairman of the Anti-Zionist Committee of the

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Soviet Union says only about 10,000 Jews still want to be "reunited with their families abroad." He stated in an interview that the new laws will ease the situation by making applications quicker. The National Conference on Soviet Jewry says more than 370,000 Jews have requested and received invitations from Israel and that many more would like to emigrate. Only 98 Jews left in January.

Abe Sofaer Draws Criticism for His Interpretation of International Law

WSJ-Greenberger-Recently some senators have called Sofaer's work "aburd," "illogical," and "distorted." Arms control is only one issue in which he has been getting flack. Justice Dept. officials claim he was too soft on Israel when he headed a task force investigating the Pollard affair. International lawyers complain that he is on shaky ground when he pushes his hard-line view that the US has the legal right to kidnap terrorist suspects and use force against states that harbor them.

Media Notes

NYT-3/21 Saturday's New Quiz. Question #1 shows a montage of Peres with his hands over his mouth, Shamir with his fingers in his ears and Rabin covering his eyes. Q- "This montage recently appeared in Israel's largest newspaper. What is its significance?" A-"The caption "Everyone is covering up for everyone," sums up the prevailing mood of disappointment with politicians stemming primarily from a series of scandals related to intelligence activities.

NYT-Jones-Marvin Kalb, a diplomatic reporter and moderator of NBC's Meet the Press, has accepted appointment as the first director of the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at the JFK School of Gov't at Harvard.

Review-"Jew of Malta"

NYT-Goodman-The Jews of Malta, a new show playing at the Shakespeare Center in Manhattan receives a mostly negative review. As for the tiresome question "Is the play anti-Semitic?" the enlightened answer is, of course not--unless you find something offensive about the proposition that insatiable greed and murderous vengeance come naturally to Jews.

ITONUT
NYC

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מנהל משרד הביטחון והצבא

מלחמה, במסגרת, בניו יורק

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אל: מנכ"ל מדיני; ממנכ"ל, מצמ"א, מע"ח

דע: יועץ רח"מ לחקשרת, יועץ טכניס לחקשרת, רמ"ח/קט"ח, בניו יורק
ר/אמנ, ע/ראש אמנ לחקר.

23 3.87 חדרון דובר מט"ר ליום

Q Chuck, do you have any comment on Gadhafi's threats that he will station Soviet nuclear missiles in Libya?

MR. REDMAN: No, I don't.

Q Do you have any reaction to President Carter's criticism that the US has no real Middle East policy?

MR. REDMAN: The White House spoke to that at the end of the week.

Q Anything on bombing raids in Pakistan?

MR. REDMAN: No.

Q Do you have anything about President Aziz's comments on the Pakistani ability to explode the bomb that he made in the Time?

MR. REDMAN: I have nothing new. I would reiterate what we've said on that general question a number of times in past weeks.

Q Does his comment that Pakistan has the knowledge and the ability to build a bomb, but not the design or the intention to do so, match the knowledge that you have?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have the ability to give you any further analysis than what I provided before, and I'll just have to leave it at that.

Q While we're still on Pakistan, any comment on Pakistan's announcement of trying the terrorists in the Karachi hijacking? And, anything further on extradition in connection with that case?

MR. REDMAN: No. I'll stay with the same position that we've tried to stick to right along, but there is a trial in the offing. As you say, they have announced that that's going to go forward, so I'd prefer not to comment while that's in progress.

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שגרירות ישראל / רושינגטון

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

אל: המשרד, בטחון

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיסות מיידי

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תאריך/ז"ח 1700 23 במארס 87

מס' מברק

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת
דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שה"ט לתקשורת, מזכיר הממשלה

פרשת פולארד

משיחות שאנו מקיימים בשבועיים האחרונים עם בכירים בתקשורת כאן עולה נקודה אחת
כחוט השני כמעט בכל השיחות והיא החשש שמא המערכת האמריקאית אינה מובנת די צרכה
למקבלי ההחלטות בארץ.

רושינגטון של ימים אלה הינה, אליבא דבני שיחנו, הדוגמא הטובה ביותר למשמעות השיטה
האמריקאית של בדיקה עצמית: שיטה שכדאי לישראל ללמוד ממנה.

מקובל על כולם שיתכנו גם בממשלים המסודרים ביותר חריגות ממדיניות. כך היה כנראה
עם פוינדקסטר ונורת' וכך, מאמינים כמה, קרה עם פולארד. אך פה גם מסתיימת ההקבלה בין
שתי השיטות.

בעוד אשר ארה"ב מסתערת על עצמה וממנה גופי חקירה רבים הסורקים את העיר הזאת
במסרקות של ברזל הרי שנישראל נזקקנו ל- 15 חדשים, ללחץ צבורי ישראלי וללחץ אמריקאי כדי
להקים ועדות שאת טיבן עדין מוקדם לשפוט.

בני שחנו ממשיכים ואומרים כי בעוד בארה"ב בולדוזר הבדיקות אינו פוסח על איש
והנשיא, מזכירי המדינה וההגנה, סגן הנשיא ואחרים עומדים תחת זכוכית מגדלת יום-יומית
הרי שאצלנו, ראה זה פלא, היריבים הפוליטיים המושבעים של אתמול מכסים אחד את אגפו של
האחר.

הגדיל לעשות משרד "נייטליין" בשבוע שעבר שהראה את מנהיגי ישראל מדברים בלשון אחת
כאשר תמונת המדבר מתחלפת כל כמה שניות אך המשפט יוצא שלם ולא מקוטע:
פרס- היתה זאת פעילות בלתי מאושרת ... רבין - נגד מדיניות הממשלה ...
שמיר-היחידה האמורה פורקה וכו' וכו'

3-11-87
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מ"מ סגן מנהל 3

טופס מברק

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

מ
687 663

סוג בטחוני

דחיות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

היה גם מי שאמר שכאן לא חסים על מי שמאושפז עם נתוח להסרת גידול במוח (וויליאם קייסי) ואצלנו יש כאלה המעלים ברצינות הטענה שרפי איתן אינו בריא לחלוטין.

אצל הידידים שבין בני שיחנו אתה מוצא דאגה ובקשה להנחיל למקבלי ההחלטות בארץ את ההכרה שעשינו עד כה כל טעות אפשרית בפרשה. אצל אלה שאינם נמנים על ידידנו אתה כבר שומע על התערבותה הבלתי נסבלת של ישראל בחהליך הדמוקרטי-חוקתי של ארה"ב, על כוחו של אייפאק ושל הקהילה היהודית ועל בליוני הדולרים שאמריקה משלמת על מנת לממן את החוצפה הישראלית.

את כל הקולות האלה אנו שומעים השכם והערב. בשיחות עם מה שיכונה בודאי "היהודי שברחוב". אלה ממכרינו כאן שאינם כותבים לעתונים או מקבלים משכורתם מן הממשל, אנחנו שומעים אמנם גם קולות מן הסוג המגלה הבנה מסויגת לפעולת הרגול (אס"ב באמת בה ברית, מדוע היא מסתירה מידע מכס וכו') אך אלה קולות הבטלים בששים אם מפאת מעוט משקלם הצבורי ואם בגלל שלפעמים קשה שלא לחוש את החשש שמלווה אמירתם.

לבסוף - הרגיעה היחסית בכסוי התקשורת של הנושא אף היא גורמת לידידנו לחשוש שמא רגיעה זאת תתפרש ע"י מקבלי ההחלטות בארץ כסיומה של הפרשה.

יולי 10
יוסי גל

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים

סוג בטחוני סודי

דחיפות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 14.10 23 מרץ '87

מס' מברק

קמחון

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המשרד + ניו יורק

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מקשיח (ממבטחון)

רמשיין וס/רמשיין (ניו יורק)

מנכ"ל מדיני, מנהל מצפ"א (משה"ח)

ציר, ונטפח צה"ל - כאן

מעמד דמוי נאט"ו - עלויות ההדרכה

למברק מקשיח 425

לנוחיותכם ולעיונכם, רצ"ב קטע בנדון מתוך דו"ח שהכין מל רישי בספטמבר 1986

בדבר המשך הנאטואיזציה.

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B. Furnishing Of Training

Section 21(g) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. §2761(g)) authorizes DOD to enter into agreements with NATO countries, Japan, Australia and New Zealand for the cooperative furnishing of training in the use of equipment, if the financial principles of such agreements are based on reciprocity. Such agreements must include reimbursement for all direct costs, but may exclude reimbursement for indirect costs, administrative surcharges and costs of billeting trainees.

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The availability of training, even on a cooperative basis, may in theory be effected under the general sales provisions of the AECA without reliance on section 21(g). However, section 21(g) offers at least two advantages which are available only to those countries covered by the provision. First, the express Congressional authorization of cooperative training makes it more likely that DOD will conclude such agreements with eligible countries. Second, agreements concluded under this section may provide for DOD not to charge for indirect costs, administrative surcharges and costs of billeting. As a general rule under the AECA, in contrast, such costs would be charged.

Training in the use of defense equipment for countries other than those identified in section 21(g) may also be provided, on a reciprocal basis, pursuant to section 30A of the AECA (22 U.S.C. §2770a), as added in 1985. Under this section, training and related support may be provided to personnel of friendly countries pursuant to an agreement providing for the provision by the recipient foreign country, on a reciprocal basis, of comparable training to U.S. personnel. To the extent, however, that the recipient country does not provide comparable training and related support within a year of receiving the U.S. training, the foreign country will be required to reimburse the United States in full for the costs of the training. Thus, this provision is potentially more limited than the cooperative training available under section 21(g).

XV

רחימות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	דף: 1
סוג בטרונני:	טופס מברק	מסודר: 5
תז"ח: 221600	מנכ"ל, מנכ"ל מדיני, ממנכ"ל, אמית"ק, מע"ת, מצפ"א, הסברה, ממ"ד, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהכ"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח	א 5
נר: 0560 63 84		ד ע : רושינגטון
מאת :	עתונות, ניו יורק	

News Summary March 21-22, 1987

Editorials

NYT 3/21 "Israel Stumbles Into Virtue" It is an open secret that Israel has been a covert supplier of arms to South Africa. Now Israel is moving to halt what it never acknowledged--but it won't say when, and its leaders imply that their welcome decision is somehow a favor to the US. Perversely, the effect is to deny Israel the credit it deserves. Israel is not doing a favor to the US by joining all Western nations in halting arms to a racist state. That stand is in Israel's own long-term interests. Israel made a wise decision. Now let it be a clear one. (Cabled 3/21)

NYT 3/22 "Lessons Mr. Reagan Hasn't Learned" Reagan passed the test of an Oval Office speech and a press conference. But his stance on the Iran-contra affair remains one of self-mystification. Unbelievably, he hasn't fully learned that he was in fact trading arms for hostages. Emerging evidence shows that profits from the sales were deposited in the kidnapers' Swiss bank account in payment for room and board for the hostages. He also forgot his hard-learned policy on dealing with terrorists over hostages. Although he said he would not travel the same road again he added that it is the responsibility of the Gov't to restore all rights to to a kidnapped US citizen. Is he not inviting bargaining with terrorists? His remarks fly in the face of warnings to US citizens not to expect help from Washington if they journey into the world's danger spots.

DN 3/22 "Reagan's Presidency is Alive and Well" Reagan is back, a full time President again. He got through his most important press conference clean and bright. In all, he came off earnest but still a bit naive, faulted in judgement but forthright.

Columns

NYT-A.M. Rosenthal 3/22 "The Locked Files" The UN's secret archive of Nazi war crimianls is a story that won't go away. Officials of the UN have kept the files hidden from historians, journalists and other interested members of the public for nearly 40 years. The pesky Israelis have demanded access, and got files. But now they have insisted that the issue is public. The Israeli position, which makes sense, is that the secrecy issue was created by UN staff, and runs counter to the original mission

אישור: שם השולח: תאריך: 22.3.87

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of the commission. They point out that a master list of names and summaries of charges found its way to a public American archive in Maryland. Any "protection of the innocent" argument is moot. It is not "secrets" that are locked up at the UN but a heartbreaking, invaluable record of organized murder, which belongs to history, not the UN.

NYT-Reston 3/22 "Bravery and Baloney" You have to admire Reagan's bravery at his last news conference, but you don't have to swallow his baloney. The only new thing he said during a dreary half-hour of repetition was that Bush had not objected to the sale of arms to Iran; that account was wrong. At no time did he explain the main charge; why he had repeatedly implored other nations not to sell military weapons to Iran and other terrorists and then had insisted on doing it himself against the advise of Shultz and Weinberger.

Press Reports

Senator Is Quoted as Saying US Recruited Israeli Officer as Spy

NYT-Engelberg 3/21 Sen. Dave Durenberger, a former chairman of the Senate intelligence committee told two Jewish political gatherings last Sunday that US intelligence agents had used an Israeli military officer as a spy in the early 1980's, according to three people who were at the meetings. The Senator issued a statement that said his remarks were intended to add perspective to the Pollard case. According to the witnesses, Durenberger said the CIA recruited a spy in the Israeli military who gave the US sensitive information during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. He also said that the CIA urged the FBI not to pursue Pollard. Casey, he said, had broken an agreement that the two nations would not spy on each other. Israeli officials would not confirm nor deny the report. But many of them welcomed the story, if true, as a counterweight to the Pollard affair, which has been a major irritant in US-Israeli relations. (Cabled 3/21)

South Africa Blames US for Israeli Decision

NYT-Battersby 3/21 South Africa's Foreign Minister has blamed the US for Israel's decision to ban new military contracts with Pretoria. Botha's statement was seen by political commentators as an effort to limit the potential damage to the close relationship between Israel and South Africa and to acknowledge that Israel had taken the minimum steps needed to satisfy the US Congress and Western European nations. The leaders of the South African Jewish community issued a carefully worded statement reaffirming both its opposition to sanctions and Israel's right as a sovereign state to act in its interest in the face of significant pressure from the US. Harry Schwartz, a Jewish leader said: "The South African Jewish community must accept that it is part of the white community and that its future lies with the South African community." (Cabled 3/21) (NYT-Week in Review 3/22)

Israel Trying Jews for Talking to PLO

NYT-Freidman 3/22 For the first time in the history of Israel, four Jews are being tried by the Gov't for holding peace talks with members of the PLO. The four were part of a 22 member delegation of Israeli anti-war campaigners that flew to Rumania and held a 2-hour dialogue followed by a banquet with 15 middle-ranking PLO representatives. The Israelis are being tried under a new law which forbids any contact between Israelis and members of the PLO. If convicted, they face up to 3 years in prison. The meeting

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was sanctioned by Arafat, but more extremist members tried to prevent it from taking place and threatened to kill those involved. Latif Dori said that "The Gov't wants to make it impossible for me to talk to my enemy. Who am I supposed to talk to? The Kurds? To the Uzbekis?... I did not choose my enemy. But we must talk to them, and they must talk to us, and nothing can stop that." Supporters of the gov't case see the defendants as misguided dreamers, who only damage Israel by propogating the myth that the PLO is something other than an irredeemable terrorist organization out to destroy Israel. (photo of Dori talking to 2 representatives of the PLO)

Israeli Jets Raid Targets in Lebanon/Controversy Within the PLO

NYT-Hijazi 3/21 Israeli aircraft attacked Palestinian targets in southern Lebanon, the first raid in over a month. A Palestinian spokesman said there were no casualties. The police said that the building that was attacked once belonged to Al Fatah but was abandoned 3 months ago. Recent comments by Arafat have stirred controversy within the PLO. Arafat told reporters in Tunis that Palestinian representatives for a proposed international conference on the Mideast need not be PLO officials as long as they had PLO approval. Objections have come from Al Fatah as well as more militant guerrillas. The argument appears bound to hurt efforts to heal divisions within the PLO. Some PLO leaders say they are afraid the organization's position will be compromised and the Palestinian cause will decline in stature if the PLO is not represented at such a conference.

The Shiites: Rising Wrath Jars Mideast

NYT-Kifner 3/22 p.1 (indepth article) (Photo p.1 of Shiites at pro-Iran demonstration in Beirut. They hold a banner that reads: "Israel, the Absolute Evil") Shiite Moslems inspired by Khomeini have emerged as a formidable, if unstable, political foe. In Lebanon, Kuwait, Iraq, Shiites are said to have been involved in terrorist undertakings. The Shiites are hardly monolithic. Only in Iran do they wield full political power. But Shiite anger is one of the roots of violence in the Mideast. In many places, the growing fundamentalist Shiite challenge threatens the established Arab order, which is largely Sunni Moslem. The fine points of Shiite doctrine are important in understanding the adherents' political behavior. Attempts by outsiders to moderate the Gulf war or the plight of the hostages run into difficulty because mediation is something with strong negative connotations. It is in Lebanon that the Shiite drama is most vivid. By pouring money into impoverished villages in the Bekaa and southern Lebanon and by providing training to the Revolutionary guards, the Iranians have built a powerful force that has mounted attacks on the Israeli controlled enclave that is patrolled by Israel's proxy, the SLA.

Khomeini Appeals For Unity

NYT-Reuters 3/22 Khomeini called for unity in Iran, particularly among its leaders, on the first day of the Iranian new year. He stated that Iran was at a "big sensitive juncture."

Iranian Assails Reagan

NYT-AP 3/21 Iran's President accused Reagan of lying at his news conference

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out secret shipments of American arms to Iran. He said that Iran would publish its own version of the affair.

News: Iranians Pulled a Sting on US

no byline 3/22 The Iranian arms deals were conceived by Khomeini as a "bait and switch" to acquire weapons and expose Russian agents in Iran, US News and World Report reported. The magazine cited unidentified Mideast sources to support its 11 page account that disputed Reagan's description of the operation. US News says the real scenario is far more troubling. "The Iranians duped not only the Americans, but the Israelis, the middlemen arms dealers and even the Soviets," the magazine concluded. It also said that Khomeini's plan "worked splendidly." According to the article, Khomeini read disinformation about his failing health and dissent within the top ranks of the Gov't. His aim was to interest US officials to sell arms. A promise to help free the hostages was used as another inducement.

Arab Arms Sales Draw Less Protest

T-Shipler 3/22 The Administration's proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations this year are meeting less opposition than usual from supporters of Israel, partly because of the cloud cast over Israeli-American relations by the Pollard spy case and the Israeli role in the Iran-contra affair. But the substance of the US-Israeli relationship does not appear to have been hurt. Administration officials expect an expansion of the close military cooperation. It is the tone of the relationship that has been damaged.

Kuwait-The Gulf War Threatens The Good Life

T-Kifner 3/21-Oil has brought this tiny Persian Gulf emirate, really just a desert town surrounded by sand, from souk to shopping mall almost overnight. The landscape is dominated by freeways, glass and steel space-age buildings and huge villas. But clouds hang over this air-conditioned Eden, where wealth is accumulated without work. Kuwait's rulers are increasingly uncomfortable by the Iran-Iraq war. Kuwait gambled on the Iraqis' but the strategic balance seems to be shifting toward Iran. A nagging problem is the fact that only 40% of the population are Kuwaiti citizens. The Parliament and freedom of the press has been dissolved. A foreign resident said "Kuwaitis much prefer cash to democracy. The bottom line here is that everyone is rich."

Another Saudi Hostage Freed

WT-special 3/21 Another Saudi hostage was freed in Beirut. Syrian military officials said the Saudi business executive, who was seized 56 days ago, had been handed over to them. They did not say by whom. (phot of Saudi with photo of Assad hanging over his head).

Religious Tensions in Egypt Claim a Life

WT-Kifner 3/22 A woman was killed and scores of people have been arrested in renewed fighting between Moslems and Coptic Christians. The clashes occurred as the Gov't expressed increasing concern over religious tensions, some prompted by rumors about the Christians.

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Carter on His Way to Syria

NYT-3/22 Photo of Carter with the leader of the Coptic Church in Egypt, Pope Shenuda. Carter will meet with Assad to discuss "every conceivable subject." Carter said he was not a representative of the US Gov't but he expected Syria to share any information on the American hostages and use its influence to gain their freedom.

Khadafy Said to Agree to Peace Talks With Chad

NYT-AP 3/22 A newspaper in Khartoum said that Khadafy agreed to peace talks with the President of Chad. There were no comments from Libyan or Chadian officials.

North and Poindexter Prepare Defenses Citing Patriotism

NYT-Rasky 3/22 p.1-North and Poindexter are preparing defense strategies stressing that they were patriots carrying out Reagan's policies, according to their friends and associates. Poindexter is said to be bitter about his treatment by the White House. Each believes he was working with the knowledge of his superiors and acting in the interest of national security both before and after the affair became public. Each continues to stress that they will be exonerated when all the facts come out.

Reagan Revises Statement on Bush

NYT-Boyd 3/21-Reagan revised the characterization of Bush's role in the Iran arms affair that he gave in his recent news conference. Both leaders appeared eager to prevent the matter from becoming a political embarrassment for Bush. Reagan now says that Bush expressed certain reservations about the arms sales.

Sex Abuse Suspect Free of AIDS

DN-Meisles 3/21 Avrohom Mondowitz, wanted in NY on suspicion of having sexually abused young boys, does not have AIDS. But Israel's Minister of the Interior still plans on deporting him. "He is not wanted in the US on charges of having AIDS, but on the suspicion of having assaulted young boys," Milo stated. (NYP-Fettmann)

The Myths About Reagan's Iran Arms Affair

NYT Sunday Magazine-Safire (Cover Story) Safire discusses the myths that have already surrounded Reagan and the arms affair. For example, there is the myth that Reagan is so out of touch as to be out to lunch. In truth, Reagan knew what he was doing, he was just wrong.

Letters

NYT- 3/22 New Yorker writes that the Pollard affair is scandalous because of its discovery, not rarity. All nations spy one another.

NYT- 3/21-Prof. of Midcast politics writes that it is misleading to regard Shiites as a monolithic and subversive bloc.

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סודי/בהול לבוקר

אל: רהמי, שהח, מנכל מדיני

פולרד.

הזקשר אתי היום אחצי כתב היינו יורק טיימסיי אינגלבר ומסר לי

שלפי ידיעות שיש בידו אני עומד לחזור ארצה בזמן הקרוב בגלל

פרשת פולרד. השיבותי לו שקבלתי הודעה על חזרתי ואני חוזר בקרוב

אכ אין לענין שום קשר לפרשת פולרד.

הכינותי ממנו, אם כי לא אמר זאת ישירות שהידיעה הזאת שאני כאילו

מוחזר ארצה בגלל פרשת פולרד הגיעה אליו ממישהו בארצ. מיותר להוסיף

שאם אמנם ידיעה זו תופרסם מחד בניו יורק טיימס-אגיכ.

מ.רוזן

ססס

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מח'
הקשר

20/3/87

תאריך חמן חיבור (ימולא עיי השולח)

לדיועה: ^{השלי} קנחובסקי - געא יועמ"ש משהב"ט

פרשת ברמודה

1. ברו, היועץ הכלכלי - בשגרירות ארה"ב בא היום (20,3) למנהל מצפ"א, בכח הח"מ.
2. ברו הציג הרשימה המצ"ב ומסר כי בסוף איש השבוע הבא יבואו לארץ שלשה חוקרי מכס (שניים מנ"י ונציגתם ברומא) על מנת לחקור מספר אנשים למשפט בגד ברעם ושאר מעורבי ברמודה.
3. הרשימה כוללת אך ורק אנשים פרטיים - למיטב ידיעתנו - לגבי השניים הראשונים בלבד יש כעת צוי מעצר בארה"ב, (כך בנייר הרצ"ב), כל האחרים על תקן של עדים (בשלב זה). האמריקנים לא ביקשו רשותנו. קתובה לשאלות אמר ברו שיכול להיות שיתאלמו החקירה עם גורמי המכס שלנו.
4. כן מבקשים האמריקנים להיפגש עם מומחה משפטי אשר יוכל להשכילם בכל הנוגע לכללי רישוי מכירת נשק וכד'. מומחה זה כנראה בבוא העת להעיד במשפט,
5. שמענו הדברים הגבנו ראשונות כדלקמן:
 - א. לשם מה באו אלינו למסור על החקירה, ועל כך השיב ברו כי ביקשו לתדע אותנו. (כאמור לעיל-לא ביקשו רשותנו).
 - ב. אנו סבורים שחקירות בישראל על ידי גופים סנקריים זרים הם INAPPROPRIATE. תשובה זו בהמשך לתגובתו של דב שפי, לפני שבועיים לאותה שאלה אם לספרהוק בשגרירות ארה"ב.
 - ג. לענין איש המומחה המשפטי הממשלתי - האם הדבר לא יכול להעשות בכתב, הבטחנו לבדוק הנושא.
 6. התגובה היא כאמור ראשונית ואנו מציעים לתאם תשכנות סופיות - אם ברצה בכך - מעבר לנאמר בתחלת השבוע הבא.

מנהל משפט כללי - א, ח, ה, ד, ב, א

דב-ל, א, ב, ג, ד, ה, ו, ז, ח, ט, י, יא, יב, יג, יד, טו, טז, יז, יח, יט, כ, כא, כב, כג, כד, כה, כו, כז, כח, כט, ל

השולח: יצחק אלמטר אישור מנהל המחלקה: אישור לשכת המנכ"ל: 1 3 3 2

ולצ"ע תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר

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Alex Weingard (Vingart)
Promil
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Rishon Le Zion

Representatives of Gilnoy and May
14 Spinoza Street
Tel Aviv

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With the exception of the first individuals, Mr. Lamrosa, AKA Lambrosa, and Mr. Hebroni, AKA Hevroni, the other individuals are not subjects of the indictment and are being interviewed, at this time, for information purposes only. If interviewed, Mr. Lamrosa and Mr. Hebroni will be advised of their rights before questioning. The U.S. Customs Service, has requested, if possible, that interviews be scheduled in advance.

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רחיבות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	דף: 1
סוג נסחונני:	טופס מברק	מחיר: 4
תז"ח: 201400	מנכ"ל, מנכ"ל מדינה, ממנכ"ל, אמית"ק, מע"ת, מצפ"א, הסכרה, ממ"ד, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח	
ני: 0540		ר ע: רושלינגטון
גטאן 59		
79		מאת: עתונות, ניו יורק

News Summary March 20, 1987

New York Headlines

Top stories in all NY papers reported on Reagan's press conference and his statement that he would not go ahead with the arms initiative again. Also on p.1 of the Times: CIA officials say that the White House knew there was little chance of improved relations with Iran (see Press Reports); Photo of Carter in Egypt; Serious crimes rose 5% in NYC, the first increase in 5 years; Messe will support drug tests for teachers; An extraordinary meeting of physicists took place in NYC and a broker from LA admits fraud. He was involved with Boesky. Page 1 stories in the Wall Street Journal deals with Toshiba and its problems with US firms and a story on a narcotics detective.

Editorials

ND "The President's Answers Just Won't Do The Trick" Reagan seemed dull but not incompetent last night. One of the most disturbing aspects of the press conference was Reagan's lame explanation for denying at his Nov. 19 press conference he had given approval to Israel to ship arms to Iran. He said he made a misstatement then. But his Nov. 19 remarks did not sound like a misstatement: "we do not condone, the shipment of arms from other countries," he said. The press conference last night demonstrated that the remaining answers will not come from the White House. Getting them is now the job of the congressional committees and special prosecutor.

Columns

NYP-Evans & Novak "US, Israel & South Africa" With US-Israeli relations at a low point, the administration's April 1 report documenting Israel's military cooperation with South Africa could generate an unprecedented reduction in the annual \$3 billion US aid program--one-third of all American assistance--despite Israel's pledge of no new contracts. One Israel supporter calls the report "devastating." Liberal democrats who normally stand by Israel are taking the aid-for-South Africa question with extreme seriousness. Those who have studied the report say its clear that Israel gets more out of the relationship than South Africa. That benefit could continue because Peres' pledge does not nullify existing contracts, some of which could run for months or more. This is what concerns Capitol Hill liberals. They want performance from Israel, not promises.

איטור:

עם השולח: ארבעה יום

20.3.87

תאריך:

ב 1 מלכו פיר תפוזים מתאפסות

NYT-Anthony Lewis "What's the Point?" Benjamin Charney is one of 9 cancer patients in the Soviet Union who are known to have asked permission to join relatives abroad. They have been told that they cannot. What imaginable official interest could outweigh the damaging impression of inhumanity? Shalit is due to go to Moscow on April 13. He will no doubt have the usual list of human rights cases we want resolved. But how much better it would be if the Soviet leadership understood that its interests would be served not by dealing with such cases as the cancer victims, but by not, anguishingly, but by just letting them go.

NYT-Mahmud Y. Zaidi (writer who deals with Third world) "Showing Sensitivity to Pakistan" America, once a major supplier of nuclear materials to India, has been unable to control India's nuclear program. America copes with Israel's nuclear program by barely mentioning it. Israel is a special friend but nuclear weapons are nobody's friends. It is thus implausible for Pakistan to conclude that if it stays its nuclear course, Washington will eventually decide that it is impractical to put pressure on Pakistan to stop production of such weapons. Like Israel, Pakistan faces a much larger foe, unlike India, which has a long-term bond with the USSR. Pakistan has supported America in the theater of third-world anti-Americanism. Now Pakistan's nuclear aid might get cut off while India might get supercomputers. The super powers must demonstrate they are serious about controlling nuclear arms. This is preferable than America closing its eyes toward India's nuclear program, blowing hot and cold on Pakistan and jeopardizing a just settlement in Afghanistan.

Press Reports

Israel-South Africa

NYT-Freidson-Peres formally presented to parliament the Cabinet decision to ban new military sales contracts with South Africa and generally to reduce ties with Pretoria. Peres became involved in a shouting match with critics of the policy. Generally, the decisions received mixed reactions from Israeli experts on South Africa and members of Parliament. In devising the decisions, the Cabinet was seeking a delicate balance of interests: the minimum amount of sanctions on South Africa, with the minimum negative effect on Israel's military exports, in return for maximum impact on Congress and American Jews. Peres said it was natural for the Cabinet to consider the feelings of the US in its decision, since the US does the same for Israel. (ND-combined: WSJ-Kessel) (Photo of Peres speaking before Parliament-NYT)

NYT-Battagby-South Africa's Dep. Foreign Minister, Ron Miller, was quoted as saying the decision by Israel's Cabinet was "a matter of greatest concern." But other South African officials appeared reluctant to comment on the action. Political commentators said that the relationship between Israel and South Africa, especially in military areas, was too valuable for Pretoria to jeopardize by publicly criticizing Israel. Contacts between the two nations are closely guarded secrets. The commentators said that Pretoria hopes that this secrecy would enable Israel to extend its current contracts and find loopholes in its embargo. There is an appreciation in Gov't circles that Israel, which also seeks to protect the interests of the 120,000 Jews in South Africa, made the decision to move more into line with sanctions extremely reluctantly and in the face of formidable pressure

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from the Congress and US Jewry.

Eitan Says He Acted With "Permission"

NYT-special-Eitan told the gov't commission investigating the Pollard affair that he acted with "permission and authority," Haaretz reported. If the report is accurate, the testimony directly contradicts what Israel has said since the start of the Pollard affair--that the incident was a "rouge" operation and that spying on the US runs counter to Israeli policy. Proceedings of the commission are secret.

10,000 Jews Expected to Leave Soviet Union in 1987

NYT-Reuters A senior Soviet official said he expected 10-12,000 Jews to emigrate this year, more than 10 times the number allowed to emigrate in 1986. "All those with legitimate rights to go will go out," said Sergei Ivanko in an interview with CNN. He said they would go to Israel. US officials who asked not to be identified said they believed it was the first time such a high figure had been mentioned in public by a senior Soviet official.

UN to Keep Files on Nazi War Crimes Closed

NYT-special-The former members of the UN War Crimes Commission have denied Israel's request that the commission's files on Nazi war criminals be opened to the public, a UN spokesman said. Giuliani said that 16 of the 17 nations on the commission had opposed the request. Diplomats said the US opposed and only Australia was in favor. The US Mission would not comment but diplomats involved said the commission members felt that the files should remain closed to protect innocent people investigated by the commission. Netanyahu, when told of the decision, said "It is inconceivable for the United Nations to continue shielding accused Nazi war criminals."

Demjanjuk Trial: Demjanjuk Denialist Wins

ND AP Demjanjuk's defense attorney said Demjanjuk was two inches taller than "Ivan the Terrible."

Reagan Renounces Iran Initiative

NYT-Boyd p.1-Reagan repudiated his Iran initiative saying, "I would not go down that road again." He also emphatically denied he had been aware of profits diverted to the contras. (see text of Press Conference-NYT)

NYT-Apple p.1 News Analysis-Reagan broke little new ground in his first news conference in 4 months and he showed himself still unable to give anything approaching a clear and complete account of how the Iran-contra affair developed. Nervous and unsure at first, Reagan rambled and stumbled. But afterwards, he seemed to hit his stride, answering questions at length and with considerably more composure, even though he never oozed self-confidence like the old Ronald Reagan.

ND-Text of Reagan on Israel's role. Statements from the Nov. 19, 1985 press conference, his written statement after the press conference and his response last night about his earlier statements on Israeli involvement.

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White House Knew Of Shift on Iran

NYT-Gordon p.1-CIA officials say that, in revised intelligence estimates in 1985, they told the White House that there was little prospect for improving relations with Iran, even as the Administration began a covert initiative to accomplish that purpose. The CIA also said that there was no imminent threat that the Soviet Union would gain significant influence in Iran. Nonetheless, the White House proceeded with the initiative and even composed an intelligence finding in Jan. 1986 that cited the possibility of growing Soviet influence in Iran. The CIA officials gave a rare on-the-record interview to counter charges that intelligence reports had exaggerated accounts of internal instability in Iran and the purported Soviet threat to lend support to the initiative.

Reagan Says Bush Never Objected

NYP-Lathem Reagan appeared to say the Bush never objected to the Iran arms deal, creating fresh problems for Bush's 1988 Presidential bid. Reagan's surprise comment came after the news conference when reporters surrounded him and asked more questions. Bush contends that he had objected to the deal. The Tower report concluded that Bush never objected to the deal.

Carter Faults Reagan on Mideast

NYT-AP-Carter said that peace efforts by America's friends in the Mideast are doomed to fail because Washington had failed to exert leadership. Carter praised efforts by Mubarak and Hussein. (Photo of Carter in Cairo-NYT p.1; ND)

Syria Promises 'Punishment' If Hostages Are Killed

NYT-Hijazi-Syria has served notice that its 7500 soldiers deployed in Beirut will mete out "the severest punishment" if any of the 25 foreigners held hostage are killed. Syria has a major interest in freeing the hostages.

US Ships in Strike Distance of Iranian Missiles in the Gulf

NYT-Halloran-The US has moved warships into the Arabian Sea, where they are within striking distance of newly emplaced Iranian missiles that threaten the entrance to the Persian Gulf. But officials sought to play down the significance of the move, saying the ships were in normal operating areas. Administration officials have repeatedly said that the security of the Gulf is a matter of vital concern to the US.

Saudis Cut Output

WSJ-Ibrahim-Saudi Arabia has cut its oil production close to a record low level in the battle to keep oil prices up. Saudi production has fallen to about 2.5 million barrels a day, down nearly a million barrels from one month ago. Oil production by other OPEC nations have also fallen.

Fugative "Rabbi" Denies Sex Charge

NYP-Juffe-A bogus rabbi wanted on child-sex abuse charges denied he abused more than 100 Brooklyn children and infected some of them with AIDS. Mondrowitz gave several interviews to newspapers in Israel.

END

רחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דף: 1
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כר : 0530	ד ע :	
	מאת : נא"ם, ניו-יורק	

אל: ליאל-לשכת המנכ"ל המדיני.
מאת: מ. יופה.

ישראל-זרא"פ.

רצ"ב שתי כתבות שהופיעו הווקר ב- NYT :

- A) "Israeli Ban Stirs South Africa Worry"
- B) "Israel Parliament Hears Plan On Pretoria"

נא"ם

מ. יופה

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אישור:	שם השולח: מ. יופה	תאריך: 20.3.87
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Israeli Ban Stirs South Africa Worry

By JOHN D. BATTERSBY

Special to The New York Times

JOHANNESBURG, March 19 — South Africa's Deputy Foreign Minister, Ron Miller, was quoted here today as saying the decision by Israel's Cabinet to bar new military sales contracts with Pretoria and to reduce ties was "a matter of the greatest concern."

But other South African officials appeared reluctant to comment on the action.

Mr. Miller was quoted in The Johannesburg Star, and Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha made an oblique reference tonight to the Israeli move at an election meeting here.

He said the ruling National Party was always blamed for sanctions imposed on South Africa. But, he said, policies of the Progressive Federal Party, the more liberal white opposition in Parliament, would also have caused sanctions and would have placed the country in greater chaos.

Western sanctions extremely reluctantly and in the face of formidable pressure from the United States Congress and American Jews.

The degree of South African concern was reflected in a statement Thursday night by Harry Schwarz, a Member of Parliament from the Progressive Federal Party and an official of the Jewish Board of Deputies, the leading Jewish organization in South Africa.

Telegram Sent to Israelis

Shortly before the group's leaders met Thursday night, Mr. Schwarz, chairman of the board's international relations committee, sent a telegram to Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, and Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, appealing to them not to support sanctions or a policy of disinvestment

in South Africa.

In the telegram, Mr. Schwarz said he could understand both Israel's objections to apartheid as well as the pressures that were being exerted on that country. But as a country that was itself subject to sanctions and boycotts, Israel should appreciate that such measures were not desirable and were often counterproductive, he said.

"As a Jewish South African who has a love for Israel," he went on, "and who has been an opponent of apartheid in South Africa all his life and is an active member of the official opposition in Parliament, I make this last-minute appeal not to support sanctions or have a disinvestment policy with South Africa which would be counterproductive to peaceful reform."

Secrecy Between Countries

Political commentators said the relationship between Israel and South Africa, particularly in military areas, was too valuable for Pretoria to jeopardize by publicly criticizing Israel.

The details and extent of Israel's sales of arms and military information to South Africa is a closely guarded secret of both countries. The commentators said the hope in Pretoria would be that this secrecy would enable Israel to extend current contracts and find loopholes in its embargo.

There is an appreciation in Government circles that Israel, which also seeks to protect the interests of the 120,000 Jews in South Africa, made the decision to move more into line with

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END

Israel Parliament Hears Plan on Pretoria

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, March 19 — Foreign Minister Shimon Peres formally presented to Parliament today the Cabinet's decision to bar any new military sales contracts with South Africa and generally to reduce ties with Pretoria.

In his appearance in Parliament, Mr. Peres became involved in a raucous shouting match with critics of the Cabinet decision. At one point the debate degenerated into a heated argument between left-wing and right-wing members over which was worse, the South African Government or Stalin's.

In general, the Cabinet decisions, reached Wednesday, received a mixed reception from Israeli experts on South Africa and members of Parliament.

people. Our enemy is an immoral policy called apartheid."

The mass circulation, right-of-center newspaper Yedioth Aharonoth hailed the plan as "a milestone," which signaled "to the Congress that henceforth our relations with South Africa would no longer be the same."

Directed at U.S. Congress

Senior Israeli officials were blunt in indicating that this plan was directed first and foremost at the United States Congress, not South Africa. In devising it, the Cabinet was seeking a delicate balance of interests: the minimum amount of Israeli sanctions on South Africa, with the minimum negative effect on Israel's military exports, in return for the maximum impact on Congress and American Jews.

On April 1, President Reagan must submit to Congress a report prepared by the State Department regarding nations receiving American aid that also sell arms to South Africa, with a view to ending American military assistance to those nations.

Israel last year received \$1.8 billion in American military aid. According to unofficial estimates, Israeli military industries earned anywhere from \$400 million to \$800 million last year from the export of military equipment and know-how to South Africa. The exact sales figure and weapons involved are secrets subject to military censorship.

Mr. Peres said it was natural for the Cabinet to consider the feelings of the United States in its decision, since the United States does the same for Israel.

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Some leftist anti-apartheid campaigners said it was nothing more than a fig leaf to pacify the United States Congress. They said the moves would still allow Israel to covertly continue military sales to South Africa on basically the same terms as before because the Government announced no date to end such top-secret arms contracts.

Government Called Irresponsible

Other legislators complained that the Government had been irresponsible for not taking more serious steps sooner. They said that once again it had required a near crisis with Congress for Israel to act.

Supporters of the plan countered that Israel's relations with South Africa had been blown out of proportion and that the new steps were meaningful. They said the actions were in line with the real level of contacts and would be the first step in a new relationship between the two nations.

Mr. Peres said in Parliament that the Cabinet plan had four main points: banning new military sales contracts with South Africa, condemning apartheid, reducing to a minimum cultural and tourist ties and appointing a team of officials to work out a detailed list of potential economic sanctions in line with those of other Western nations.

"Israel is not fighting the whites or the blacks," Mr. Peres said. "Israel fights discrimination. Our enemy is not

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(ה) השוואה עלויות הדרכה

1. רצי"ב הצעת גאסט בנדון וההסבר לכן, כפי שהם מגיעים לידי בטיח בהצעת החוק שהוגשה ע"י הממשל (הועברה לכם מתוך הרקורד הקונגרסיונאלי, בדיפ' האחרון).
2. כעת אנו בודקים אם הניסוחים האלה עונים על כל צרכינו.
3. עם זאת מציעים שנפעל גם להחלח ההסדר עבור נאטו (רצי"ב) על "בנות הברית הגדולות שאינן חברות בנאטו". נא אישורכם.

(ו) יעדים נוספים

1. מחייבים את ההצעה בסעיף 16 בשלך. שוקלים באם יש להעביר תיקון מיוחד או להרחיב את כוונת המחוקק בדו"ח הלוגאי לחוק (אזי ניתן אולי לצמצם את היריעה לישראל).
2. סוכס על דעת הרמשי"ן לשאוב ^{מהקטע} מזכר ההבנה החדש בהקשר רחב זה (רצי"ב הקטע הנוגע בדבר).

(4) חוזרים ומבקשים אישורכם לסעיף (ה) 3 ^{הקטע}. א.א.

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א.א.

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מחירי הדמייה

כולם נמצאים

הנהגה והנהגה (כ)

SECTION 110. EXCLUSION OF SALARIES FROM TRAINING PRICES

This section amends section 503(a)(3) of the FAA to allow prices charged for training purchased using non-repayable PMS credits to be based on the same criteria as the same training priced through the MAP program by eliminating from the former the requirement to include salaries of training personnel.

הנהגה והנהגה (כ)

EXCLUSION OF SALARIES FROM TRAINING PRICES

SEC. 110. The last sentence of paragraph (3) of section 503(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by inserting immediately after the phrase "under paragraph (3)" the phrase "or from funds made available on a nonrepayable basis under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act" and by inserting after the words "Armed Forces of the United States" the phrase "(other than the Coast Guard)".

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(G) THE PRESIDENT MAY ENTER INTO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS IN CARRYING OUT SECTION 814 OF THE ACT OF OCTOBER 7, 1975 (PUBLIC LAW 94-106), AND MAY ENTER INTO SIMILAR AGREEMENTS WITH JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND, FOR THE COOPERATIVE FURNISHING OF TRAINING ON A BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL BASIS. IF THE FINANCIAL PRINCIPLES OF SUCH AGREEMENTS ARE BASED ON RECIPROCITY, SUCH AGREEMENTS SHALL INCLUDE REIMBURSEMENT FOR ALL DIRECT COSTS BUT MAY EXCLUDE REIMBURSEMENT FOR INDIRECT COSTS, ADMINISTRATIVE SURCHARGES, AND COSTS OF BILLETING OF TRAINEES (EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES OCCUPYING COMPARABLE ACCOMMODATIONS ARE CHARGED FOR SUCH ACCOMMODATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES). EACH SUCH AGREEMENT SHALL BE TRANSMITTED PROMPTLY TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE COMMITTEES ON APPROPRIATIONS, ARMED SERVICES, AND FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE SENATE.

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2. ^{ill} Except as provided below, full consideration will be given to qualified industrial or governmental sources of the other country for conventional defense supplies and services consistent with the policies and criteria of the cognizant purchasing agencies, if such offers satisfy all requirements of the purchasing organization for performance, including requirements related to quality, delivery and cost.

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דף..... מחור..... דפים

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תאריך וזיחה. 17:00. 20.3.87

מס' מברק.....

אל : מצפ"א, לשכת השר, לשכת המנכ"ל

דע : לשכת רה"מ, מקשי"ח

השגרירות, פרטוריה - ים הלביתא

ישראל-דרא"פ : מסיבת העתונאים של המורשה מיקי לייננד

לשלנו 584 .

להלן דו"ח על המסיבה שהוכנה ע"י אחד ממשתתפים .

י.ס.ס
למדו

שם המסרד 3
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דפים מתוך 97

סוג מסמך

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Congressman Mickey Leland, (D-TX), former Chairman of the Black Congressional Caucus, held a news conference to react to the announcement by Israeli Foreign Minister Peres that Israel will ban new military sales contracts with South Africa.

Leland said he is "taking the leadership" in holding the press conference because he is pleased with the "breakthrough" Israel has made in taking this step. He said he is "pleased with Shamir's compliance with the wishes of the Foreign Minister" on this, but "appalled at the opposition of Ariel Sharon," the only member of the Cabinet to oppose the measure.

"If in fact Peres and the GOI will follow through, this is a breakthrough" he said although he acknowledged that Israel is heading to Western pressures. During the press conference, Peres phoned Leland. Leland quoted Peres as saying the following: "Blacks and Jews have had a history of mutual relations and I hope we can continue this and our common plight to end apartheid." Peres invited Leland to Israel to continue discussing the matter. In a previous discussion with Leland, Peres said Israel has "an international Jewish foreign policy," referring to its concern for the 120,000 Jews in South Africa and elsewhere. Leland said he told Peres that if 24 million blacks have to suffer as a result of this, there is no real balance. He acknowledged that White South African Jews were at the forefront of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa.

Leland said he is interested in pursuing the matter because Israel has to get the message from "so called one of its closest allies." Later, Leland said Israel's step is a strong message to South Africa because "its coming from a close ally" of Pretoria.

The congressman said, in response to a question on Black Americans' perception of Israel that because Israel receives more aid than the entire continent of Africa, this causes consternation. He however said, he was not advocating a cut in economic aid to Israel.

Leland pointed to the fact that several Arab states are selling oil to South Africa, \$10 billion over a period of 3-5 years.

... When I asked him if he was taking steps to get the other countries named in the April 1st report or others found in violation of the arms embargo to follow in Israel's footsteps, he said, "We have not taken any steps. Israel is my pet peeve." Following the press conference, when asked by the Israel Radio correspondent if the Black Caucus will put pressure on other countries, he said there "is no question" they will encourage a "world boycott" against South Africa.

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קמחן

אל: המשרד

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אל : מצפ"א .

דע : לשכת מנכ"ל אוצר

מקש"ח

בית הנבחרים : תקציב וסיוע חוץ

לשלנו 581

1. היום (20) וועדה התקציב היתה אמורה לדון בסעיף 150 ("ענינים בינלאומיים"), אך זקות ספורות לאחר פתיחת ה- **MARK-UP** . העדיף היו"ר, המורשה ביל גריי, להשהות את הדיון .
2. כמדווח בשלנו 530, החליטו הרפובליקאים בוועדה להמנע בכל הצבעה שתקויים ב- **MARK-UP** , וכך נהגו אתמול כשנידון סעיף 050 (תקציב הבטחון) וכשהוחלט - בקולות הדמוקרטים בלבד - לקצץ כ-24 בליון דולר מתוך בקשת הנשיא לסך של 312 בליון לצרכי בטחון .
3. עד כה העריכו הבריות שעל ידי המנעותם יתנו הרפובליקאים תמיכה פאסיבית למהלכי גריי, ואולם היום, עם פתיחת ה- **MARK-UP** , שאל היו"ר את בכיר המיעוט בוועדה, המורשה הרפובליקאי דל לטה, באם זה נכון שהרפובליקאים מתכוונים להמנע בכל הצבעה ע"מ לאפשר לדמוקרטים "להשיג את החבילה שלהם", כפי שדווח בכתבה שהתפרסמה בעתון השוופוסט היום. משלטה אישר את הידיעה ולאחר חילופי דברים נוהליים עם שני חברים רפובליקאים בוועדה, הודיע גריי שהוא משהה את הישיבה, כי הרי אינו זקוק לרפובליקאים אם הם נותנים לדמוקרטים יד חפשית ומוציאים את עצמם מהתהליך: הדמוקרטים יכולים להתכנס בקאוקוס, ולהכין הצעת תקציב לבדם. בציינו שיטת להפגש עם בכיר המיעוט אם ירצה בכך, סגר גריי את הישיבה-ובזאת כלל לא נגעו בסעיף 150.
4. עוד נראה כיצד יתפתחו הענינים .

יוסף אלמ
למדן

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דפוס.....מחוק.....דפים
סוג בטחוני. ש. מ. ר.
דחיסות.....מ. ד. י.
מאריך וזייה. 18:00 - 20.3.87
.....מנהל משרד

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קסטין
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אל: המשרד

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אל : מנהל מצפ"א .

דע : לשכת מנכ"ל אוצר
מקשי"ח (מי בטחון)
ציר כלכלי (כאן)

סנט : סיוע חוץ

1. לידיעתכם, רצ"ב מכתב שיו"ר וועדת החוץ שלח ליו"ר וועדת התקציב ערב הדיון אצל האחרון על סעיף 150 (מברקנו 530) .
2. ממקור מהימן אנו למדים שבכוונת יו"ר וועדת החוץ לחתור ל- **PROGRAM FREEZE** ב- **MARK-UP** של חוק הסיוע לשי"ת 1988, שיקויים ב-31 דנא - פירוש הדבר (כפי שמוסבר בסעיף 7 לשלנו 291) קיצוץ של כ-350 מליון דולר בהוצאות בפועל לעומת השנה, ש"ת 1987 .
3. להערכת המקור, אין בטחון שיצליחו להשיג זאת, במיוחד לנוכח נטיית וועדת התקציב להנהיג קיצוצים עמוקים יותר, אך בנסיבות הקיימות, חוצאה כזו היא הטובה שניתנת להשגה, אם בכלל.
4. כמו כל שאר אנשי שיחנו בימים אלה, המקור מקבל כנתון המשך הסיוע לישראל ברמתו הנוכחית, כך שכל קיצוץ יהיה ע"ח מדינות ותכניות אחרות.

אולי אמת
למדו

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CLAMBORNE PELL PHOENIX ISLAND, CHAIRMAN
 JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. DELAWARE
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 PAUL S. TALLE, JR., VIRGINIA
 DANIEL J. EVANS, WASHINGTON
 MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, STAFF DIRECTOR
 JAMES P. LUCER, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

March 16, 1987

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The Honorable Lawton Chiles
 Chairman
 Senate Committee on the Budget
 Washington, D.C. 20510

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Dear Lawton:

As you begin the Budget Committee markup this week, I wanted to provide you with additional thoughts and recommendations on the 150 function.

I am mindful of the difficult task your Committee faces in recommending cuts consistent with Gramm-Rudman-Hollings requirements. I understand that you would like to put together a package of revenues and spending cuts that would improve on the proposal submitted by the President. I support that effort, but I cannot emphasize too strongly the need to ensure that the tools necessary for the effective conduct of foreign policy -- our first line of national defense -- are not taken away.

The 150 function cannot be cut from the 1987 CR level without seriously weakening that first line of defense. In addition, a modest increase in funding, particularly for the multilateral development banks, is justifiable if a significant revenue component can be achieved.

It is essential, in my view, that we honor our pledges to base rights countries, sustain the financial underpinning of the Camp David peace process, ensure that fledgling democracies such as the Philippines and Haiti do not fail, promote our security and trade interests by helping developing countries to achieve economic growth, and maintain our information gathering and representational activities abroad at undiminished levels.

The programs funded in the 150 function earn dividends that do not show up as receipts in the federal financial accounts. Those dividends are as important and tangible, however, as a check made out to the U.S. Treasury. They include jobs created for, and taxes paid by, workers making products for export to reinvigorated economies abroad; military bases, whose security value could be duplicated by alternative

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
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means only by spending billions of additional dollars; and a diplomatic establishment providing the information and analysis necessary for sound foreign policy decisions affecting our nation's very existence.

The 150 function, constituting less than 2% of the federal budget, cannot make a significant contribution to deficit reduction. Such an argument, I know, could be made with regard to other functions or activities of comparable size. However, I submit that the 150 function is unique, for it constitutes the set of activities that determine America's place in the world. I urge the Budget Committee to provide the resources needed to ensure that our country's role in world affairs is not diminished.

With every good wish.

Ever sincerely,



Claiborne Pell
Chairman

XFP

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תאריך וזיחה 15:30 - 20.3.87

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אל : מצפיא, מקשיח .

דע : לשכת מנכ"ל מדינה

לשכת רה"מ

לשכת שהבי"ט, יועץ שהבי"ט לתקשורת

הסנטור דורנגרגר וריגול אמריקאי בישראל

רצ"ב הודעה לעתונות שדוברת הסנטור הוציאה היום .

א.ר. ארמ
למדו

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Dave Durenberger news

U.S. Senator for Minnesota

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
ISSUED: MARCH 20, 1987

CONTACT: LOIS WEST
202-224-9475

DURENBERGER CLARIFIES ISRAELI STORY

In response to published reports about statements allegedly made by Sen. Dave Durenberger (R-Minn), regarding the Jay Pollard spy case, Durenberger said that he appeared before a group of Americans concerned about U.S.-Israeli relations.

"In speaking to that particular group, I tried to put the Pollard case in perspective," he said.

"I related to them that 1982 newspaper accounts of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon led to public speculation that the United States may have had intelligence sources within the Israeli Government.

"I did not relate these events to them in order to justify Israel's actions in the Pollard case, but rather to shed light on how it may have occurred.

"I will not comment on the specifics of U.S. intelligence operations overseas. I would like to reiterate my often-stated views on the Pollard case, which is that friends shouldn't spy on friends. The recruitment of Jay Pollard was not justified, regardless of whether the Israelis believed this rule to have been broken or not.

"I believe the Pollard Case demonstrates that intelligence operations must always be evaluated as to the risk versus the benefit. In the Pollard case, it clearly was not."

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דפוס..... מחזור..... דפוס
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מאריך וזמן, 16:00, 20.3.87

מס' סג' מבר

סגירות ישראל - ווטינגטון

קטחון

אלו המשרד

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אל : מנהל מצפ"א

דע : מנכ"ל אוצר

מקשי"ח

ציר כלכלי (כאן)

המורשה דייויד אובי והקלות בהחזר חובות ה-FMS

1. כידוע, עוד בסחו שעבר, עת שבכירי וועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות בסנט (קסטן ואינווייה) עסקו בחוק ההקצבות לסיוע חוץ והציעו הקלות **ל"א** חנות" לגבי חובות ה-FMS (בכלל), הביע דייויד אובי (יו"ר הוועדה המקבילה בבית הנבחרים) התנגדות נמרצת להצעותיהם, ומנע את קבלתן.
2. בינואר ש.ז., בעקבות פירסום הפרטים הראשוניים על הצעות הממשל בדבר ה- **RE-FINANCING** או **PRE-PAYMENTS**, פנה אובי ל- **GAO** (משרד החשב הכללי), וביקש חוות דעה משפטית באם לנשיא הסמכות בחוק להציע הצעות כאלה כאקט אקסקוטיבי, בלא אישור הקונגרס.
3. ה- **GAO** טרם הגיש את חוות הדעה, ולהערכת אחד מהעוזרים בצוות הוועדה של אובי, ספק אם משפטני ה- **GAO** ינקטו עמדה חד-משמעית. בעבר הצטיינו במתן דעות שמצביעות על פנים ל"כאן ולכאן".

אלו המשרד
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תאריך וזיחה 17:00 - 20.3.87

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אלו המשרד + בטחון

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דע : מקשיח

בית הנבחרים : סיוע חוץ .

ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות בוועדת ההקצבות קיימה השבוע שני דיונים .

ב-17 העיד בפניה שר האוצר גיימס א. בייקר. עיקר דבריו (והדיון) הוקדשו לשאלות בנקים מולטילטרליים ותוכניות פיתוח בינ"ל. נושאים הנוגעים לנו לא עלו ישירות אלא שה"ר אובי ביקר את תוכניות הממשל בנושא שינוי מבנה החוב, בטענה שמדובר בהחזר של סכומי ענק בעתיד, והדעה שמצרים לא תוכל לעמוד בה.

ב-19 העידו בפניה דרוינסקי ממחמ"ד וגאסט מהפנטגון. עדויותיהם דומות לדבריהם בעבר ולא יועברו. רצ"ב סיכום שהכינו ידידים שנכחו בדיון. השומה ליבכם לחשובת גאסט לפורטר לגבי הלבאי, שהפרייקט מלכתחילה הינו תוכנית סיוע כלכלית, ולכן הכסף שהושקע בו עד כה לא בוזבז. כן אמר שנראה לו שהמטכ"ל שוקל המלצה שליטת לגבי המשך הפרוייקט.

במהלך דיון זה הובעה דאגה מיכולתה הגרעינית של פקיסטאן.

במהלך שני הדיונים חזר אובי על דבריו בדבר הצורך להעלות מיסים כדי לממן את בקשות הממשל, כשהוא חוזר על הברירות אפשריות בפניהן עומדים המחוקקים. הוא ביקש הנחיות ועדיפויות לקיצוץ, נוכח הגרעון הצפוי, ודוברי הממשל מצידם חזרו על נחונייהם, כאשר בין הממשל והמחוקקים חילוקי דעות לגבי גודל הגרעון הצפוי ב-88 וכתוצאה מכך, אי הסכמה לגבי מידת הצורך לקצץ.

טובה הינו
טובה הרצל

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MEMORANDUM

DATE: 3/19/87

SUBJECT: Security Assistance Overview

WITNESSES: Hon. Edward J. Derwinski, Under Sect. for Security Assistance, Science and Technology

Lt. General Philip C. Gast, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense

MEMBERS PRESENT: Chairman Obey (D-WI), McHugh (D-NY), J. Lewis (R-CA), Porter (R-IL)

MEDIA: Light print press

ATMOSPHERE: Friendly, intense at times

Summary

The perennial game of "chicken" continued as each side tried to pin the other down on the issue of earmarking. Derwinski stated that in his short time on the job he is "struck by the complications of the earmarking" and "it seems to me that if total funds are going to be cut than earmarked countries ought to be cut - if not proportionally, at least to some extent." Chmn. Obey asked if the Administration was suggesting a "lower earmark for Israel and Egypt", and pushed hard for the Administration to "lay their proposals on the table". In response, Derwinski stated "I don't think there needs to be continued debate over Israel and Egypt, we have agreement in areas of policymaking." Rep. Porter queried as to Israel's decision to scrap the Lavi and if this would essentially waste the money that the U.S. had put into the project. Chmn. Obey pinpointed Derwinski on the issue of arms sales to Saudi Arabia. "What are the Administration's plans for future slices of arms sales to Saudi Arabia?" Derwinski focused on the Javits Report, a summary of all the anticipated arms sales for the calendar year of 1987, which the Administration had previously sent to Congress. Chmn. Obey stated that his opposition to further arms sales to Saudi Arabia rested primarily on Saudi Arabia's role in the Iran Contra scandal. The Biden-Levine amendment was not mentioned during the hearing, but was heavily argued against in Gast's written testimony.

Report

Chmn. Obey expressed his annoyance, "I'm tired of asking and not hearing" any changes in the Administration's proposal. "If the Administration plans to squawk about our earmarking, than they have an obligation" to tell us how they would allocate the limited funds. Derwinski ducked the question; Obey requested that they see some answers in writing. No specific suggestions arose in regards to cutting back on aid to Israel, except in the context of an across the board cut. It is Obey's intention to markup two foreign aid bills: one which would cut 1.6 billion from security assistance and meet the Gramm-Rudman target of \$108 billion; and one which would cut 300 million - meeting the target set by the Gray/Wright proposal.

In response to Rep. Porter's assertion that the 1.3 billion put towards the Lavi is "going down the drain", Gast reminded him that no such decision has been made by Israel. Moreover, as Sect. of Defense Weinberger maintained

Ⓟ

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early on, the Lavi project "was an economic program from the start" and should even have been supported with ESF funds. The implied rationale for this are the economic benefits brought about by the Lavi project and the fact that "there were perfectly good planes and parts that could have been bought."

Chmn. Obey asked Derwinski for the total dollar value on the proposed arms package to Saudi Arabia. Derwinski was unable to answer, but said that the usual question raised by Congress was "does the sale constitute a threat to Israel?" Obey interjected to say that "that is a question, but there are broader questions." Speaking of the recent disclosure of the U.S. role in providing arms to Iran and the often used theme that Iran poses a major threat to Saudi Arabia, Obey said "it bugs me" that arms sales would now be proposed to Saudi Arabia.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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אל: המשרד, בטחון

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להלן מחור חדרוך תביח חלבן.

תחנות

MR. DONALDSON: Although I cannot at the moment cite words -- I don't have them in front of me. I recall, I think, that Mr. Reagan, while governor, and before he was President, and abroad, felt free to criticize President Carter's policy in a number of areas. What does he think is the difference here?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, I just -- this is a very delicate area in terms of the peace process in the Middle East and --

MS. THOMAS: What peace process?

Q Yeah, right.

MR. FITZWATER: Bill?

Q Merlin, this (inaudible due to voices in the front row) -- the substance of Mr. Carter's remarks.

MR. FITZWATER: I'm sorry, I didn't hear you.

Q Understanding that you all are disappointed that Mr. Carter made his remarks at all, that still leaves on the table the substance of what he said, the gist of which is apparently that the Reagan Administration is more likely to use either the threat or actual use of military force than diplomacy, and that's one of the reasons why the US doesn't appear to be much of a player in the Middle East at this point. Can you respond to the substance of what Carter said?

MR. FITZWATER: Yes, he's wrong. The administration has demonstrated a continuing diplomatic effort in the Middle East since the beginning of the administration. I only wish I had the numbers to tell you the amount of times and

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the number 1300 and various illegible scribbles.

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trips and time spent by Richard Murphy in traveling in the Middle East, in conferring with the countries of the Middle East in attempting to keep the peace process moving. I was in the Middle East with the Vice President, where he spent five days recently, working in the same kinds of consultations. Secretary Shultz has, as well. It simply is not true that this administration has neglected diplomatic channels in the Middle East. Indeed, we have been intimately involved for months and years, and the State Department, I'm sure, can document that for you in great detail.

MR. DONALDSON: Have you gained in the Mideast peace process during the time of the Reagan presidency?

MS. THOMAS: Any successes?

MR. DONALDSON: I won't limit it to the last year.

MR. FITZWATER: I think that when you talk about the peace process in the Middle East, you talk about gains that come in inches and not miles, and there have been a lot of gains. There have also been setbacks.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, Carter had gains that came in miles. We had a peace treaty under Jimmy Carter between Israel and Egypt. What can you say about Ronald Reagan?

MR. FITZWATER: And I certainly don't try to diminish those gains or to detract from them in any way.

Q What is any gain that you can point to in the Middle East peace process since Ronald Reagan's been President?

MR. FITZWATER: Certainly, there have been a number of gains in terms of the relationships -- the attempts, for example, by King Hussein to establish a dialogue. It later fell through, but, nevertheless, it's like the entire history of peace in the Middle East. You move forward a little, you fall back some. But the point is ---

Q But wait a minute. Sam is right. There was a measurable gain. There was the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel under Jimmy Carter.

MR. FITZWATER: Exactly. So what's wrong with that? I congratulate them on that. That's outstanding. I don't mean to detract from that in any way. I'm simply saying, it is not right to say that we have not been pursuing the peace process in the Middle East. We have.

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Q I think the question is, although you are willing to admit that there was a significant gain in the previous administration, we keep asking you to point out something that's a solid gain that's still in place in this administration.

MR. FITZWATER: I just said -- I just told you the gains are small and there are setbacks. And the point is, we keep trying. I didn't suggest there had been any breakthroughs -- there haven't been. Frank?

GP →

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אל: מנכ"ל מדיני, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ח

דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהביט לתקשורת, מזכיר הממשלה
ר/אמו, ע/ראש אמן למחקר

דרא"פ - החלטת הקבינט - תגובות בעתונות

להלן מדגם מהעתונות המרכזית.

יוסי
יוסי גל

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Israelis to end arms trade with S. Africa

By Peter Youngusband
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

CAPE TOWN, South Africa — Israel's decision to halt arms supplies to South Africa was received without government comment yesterday, leading to speculation that both sides had a special "arrangement" to make the cutoff as painless as possible.

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir appeared to leave loopholes when he spoke of a "gradual reduction" of ties with South Africa and no signing of new military contracts, indicating that old ones might still be honored.

Observers noted that there has been a flurry of visits here by high-ranking Israeli military personnel and government officials before the announcement. And they attached particular significance to Pretoria's noncommittal reaction.

The bonds between Israel and South Africa have always been close, ever since South Africa's deciding vote at the United Nations for Israeli statehood. Since then, the bond has been strengthened by the similarity of their situations.

Both countries are surrounded by hostile states and periodically subjected to boycotts and sanctions. Israel also receives financial support from South Africa's 120,000-strong Jewish community — second only to that it receives from American Jews.

Both countries are interested in the same kind of weaponry, and there has been a high level of shared military knowledge.

Israel supplied South Africa with spare parts for its Mirage jet fighters and blueprints for building its own Mirages after France joined the world arms embargo against this country. Its Reshev gunboats served as a prototype for the modernization of South Africa's coastal navy, armed with Israeli Gabriel missiles.

South Africa now manufactures a vast



Foreign Minister Shimon Peres announces that Israel will impose limited sanctions on South Africa, banning new military sales to Pretoria.

amount of military equipment initially bought from Israel. The latest South African fighter jet, the Cheetah, is a refined model of the Mirage, combining aspects of French and Israeli modernization.

There has also been recurring speculation that the two countries shared information and technology in the production of nuclear weapons, and that Israeli nuclear weapons have been tested off the South African coast.

Israeli government figures show \$250 million worth of trade with South Africa in 1985, the last year for which such figures are available, although arms deals are kept secret.

Aharon Klieman, a military analyst at Tel Aviv university, said in an interview that damage to the Israeli arms industry would be considerable if sanctions were applied against South Africa. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has pointed out that sanctions against South Africa would adversely affect some Israeli firms, including arms manufacturers.

In one emotional debate in the Israeli parliament, Elisha Lankin, former am-

bassador to Pretoria, argued that sanctions could provoke a wave of anti-Semitism in South Africa.

"We should weigh what our interests are," he said. "First, we should think of the Jewish community — 120,000 Jews are more important than black African nations. Sanctions do not solve any problems."

The decision for Israeli leaders was a difficult one. But, in the end, Israel's dependence on American aid and weapons won out. As Harry Schwarz, defense spokesman for South Africa's Progressive Federal Party and himself a Jew, commented yesterday: "Sympathy must be had for Israel's position. Her dependence on the United States is clearly paramount."

South Africa, however, has virtually achieved self-sufficiency in arms production — with foreign help — despite a "mandatory" arms embargo imposed by the United Nations in 1977. And it has many years of experience in under-the-table dealings, not only with its friends but also with its enemies in black Africa.

Israel Downgrades Ties to South Africa, Apparently in Response to U.S. Pressure

By YURAM KESSEL

Special to THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

JERUSALEM—Israel said it will downgrade its ties, especially military, with South Africa, apparently in response to U.S. demands that it review its policy toward Pretoria.

The lower-profile policy, which includes a promise not to conclude any fresh defense contracts and to reduce cultural and tourism links, was decided Wednesday night by the inner cabinet of 10 senior Israeli ministers and confirmed yesterday in the Knesset, Israel's parliament, by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. The policy switch appears motivated more by a desire to placate Washington than a belief that it will help end white domination in South Africa.

"We shall gradually reduce our relationship with South Africa following policies that other democratic countries pursue," Mr. Peres said in speech. He stressed that while Israel unreservedly condemned racism in South Africa, it could "not lead and we are not going to lead a world policy toward South Africa. At the same time we are not going to remain outside of a world policy as it is formulated by [democratic] countries."

Israeli leaders apparently recognize that their previous statements denouncing apartheid on moral grounds no longer suffice and that the receipt of valuable military aid from the U.S. could be in jeopardy because of a State Department report, due April 1, that is expected to name Israel as a major exporter of weapons to South Africa. That would put Israel on the spot: under terms of the congressional Anti-Apartheid Act of October 1986, countries that sell weapons to South Africa stand to forfeit U.S. aid.

Israel, the largest recipient of U.S. aid, receives \$1.5 billion in military assistance out of an overall annual military aid package of \$3 billion. "We have taken U.S. opinion into account," Mr. Peres told the Knesset.



Shimon Peres

Price Too High

"We simply cannot afford the risk of another wrangle with Washington at this time," one official said in an indirect reference to the strained relations over the Iran-arms scandal, in which Israel played a part, and the recent sentencing of U.S. Navy intelligence analyst Jonathan Jay Pollard as an Israeli spy.

Officials in Pretoria hadn't any official comment on the Israeli move, but politicians and commentators said it was understandable, given U.S. pressure on Jerusalem. "Israel, like South Africa has been among the pariah nations... and whatever military link was forged between the countries was because of this," the pro-government Citizen newspaper commented in an editorial. "It is vitally important for both South Africa and Israel that they are not estranged from each other because of U.S. blackmail." Because South Africa produces 90% of its own weapons, Pretoria officials seemed more concerned about a cutoff of nonmilitary Israeli goods than arms, analysts said.

Before Wednesday night's decision, Foreign Minister Peres had been pushing for Israel to fall into line with Western European states, but both other members of the governing triumvirate—Prime Minister Yitshak Shamir and Defense Minister Yitshak Rabin—had argued firmly against a major shift.

Mr. Shamir argued that while Israel condemned apartheid vigorously on moral grounds, it couldn't afford to neglect the interests of South Africa's 115,000 Jews, always close friends of Israel. (The Citizen, in its editorial, noted that South Africa was one of the first countries to recognize Israel and that the South African Jewish community had been allowed to maintain financial ties with Israel despite South Africa's stringent control over foreign investments.)

Defense Industry Lobby

Mr. Rabin had been swayed by the arguments of a powerful defense-industry lobby, which maintained that thousands of jobs could be lost if defense contracts were summarily curtailed. Needing to make its home-based arms industry economically viable, Israel has long adopted the approach of selling arms to any government that wanted them. Consequently, arms exports amount to more than \$1 billion annually.

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But Mr. Rabin and Mr. Shamir lined up with Mr. Peres in Wednesday night's decision, with only Ariel Sharon, the former defense minister and currently industry and trade minister, arguing against sanctions. "American attitudes, especially given the mood in wake of the Pollard sentencing, weighed heavily with both Shamir and Rabin" one cabinet source observed.

The new policy isn't clearly delineated. It stipulates that no new defense contract will be signed. But Mr. Peres refused to respond to reporters' questions on how long existing arms-export contracts with South Africa will run.

Military censorship precludes mention of the precise amounts involved in such defense contracts or what they involve. But foreign estimates say that existing arms contracts with South Africa are worth between \$200 million and \$500 million annually and involve the transfer of technology more than weapons. In the Knesset, Mr. Peres rejected as "baseless slanders" a claim by a Communist member about alleged Israel-South African cooperation in the production of nuclear weapons.

The government also wouldn't elaborate on any other sanctions that will be instituted. But officials say they probably will involve limiting trading, cultural and scientific ties.

An important element of the trade relationship is coal. Israel imports \$112 million worth of South African coal annually for its electricity-generating plants. But Mr. Peres said coal from China could be substituted for the South African coal.

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Israel Pledges to Reduce Military Ties to South Africa

By Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, March 19—Israel admitted today for the first time that it has significant military ties to South Africa in defiance of the U.N. arms embargo and it pledged to reduce them gradually by not entering into new military pacts with the white-ruled government there.

But the decision, announced after two long sessions of the 10-member inner Cabinet yesterday, will not affect existing military pacts between the two nations, officials said.

The move was designed to deflect pressure coming from the U.S. Congress and American Jewish organizations, and specifically from a State Department report to Congress due April 1 that is expected

to outline the military relationship between Pretoria and Jerusalem that has long been an open secret despite repeated Israeli denials.

Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who announced the pledge in parliament this afternoon, also said a government committee would review other economic, cultural and diplomatic ties with South Africa over the next two months in an effort to bring Israel's policies in line with those of the United States and Western Europe, which have imposed limited trade, diplomatic and travel sanctions on Pretoria.

[In Washington, State Department spokesman Charles Redman said, "We welcome this step as a positive development." The Associated Press reported.]

Israeli officials would not say how many military pacts there are between the two countries or when they expire, although one estimated that it could take at least four years for the contracts to lapse.

"We're not playing games," said a senior official, speaking not for attribution. "We have long-term contracts that affect many factories and many workers and their families, and we've decided that when these are going to end, we will not renew them. When do they lapse? I have no idea, but it won't happen overnight."

Other sources here contend that the government has not made a firm commitment, but wants to gauge Washington's response to today's announcement and the April report before making a final decision on how extensive its sanctions should be.

Peres accompanied his announcement with a strong denunciation of South Africa's apartheid system, which he characterized as "a policy totally rejected by all human beings."

Israel, Peres earlier told a conference of American Jewish leaders, is "not a global force. We cannot impose and we are not going to impose, we cannot lead and we are not going to lead a world policy toward South Africa. Yet we are not going to remain outside of a world policy as it is formulated by free countries."

Under U.S. legislation enacted last year, countries that sell arms to South Africa in violation of the 1977 embargo could face a cutoff in American military aid. Israel, which gets \$1.8 billion annually, is the world's largest recipient of such aid. The State Department report is required under the legislation.

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Few here expect that Congress would cut aid to Israel because of South Africa, and an earlier campaign to push it toward adopting trade sanctions similar to those passed by Congress failed. But the scandal involving former U.S. Navy intelligence analyst Jonathan Jay Pollard's spying for Israel has made leaders here uneasy about defying Washington and ignoring American Jewish leaders, who have warned that apartheid is a volatile issue in the United States and that Israel would be wrong to dismiss the possible impact of the April 1 report.

As a result, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin reportedly reversed their previous stances against any sanctions and agreed to the limited commitment outlined today. They joined Peres to overcome reservations expressed by three former defense ministers, Ariel Sharon, Moshe Arens and Ezer Weizman, all of whom have argued privately that Israel's links to South Africa are too important to be abandoned.

"The key here is the enormous general nervousness surrounding the Pollard affair," said Michael Wade, an associate professor of African studies at Hebrew University and a critic of apartheid who emigrated from South Africa two decades ago. "If it wasn't for Pollard, this whole thing would have been a lot less substantive. As it is, it's a small opportunity but the best we're likely to get under this government."

Government sources have confirmed that Rabin went to South Africa in January to warn the Pretoria government that Israel would be compelled to take a tougher public stance. These sources have confirmed that every Israeli defense minister in recent years, including

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Sharon, Arens, Weizman and Rabin, have made secret visits to South Africa to discuss arms sales and promote Israeli defense products.

Israel has never disclosed the extent of its arms trade with Pretoria, although published reports have put it between \$50 million and \$125 million annually—as much as 10 percent of Israel's annual arms exports. Much of the trade dates back to 1976, when South African prime minister John Vorster visited Israel at the invitation of then-prime minister Rabin and defense minister Peres and reportedly signed a strategic cooperation pact.

In recent years South Africa reportedly has helped fund development of new Israeli weapons systems and has received in return licenses to produce those systems in South Africa. Such items as Uzi submachine guns, Galil assault rifles, guided-missile boats, radar and communications systems and the new Cheetah reconnaissance jet are said to be produced in South Africa under the agreements.

Israeli leaders privately have justified this trade on several grounds: protection for the 100,000-member South African Jewish community, development of export markets for Israel's costly and extensive defense industry and Israel's traditional opposition to international embargoes as a result of its own vulnerability and status as an outcast at the United Nations and other Third World-led forums.

"Before we decide on sanctions we should think it through and hold a discussion," Weizman was quoted



ASSOCIATED PRESS

Shimon Peres addresses Israel's parliament on the South African issue.

in the daily Yedioth Aharonoth as saying today.

Unlike Israel, which has played down the relations, South Africa regularly boasts of the strong ties. Last July, just weeks after Pretoria imposed a state of emergency, a senior economic team from Israel's Finance Ministry visited South Africa to renew commercial trade agreements and a pact that has allowed South African Jews to export millions of dollars to Israel. Israeli officials said the South Africans had threatened to let the agreements lapse unless the mission took place.

In parliament following his an-

nouncement, Peres defended Israel's reliance on military exports, telling left-wing opponents, "Your fine words will not protect us against embargoes or maintain our security." He denied that Israel has aided South Africa in developing nuclear weapons technology.

The committee to review Israel's ties with South Africa will consist of representatives of the prime minister's office and foreign and defense ministries, including Yossi Beilin, Peres' top aide and a supporter of sanctions, and Yosef Ben Aharon, Shamir's senior aide, a strong critic of such measures.

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Israel Parliament Hears Plan on Pretoria

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, March 19 — Foreign Minister Shimon Peres formally presented to Parliament today the Cabinet's decision to bar any new military sales contracts with South Africa and generally to reduce ties with Pretoria.

In his appearance in Parliament, Mr. Peres became involved in a raucous shouting match with critics of the Cabinet decision. At one point the debate degenerated into a heated argument between left-wing and right-wing members over which was worse, the South African Government or Stalin's.

In general, the Cabinet decisions, reached Wednesday, received a mixed reception from Israeli experts on South Africa and members of Parliament.

Some leftist anti-apartheid campaigners said it was nothing more than a fig leaf to pacify the United States Congress. They said the moves would still allow Israel to covertly continue military sales to South Africa on basically the same terms as before because the Government announced no date to end such top-secret arms contracts.

Government Called Irresponsible

Other legislators complained that the Government had been irresponsible for not taking more serious steps sooner. They said that once again it had required a near crisis with Congress for Israel to act.

Supporters of the plan countered that Israel's relations with South Africa had been blown out of proportion and that the new steps were meaningful. They said the actions were in line with the real level of contacts and would be the first step in a new relationship between the two nations.

Mr. Peres said in Parliament that the Cabinet plan had four main points: banning new military sales contracts with South Africa, condemning apartheid, reducing to a minimum cultural and tourist ties and appointing a team of officials to work out a detailed list of potential economic sanctions in line with those of other Western nations.

"Israel is not fighting the whites or the blacks," Mr. Peres said. "Israel fights discrimination. Our enemy is not

people. Our enemy is an immoral policy called apartheid."

The mass circulation, right-of-center newspaper Yedioth Aharonoth hailed the plan as "a milestone," which signaled "to the Congress that henceforth our relations with South Africa would no longer be the same."

Directed at U.S. Congress

Senior Israeli officials were blunt in indicating that this plan was directed first and foremost at the United States Congress, not South Africa. In devising it, the Cabinet was seeking a delicate balance of interests: the minimum amount of Israeli sanctions on South Africa, with the minimum negative effect on Israel's military exports, in return for the maximum impact on Congress and American Jews.

On April 1, President Reagan must submit to Congress a report prepared by the State Department regarding nations receiving American aid that also sell arms to South Africa, with a view to ending American military assistance to those nations.

Israel last year received \$1.8 billion in American military aid. According to unofficial estimates, Israeli military industries earned anywhere from \$400 million to \$800 million last year from the export of military equipment and know-how to South Africa. The exact sales figure and weapons involved are secrets subject to military censorship.

Mr. Peres said it was natural for the Cabinet to consider the feelings of the United States in its decision, since the United States does the same for Israel.

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Israel reportedly to halt Pretoria arms dealings

United Press International

Boston Globe

JERUSALEM - The government decided yesterday to sign no more weapons deals with South Africa, Israeli radio said. The move apparently was an effort to avoid possible US aid cuts and to repair US-Israeli ties in the aftermath of the Pollard spy scandal.

Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was scheduled to announce the decision this morning in a speech to the Knesset, Israel's parliament, officials said.

The decision followed US pressure to impose sanctions on South Africa and appeared to reflect a desire to head off any further deterioration in US-Israeli relations because of the case of Jonathan Pollard, an American Jew sentenced to life in prison March 4 for spying against the United States for Israel.

A senior political official, who spoke on the condition that he not be identified, said government ministers agreed "in principle to

An Israeli commission yesterday began its confidential inquiry into the Pollard espionage case. Page 4.

reduce the relationship with South Africa." But he did not specify what action Israel will take.

Israel's state-owned radio reported that the inner Cabinet had agreed to sign "no more military contracts" with South Africa.

The radio said Israel's cultural and educational links to South Africa, which has a large Jewish community, would be studied over the next two months by a committee of Israeli leaders.

The Inner Cabinet - the 10 most influential government ministers - met twice yesterday in anticipation of a US report expected to name Israel as a principal supplier of military hardware to the South African government, Israeli radio said.

Israel bows to pressure; limits S. African trade

JERUSALEM [AP]—Foreign Minister Shimon Peres said Thursday Israel will impose limited sanctions on South Africa for the first time by banning new military sales contracts with its white-controlled government.

The decision was made Wednesday night by a 10-member cabinet forum in anticipation of the April 1 release of a U.S. government report that is expected to list Israel as one of Pretoria's five top weapons traders.

Israel feared the report would strain relations with Washington and lead to pressure for a cutoff in U.S. military aid.

Peres' remarks to 65 American Jewish leaders were the first official confirmation of the cabinet decision, which was reported by state television Wednesday night.

"We shall not sign in the future any more contracts in the domain of defense with South Africa and we shall gradually reduce our relations with South

Israel will question diplomats who refused testimony in the Pollard spy probe. Page 5.

Africa," Peres said.

Peres refused to elaborate on the sanctions, but government officials said Israel also would curb trade, cultural and scientific contacts with Pretoria and set up a panel to formulate a new policy toward South Africa within two months.

The measures are subject to approval by the full 25-member cabinet, which meets Sunday and is all but certain to give approval.

The measures were backed by Peres and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, but Ariel Sharon of Shamir's right-wing Likud bloc voted against them, the Israeli media said.

Although new military trade contracts would not be signed,

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Chic Trib

the measures are unlikely to nullify existing contracts, the officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Israel has a billion-dollar-a-year arms export business, but keeps its trading partners and size of its arms sales closely guarded secrets. Sources in Jerusalem say Israeli sales to South Africa are mostly light arms.

Foreign newspapers also have reported cooperation between the two countries on nuclear tests, but Israeli officials deny it.

The United Nations Security Council approved an international embargo on arms sales to South Africa in 1977. Since then, South Africa has expanded its weapons production and is estimated to manufacture about 90 percent of its own arms needs as well as exporting weapons.

The United States bans sales of American arms to South Africa.

Israel has condemned South Africa's apartheid police of racial segregation in the past but has balked at imposing sanctions, largely out of concern for that na-

tion's 120,000-member Jewish community, which strongly supports Israel.

Peres made an oblique reference to these Jewish pressures in his 35-minute speech, saying: "Israel is looking for ways to be part and parcel of the democratic world. The transition is not so simple."

Israel is "not fighting a people or a country. We are fighting a totally rejected policy by anybody who believes all human beings were created equal," Peres said. "Our enemies are not the white people in South Africa or the black people ... our enemy is apartheid."

"We cannot lead and are not going to lead a world policy toward South Africa. Yet we are not going to remain outside of a world policy as it will be formulated by these countries," Peres added in his speech to the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act adopted by the U.S. Congress last year says nations that sell weapons to South Africa could lose U.S. military aid. The act requires a report listing those nations be published by April 1.

Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid and will receive about \$1.3 billion in military assistance this year.

Chicago Tribune (APPS 104-100)

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Balt Sun
Israel moves to reduce ties,
end arms sales to Pretoria

From Wire Reports

JERUSALEM — Israel has decided not to sign new defense contracts with South Africa and to reduce ties with Pretoria because of its policy of racial discrimination, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres said yesterday.

Mr. Peres said in Parliament that the Cabinet plan had four main points: banning new military sales contracts with South Africa, condemning apartheid, reducing to a minimum cultural and tourist ties, and appointing a team of officials to work out a detailed list of potential economic sanctions in line with

those of other Western nations within two months.

In announcing the decision of the 10-man Inner Cabinet, Mr. Peres said Israel had to take into account the opinion of the United States, its chief supplier of military aid.

Israel was under no pressure from Washington, he said, but "We certainly do have to take into account the opinion of the United States. Do you know why? Because it shows more consideration for us today than anybody else."

A new U.S. law has authorized

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Congress to cut military aid to countries that maintain military ties with South Africa.

"Israel is not fighting the whites or blacks," Mr. Peres said. "Israel fights discrimination. Our enemy is not people. Our enemy is an immoral policy called apartheid."

The sanctions fail to end existing weapons contracts or to cut off all trade. However, Foreign Ministry officials have said that Israel has signed no new military contracts with South Africa since 1977.

Israel does not discuss weapons sales, and it was not known how long existing contracts run or what kind of licensing arrangements Israel has with South Africa for the manufacture of Israeli-designed

weapons.

Mr. Peres refused to answer questions from reporters on the length of current contracts or to disclose their value.

Press reports estimate the value of existing military contracts with South Africa at between \$200 million and \$500 million a year, most involving the transfer of technology rather than weapons.

Visiting American Jewish leaders this week have warned Mr. Peres and other Israeli leaders against further damaging relations with Washington over South Africa.

However, Yossi Beilin, director-general of the Foreign Ministry, said Israel's decision was not prompted by a pending U.S. report that is expected to list Israel as one of the top five weapons dealers with South Af-

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rica. Instead, he said, the move was "a result of a change that took place in South Africa in June 1966, when its government declared emergency rule."

The Israeli decision followed months of argument in the Cabinet, with Mr. Peres pushing for action that would align Israel with the major Western states.

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir repeatedly said he opposed sanctions, while former defense ministers from both ends of the Israeli political spectrum said cutting ties would cause grievous damage to Israel's arms industries.

Israeli leaders had condemned apartheid as racist many times in the past, but officials said the Jewish state was reluctant to take any steps that could prompt a backlash

against South Africa's estimated 115,000 Jews.

Julius Weinstein, head of the South African Zionist Federation, told Israel Radio in an interview that he did not think Jewish South Africans would be affected by the decision.


"If Israel is forced in her own interest to take the action of sanctions . . . we will regret the action, but we will not in any way waver in our support," he said.

Israel also has hesitated to join Western moves against South Africa because of the Jewish state's own long experience of being the target of economic boycotts imposed by Arab states on companies trading with Israel. It has identified with South Africa as an isolated country in a troubled region.

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S. Africa's new Cheetah fighter jet: sign of Pretoria's success in shrugging off UN arms embargo

S. Africa-Israel ties strained

But Israeli arms curb unlikely to undermine Pretoria's military might

Jews of South Africa

Close or not, Pretoria's ties to Israel leave South Africa's strongly Zionist Jews open to criticism - from blacks as well as whites.

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Why Israel acted

By curbing arms sales to Pretoria, Israel aims to head off another crisis with the US. Pollard and the Iran deal have caused trouble enough.

Page 9

By Ned Temko
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Johannesburg

There is less than meets the eye to Israel's decision yesterday to curb defense contracts with South Africa.

Politically, the policy shift by Israel, one of the few countries still on unabashedly good terms with South Africa, can only worry Pretoria. This is not so much for what the announcement implies about Israeli-South African ties as for what it says about the depth of the swerve in American public opinion against the government here.

The Israeli decision came only 10 days before an expected move by Washington - on which Israel depends for hundreds of millions of dollars in aid - to press for such a step.

According to reports from Jerusalem, Israel's 10-member "in-

ner Cabinet" also decided generally to reduce links with South Africa and to set up a committee to begin a two-month investigation of possible further steps in that direction.

But in practical terms, the initial Israeli move is unlikely to have much effect.

For one thing, arms embargoes have a funny way of sprouting holes. Since November 1977, South Africa has been subject to a mandatory world arms embargo voted by the UN Security Council. Still, military hardware and arms technology have seeped through - and not only from Israel. There is big money for private businessmen in selling weapons and weapons secrets, anywhere, anytime.

There are other factors, say Israeli and local analysts here, likely to minimize any early ef-

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fect from the Cabinet move in Jerusalem.

Responding to the 1977 Security Council action, South Africa has moved energetically to develop its domestic defense industry.

Under a state-controlled umbrella known as Armscor, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa, a network of specialized companies has achieved something very close to self-sufficiency for South Africa in the production of most types of hardware.

Although official figures are unavailable, neither Armscor nor the government has made much effort to hide the fact that South Africa has become a major arms exporter.

Though it is impossible to say whether South Africa has actually manufactured nuclear weaponry - a closely guarded national-security secret - Pretoria has

possessed, at least since April 1981, the capability of producing weapons-grade uranium.

By now, South Africa theoretically could have manufactured a "slowly expanding nuclear arsenal of perhaps 15 atomic weapons," according to the newest edition of "Going Nuclear," Carnegie Endowment expert Leonard Spector's annual survey of the world nuclear balance.

In the conventional arena, the South Africans' latest achievement, unveiled last July, has been to upgrade its aging force of French-design Mirage IIIa fighter aircraft with state-of-the-art guidance systems and weaponry. The revamped craft, dubbed the Cheetah, is cited by officials as a sign of South Africa's success in shrugging off the 1977 arms sanctions.

Some of South Africa's black neighbor-states have been amassing upgraded arsenals of their own. Angola, for instance, is said to have received MIG-21 and MIG-23

fighters from Moscow. Still, in the near term, South Africa seems in no danger of forfeiting its huge edge in the regional balance of power.

Further Israeli steps could have more-serious effects. The most visible sign of Israeli-South African military links is the sight of compact Uzi submachine guns slung across the shoulders of South African soldiers. But the most important Israeli-South African link, say nongovernment analysts here, involves computer-age technology. Still, even if a curb on computer dealings and the exchange of military know-how were announced, few analysts expect that it would stem considerable nongovernment contacts in this area.

Some analysts, moreover, see the Israeli fanfare over banning future government defense deals with Pretoria as a move to deflect political pressure from the Americans. If successful in this, they reason, Israel might well inch away from

any determined break with South Africa during the eight weeks that the Cabinet committee has to chart possible further moves. This interim might also see a gradual lessening in fallout from the recent sentencing of Jonathan Pollard, a United States citizen caught spying on the US for Israel.

The US State Department responds: Spokesman Charles Redman welcomed the move as a "positive development."

He declined to say whether the United States had any direct role in the Israeli decision, but did say the US had discussed the issue with the Israeli government "on several occasions."

The State Department spokesman also declined to comment on whether there has ever been any "leakage" to South Africa of US arms supplied to Israel. The US has supported the arms embargo that was imposed on South Africa by the UN in 1977.

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FRIDAY, MARCH 20, 1987

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

INTERNATIONAL

Israel moves to avert new crisis with US

Curb on arms sales to South Africa preempts US criticism

By Joel Greenberg
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Jerusalem

Israel has moved to head off another crisis with the United States by announcing a revision of its policy toward South Africa.


Foreign Minister Shimon Peres told the Israeli parliament yesterday that the government had decided to sign no new defense contracts with Pretoria and would reduce overall ties with the South African government. Mr. Peres said a committee had been appointed to recommend a new policy toward South Africa, in line with those of Western nations which are critical of Pretoria's policy of racial segregation. Peres reiterated Israel's "uncompromising condemnation" of apartheid.

The announcement was timed to precede a US State Department report on countries that maintain military ties with South Africa. The report is to be submitted to Congress April 1 and Israel is expected to be prominent among countries named in the report. These nations are expected to be the targets of cuts in US military aid on grounds of violating a 1977 UN embargo on weapons shipments to South Africa, and contradicting the US's adoption of sanctions against Pretoria last year. The US currently gives Israel some \$1.8 billion in military assistance.

The Israeli move was clearly aimed at deflecting expected US pressure on Israel after April 1 to cut its military links with South Africa. The government has already been stung by American outrage over the Pollard spy case and over Israel's role in the Iran arms deal, and is anxious to avoid a further strain in relations, analysts say.

However, the Cabinet decision also reflects a gradual reassessment of Israeli policy toward South Africa, which has paralleled Western and US moves to impose sanctions.

The move to revise relations with South Africa was not easy for the Cabinet which met all day Wednes-



S. African military officer armed with Israeli-made Uzi submachine gun

day before coming to a decision.

The ministers wrestled with long-standing arguments favoring Israel's economic, military, and cultural ties with South Africa. The arguments were rejected under the threat of US pressure, but they have also been undermined by changing political and economic realities.

Concern for South Africa's 120,000-strong Jewish community has traditionally been presented by officials here as a chief reason for Israeli relations with Pretoria. Both Peres and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir this week restated their concern that a break with South Africa

could have a negative effect on a Jewish community which contributes heavily to Israel and is a reservoir of future immigration.

However, observers say, it is precisely Israel's military ties with South Africa that are a source of unease for many South African Jews, especially those actively opposed to apartheid.

"Who is to say that military aid to South Africa is what the Jews there want?," asks Hebrew University's Gideon Shimoni, who has written a study of South African Jewry. "South African Jews are opposed to blanket sanctions, but are privately ashamed and disgusted at Israel's military assistance to [Pretoria]."

Dr. Shimoni said concern for South African Jews was overemphasized by Israeli leaders, who were, in fact, motivated more by economic and political interests to maintain ties to Pretoria.

Israel's military ties with South Africa have been depicted by officials as providing an export outlet that is vital for Israel's military industries. However, the relatively modest scope of such ties and their growing political costs have increasingly tipped the scales against maintaining such contacts. Though foreign arms directories name South Africa as Israel's main arms purchaser in the 1970s, it now reportedly lags behind the US, European nations, and South America in total value of arms purchased. South African defense imports from Israel are far lower than such transfers from other Western nations.

Israeli officials are tight-lipped over the extent and nature of Israeli defense aid to South Africa. However, foreign reports say the assistance has changed from outright weapons transfers to assistance in such fields as security and military technology, communications systems, supply of spare parts, coproduction of military hardware, and cooperation in research and develop-

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ment. Though Israel supplied South Africa with gunboats in 1976, Peres denied that Israel currently supplied it with airplanes or tanks.

South Africa's dependence on Israeli arms has also been reduced by a burgeoning local defense industry which, published reports say, has made South Africa a net exporter of arms.

Israel's civilian trade ties with South Africa - mostly joint economic ventures and imports of raw materials - are relatively small. They are estimated at only 1 percent of Israel's exports and 2 percent of imports.

The political cost of maintaining these ties is becoming increasingly prohibitive for Israel. Israel originally protested the 1977 UN resolution imposing an arms embargo on South Africa but has since promised to abide by it. There has been no concrete evidence of Israeli arms shipments to South Africa since 1977.

The recent restoration of ties with Israel by a number of black African states has made Israel's relations with Pretoria a growing diplomatic risk in the continent.

Observers say US pressure and the slow undermining of material and political gains for Israel from relations with South Africa is pushing the government increasingly toward reducing the scope of ties with Pretoria.

A growing moral concern in Israel is expected to encourage this trend. Parliament member Yair Tzaban said yesterday that the Jewish state, whose people were "the worst victims of racism" throughout history, could ill-afford to maintain cozy ties to South Africa's apartheid regime.

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When ties are close, South African Jews are embarrassed by Israel's connection with a government seen as racist. When ties are strained, Pretoria views pro-Israeli sentiments as disloyalty.

Close or not, Pretoria's ties to Israel touchy for S. Africa Jews

By Patrick Laurence
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Johannesburg

Israel's decision not to sign any new military contracts with South Africa highlights the traditionally awkward situation of South African Jews.

Whether relations between Israel and South Africa are friendly or strained, they leave this country's strongly Zionist, 120,000 Jews open to criticism.

When Israeli-South African ties are conspicuously close, as in the past decade, the Jewish community here is embarrassed by Israel's connection with a government seen as racist. When ties are strained, Pretoria's white, mainly Afrikaner rulers view pro-Israeli sentiments among Jews here as disloyalty.

The Israeli decision, announced yesterday in Jerusalem, comes only days before the April 1 release of a United States government report that was expected to list Israel as one of Pretoria's top five weapons traders. Under a US act adopted last year, nations that sell weapons to South Africa could lose US military aid.

Anti-Semitism per se is no longer part of mainstream Afrikaner thinking, but hostility toward Jews can surface. At the UN in the early 1960s, Israel denounced apartheid as "reprehensible and repugnant to the dignity and rights of peoples and individuals." Then-South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd rescinded special concessions that allowed Jews to transfer money to Israel.

The South African Jewish Board of Deputies, seen as the Jews' "central representative institution," conducted a survey on anti-Semitism last July. The board expressed concern about anti-Semitism in ultra-rightist Afrikaner circles. The survey said that the Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party) questions the loyalty of South Africa's Jews to Pretoria and "denies the truth of the Holocaust . . ."

And the Afrikaner Resistance Movement, the survey said, attacks parliamentary democracy as a "British-Jewish system designed to weaken the Afrikaner people by dividing them against one another."

The report also noted "increased expressions" of anti-Semitism among those blacks who associate Israel - and through it, Zionism - with apartheid. Noting that the multiracial United Democratic Front had not taken a specific stand on Jews, it said that the group had "shied away from formal contact with the organized Jewish community [and demands] denunciation of Zionism as a precondition for such contact."

In the black Azanian People's Organization, the survey said, "anti-Zionism is accompanied by anti-Semitism" because "Jews are perceived as an integral part of the ruling white minority." In fact, many South African Jews are prominent foes of the ruling National Party, which opposed South Africa's decision to fight against Nazi Germany in World War II.

Some South African Jews have criticized the Board of Deputies for not being critical enough of the government nor vigorous enough in the quest for a just society. The emergence in 1985 of two strongly anti-apartheid Jewish organizations, Jews for Social Justice in Johannesburg and Jews for Justice in Cape Town, is seen as an indication of Jewish impatience with the board's approach.

Discussing the argument that close Israeli ties with South Africa guarantee the security of Jews here, Rabbi Selwyn Franklin of Jews for Justice said: "In the short term it might work to the interest of the Jewish community. But in the long term it would be unwise. It is important for Israel to be more circumspect."

This report was written in conformity with South Africa's press restrictions.

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Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Israel's South Africa Ties

With U.S.-Israeli relations at a dark point, the administration's April 1 report documenting Israel's military cooperation with South Africa could generate an unprecedented reduction in the annual \$3 billion U.S. aid program—one-third of all American assistance—despite Israel's pledge yesterday of no new contracts.

Even strong Israeli allies in Congress say privately that the report, described by one who has seen it as "devastating" and tough in draft form, might persuade the pro-Israel, anti-apartheid Democratic Congress to leverage Israel for an immediate, total arms cutoff by threatening the aid program. One reason, in addition to pressures on liberals by anti-apartheid constituents, is the pungent political fallout from the Jonathan Pollard spy scandal, which may have tainted Israel in the eyes of Americans.

But even if Israel's annual billions are approved unscathed—a more likely result than possible cuts—the unusual administration spotlight on Israel's semi-secret military deals with South Africa will keep beleaguered Israel on edge. A cut, if it comes, would most likely be predicated on Israel's profit

from its Pretoria arms trade, estimated at around \$400 million a year.

The energy that flashed that spotlight comes from a proviso that crept unwanted into the Senate's South Africa sanctions bill last fall. It demanded an administration report to Congress on all military relationships between South Africa and any recipient of U.S. military aid. Israel alone appears to qualify, though many other Western states, including France, sell weapons to Pretoria.

The study is anathema on Capitol Hill because it will pose a no-win political dilemma for liberals torn between their pro-Israel feelings and their alliance with pro-Israel constituencies, on one hand, and their hatred for apartheid, on the other. That is an emotion widely shared by voters.

Anti-sanctions conservatives have no such divided loyalties. Although apartheid-haters, they voted against sanctions for South Africa and view Israeli aid as a blessing for Pretoria. Their concern is geopolitical.

Exiling the apartheid regime from the West, they fear, would expose South Africa to Soviet scheming and penetration, which could risk the fu-

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ture of that country's unequalled mineral wealth and its control of essential oil waterways around the Cape.

Indeed, one ranking Republican senator on the Foreign Relations Committee says privately he is working up language that is "not too obvious" to allow Israel to continue its extensive arms and technology transfers to South Africa without risking any possible congressional sanction. An aid cut-off is not absolutely required under the new law.

But liberal Democrats who normally stand solidly with Israel on all counts are taking the aid-for-South Africa question with extreme seriousness. Reps. Stephen Solarz and Lawrence J. Smith, both members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, welcomed Israel's expected assurances that there will be no new military contracts with South Africa. But Smith told us that Democrats who voted to override President Reagan's veto of the sanctions bill have a special reason to see the law fully obeyed, and Solarz thinks there still may be an effort "to reduce aid."

The report due in 10 days is so sensitive that the White House cannot

decide whether the president himself should dignify it with his signature or let it be signed by a low-level State Department official. As first drafted, it makes chilling reading: it documents Israel's financial gain from military sales to South Africa, its transfers of technology, much of which originated in the first place in the United States, and its regular loans to South Africa of "skilled personnel," such as scientists and instructors.

Although Israel has long been suspected of sharing its nuclear weapons secrets with South Africa, the initial draft of the report is confined to conventional weapons and technology. Those who have studied the report say it makes clear that in commercial and financial terms, Israel gets far more out of its military relationship with South Africa than Pretoria does.

That benefit could continue because Foreign Minister Shimon Peres' pledge to ban new military sales does not nullify existing contracts, some of which could run for months or more. That is what concerns Capitol Hill liberals. From Israel today, they want performance, not just promises.

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מס' 03.87 תאריך

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טווי ביותר

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* חוזם: 3,11412

* אל: המשרד
* מ-: רוש, כר: 618, תא: 200387, זח: 1800, דח: מ, טג: טב
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* טווי ביותר/מיווי

* אל: רובינשטיין, מנכ"ל מדינה.

* פרשת איראן

* מדוברי מזכיר המדינה בנישתי אתמול, ברור שלא ויתרו
* על הדרישה למגוט האנשים שלנו אישית לצורכי החקירה.
* בהקשר זה, יעניין אתכם לדעת שהיום מתפרסמים כרטיס
* על תגובות החוקר המיוחד בפרשת DEAYER
* בהם יש התייחסות לתזכירים שהוגשו על ידי ממשלת קנדה.
* מודגש שתזכירים אלה אינם מספיקים ודרושה הופעה אישית
* של האנשים המעורבים. ממשלת קנדה מסרבת להענות בטענת
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* ויפנו שוב אלינו לבקש הופעה אישית של המעורבים
* בפרשה. נצטייר במסריעים להמשך החקירה - נן שכל הרצון
* הטוב שאנו מגלים לא יסויע לנו במיוחד. כדי להקדים
* תרופה למכה - ועל מנת למנוע מצב כנ"ל - נא לשקול
* אם לא רצוי כבר עכשו לנקוט בפעולת הסברה מתאימה גם
* אצל פיקרינג ובמקביל כאן.

* שבת שלום.

* ה. רוזנ==

* תפ: שהח, רהמ, הנכ, ממכנל, שהבט, טיובל, מצמא, מזכירה ממ שלה

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נד:א

בלמס/רגיל

בטחון נר:632

ניו יורק נר:113

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני/משה"ח, ממנכ"ל/משה"ח, מצמ"א/משה"ח
מע"ת/משה"חדע: יועץ רזה"ח לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, רמ"ח
קש"ח, ניו יורק, ר/אמ"נ, ע/ראמ"נ למחקר

תדרון דובר מחצ"ד ליום 20/03/87

Q. THE JERUSALEM POST HAS A STORY TODAY QUOTING SENATOR DAVID DURENBERGER AS SAYING THE UNITED STATES RECRUITED AN ISRAELI OFFICER TO SPY ON ISRAEL FOR THE UNITED STATES IN 1982 DURING THE LEBANON INVATION. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THAT ?

MR. REDMAN: NO, I DON'T. IN ANY CASE, STANDARD PRACTICE IS THAT WE DON'T COMMENT ON ANY KIND OF ALLEGED INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Q. IF I CAN GO BACK TO THE JERUSALEM POST STORY THE POINT OF THAT STORY WAS THAT THIS 82 SPYING INCIDENT WAS A DIRECT PRELUDE TO POLLARD AFFAIR AND THAT POLLARD WAS RECRUITED BY ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS IN DIRECT RETALIATION FOR WHAT THEY CONSIDERE D TO BE AMERICAN SPYING ON THEM. AND THAT THE

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

AMERICANS, I THINK THE QUOTE IN THE SOTRY WAS THAT THE AMERICANS HAD CHANGED THE RULES OF THE GAME SO WE RECRUITED POLLARD IN RETALIATION. ANY RESPONSE TO THAT ?

MR. REDMAN: MY ANSWER HAS TO BE THE SAME BECAUSE OF THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE QUESTION. THAT'S JUST A GROUND RULE I HAVE TO FOLLOW FROM THE PODIUM.

Q. CHUCK ? WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THE AMERICAN COMPANIES OPERATING IN SYRIA ? WHAT'S THEIR STATUS ? ARE THEY STILL OPERATING LIKE MARITON (?) OIL AND PEPTIN (?), SINCE THE MEASURES YOU'VE TAKEN AGAINST SYRIA ?

MR. REDMAN: I'LL HAVE TO TAKE A LOOK AND GET YOU AN UPDATED REPORT.

ITONUT==

תפ: שהח,רהמ,מנכ"ל,ממנכ"ל,מצמ"א,אביטל,מע"ת,הסברה,מזכ"ר/מרכז,
ממד,רט

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

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חוזם: 3,10740

אל: המשרד

מ-: לוסאנגלס, נר: 85, תא: 190387, זח: 0900, זח: מ, טג: ט

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אחראי

סודי / מיודי

נר 11 פר רוש בנמרז

אל: מצפ"א

דע: שגריר + ציר - וושינגטון

מאת: קונב"ל, לוסאנגלס

שוחחתי עם גיל גלייזר הניוודז עם ראש מטה הבית הלבן בייקר. גלייזר יתקשר לבייקר להמליץ שהנשיא, במסיבת עיתונאים מחר, יבהיר שממשלת ישראל הניחה דעתו שהמסעלת מולרד נעשתה שלא בסמכות רידיעת הורג המדיני, שממשלת ישראל החליטה על הקמת ועדה הברזקת כיצד דבר כזה יכול היה לקרות, שישראל היא נכס זיוני לארה"ב, ששיתוף הפעולה האינטראטגי בין שתי המדינות יימשך, ושאתרד שהפרשה, ע"י ניוטחה מעבר לכל שיעור, תעיב על יהסי ישראל- ארה"ב הנשענים על יסודות איתנים.

בנצור

תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, מצפא, בראון, טייבל, ר, מרנד, אמד

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK
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News Summary March 19, 1987

New York Headlines

Top story in the New York Times reports on Michael Deaver's indictment on perjury counts. Also on p. 1 of the Times: Israel has decided not to sign any new military sales contracts with Pretoria (see Press Reports); The CIA is providing the contras with precise information on civilian targets. The contras plan to destroy the targets in a spring offensive. Congressional panels have decided to merge their inquiries (see Press Reports); For now, the only weapon against AIDS is prevention; Foster Care in NY: A Nightmare for Some Children. Headline in Newsday deals with Deaver. Headline in the Daily News deals with the spread of AIDS. Top stories in the Wall Street Journal reports on a credit-card war which may be breaking out in the US.

Columns

NYT-Safire "Fruit of the Cactus" The Israeli military undermined democracy in Israel by forcing the Defense Minister to reward rather than punish the central figure in the so-called "rouge operation." For the first time, the relationship between Israelis and Jewish Americans has been put under stress. At this point, it might be a good idea for the rightly angered Americans to let the Israelis teach themselves how powerful and cleansing the voice of their own people can be. Israelis will find out who is responsible for the Pollard affair. In the course of these revelations the top leaders of the Israeli Gov't will put patriotism first and resign, getting out of politics for good. Labor and Likud will look to younger leaders not tainted by scandal to rejuvenate the system. Israel's leaders are not Israel. Only Israel's people are Israel. Aroused by the betrayal of their national morality, they will amaze themselves and strengthen their democracy in rising to their greatest peacetime challenge. (Cabled)

WSJ-Cockburn "Israel's Pollard Scandal: Arrogance, Not-'Dual Loyalty'" Israel has acted with careless arrogance because it had every reason to believe that its carelessness would remain unchecked and its arrogance unchallenged. All the talk about "dual loyalty," with that phrase's undoubted anti-Semitic resonance, is something of a red herring. Pollard went to prison for breaking the law, not for "dual loyalty." The depth of Israel's arrogance was well illustrated by Avineri's "Letter to an American Friend." The letter was the ultimate parody of the Zionist

אישור:

שם השולח: 19/3/87

19.3.87

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argument: The more Zionism messes you up (by recruiting Pollard and thus provoking charges of dual loyalty), the more this proves, says Avineri, that America is not the "promised land!" The Hebrew language newspapers have provided frank talk about this subject and others, such as candid acknowledgements of PLO peace overtures, all regarded as a matter best kept secret from the US public. (Cabled)

Press Reports

3 Told to Shun Pollard Panel

NYT-special--A lawyer for three Israelis in the Pollard spy case said he had advised them not to testify before a Gov't commission examining the affair. Libani told Yagur, Ravid and Erb not to appear because anything they said could be used against them later. (ND-wire)

Israel Will Curb Arms for Pretoria

NYT-Freidman-p.1 The Israeli Cabinet decided not to sign new military sales contracts with South Africa. The Cabinet acted in response to pressure from Congress and American Jews to curtail Israel's relations with Pretoria. In addition to the ban on new military sales, the Cabinet decided to limit further Israel's cultural, official and tourist relations with South Africa and to set up a committee to recommend possible areas for economic sanctions in line with steps adopted by other countries. Since all military contacts between Israel and South Africa are kept secret, it will be impossible to monitor Israel's compliance with the Cabinet decision. Peres is to present the new Israeli approach to parliament on Thursday. Officials made no attempt to hide that the decision was made to blunt criticism of Israel due to a report Reagan is to submit to Congress regarding those countries receiving US aid that are also selling arms to South Africa. Israeli officials had hoped that they would somehow be able to finesse Congress into overlooking the Israeli military relationship with South Africa in view of the fact that thousands of jobs in Israel's already troubled military industry were dependent on the trade. But since Pollard, Israeli leaders realized that they could not afford to risk another embarrassing confrontation with Washington. Virtually all ministers in the "inner Cabinet" agreed with Peres's outline. Sharon disagreed, arguing that Israel should stand up to the US pressure for reasons of national interest.

Israeli Deporting Brooklyn Fugitive

DN-Meisels--Israeli authorities have ordered that a Brooklyn man be deported back to the US within 30 days to face charges he sexually assaulted children while posing as a Hasidic rabbi and child psychologist. The Israelis ordered the deportation after receiving a letter from a social worker in the office of Brooklyn Assemblyman Dov Hikind alleging that Avorham Mondrowitz may have assaulted as many as 100 children and given some of them AIDS. Hikind's office would not confirm the AIDS allegations. Israel's ministry of Health had no record that Mondrowitz has AIDS or was checked for AIDS. DA Elizabeth Holtzman's office said Mondrowitz has been wanted since Dec. 1984 on two counts of sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of children. Holtzman's office began extradition proceedings in May 1985 when it found that he fled NY for Israel with his wife and 7 children. The social worker said she is treating 100 children who Mondrowitz is suspected of having abused. Of these, she claims, 28 have been found to have AIDS and 4 seem likely to have been infected by Mondrowitz. (NYP-Juffe)

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McFarlane Told of Saudi Offer to Aid Contras

NYT-Berke-In separate letters written to his lawyer and three members of Congress before his suicide attempt, McFarlane disclosed that Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to Washington had offered secret contributions in 1984 for the contras. McFarlane believes that the contributions of about \$25 million were actually made. Investigators are trying to determine whether the money and other funds found their way to a fund used by the CIA or intelligence services in Saudi Arabia or Israel, according to an unmaned source cited by the Washington Post.

Captive Saudi Diplomat Freed in Beirut

NYT-Hijazi-A Saudi diplomat kidnapped in West Beirut 66 days ago was freed 24-hours after a pro-Iranian organization said it would delay a death sentence for a French hostage for one week. No one claimed responsibility for the diplomat's kidnapping, and the circumstances of his release and who held him were not disclosed at a news conference which included Nahib Berri and Brig. Gen. Kannaan, the chief of Syrian military intelligence.

Iran Trade Shift Seen

NYT-Sanger-Two of the Federal agencies now ready to approve the sale of American computers to Iran's electrical power system had blocked a similar sale a year ago under pressure from the Defense Dept. At that time the US sought guarantees from Japan that they would not supply advanced computer systems to Iran. They received informal guarantees but now Japanese-made computer systems are being installed at four power distributic centers in Iran. The issue is likely to become a focal point of a debate over whether, in the aftermath of the Iran arms sales disclosures, any trade with Iran should be allowed. Rules of trade with Iran have been interpreted to fit the political mood.

Congressional Panels Merge

NYT-Rosenbaum p.1-The special Senate and House committees investigating the Iran-contra affair decided to hold joint hearings, and set a timetable for granting limited immunity to North and Poindexter. The extraordinary agreement, which also calls for the merging of the committee staffs and shared evidence, is expected to speed up the investigations by eliminating the need for separate hearings. The public hearings are expected to begin on May 5 and may end by August.

Sweden's Own Iran Scandal

ND-Peracchio-Swedish Gov't officials are trying to untangle the messiest and potentially most damaging scandal in Sweden's recent history. The inquiry includes connections between the illegal sale of millions of dollars worth of weapons to Iran, the emrgence of a shadowy arms cartel operating throughout Europe, one or possibly two murders--including the unsolved assassination of Palme and official incompetence of gov't officials and collusion between the gov't and the arms industry greedy for expanded sales.

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Legal Snag on Swiss Records

NYT-AP-The special prosecutor in the Iran-contra arms case said he had run into a legal snag that would delay efforts to get Swiss bank records for his investigation.

Carter in Cairo

NYT-AP-Jimmy Carter said he might get new information about American and other foreign hostages in Lebanon during a visit to Syria over the weekend. He also said members of the PLO should be able to take part in Mideast peace talks along with other Palestinians. He said Arafat would be "welcomed by me."

Rumor Fuels Egypt Furor Over Religion

NYT-Kifner-A series of clashes between young Moslem fundamentalists and minority Coptic Christians, some spurred by a rumor that Christians had a secret spray that made crosses appear on Moslem women's veils, had prompted an unusual display of official concern. Facing the issue of religious tensions with unusual bluntness, Mubarak has warned Egyptians to beware of "rumormongers who would destabilize Egypt."

Demjanjuk Trial

NYT-Fettmann-Tempers flared at the Demjanjuk trial as the presiding judge and the chief defense lawyer exchanged heated words. The emotional outburst came from Justice Levine, who objected to O'Connor's cross examination of a retired police inspector.

Jesse Jackson Urges Rejection of Split in Black-Jewish Relations

Amsterdam News-Anekwe-Jackson urged Blacks and Jews to recapture and nurture the moments of triumph when Black GI's in WW II liberated Jews in Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps. Jackson made these remarks at the Queens Black-Jewish People to People Project at Queens College. Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum also spoke.

Letters

NYT-Morris Abram & Jerry Goodman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry respond to a recent NYT editorial on Soviet Jewry. They say they are leery that a new arms treaty would not automatically guarantee more freedom and more emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union.

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דחיפות: מיידי	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	תאריך: 1
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נר : 0500		רע :
		מאת : נאו"ם, ניו-יורק

אל: ליאל-לשכת המנכ"ל המדיני.
מאת: מ. יוסה.

ישראל-דרא"פ.

רצ"ב כתבת ה- NYT מהבוקר (19/3) על רקע החלטת הקבינט על קשרי ישראל-דרא"פ :
"Israel Will Curb Arms For Pretoria"

נאו"ם

מ. יוסה



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אביטל געט
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אישור:

שם השולח: מ. יוסה

תאריך: 19.3.87

ISRAEL WILL CURB ARMS FOR PRETORIA

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Cabinet, Under U.S. Pressure, Acts to Bar New Contracts

By **THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN**

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, March 18 — The Israeli Cabinet decided today not to sign new military sales contracts with South Africa, Cabinet officials said. They said it had acted in response to pressure from Congress and American Jews to curtail Israel's relations with Pretoria.

In addition to the ban on new military sales, the Cabinet decided to limit further Israel's cultural, official and tourist relations with South Africa and to set up a committee to recommend possible areas for economic sanctions in line with steps adopted by other nations, the officials said.

Foreign Minister Shimon Peres is to present the new Israeli approach to South Africa in a speech to Parliament on Thursday. Until then, no official statement will be issued.

Since all military contracts between Israel and South Africa are secret, it will be impossible to monitor Israel's compliance with the Cabinet's decision. Few people know how much longer existing contracts have to run or whether they include renewal arrangements that would technically not involve signing new contracts.

Moreover, a good deal of Israel's profits from military sales to Pretoria come from license fees, under which

Continued on Page A12, Column 1

Israel to Bar New Arms Deals With South Africa

Continued From Page A1

South Africa manufactures or assembles arms designed by Israel, such as the Saar-class missile patrol boats and the Gabriel sea-to-sea missiles.

Officials made no attempt to hide the fact that the decision today was being made to blunt what they expect to be the negative effect of a report that President Reagan is to submit to Congress by April 1 regarding those countries receiving American aid that are also selling arms to South Africa.

According to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, passed by the Congress on Oct. 2, the President is to issue

the report prepared by the State Department "with a view toward ending" American military assistance to nations selling arms to South Africa because of its apartheid policies.

Israel received \$1.8 billion in American military aid last year. According to unofficial estimates, Israeli military industries earned anywhere from \$400 million to \$800 million last year from the export of military equipment and know-how to South Africa. The exact figure is secret.

Israeli officials had been hoping that they would somehow be able to finesse Congress into overlooking the Israeli military relationship with South Af-

rica, in view of the fact that thousands of jobs in Israel's already troubled military industries were dependent on the trade.

But a senior Israeli official said that after the espionage scandal involving Jonathan Jay Pollard again became news two weeks ago after a United States court sentenced the American to life in prison, Israeli leaders realized that they could not afford another embarrassing confrontation with Washington.

The officials were reinforced in this view by advice from a range of American Jews who are visiting Jerusalem this week as part of a meeting of the

Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.

In all of their discussions with Israel's top leadership, the American Jews have been stressing the importance of Israel's getting out in front of the President's South Africa report with some concrete steps that will persuade Congress that Israel is reducing its ties, officials said.

"If we did not have the Pollard affair hanging over our heads, April 1 would not have looked so scary," a senior official said. "But it was clear to everyone in the Cabinet that there is no way now that anyone can fool around or stall with the Americans."

Decision by Inner Cabinet

Israel's inner Cabinet, made up of the 10 leading Labor and Likud ministers of the national unity Government,

made today's decisions after a debate that lasted most of the day.

According to officials, Foreign Minister Peres laid down the outlines of the new approach, and he was supported by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and virtually all the other ministers present.

The most vocal dissenter was the Minister of Industry and Trade, Ariel Sharon, who argued that Israel should stand up to the American pressure for reasons of national interest, officials said.

The big surprise was that Defense Minister Rabin, one of the leading advocates of relations with South Africa, supported the majority. According to officials, Mr. Rabin was deeply influenced by the threat of a further deterio-

ration in American-Israel relations that might result if Israel ignored the sentiment in Congress for sanctions against Pretoria.

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

16

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דף 1 מחוד דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיסות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 19.15.15 מרץ

מס' מברק

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המשרד + ניו יורק + בטחון

607 104 586

מצפ"א

דע: לשכת מנכ"ל אוצר

מקטי"ח

ציר כלכלי, כאן

התקציב: ההיבט הישראלי

מילואים לשלבו 530

א. הסיוע עבור ישראל

בכל הדיונים עד כה מקובל כמעט כאקס אימטה שישראל ומצרים יקבלו את מלוא הסיוע שלהן. והקיצוצים (שבוודאי יהיו) יחולו על מדינות ועל תכניות סיוע אחרות. אתמול בישיבת וועדת התקציב בסנט ביקש בכיר המיעוט, הסנטור פיט דומניצ'י, לדעת כיצד יראה סעיף 150 לנוכח הקיצוצים הצפויים, אם יינתן סיוע לישראל, למצרים ולפקיסטאן בלבד. (דבריו הזכירו את גישתו של המורשה דייוויד אובי, יו"ר וועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות בבית הנבחרים, שהציע בשלב מסויים בשנה שעברה שארה"ב תאמץ תכנית סיוע למדינות מזהיית בלבד). אנשי הצוות קבלו על עצמם להכין את המספרים המבוקשים.

ב. הקלות בחלום מצבת חובות ה-FMS

1. יו"ר וועדת התקציב, הסנטור לוטון צ'יילס, התעניין בהצעות הממשל בנדון, ובין היתר שאל כמה כספים יפסיד האוצר (בטווח הקצר) אם כל המדינות הרשאיות יבחרו באופציה של REFINANCING. בתשובה אמר דאג אולין (הממנה על סעיף 150 בצוות העוזרים) שבין השנים 1988 ל-1992 יחסרו הכנסות בסך של 3.4 בליון, אם כל המדינות יפעלו כך.

2. צ'יילס שאל גם לגבי ה- BALLOONING שתישא מצרים לדראת סוף תקופת פריסת החובות החדש. השמע שעל מצרים לשלם כ-3 בליון דולר בשנת 2008 (כך נדמה לי - י.ל.). העיר צ'יילס שככל הנראה ארה"ב עושה למצרים "טובה שאי" ביכולתה לקבל".

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שגרירות ישראל / נושיונגטון

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דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחופות מידי

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

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586 - 2
104 - 4
607 - 6

3. צויילס המשיר ושאל אם מדינה כלשהי הביעה ענין בהצעה זו עד כה, ומשנאמר לו שרק עומאן מגלה ענין, תהה הסנטור שמא ארה"ב תטיב לעשות אם תסיר את ההצעה מסדר היום - כי חרף היא עולה לנו כסף רב ורק עומאן מעונינת בה ממילא, כדבריו.

לתשומת לבכם.

אורי
למדן

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף מחוד דפים

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מנהל מצפ"א

דע: מקשיח

סנט: מכירות נשק למדינות ערב
482 לשלנו

1. השיחה עם המזכיר שולץ התקיימה אחמול (8). השתתפו הסנטורים דול, הלמט, ספקטור ובושביץ (רפובליקאים); ופצנבאום ולאוסנברג (דמוקרטים). נילוו אל שולץ דיק מרפי, אד דרווינסקי ועוד שני אנשי מחמ ד.

2. כמתוכנן, הסנטורים מסרו שיסכימו לעיסקות המוצעות עם סעודיה (ראו-נא שלנו 102) בתנאי שהממשל לא (א לא) יציע מכירות נוספות השנה וכן לא יחזור לאספקת תחמושת ח"ש, שיש בה אוראניום מדולל (ראו נא שלנו 19) לידי מדינות ערב (להוציא אולי מצרים).

3. שולץ אמר שיבחון את ההצעה, יעוד יחזור עם תשובתו לסנטורים. כיכ הבהיר שחוסיון לא ביקש חוקים ניידיים או ניווד ההוקים שבידיו, וספריטים אלה אינם ב"רשימת הקניות" של המחש

4. ההתנגדות למכירת תחמושת ח"ש בעלת אוראניום מדולל מעסיקה את הממשל. רצ"ב "נייר מידע" שהפיצו אתמול בגבעה, המעיד על מכירת תחמושת כזו (מסוג "פלנקט" - PHALANX 20- מ"מ) למדינות רבות, החל בישראל ב-1979.

5. כ"כ נייר הסברה בנדון שמופץ ב"י איפא"ק.

6. נודה להערותיכם לגבי תחמושת יו.

למדו
327

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INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Depleted Uranium Ammunition *enclosed in brief*

- First sales of DU Phalanx: *surface to air used by Navy* *15/16" projectiles enclosed in album*

-- September 1979 - Israel (100,000)

- How many sales of 20mm Phalanx have been made and to whom?

585 -	Pakistan	46,000	(October 1984)
	United Kingdom	310,400	(July 1982 and on)
606 -	Portugal	30,000	(July 1986)
	Taiwan	77,000	(1982)
	Israel	175,000	(September 1979-100,000, October 1986-75,000)
2/4	Saudi Arabia	310,936	(December 1980)

- When was the first DU Tank round sold and to whom?

-- 30 April 1982 - M774 Tank ammunition (predecessor to M833)
Taiwan (1,000)

- What is the real status of sales of the M833 to the Mideast?

-- Jordan - LOA accepted (2,235 for \$1.5M with delivery April 87)
-- Egypt - LOA in-country (9,990 for \$6.3M)
-- Saudi Arabia - LOA in-country (9,990 for \$6.8M)
-- Bahrain - under releasability review (1,800 for \$1.2M)

- Are there any other sales that we have made, or requests to purchase M833 ammunition?

-- Taiwan - LOA in-country (7,470 for \$5.4M)
-- Korea - P&R data only (60,000 for \$35.2M)

- Why hasn't Europe or Israel requested the purchase of the M833?

-- European countries manufacture the tungsten round. This round through machining is almost as effective as the DU round and therefore the Europeans see no reason to revert to the DU round where there is a reluctance to stockpile and store DU (the DU does have a very low level of radioactivity). Israel believes that the tungsten round it manufactures is just as capable as the DU round and therefore the DU round is not needed.

- Why did the Army go to the DU round?

-- At the time the Army went to the DU penetrator, it not only was less costly to manufacture, but the performance was much better than the tungsten round. Army states "Given equal levels of technology, we achieve better performance against initial armored targets with DU. We have seen improvements in tungsten performance but our tests still show DU to be the best materiel."

[Handwritten signature]

- What kinds of anti-tank rounds are in the U.S. Army inventory. What can we produce or could we produce?

-- M735 APPSDS (Armor Piercing, Fin Stabilized, Discarding Sabot) - 130,000 rounds in inventory - no longer in production could be produced in U.S.

-- M774 APPSDS - 190,000 rounds in inventory - no longer in production - replaced by M833

-- M833 APPSDS - Kinetic round in production for U.S. Army

-- M456A2 HEAT-T - No longer in production*

-- M302A1 APDS-T - No longer in production*

-- M303A1 HEP-T - No longer in production*

*Army draws on its old stocks to provide this round to FMS customers. Only two rounds are used by the Army in the 105mm - M833 and the M456A2.

- Both Iraq and Syria have the T72 Tank in its inventory.

M60 M48 M-1

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66 15

If 20° other countries
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THE M833 DEPLETED URANIUM ANTITANK ROUND

The Sale

The Department of Defense has proposed sales of the U.S. Army's M833 depleted uranium 105mm antitank round to several Arab nations. ~~This type of ammunition has never been exported by the United States, not even to our closest allies, let alone nations with whom we have no formal defensive arrangements.~~ The nations being offered this ammunition are: Saudi Arabia (15,000 rounds); Egypt (10,000 rounds); Jordan (1,800 rounds); and Bahrain (1,200 rounds). According to press accounts, ~~Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are among those nations forbidden the sale of commercial depleted uranium by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State Department.~~

The Danger

The only nation in the Middle East with tanks that are particularly threatened by this round is Israel, whose Merkava has the heavy armor that minimizes the effectiveness of the more commonly available tungsten penetrator rounds. The latest model Soviet tanks with the very heavy armor that the M833 was designed especially to deal with have not yet been sold in the Middle East, and the nations likely to receive them (Iraq, Syria, and Libya) are not likely to mount tank attacks on any of the nations proposed to receive the M833.

The Ammunition

The M833 is an Armor-Piercing, Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) 105mm kinetic energy antitank round with a penetrator rod made of depleted uranium. It is intended for use by tanks against other tanks. The effectiveness of APFSDS rounds rests on their ability to penetrate armor by means of the energy imparted to the penetrator by the gun's firing, hence the description 'kinetic energy.' The fin acts to control the flight path while the sabot (the packing around the penetrator rod to help capture the energy of the firing) falls off after leaving the gun barrel so as to leave the aerodynamically formed penetrator rod with as much of the energy as possible. The advantage of depleted uranium over tungsten or steel penetrators is that the depleted uranium penetrator increases the probability of any hit on a tank actually resulting in the tank's destruction rather than just damage. Depleted uranium's greater lethality stems from: 1) its greater density, which carries more energy with the round, increasing penetrating capability; and 2) uranium has the unusual property of starting fires when striking steel, making the likelihood of catastrophic fires inside a hit tank greater. The United States is the only western nation known to manufacture depleted uranium rounds.

Nuclear Uses?

While depleted uranium can be enriched into nuclear-weapons quality material, the processes always require the use of nuclear reactors, whose possession generally assures access to other materials more easily transformed into fissionable material.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מחוד דפיס

סוג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מייד

המשרד + בטחון + פרטוריה

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תאריך/ז"ח 1940 19 מרס 87

מס' מברק

אל :- מצפ"א, לשכת השר, לשכת מנכ"ל
דע :- לשכת רה"מ, מקש"ח
השגרירות פרטוריה

ישראל - דרא"פ : מסיבת העיתונאים של המורשת מיקי לייילנד

מתוך דיווח בע"פ של אחד מהמשתתפים במסיבה (שארכה כחצי שעה, בהשתתפות 8-עיתונאים שחורים, קובי לון מ"קול ישראל" באנגלית, ועוד כתב אחד או שניים).

1. לייילנד פתח בהבעת שביעות רצון מהחלטת הממשלה. אינו שבע רצון ממעורבותה של ישראל בדרא"פ בעבר, והחלטה מהווה פריצת דרך קטנה". הוא מרוצה שרה"מ מצוי בקנה אחד עם 15 IN COMPLIANCE WITH רצון שה"ח. לעומת זאת הוא (לייילנד) מזועזע מהתנגדות השר שרון להחלטה.

2. זמן קצר לאחר פתיחת המסיבה נקרא לייילנד לשיחת טלפון עם שה"ח פרס. בשובו הודיע שמזה זמן רב הוא עומד בקשר עם השר בנושא דרא"פ. פרס אמר לו שלשחורים וליהודים היסטוריה של יחסים אלה באלה: הוא תקווה שיהיה ניתן לחמשיך כך ושהיה להם "הגורל המשותף" להביא את האפרטהייד לקץ.

3. בחלק של השו"ת, נשאל לייילנד עד כמה אינו מרוצה מהצעד שנקטה ישראל. השיב שישראל מציחת ללחצים מערביים, והוא מקווה שתטיל עיצומים גדולים יותר על דרא"פ, בתשובה לשאלות נוספות, אמר שבשנה שעברה אמר לו פרס של ישראל "מדיניות חוץ יהודית בינלאומית", אך לגבי דידו (של לייילנד) לנוכח 24 מיליון השחורים הסובלים בדרא"פ, אין איזון במדיניות כזו. ברור שהחלטת ישראל, מקורה אינו בשיקולים כלכליים שעה שישראל מוכרת (לעולם בולו) נשק בשרוי של ביליון דולר לשנה. כיום, ארה"ב נעשית רגישה יותר ליחסי ישראל עם דרא"פ. ישראל אמנם גינתה תמיד את האפרטהייד, אך בפעם "SHE IS PUTTING HER MONEY WHERE HER MOUTH IS" הוא (לייילנד) קיים גם מגעים עם הציבור היהודי (בארה"ב) במגמה שיביאו לשינויים האלה ביחסי ישראל - דרא"פ, שכללו ש"פ פתוח ונרחב ואף לא היה נקי מהחשד של ש"פ גרעיני, אם כי אינו יכול לאמת זאת. הכל מכירים בחוסר האיזון במימדי הסיוע המוענק לישראל, וקיימת "תדהמה" אצל רבים - והוא נמנה עליהם - שישראל מקבלת

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and some illegible text.

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 2 מחוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

584 - 22
605 - 22
2/2

יותר סיוע מאשר היבשת השחורה כולה. עם כל זאת אינו קורא לקיצוץ בסיוע לישראל.

4. מדינות ערב מכרו נפט לדרא"פ בשווי של כ-10 ביליון דולר במשך 3-5 השנים האחרונות. אנו חייבים לנקוט גישה מאוזנת, ולהתקיף בכל החזיתות. עם זאת יהיה למסר מישראל השפעה חזקה על דרא"פ, היות וישראל הינה בת ברית של דרא"פ.

5. בתחום המסיבה נטאל ליילנד באם הוא חתר להפעלת לחץ על שאר המדינות (כמדינות ערב) שהצביע עליהן כמקיימות יחסים עם דרא"פ. הוסתע קמעה מהשאלה וחשיב בשלילה - "NO - ISRAEL IS MY PET PEEVE". לאחר המסיבה ראיינה אותו

קוני לון עבור "קול ישראל" וגם לה אמר כי אנו (בקאוקוס השחור בקונגרס) נלחץ לחרס עולמי (WORLD-WIDE) על דרא"פ.

אולי
למדו

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

כנס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סיווג בטחוני שמור

דחיסות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח -175 19 מרס 87

מס' מברק

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המשרד + בטחון

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אל :- מצפ"א

דע :- לשכת מנכ"ל אוצר, מקשיח ציר כלכלי (כאן)

ביה"נ : סיוע חוץ והתקציב
לטלנו 101

1. בהתאם לסיכום בסעיף א' במברקנו הבי"ל, המכתב הרצי"ב שוגר אתמול (18) ליו"ר וועדת התקציב, ביל גריי, על חתימתם של יו"ר וועדת החוץ וכל החברים הדמוקרטים בוועדה, להוציא יו"ר וועדת המשנה לאירופה ולמזרח"ת, לי המילטון, ושני חברים שאינם חשובים במיוחד, ג'רי סטאדס ו-וויין אוואן.
2. המכתב מדבר בעדו. כפי שתראו, החותמים מתריעים שהיה וסעיף 150 ("ניהול עניני חוץ") יקוצץ מתחת לרמת המימון הנוכחי, יתקשו לתמוך בהחלטת התקציב.
3. לא ידוע על איום דומה מוועדה מאשרת אחרת. ספק אם יש בו כדי להבהיל את גריי.

א.ס.ע. אלמבר
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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

HOWARD L. BERMAN

26TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

March 18, 1987

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Congressman William H. Gray III
Chairman
House Budget Committee
A214 HOB Annex 1
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Gray:

As you begin your deliberations to craft a budget resolution for Fiscal Year 1988, we are writing to urge in the strongest and most unequivocal terms our belief that Function 150 should be protected from further budget cuts below existing funding levels. In the last two years this Function has been cut to dangerously low levels, gravely damaging a number of critical foreign assistance programs.

Mr. Chairman, we fully understand the enormous and complicated task you face this year as you struggle to put together a budget resolution which meets the mandate of the Gramm-Rudman law. Of all the responsibilities vested in Congress, there is no duty which tests our wisdom and judgment more than attempting to establish national priorities in the budget resolution. Because of the fiscal restraints imposed by Gramm-Rudman, many of the programs closest to you and to each of us have suffered greatly. But none has taken the beating that has fallen on foreign assistance.

Since 1985, no program in the federal budget has contributed more in absolute dollar terms to deficit reduction than the foreign assistance account. Between 1985 and 1987, \$7.5 billion was cut in foreign assistance. It stands now at a level below that of 1984. Individual development accounts show a grim and embarrassing picture: international health programs, 26% reduction in funding; international population programs, 20% reduction; international education, 18% reduction; agriculture, rural development, and nutrition programs, 17% reduction. \$700 million has been cut from multilateral aid programs (World Bank, African Development Bank, International Development Association, etc.) -- a 37% reduction in this category of programs.

Chairman William H. Gray III
House Budget Committee
Page 2.

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5/2
6/4


Foreign aid is not a drain on U.S. resources. In 1984, when U.S. contributions to the World Bank totaled \$1 billion, American businesses received \$1.1 billion from the World Bank in the form of disbursement contracts. What does not return to the United States in the form of cash, is reimbursed to us in the benefits reaped from defusing problems which lead to political instability worldwide.

Current estimates of the World Bank are that 700 million people in the world -- more than the entire population of the western hemisphere -- do not get enough food for an active and healthy life. Without our food aid, an estimated 20 million would have died in sub-Saharan Africa and life expectancy would not have increased in the Third World by 10 to 20 years. We are the richest nation in the world. If we do not lend a hand to help the rest of the world climb out of its poverty, it will not be for lack of money, but for lack of wisdom.


Domestic programs need not suffer because of the money we appropriate for development assistance. We must not establish a trade-off which is divisive and completely unnecessary. Because its constituency is poor and without a political voice, foreign assistance is an easy target to cut. But it is for this reason that we urge you to reach beyond political rewards to include these people in our moral calculus.

Mr. Chairman, we understand that your job this year is a difficult one -- full of painful choices and thankless decisions. We are reluctant to talk in absolutes, but this situation requires dramatic action. We think it is fair to inform you that it would be very difficult for us to support a budget resolution which cuts Function 150 below the existing funding level.

Yours respectfully,



Howard L. Berman, M.C.



Dante B. Fascell, M.C.



Mel Levine, M.C.



Sam Gejdenson
Sam Gejdenson, M.C.

Gary L. Ackerman
Gary L. Ackerman, M.C.

Lawrence J. Smith
Lawrence J. Smith, M.C.

Edward F. Feighan
Edward F. Feighan, M.C.

Tom Lantos
Tom Lantos, M.C.

Robert G. Torricelli
Robert G. Torricelli, M.C.

Mervyn M. Dymally
Mervyn M. Dymally, M.C.

Stephen J. Solarz
Stephen J. Solarz, M.C.

James H. Bilbray
James H. Bilbray, M.C.

Morris K. Udall
Morris K. Udall, M.C.

Ted Weiss
Ted Weiss, M.C.

James McClure Clarke
James McClure Clarke, M.C.

Dan Mica
Dan Mica, M.C.

Don Bonker
Don Bonker, M.C.

Gus Yatron
Gus Yatron, M.C.

Geo. W. Crockett, Jr.
Geo. W. Crockett, Jr., M.C.

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604 -a

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ס ז פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 3 ע"פ

המשרד + בטחון

סוג בטחוני מסור

603 581

דחופות מיוחד

תאריך/ז"ח 19 1820 מר

מס' מברק

אל :- מנהל מצפ"א
דע :- מנהל האוצר, מקש"ח (משהבי"ט)

בית הנבחרים - תקציב

לשלנו 530

- א. מתוך שיחת אקראי עם המורשה דינויד אובי (יו"ר וועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות).
 (1) במהלכים של המורשה ביל גריי (יו"ר וועדת התקציב) מדה לא מבוטלת של היסטוריונים
 שמיועדת להותיר רושם עמוק על הממשל ובעיקר על הבית הלבן. להערכתו של גריי (וגם
 של אובי) חייבים להביא השנה להכנסות חדשות (ר"ל מסים); ואם יעד זה לא יושג
 השנה, תוחמץ ההזדמנות כי הרי בשנה הבאה (1988) - שהיא שנת בחירות לנשיאות - אין
 כל אפשרות של הטלת מסים חדשים.
- (2) גריי מכיר בכך שבפרמטרים הקיימים (בלי הכנסות נוספות) לא ניתן להכין כל
 הצעת תקציב מאזנת שיש לה סיכוי להתקבל. לכן ייתכן שבסופו של דבר הוא וחבריו
 הדמוקרטים (בתמיכה הפאסיבית של הרפובליקאים) יכינו לא הצעה אחת שתיים.
 (א) הראשונה תענה על דרישות חוק ג"ר ותביא לצמצום של הגרעון הפדרלי עד 108 בליון
 דולר בש"ת 1988 (כמתחייב מחוק הנ"ל), תוך קיצוצים ברוסליים שיסתכמו ב-60 בליון
 דולר ויותר, ומתוך הנחה שאין מנוס מהפעלת שיטת ה- SEQUESTRATION,
 הואיל ואיש לא יצביע בעד תקציב קשה כזה.
- (ב) השניה תיבנה לפי השיטה המתוארת בשלנו 291 - דהיינו צמצום הגרעון ב-36 בליון
 בלבד, כאשר סכום זה יורכב מנוסחה שכבר מכונה בגבעה"ש : 9 ; 9" - כלומר, 18
 בליון דולר בהכנסות חדשות (מסים); חסכון של 9 בליון דולר בהקפאת תכניות
 בלחי מוגנות; וקיצוצים בסך של 9 בליון דולר בכל הסעיפים הבלתי מוגנים בתקציב
 (לרבות סעיף 250).
- (3) גריי מקווה שהציבור יתקומם כשיביין משמעות ההצעה הראשונה, ושבסופו של הכל
 הנשיא יסכים להצעה השניה כרע במיעוטו.

ב. וועדת התקציב

הוועדה פתחילה היום את ה-Mark-up של החלטת התקציב, ודנו על תקציב הבטחון (סעיף 50 לעיונכם, רצי"ב דברי הפתיחה של גריי.

סיה הנה 2 3 3 1 2 1 3 3 2 3

5/81/603 2/3

Today we begin our mark-up for the fiscal year 1988 budget facing an inordinately difficult situation. Under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction law, we are required to produce a budget with a projected deficit of no more than \$108 billion in 1988.

We must not underestimate the importance of our task. Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle are in strong agreement that steady reduction of the deficit is absolutely necessary to the health of our economy. It is key to dealing with our trade deficit, which has made us the greatest debtor nation on earth and cost Americans millions of jobs. It is fundamental to further reduction of interest rates, which is vital to continued economic growth.

I know how my Republican colleagues feel about this. Only yesterday the House Republican Conference passed a resolution saying it would, and I quote, "oppose any attempt to increase the fiscal year 1988 deficit target range of \$108-\$118 billion."

However, in writing a budget we are not dealing just with dollars and cents. It is our responsibility to meet the pressing needs of the nation, to reduce the deficit, and still to meet the requirements of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.

We are talking here about spending some one trillion dollars. We are talking about decisions that will affect every American and that may affect this country's economy for years to come. I would hope that all members of Congress would be cognizant of the seriousness of the task ahead and its importance to the people who elected them.

I also would remind all of my colleagues that the budget we write now must withstand a severe test next summer. For the August snapshot, both the administration and the Congressional Budget Office will project the level of spending and revenues. Even without the sequestration enforcement mechanism that was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the law still calls for us to use the average of those projections to reduce spending across the board, half from defense and half from discretionary domestic programs, so that the deficit is no greater than the target established in the law.

In January, the President sent us his budget proposal, which he claimed would achieve that target. However, according to the Congressional Budget Office, the President's budget actually falls \$26.4 billion short.

As my Republican colleague from Kentucky, Harold Rogers, acknowledged on the floor last night, the law requires us to cut the projected deficit for fiscal 1988 by approximately \$62 billion. Even the President claims only \$42 billion in deficit reduction, which CBO says is a net of \$36.1 billion.

The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit target of \$108 billion essentially requires that we stop the government from spending even one dollar more than it is spending in the current fiscal year. For this reason I have asked that we begin our deliberations using a baseline that puts us all on the same playing field.

A total outlay freeze -- holding all spending to the same level as in the current fiscal year -- would very nearly produce a 1988 deficit that meets the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings target, and without raising additional revenues.

As I have said before, this baseline is not intended for consideration as a final product. Rather, I am proposing that we use this baseline so that, as we determine our priorities, we can fully understand the fiscal implications of any changes we make. It will be up to the members of this Committee -- Republicans as well as Democrats -- and ultimately to the full membership of the House, to decide whether they want to increase spending from this base, and by how much, and how they want to pay for it.

581/603 3/7

Because questions have been raised regarding the Committee's mark-up procedure, I would like to explain briefly the process we follow. Under the Budget Act, the Committee has the authority to "originate" legislation. That means we create the budget resolution in Committee rather than working from an introduced bill. Committee rules provide a procedure whereby the Committee first tentatively considers the elements of a budget resolution and reserves the option to make further modifications before final action.

This procedure has been followed by the Committee in past mark-ups. However, in prior years, the Committee has begun mark-up with a variety of forms before it. As I'm sure my esteemed colleague Mr. Latta, who has served on the Committee since its inception, will recall, in some years the document took the form of a Chairman's recommendation of the parameters of a final package. In other years, the document consisted of a baseline upon which the Committee built toward an eventual budget resolution.

But there is no single "historic" process. For example, in the fiscal year 1980 mark-up, we used a staff recommendation, and we adopted more than 25 amendments from both sides, including some from the Chairman himself, Bob Giaino.

For fiscal 1985, when Jim Jones was Chairman, we used a "Committee recommendation" that established broad parameters for nondefense domestic spending, military, revenues, credit, and administrative savings. After we adopted those parameters we proceeded to mark up in the traditional manner, function by function, considering aggregates and other matters.

Thus our procedure this year is not in any way a departure from a historical norm. I suggest we begin with a discussion of the economic assumptions we want to adopt for fiscal 1988. Following that, we will proceed through the budget function by function, and the Chair will welcome amendments from both sides of the aisle to make alterations to the outlay freeze baseline.

I hope that all members of the Committee recognize the importance of participating in the effort to write a budget resolution for fiscal 1988. We have an awesome responsibility that demands the best from all of us.

At this point I would like to ask the ranking Republican member, Mr. Latta, if he has any comments.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ס ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף ומחוד ו דפים

סוג בסחוני סודי

מיידי דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח 19 1920 מרט

מס' מברק

המשרד + בטחון

608 580

אל -- מצפ"א

דע -- מקשי"ח

בית הנבחרים : סיוע חרץ
לשלנו הגלוי מהיום

כמדובר, ועדת המשנה לאירופה ומז"ת טרם פרסמה את דו"ח הלואי שהוא פירוט ברזנת המחוקק. הוא הודפס בגרסתו הראשונית ולחברי ועדת המשנה עד סוף היום (19) להעיר הערותיהם. בדו"ח הלואי מספר סעיפים לא-נוהים במיוחד לישראל. ידידינו פועלים להסירם בקצרה האפשרי.

טובה הרצל

עמ"מ 2
ההג 3
השג 3
אלגנט 1
גבסא 2
ג'נרל 1
פאלי-א 1
אלכ 3

2/3 - 601 / 579

חוזים קיימים" או "אחוז נתון מהחוזים יבוא לקיצו בחוך מספר שנים כלשהו", לפי איזה נתון יהיה יותר יעיל לצורך יחסי ציבור. חזר עלהצעה לפיה יש צורך במשהו יותר מפורט מהצהרת הקבינט מספר פעמים.

ברמן אמר שהשאיפה שלו לראות חוזים Suspended. חזר על עמדה זו יותר מאוחר וכאשר השגריר התייחס לנסיונה של ישראל עם צרפת והמיראג', אמר ברמן שיש עקרונות והראיה : החוקים שחוקק הקונגרס האמריקאי למנוע כניעה לחרם, למרות הנזק הכספי לחברות אמריקאיות.

לדברי השגריר שאלמלא היה שינוי במדיניות, לא היה מתקיים דיון פנימי בן חצי שנה, ולכן אין מקום למסקנה, כפי שמצטייר מהנ"י טיימס, שמדובר בתכסיס, השיב סולרז כדלקמן : מאז 77' הוא עצמו השתמש בטעון הישראלי לפיו ישראל תכבד חוזים קיימים, תוך שהוא נדרש לצביעות השוררת בנושא. הוא תוהה כמה שונה הנוסח החדש מהקו שננקט בעבר. דו"ח מחמ"ד אמנם לא יפגע כנראה ישירות בסיוע אולם יעורר בעיות, במיוחד אצל שחורים. חשוב שאמנם יודע שישראל מצמצמת את היחסים ואין מדובר ב"תרגילי". זאת כדי שאם אמנם תעלה הצעה לקצץ בסיוע, היא תובט ברוב מוחץ. ישראל תהנה מפרות הדו"ח שבועים אולם אם יתברר שהעניינים נשארו כפי שהיו יפעל הדבר כבומרנג. דברים ברוח דומה אמרו גם לנטוט, ג'ידנטון, ברמן וסמית.

לדברי השגריר שלא נמסור פרטים על עסקות נשק השיב לויין שאזי יתפטו בנתון כלשהו, אולי מדוח מחמ"ד. לדברי השגריר על פגיעה אפשרית בקהילה היהודית בדרא"פ אמר ברמן (ואחרים הסכימו) שאם רווחתה תלויה באספקת נשק ישראלי לדרא"פ, מצבה חמור.

ברמן אמרו שאולי יש דרך להמעיט בנשק לכלכלת ישראל, ולוויין הציע כאפשרות הגדלת הז'אין למדינות נאט"ו, תוך שהוא מציינ שהדיבורים הנשמעים במסדרונות הקפיטול שונים מאשר לפני מספר שבועות. מעבר לפרשת איראן, פולרד, סלע ואיתן, קשיים תקציביים בתוך ארה"ב. אם ישראל לא תתפט כרצינית לגבי דרא"פ, שום יוזמה נוסח צמצום החזרי חובות לא תצלח.

סמית אמר שלגבי ישראל יש סטנדרטים כפולים וברמן הסכים באמרו שטמע שלרפ"ג, בריטניה וצרפת, יחסים יותר קרובים עם דרא"פ. כשהשגריר סקר את ההשתלשלות בפרשת פולרד אמר סמית שהלקח הוא שבלי קשר למה שישראל תעשה, תמיד יימצא מי שיאמר שאיננה

3/3 601/579

עושה די. ולכן במקרה הזה צריך לעשות די כדי לסתום פיות המקטרגים.

לוויין העריך שהנזק משאלת דרא"פ גדול יותר מהנזק בפרשת פולרד, במיוחד

בהקשר של השנים ביחד. ברמן העריך שזה המצב בקונגרס אך לאו דווקא בניבור.

סולרד : לא ניתן להוכיח שאין יותר מרגלים, ניתן להוכיח שאין יותר חוזים. בהקשר

זה אמר שמאמרו של אבינרי היה outrageous. אין יהודי ארה"ב פוחדים מפוגרום

לעצמם, אלא מהשלכות לישראל. (נראה שהנוכחים הסכימו אתו) אין התרשמות שמערך הביון

האמריקאי מלא מרגלים יהודים, אך אין לזלזל בהשאת איתן וסלע בתפידיהם. מציע

שישוכנעו להתפטר בכפוף למסקנות ועדת החקירה.

לקראת סוף הישיבה אמר ברמן שקלט ידיעות שהממשל עודד את ישראל למכור נשק לדרא"פ.

הוא (וסמית) אינם מופתעים מהידיעות הללו. מציע שבמגיעה עם ממשל שמרני שהאינטרסים

שלו אסטרטגיים (ויוכל להחליף בת ברית) בל תשכח את ידידיה הליברלים. הממשל מנצל את

שמה של ישראל ורווחתה לקדם את עמדותיו, לדוגמא במלחמת הכוכבים. לוויין הרחיב

ואמר שהוא מבין את ישראל, הנחונה בין הפטיש והסדן. תמיכה בממשל העוין את כל מה

שהקונגרס (ולא רק הליברלים בחבריו) מייצג, חוץ הסתכנות בניכור הקונגרס. במקרה של

איראן - קונטרס, נפלה ישראל בפח. שאלה זו נדונה קצרות ובכך תמה הישיבה. (להזכירכם:

כל הנוכחים היו דמוקרטים)

במספר שיחות היום בגבעה התגובה להחלטת הקבינט היתה דומה לזו של החברים היהודים :

שביעות רצון מההחלטה ומעיתויה (לפני פרסום דו"ח מהמ"ד ולא אחריו) זוך תהיה על הנסוח

"חוזים חדשים" בהשואה לעמדה המוצהרת בעבר.

טובה הרצל

אשראי

14

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

המשרד + בטחון

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מייד

575 600 $\frac{1}{21}$

תאריך/ז"ח 1700 19 מרס 87

מס' מברק

אל - : מצפ"א

דע - : מנכ"ל אוצר; מקשי"ח

ביח הנבחרים : סיוע חוץ

ועדת המשנה לאירופה ומז"ת קיימת היום **MARK-UP** בדבר המלצותיה על סיוע חוץ ל-88 ו-89' ובכלל זה 3 בליון דולר לישראל. מליאת הועדה תפתח בדיון בשבוע הבא.

במהלך הדיון הבוקר (בו השתתפו מרבית חברי ועדת המשנה) עלתה בין היתר שאלת מכירת סגזי אוראניום מדולל לירדן, כאשר לארי סמית אומר שישנו באופן משמעותי את המאזן במז"ת תגמל לויין מנצל זאת כהוכחה לצורך בתיקון חוק יצוא פנשק (יוזמת ביידן - לוויין). אמנם מדובר בעסקה מתחת לסף הנדרש בחוק, אולם היא משמעותית ולא היתה שום התייעצות עם הקונגרס לגביה. רוקי סודארט', סגן עוזר המזכיר לעניני מז"ת, נכח בדיון וטוכם שחברי הועדה יקבלו תדרוך סגור

על הפגזים הללו.
רצ"ה הקטעים הרלבנטיים

מתוך הצעת החוק המוצעת. דו"ח הלואי של ועדת המשנה ובו כוונת המחוקק, עדין עובר תיקונים של החברים בה. הקטעים הרלבנטיים יועברו עם השלמתו.

טובה הרצל
אשראי

-25-

מח 2
מח 3
מח 2
מח 1
מח 1
מח 1
מח 1
מח 3

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EME01

575/600

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[March 18, 1987]

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST
RECOMMENDATIONS: 1987 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATION BILL

1 TITLE VI--EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

2 SEC. 601. ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL.

3 (a) FMS FINANCING.--

4 (1) AMOUNT.--Of the total amount of credits extended
5 under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act, not less
6 than \$1,800,000,000 for fiscal year 1988 and not less
7 than \$1,800,000,000 for fiscal year 1989 shall be
8 available only for Israel.

9 (2) TERMS.--Israel shall be released from its
10 contractual liability to repay the United States
11 Government with respect to the credits provided pursuant
12 to paragraph (1).

13 (3) ADVANCED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.--To the extent that
14 the Government of Israel requests that funds be used for
15 such purposes, credits made available for Israel pursuant
16 to paragraph (1) shall be available for the Lavi program
17 or for another advanced fighter aircraft or (if agreed by
18 Israel and the United States) for other advanced weapon
19 systems, as follows:

20 (A) Up to \$150,000,000 for each of the fiscal
21 years 1988 and 1989 shall be available for research

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1 and development in the United States.

2 (B) Not less than \$300,000,000 for each of the
3 fiscal years 1988 and 1989 shall be available for the
4 procurement in Israel of defense articles and defense
5 services (including research and development).

6 (b) ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND.--

7 (1) AMOUNT.--Of the amounts authorized to be
8 appropriated to carry out chapter 4 of part II of the
9 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, not less than
10 \$1,200,000,000 for fiscal year 1988 and not less than
11 \$1,200,000,000 for fiscal year 1989 shall be available
12 only for Israel.

13 (2) TERMS.--The total amounts of funds allocated for
14 Israel under that chapter for those fiscal years shall be
15 made available as a cash transfer on a grant basis. Such
16 transfer shall be made on an expedited basis in the first
17 30 days of the respective fiscal year. In exercising the
18 authority of this paragraph, the President shall ensure
19 that the level of cash transfer made to Israel does not
20 cause an adverse impact on the total level of nonmilitary
21 exports from the United States to Israel.

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1 SEC. 602. ASSISTANCE FOR EGYPT.

2 (a) FMS FINANCING.--

3 (1) AMOUNT.--Of the total amount of credits extended
4 under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act, not less
5 than \$1,300,000,000 for fiscal year 1988 and not less
6 than \$1,300,000,000 for fiscal year 1989 shall be
7 available only for Egypt.

8 (2) TERMS.--Egypt shall be released from its
9 contractual liability to repay the United States
10 Government with respect to the credits provided pursuant
11 to paragraph (1).

12 (b) ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND.--

13 (1) AMOUNT.--Of the amounts authorized to be
14 appropriated to carry out chapter 4 of part II of the
15 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, not less than
16 \$815,000,000 for fiscal year 1988 and not less than
17 \$815,000,000 for fiscal year 1989 shall be available only
18 for Egypt.

19 (2) TERMS.--All of the funds made available to Egypt
20 under that chapter for those fiscal years shall be
21 provided on a grant basis.

22 (3) CONDITIONS ON CASH TRANSFERS.--Subject to the
23 requirements of paragraphs (5) and (6), of the amounts
24 provided for Egypt for each of the fiscal years 1988 and
25 1989 pursuant to paragraph (1)--

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1 (A) \$115,000,000 may be provided as a cash
2 transfer with the understanding that Egypt will
3 undertake significant economic reforms which are
4 additional to those which were undertaken in previous
5 fiscal years; but

6 (B) amounts in excess of \$115,000,000 may be
7 provided as a cash transfer (subject to the ceiling
8 imposed by the last clause of the second sentence of
9 paragraph (4)) only if--

10 (i) significant progress is being made by
11 Egypt in implementing a comprehensive economic
12 reform program; and

13 (ii) the additional funds for such transfer
14 are derived by reprogramming equal amounts from--

15 (I) funds justified for project
16 assistance for Egypt, and

17 (II) funds justified for Commodity Import
18 Programs for Egypt.

19 (4) DERIVATION OF FUNDS FROM CIP PROGRAMS.--For
20 purposes of subclause (II) of paragraph (3)(B)(i), funds
21 shall be derived first from funds justified for public
22 sector Commodity Import Programs. If all the funds
23 justified for those programs have been used for purposes
24 of subclause (II), funds justified for private sector
25 Commodity Import Programs may be used for purposes of

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1 that subclause, except that not more than 75 percent of
 2 the total amount of funds justified for both public
 3 sector and private sector Commodity Import Programs may
 4 be used for purposes of subclause (II).

5 (5) MAINTAINING THE LEVEL OF UNITED STATES
 6 EXPORTS.--In exercising the authority of paragraph (3),
 7 the President shall ensure that the level of cash
 8 transfer made to Egypt does not cause an adverse impact
 9 on the total level of nonmilitary exports from the United
 10 States to Egypt.

11 (6) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.--Not less than 15 days before
 12 making any cash transfer to Egypt under subparagraph (A)
 13 or (B) of paragraph (3), the President shall notify the
 14 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
 15 Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
 16 the Senate in accordance with the procedures applicable
 17 to reprogramming notifications under section 634A of the
 18 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

19 (7) ALBERT EINSTEIN PEACE PRIZE FOUNDATION ARID LANDS
 20 DEVELOPMENT PROJECT.--Of the amount made available for
 21 Egypt pursuant to paragraph (1), not less than \$1,000,000
 22 for each of the fiscal years 1988 and 1989 shall be
 23 available only for the Albert Einstein Peace Prize
 24 Foundation Arid Lands Development Project.

25 (c) PUBLIC LAW 480.--The Congress finds that, as a result

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1 of previous expressions of congressional concern, there has
 2 been a phased reduction in recent fiscal years in the amount
 3 of assistance provided for Egypt under title I of the
 4 Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954.
 5 The Congress directs that this phased reduction continue in
 6 fiscal year 1989 and subsequent fiscal years.

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1 SEC. 603. COOPERATIVE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROJECTS.

2 Of the amounts made available to carry out chapter 4 of
 3 part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to
 4 the economic support fund), not less than \$5,000,000 for each
 5 of the fiscal years 1988 and 1989 shall be available only for
 6 regional cooperative programs in the Middle East in
 7 accordance with section 202(c) of the International Security
 8 and Development Cooperation Act of 1985.

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1 SEC. 604. USE OF CERTAIN DEOBLIGATED FUNDS FOR PROJECTS IN
2 THE MIDDLE EAST.

3 (a) USES OF FUNDS.--Funds made available pursuant to
4 subsections (b) and (c) shall be transferred to and
5 consolidated with the funds made available to carry out
6 chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
7 (relating to the economic support fund) and shall used as
8 follows:

9 (1) The first \$750,000 made available shall b
10 for scholarships for Israeli Arabs for study at
11 institutions of higher education in the United States.

12 (2) Of the remaining funds made available, half shall
13 be used for regional cooperative programs in the Middle
14 East in accordance with section 202(c) of the
15 International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
16 1985, and half shall be used for development projects on
17 the West Bank and in Gaza.

18 (b) PROTOTYPE DESALTING PLANT IN ISRAEL.--Any unexpended
19 amounts of the funds obligated to carry out section 219 of
20 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which are not need to
21 carry out that section, shall be deobligated and used in
22 accordance with subsection (a).

23 (c) DEOBLIGATED ASSISTANCE FOR SYRIA.--Amounts continued
24 available for the necessary expenses arising from the
25 termination of assistance programs for Syria pursuant to

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1 section 1004 of the Department of State Authorization Act,
 2 Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, and pursuant to section 101(b)(1)
 3 of Public Law 98-151, which are not needed for such expenses,
 4 shall be deobligated and used in accordance with subsection
 5 (a), notwithstanding the paragraph relating to the "SYRIA
 6 TERMINATION ACCOUNT" in section 101(j) of Public Law 90-190.

7 (d) CONTINUED AVAILABILITY.--Funds deobligated pursuant
 8 to subsection (b) or (c) are hereby continued available until
 9 expended in accordance with subsection (a).

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1 SEC. 605. WEST BANK DEVELOPMENT FUND.

2 (a) FINDINGS.--The Congress finds that--

3 (1) the United States has shown its support for the
4 West Bank development fund;

5 (2) United States direct assistance to that fund, and
6 United States assistance for that fund through Jordan,
7 necessitate increased cooperation between the United
8 States and the regional states involved; and

9 (3) other members of the Organization for Eco.

10 Cooperation and Development have professed their desire
11 for peace in the Middle East and their concern for the
12 inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

13 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.--The United States--

14 (1) hereby reiterates its support for the West Bank
15 development fund, and

16 (2) calls upon the other members of the Organization
17 for Economic Cooperation and Development to contribute to
18 the West Bank development fund, as a demonstration by
19 them of a tangible commitment toward peace and
20 coexistence in the Middle East and toward the well-being
21 of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

22 (c) REPORT TO CONGRESS.--Not later than February 1, 1988,
23 the Secretary of State shall report to the Congress on United
24 States efforts to encourage other members of the Organization
25 for Economic Cooperation and Development to contribute to the

West Bank Development Fund

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1 SEC. 606. ASSISTANCE FOR LEBANON.

2 If any funds that were obligated, before the date of
3 enactment of this Act, for assistance for Lebanon under
4 chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
5 (relating to the economic support fund) cannot be used for
6 assistance for Lebanon, those funds shall be deobligated and
7 shall revert to the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts and,
8 notwithstanding any other provision of law, may not be
9 reobligated for use for any other purpose.

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1 SEC. 607. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES FOR JORDAN.

2 (a) MIDDLE EAST PEACE.--The foreign military sales
3 financing authorized by this Act for Jordan is provided in
4 the recognition of progress Jordan has made in the search for
5 a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, to encourage
6 further progress, in recognition of the continuing defense
7 needs of Jordan, and in the expectation that Jordan will
8 enter into direct and meaningful negotiations with Israel
9 based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions and
10 338 in order to resolve the state of war between those two
11 countries.

12 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.--It is the sense of the Congress
13 that no foreign military sales financing authorized by this
14 Act may be used to finance the procurement by Jordan of
15 United States advanced aircraft, new air defense weapons
16 systems, or other new advanced military weapons systems, and
17 no notification may be made pursuant to section 36(b) of the
18 Arms Export Control Act with respect to a proposed sale to
19 Jordan of United States advanced aircraft, new air defense
20 systems, or other new advanced military weapons systems,
21 unless Jordan is publicly committed to the recognition of
22 Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel
23 under the basic tenets of United Nations Security Council
24 Resolutions 242 and 338.

25 (c) CERTIFICATION.--Any notification made pursuant to

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1 section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act with respect to
2 a proposed sale to Jordan of United States advanced aircraft,
3 new air defense systems, or other new advanced military
4 weapons, shall be accompanied by a Presidential certification
5 of Jordan's public commitment to the recognition of Israel
6 and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel under the
7 basic tenets of United Nations Security Council Resolutions
8 242 and 338.

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1 SEC. 608. USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE NEAR EAST.

2 (a) FINDINGS.--The Congress finds that--

3 (1) there is evidence that chemical weapons have been
4 used in the Iran-Iraq war;

5 (2) there are reports that Syria and Libya have the
6 capability to engage in chemical warfare; and

7 (3) the existance of chemical weapons would pose a
8 threat should wider war break out in the Middle East.

9 (b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.--Not later than February 1, 1988,
10 the Secretary of State shall report to the Congress on the
11 activities and capabilities of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya
12 with regard to chemical, biological, and radiological
13 weapons, including their sources of supply for such weapons,
14 the technology, equipment, and material each possesses, and
15 the extent to which such weapons could affect the balance of
16 power in the region. This report shall include a United
17 States plan for addressing this problem.

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1 SEC. 612. EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES FOR NATO SOUTHERN FLANK
2 COUNTRIES AND MAJOR NON-NATO ALLIES ON THE
3 SOUTHERN AND SOUTHEASTERN FLANK OF NATO.

4 (a) EXTENSION OF PROGRAM.--Section 516(a) of the Foreign
5 Assistance Act of 1961 is amended in the first sentence by
6 striking out "and 1988" and inserting in lieu thereof "
7 1988, and 1989,".

8 (b) MAJOR NON-NATO ALLIES.--Section 516(a) of that Act is
9 amended in the first sentence by inserting "
10 non-NATO allies on the southern and southeastern flank of
11 NATO which are eligible for United States security
12 assistance," after "military structure".

13 (c) EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES.--Section 516 of that Act is
14 amended--

15 (1) in subsection (a)--

16 (A) in the first sentence, by inserting
17 "excess" before "defense articles", and

18 (B) in the second sentence, by inserting "excess
19 defense" before "articles"; and

20 (2) in the text of subsection (b) preceding paragraph
21 (1), in subsection (c), and in subsection (d), by
22 inserting "excess" before "defense articles".

23 (d) MAINTENANCE OF MILITARY BALANCE IN EASTERN

24 MEDITERRANEAN.--That section is amended--

25 (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection

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1 SEC. 615. ANNUAL REPORTS ON ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN EGYPT,
2 ISRAEL, TURKEY, AND PORTUGAL.

3 Section 1205(b) of the International Security and
4 Development Cooperation Act of 1985 is amended by adding at
5 the end thereof the following: "Each such report shall also
6 include--

7 "(1) a description of how United States assistance
8 for each country is designed to help it through its
9 economic difficulties;

10 "(2) an assessment of the steps being taken by each
11 country to help it overcome its economic difficulties,
12 including a description of any economic policy reforms
13 undertaken during the previous year;

14 "(3) a listing and explanation of the steps proposed
15 by the United States to help each country overcome its
16 economic difficulties, and a description of the means by
17 which the United States conveys its recommendations to
18 each country; and

19 "(4) such other information as the Congress may
20 request with respect to the economic conditions in each
21 country."

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1 SEC. 616. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

2 (a) CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS.--

3 (1) FREQUENCY OF REPORTS.--Section 620(c) of the
4 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking out
5 ``60-day`` and inserting in lieu thereof ``120-day``.

6 (2) DUPLICATIVE REQUIREMENT.--Section 620(x)(2) of
7 that Act is repealed.

8 (b) MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS.--Section 6(b) of
9 the Multinational Force and Observers Participation
10 Resolution is amended by striking out ``Not later than
11 January 15 of each year (beginning in 1983),`` and inserting
12 in lieu thereof ``As part of the annual congressional
13 presentation materials for foreign assistance,``.

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Add the following to the military assistance and sales title of the bill:

1 SEC. . SALES OF ANTITANK SHELLS CONTAINING A DEPLETED
2 URANIUM PENETRATOR COMPONENT.

3 The President may not sell antitank shells containing a
4 depleted uranium penetrator component to any country other
5 than--

6 (1) a country which is member of the North Atlantic
7 Treaty Organization, or

8 (2) a country which has been designated as a major
9 non-NATO ally for purposes of section 1105 of the
10 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987.

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Add the following to the military assistance and sales title of the bill:

1 SEC. . RECIPROCAL LEASING.

2 Section 61(a) of the Arms Export Control Act is amended
3 in subparagraph (B) by striking out "fiscal year 1987 and
4 only with respect to one country" and inserting lieu thereof
5 "fiscal years 1987, 1988, and 1989 and only with respect to
6 one country each such year".

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Add the following to the ESF title of the bill:

- 1 SEC. . RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES.
2 Funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out chapter
3 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for fiscal
4 year 1988 or fiscal year 1989 may not be used to finance the
5 construction of, the operation or maintenance of, or the
6 supplying of fuel for, any nuclear facility in a foreign
7 country unless the President certifies to the Congress that
8 such country is a party to the Treaty on the
9 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or the Treaty for the
10 Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the "Treaty
11 of Tlatelolco"), cooperates fully with the International
12 Atomic Energy Agency, and pursues nonproliferation policies
13 consistent with those of the United States.

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מלך, המשרד, בטחון, ניו יורק

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אל: מנכ"ל מדיני; ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע: יועץ רח"ם לתקשורת, יועץ שחבי"ס לתקשורת, רמ"ח/קש"ח, ניו יורק
ר/אמן, ע/ראש אמן למחקר.

19.3.87

תדרוך דובר מחמי"ד ליום

MR. REDMAN: Let's get underway. Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. Jim?

JIM ANDERSON (UPI): Chuck, do you have any reaction to the Israeli announcement that they are going to curb their relations with South Africa?

MR. REDMAN: Their statement with regard to military equipment or arms.

MR. ANDERSON: Yeah, the one that I read wasn't that clear. I presume it will include that, but it may include something more.

MR. REDMAN: What I have specifically in relation to the report concerning the Cabinet decision, that they decided to phase out military contracts with South Africa. We welcome this step as a positive development.

MR. ANDERSON: And did the United States have any role in persuading them to do this?

MR. REDMAN: As always, I won't comment on the specifics of diplomatic exchanges. We have, of course, discussed the issue of South Africa with the government of Israel on several occasions.

Q -- this morning when the Israeli ambassador met with Secretary Shultz?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have a readout on that meeting. All I could say is that that meeting was at his request -- Ambassador Rosenne's request.

BARRY SCHWEID (AP): Why is it a positive development? What's positive about it?

MR. REDMAN: You know our position concerning military shipments to South Africa is a longstanding one. We supported the UN actions on that score any number of years ago and have continued to apply those measures ourselves.

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including numbers like 24141, 4, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 3, 3, 2.

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MR. SCHWEID: Well, but if I can just fine-tune it a little bit, the US's position is that there should be no arms shipments or relations with South Africa, or it should be kept to a very limited level, or what?

MR. REDMAN: Let me refer you to the record. I'll have the press office look into that to get the exact words. But in essence, it's support for the mandatory UN measures that were adopted in the 1970s, I believe.

MR. ANDERSON: Do you have any suspicion that there was any leakage to South Africa of US arms supplied to Israel?

MR. REDMAN: No, I don't -- I just can't answer that question, Jim. I don't have any information on it.

Q The -- separate subject?

MR. ANDERSON: Still on Israel, if we can. Have you had a chance to look into the question we've been asking for the last couple of days about the Israelis paying legal costs in the Pollard case?

MR. REDMAN: I just don't have anything to offer on that.

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 סוג בטחוני...?
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 מס' מברק...

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אל: מנכ"ל אוצר

דע: לשכת שר האוצר, חשב כללי/אוצר, מנכ"ל מדינה, מצפ"א

בהמשך למברקי הקודם, רצ"ב מזכר פנימי של האחים סלומון (שלא לתפוצה כמובן)
 שהועבר אלי ע"י מרכז הטיפול בנושא.

כמסתבר מתוכן הדברים, מימון מחדש של החובות הבטחוניים איננו כבחינת תקדים
 ל-150 מיליארד דולר, כטענות שהשמיעו באוזנינו האמריקאים, כולל בפגישת שר האוצר
 עם מזכיר האוצר ג'ים בייקר.

פנהט דרוך

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Salomon Brothers Inc

Re: Preliminary Position Paper on Precedent

September 23, 1986

From: Miner H. Warner

There are three generic domestic approaches to be considered with respect to Egyptian FMS debt:

1. forgiveness of principal and interest.
2. write down of interest rate.
3. refinancing of DOD guarantees from FFB through private sector.

1. Forgiveness of principal and interest.

The U.S. Government has never forgiven principal and interest on loans. Forgiveness requires legislative action.

2. Write down of interest rate.

Precedent here would be applicable to FFB's \$150 billion portfolio and estimated \$350 billion in Agency direct loans currently outstanding, a \$500 billion precedent. FFB foreign loans funded are exclusively \$20 billion FMS. Direct loans include AID, USDA (PL 480 Title I & II), Eximbank, etc.). An interest writedown is Pandora's box.

3. Refinancing of DOD guarantees through private sector.

Precedent relates solely here to FFB -- all other government guarantees (approximately \$250-60 billion) are funded through private sector and not subject to modification. Precedential effect on perhaps \$2 billion in guarantees (aside from remainder of FMS).

Of FFB's \$150 billion portfolio, approximately \$50 billion consists of guarantees. Of the other \$100 billion, the bulk consists of USDA Certificates of Beneficial Ownership ("CBO"s) principally for FmHA and REA. CBO's are market priced securities consisting of bundles of below market direct loans backed by revolving funds which are replenished through the appropriations process. To cite an example, REA CBO's are comprised of many relatively small long term 2% and 5% loans to rural electric and telephone distribution cooperatives. Obviously, it is difficult to improve upon 2% long term money, so there will never be constituency pressure to refinance.

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Salomon Brothers Inc

OMB July 8, 1986 guidelines on nonrecourse loan asset sales provide, I believe, for Agencies to call their CBO's at par in order to sell nonrecourse loans.

The remainder of the \$100 billion principally consists of loans to two on-budget agencies - Eximbank and TVA. TVA has different call provisions from that of other FFB borrowers for debt issued prior to 1985. A precedent for changing call provisions was set in, I believe, 1978 when Postal Service prepaid FFB debt at par. That precedent is not widely known, nor has it been followed.

Of the \$50 billion in FFB funded guarantees, this divides approximately as follows:

1. REA guarantees (\$21 billion).
2. FMS guarantees (\$20 billion).
3. Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) (\$5 billion).
4. Other guarantees (\$5 billion).

1. REA Guarantees (\$21 billion)

Congressional supporters of the rural electric cooperatives have passed legislation (July 2, 1986) providing for prepayment at par and refinancing of REA guarantees in the private sector. Treasury has published interim regulations which defeat Congressional intent. It is expected that Congress may deal with the interim regulations and clear the way for substantial refinancing.

There is approximately \$9 billion in REA guarantees debt at 10% or higher. FMS does not serve as precedent for REA guarantees, as this question is being resolved through the political legislative route. Our proposal contemplates an administrative solution (including a nominal prepayment fee).

2. FMS Guarantees (\$20 billion)

We guesstimate that approximately \$12 billion is at 10% or higher.

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Salomon Brothers Inc

3. Sallie Mae (\$5 billion)

This is 15 year original term floating rate (90 day T-bill) guaranteed by Department of Education. This was Treasury's "dowry" to Sallie Mae when this quasi Federal Agency left FFB in 1981.

4. Other Guarantees (\$5 billion)

This represents a hodge podge of different programs and some of the important fundings are short term rollovers.

Major items include:

1. TVA two programs (\$1.2 billion) short term notes financing for TVA nuclear fuel. TVA nuclear plants currently all closed down.

2. Military Sealift Command (\$1.5 billion) short term construction/bridge financing for 18 vessel Navy lease program.

3. HUD (\$1 billion), 3 programs, none of which are candidates for refinancing.

Of the \$5 billion, the above accounts for \$3.7 billion. In other words, FMS refinancing could theoretically serve as precedent for approximately \$2 billion of FFB funded guarantees.

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

דף...ל...מתוך...2. דפים

אל: המשרד

סווג בטחוני...גלני...

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תאריך וזיח 1000 19 במארס 87

מס' מברק

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אל: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת

ראה נא המכתב הרצי"ב של עורך ה- **CSM** ובקשתו לערוך יום צלומים

עם ראש הממשלה לכתבה מצולמת.

נודה על התיחסותכם.

עתונות

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

One Norway Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02115 (617) 450-2000

March 10, 1987

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Ambassador Meir Rosenne
Israeli Embassy
3514 International Drive, NW
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Ambassador Rosenne,

Paul Van Slambrouck, International News Editor of The Christian Science Monitor, and Neal Menschel, the Monitor's Senior Photographer, will be visiting Israel during the months of March and April.

Mr. Menschel will be working on several photo essays during his visit. One of these will be a visual "day in the life" profile of leading statesmen in the region. Ideally, but not necessarily, the photo essay would be accompanied by an interview with the statesman. Of course, we would like Prime Minister Shamir to be the focus of one such photo essay.

If at all possible, Mr. Menschel would like to photograph Prime Minister Shamir for at least one full day, following him at his home, office, and during any public appearances he may be making. Naturally, Mr. Menschel would be as unobtrusive as possible.

At this point in the scheduling, Mr. Menschel has open dates between April 6 and April 22.

In a few days Mr. Menschel will follow up this letter with a phone call to see if there is anything else that needs to be done to assure success to this project.

Mr. Menschel is looking forward to his visit to Israel. We are most appreciative of your kind assistance.

Yours sincerely,

David Anable
Managing Editor



file

official text

03/19/87

U.S. CITES GREATER RECOGNITION OF TERRORIST PROBLEM (1880)
(Excerpts: Bremer before Senate Caucus on Anti-Terrorism)

Washington -- A U.S. anti-terrorist official says there is growing recognition that terrorism is an international problem which must concern all the countries of the West.

L. Paul Bremer, ambassador-at-large for counter-terrorism, told a Senate hearing March 18 that "a year ago European governments did not accept our assertions that certain countries sponsor terrorism. Now they do."

He said that excellent police and intelligence cooperation, in addition to more criminal prosecution of terrorists, have contributed to a leveling off of terrorist incidents in 1986.

The number of terrorist incidents last year was roughly equal to or slightly below the 782 recorded in 1985, he said.

However, the ambassador said that "given that we had been seeing annual increases of 30-40 percent, we must regard this leveling off with cautious optimism."

Following are excerpts of his opening statement before the Senate Caucus on Anti-Terrorism, as prepared for delivery.

(begin excerpts)

THE OVERVIEW

During the past year there have been a number of important developments in our efforts against terrorism. Most important, there has been considerable progress in recognizing that terrorism is an international problem which must concern all countries in the West. A year ago this was not the case. And, a year ago European governments did not accept our assertions that certain countries sponsor terrorism. Now they do.

Moreover, excellent police and intelligence cooperation have led to many arrests of suspected terrorists, thereby thwarting potentially damaging terrorist incidents. And courts in Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Turkey have sentenced terrorists to lengthy prison terms. The rule of law has been effectively enlisted in the fight against terrorism.

These efforts are beginning to show results, last year for the first time the number of international terrorist attacks began leveling off. The number of terrorist incidents in 1986 was roughly

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equal to or slightly below the 782 recorded in 1985. Given that we had been seeing annual increases of 30-40 percent, we must regard this leveling off with cautious optimism.

Even so, our figures -- which are preliminary and expected to change somewhat as we refine our analyses -- show about 2,000 people killed and injured in some 770 international terrorist incidents in 1986.

While the total number of incidents remained roughly constant, we noted important shifts during the year. The level of incidents in the first three months of 1986 was above that of 1985. But after the U.S. raid on terrorist targets in Libya we began to see interesting changes: In Western Europe where many of the more spectacular terrorist attacks have been staged, there was a marked dropoff in the level of international terrorist attacks -- from an average of about 15 each month during the first three months of the year to a handful per month during for the remainder of the year.

Partially due to this drop, in 1986 international terrorism in Western Europe dropped 30 percent and Middle East "spillover" terrorism in Western Europe was down by 50 percent.

There is no doubt that the U.S. raid on Libya contributed to the decline of international terrorism in Europe. The concomitant expulsion of some 100 Libyan "diplomats" from European capitals and tighter security measures throughout Europe contributed to the decline. Colonel Qadhafi's terrorist operations were clearly disrupted and his confidence shaken.

While the number of incidents declined in Europe, they rose 26 percent in Latin American, which for the first time last year experienced more international terrorism than Western Europe. Latin America now has the dubious honor of being the second most popular venue, after the Middle East, for international terrorist actions.

Before I move on to a discussion of the actions we are carrying out to combat terrorism, I would like to emphasize a few special points about these numbers.

The first, as I have mentioned, is that these figures are preliminary and we may yet see some shifts.

Secondly, while the number of casualties is not dramatically higher than it was in 1985 and U.S. dead are down from the prior year, it could easily have been otherwise. Had the FBI -- in my opinion the world's finest law enforcement agency -- not pursued leads on Sikh terrorists and cooperated with our Canadian friends, an Air India liner might well have been blown out of the skies on a New York-London flight. Had an alert El Al guard not discovered a bomb which Nezar Hindawi tried to get aboard and El Al 747 flying from London to Tel Aviv, over 300 people, some 200 of them American citizens, would have died.

Those two incidents alone would have added 500 killed and made 1986 the bloodiest year on record for international terrorism. The narrow margin by which these acts were averted indicates that we have no cause to slacken our efforts.

PRACTICAL MEASURES TO COUNTER TERRORISM

Let me begin by trying to distinguish between anti-terrorism and counter terrorism. To me, anti-terrorism consists of largely passive measures intended to discourage an attacker. You are familiar with most of them: armor plating, metal detectors, sniffer dogs and devices and the like. They are necessary but not sufficient.

There are simply too many targets to pursue a purely defensive policy. We can and should harden the obvious targets, but the

terrorists have too often shifted their sights and inflicted casualties.

I'll cite three examples related to airlines. By the spring of 1972 security had become too tight to hide weapons in hand baggage aboard flights to Israel. So the Japanese Red Army terrorists simply put their weapons in checked baggage. On arrival in Tel Aviv, they opened their bags in the baggage claim area and opened fire -- with deadly results. In the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985, the terrorists directed their attacks against ticket areas which could be approached before going through security checks. Security of all passengers and bags is tighter. So when Pan Am 073 was attacked last September, the hijackers did not attempt to smuggle anything aboard. They disguised themselves as security officers, circumvented the careful security screening in the terminal, and attacked the plane from the tarmac.

These and many other examples show that we must take active measures to suppress terrorism. We must undertake practical measures to bring the terrorism threat under control. We must move beyond anti-terrorism to counter terrorism.

We are confident that the most effective means to suppress terrorism are not those which attract so much attention from Hollywood and the press, but practical, cooperative measures in the intelligence, police and judicial fields.

My office deals with many things, from policy coordination throughout the government to research and development for new anti-terrorist technologies, to advising on the use of force against terrorists. But our bread and butter is the work we do in carrying out a five-part counter-terrorism strategy: the identification, tracking, apprehension, prosecution and punishment of terrorists.

-- The first of these tasks, identification, is primarily an intelligence function.

We must know who terrorists are. I don't mean just names, I mean knowing, by groups and individually, terrorists' goals, ideology, propensity for violence, sponsors and areas of operation. This is not easy.

I have been a Foreign Service officer for over 20 years and over that time have dealt with mountains of intelligence material. But I have never seen intelligence as wispy as what we have on terrorists. I do not say this to deprecate our intelligence community, but rather in recognition of the inherent difficulties involved in gathering solid information about terrorists.

Terrorists do not publish organizational charts for our benefit. Satellites, U-2s and SR-71s are indispensable tools of modern intelligence, but they can tell us little about terrorist organizations. Information about terrorist groups is heavily dependent on human intelligence. And penetrating these groups is not easy. The most tightly organized -- and the most dangerous groups -- compartmentalize information very tightly. Even if you do get an agent inside, it may take years before he learns anything besides who is on either side of him and directly above.

Over the past few years our government has devoted a great deal of effort to improving our human intelligence on terrorism. And we are beginning to see results as our intelligence improves and with it, our ability to analyze and understand how terrorists operate.

The scarcity of good intelligence on terrorists is one reason why sharing intelligence with friendly nations is so important. Figuring out what terrorists are up to is rather like working a jigsaw puzzle

that came in a plain brown wrapper. You don't know how big it is and you don't know what the finished product looks like. As you work this kind of puzzle it becomes obvious that a puzzle 50 percent complete is more than twice as comprehensible as one 25 percent complete.

That is why we devote so much time and effort to intelligence sharing.

-- Our second task, tracking, is where intelligence and action start to come together.

As terrorists and their methods and habits begin to be identified, we can begin to track them. We are especially anxious to get that information to people guarding international borders. We emphasize borders because that is where terrorists are particularly vulnerable. Even in the most open societies, no one questions the right of customs and immigration officials to carry out painstaking examinations of documents and possessions. Indeed, the arrest of Mohammed Hammadei in Germany was the result of a careful border search.

-- Our third step, arrest, is fundamentally a police matter, but can begin to raise questions of political will.

Arresting terrorists is not like arresting ordinary felons. Terrorists are almost invariably better armed and more prone towards violence than either regular police or common criminals. Paramilitary weapons and tactics are frequently required to arrest terrorists. But the problem doesn't end with more and better SWAT teams.

Too often we have seen countries who have reached a tacit understanding with terrorists. It usually goes something like this: "So long as you do not attack our interests we will permit you to live in or transit our country." Countries which would never permit common kidnapers and murders to enter or stay, all too frequently turn a blind eye to terrorists who have kidnapped and murdered.

Why? Terrorists are quick to turn their terror on any organization or country which interferes. It was the arrest of Mohammed Hammadei in Germany which led to the kidnapping of two German businessmen and the current spate of hostage-taking in Lebanon.

-- The final steps, prosecution and punishment, are often questions of political will.

Terrorist trials can lead to increased terrorist reprisals which may have begun with the terrorist's original arrest.

The long jail sentences which terrorists so richly deserve can provoke seemingly endless terrorist depredations. The hijacking of TWA 847 was largely directed at securing the release of terrorists imprisoned in Kuwait, as was the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner, and the taking of some of the hostages in Lebanon. But if the rule of law is to prevail in the fight against terrorism -- and it must prevail -- then democratic countries must be willing to punish captured terrorists.

(end excerpts)

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News Summary March 18, 1987

Top story in New York Times deals with proceeds from the Iran arms sales being traced to kidnapers (see Press Reports). Also on p. 1 of the Times: The Reagan Administration, under Congressional pressure, has recinded a plan to tighten control over the release of potentially sensitive unclassified information stored in computers; Test on humans near in AIDS vaccine hunt; Catholic hospitals in Europe are defying Vatican on in-vitro fertilization; A judge rebuffed Michael Deaver's challenge, leading the way for his indictment. Page 1 headline stories in the New York Post, Daily News and Newsday, and also a p.1 Times story reports on the suicide attempts of 2 more New Jersey teens. Top stories in the Wall Street Journal deal with the problems of Mexican Universities and how computers are reshaping buying and selling roles in small businesses.

Columns

NYT-Alan Dershowitz "The Pollards and Rosenbergs" The espionage convictions of the Pollards raise inevitable comparisons with the 1951 Rosenberg case. The most striking comparison involves their sentences. Few Americans are raising their voices at the excess life sentence. The Government's current appraisal of the damage caused by Pollard is exaggerated. The information could have been sold to an enemy rather than an ally and it was primarily regional and tactical rather than global and strategic. All countries spy on friends and foes alike. Certainly the US spies on Israel. And Israel spies on us. The big news in the Pollard case is that the Israelis got caught. American Jewish leaders are keeping a low profile on the Pollard sentence, sensitive to the canard of dual loyalty. Yet many American Jews at a grassroots level are outraged at the sentence. (Cabled)

NYP-Rowan "Spying Among Friends: A Sad Fact of International Life" Why should anyone be surprised that Israel has run a major spy operation against the US through Pollard? Disappointed, yes. Surprised, no. And like a spouse who spies out of paranoia and gets caught, Israel finds that a price must be paid. The US strategic plan presumes a growing friendship with the Arab world while Israel's objective is to limit the degree of this friendship. Nervous, insecure Israel wants to know day by day, whether they remain first in the hearts of Washington. Being outraged at Pollard is a cheap and futile emotional reaction. The real answer is for Americans to recognize Israel for what it is: a friend

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who is dependent on the US, but which will not hesitate to cross, or try to "sucker" the US when Israel's own national survival as a nation seems to require it. We have to stop taking that "special relationship" stuff too seriously.

DN-Grady-"No Carter Hostage to Image" It might be the crowning Iran scam irony--a cosmic joke--if Carter manages to bust loose the hostages in Lebanon during his 5-country swing through the Mideast. The truth is that Carter owes Reagan a big favor. He would still be a maligned figure if not for Reagan. The new image is Jimmy-Was-Not-Such-A-Bad-President-After-All. Carter got his prisoners out without paying ransom.

Press Reports

Shamir Says He Was Unaware of Pollard Deal

NYT-Phelps-Morris Abram said that Shamir told him that if any member of his gov't had known that Pollard was spying on the US for Israel, it would have never happened. Abram praised Israel's decision to authorize two committees to investigate and said: "The President of the United States did not know what North was doing. It is quite possible there is some comparison between what went on in the North case and in this case--that the highest authorities did not know." However, he called the decision to promote Sella a "serious and irresponsible act."

Administration Says Rabin is "Incorrect" on Sella

ND-AP-A Reagan administration official said that Rabin was incorrect in suggesting the US reneged on an agreement by refusing to grant immunity to Sella in the Pollard case. The official, speaking on the condition that he not be identified, said that "we never had an immunity deal" with Sella.

Jews Who Killed Arabs to Get Reduced Sentences in Israel

NYT-special-Pres. Herzog plans to commute the sentences--from life in prison to 25 years--of three Jews convicted of murdering Palestinians. A spokesman said that it is customary to reduce life sentences to 15 years after a few years after the conviction. This is not the case with "security prisoners," or convicted Arab guerrillas. But no Arab has ever served more than 25 years in an Israeli prison. The terms of the three men could also be reduced further for good behavior and they will also be eligible for short visits home. (ND-Phelps)

Millions From Arms Sales Traced to Iran Group Aiding Kidnappers

NYT-Gerth p.1-Several million dollars in profits from the Iran arms sales were paid by an Iranian group that financed the kidnappers of Americans in Lebanon, according to US officials and associates of Ghorbanifar. The payments meant, in effect, not only that arms were being supplied to Iran, but also that money was being paid as part of the effort to free the hostages, the US official said. Some describe the payments as "ransom" while an American official described it as "payments for services rendered." The payments suggest that profits might have been paid for some of the expenses incurred by the kidnappers in holding the hostages. Other payments by Ghorbanifar, according to his associates, were intended as political contributions to Iranian leaders, with as much as \$6 million going to Rafsanjani. Altogether the payments totaled as much as \$10 million.

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Iran Panel Plans Limited Immunity

NYT-Rosenbaum-The congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair plan to grant limited immunity from prosecution to former White House official Col. Robert Earl and Richard Gadd, a retired military officer. Meanwhile, arrangements for granting immunity to North and Poindexter are still under discussion.

5 Palestinian Factions Agree to Meeting on Reunification

NYT-special-5 Palestinian factions have agreed to hold a session of the Palestinian parliament in exile on April 20 in an effort to reunify the PLO, PLO officials said from Tunis. The meeting will probably be held in Algiers. The factions are splintered over internal politics and disagreements on how vigorously to oppose Israel. Syria has pressured Damascus based factions not to meet with Arafat but this disapproval has not deterred them from seeking reunification with Al Fatah, most recently in several meetings last week in Tunis. The PLO groups opposed to Arafat started drifting toward reconciliation after Hussein suspended his political alliance with Arafat in Feb. 1986.

Clerics in Lebanon Plea for Hostage; Captors Respond

NYT-Hijazi-In a development that political observers said might help bring freedom to foreign hostages in Lebanon, the countries most prominent Moslem clerics have publicly criticized the captors. The new sentiment has been generated by the plight of a French hostage, now under a death threat from his kidnapers. The group extended its deadline. There has never been an occasion when three religious leaders spoke out at the same time in support of a kidnap victim. Some say the reason for speaking out now is that the kidnappings have become an embarrassment; Moslem scholars have repeatedly protested when the foreign press associated the Islamic cause with terrorism. There is no guarantee that the kidnapers will heed the three clerics, however.

Syrian Says Americans Will Soon Be Freed

NYP-Reuters-A Syrian intelligence official told the wives of three American hostages that their husbands would soon be free. Kanaan, Syria's military intelligence chief "was very helpful. He made us understand that certainly our husbands would be freed very soon," said the wife of an Indian Prof.

Demjanjuk Trial

NYP-Fettmann-The judges in the trial ruled that prosecutors can introduce testimony from dead witnesses. The critical ruling allows the gov't to present evidence of at least three more victims of Treblinka who identified photos of Demjanjuk as Ivan the Terrible.

Linnas Case

ND-Fessenden & Cocco-Pat Buchanan has written to Messe saying that Reagan opposed the deportation of accused Nazi war criminal Karl Linnas and thought that he should be tried in the US. But a Justice Dept. official, who confirmed that the note was written, says it doesn't represent the president's

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views. Justice Dept. lawyers plan to go to court today in an effort to lift the stay that Linnas' attorneys obtained from a Court of Appeals in Manhattan. By the end of the week, Messe is expected to announce a decision on whether to deport Linnas to the USSR or not.

Soviet Nazi Captured

ND-wire-A Soviet officer who joined the Nazis and committed atrocities against civilians was tracked down and sentenced to death for his WW II crimes, Pravda said.

Israelis Douse Smoking Bar

DN-Chicago Trib-If you smoke and can't find a public place to light up any more, come to Israel, where smokers would rather fight than quit. An attempt to widen Israel's smoking ban to all work places, meeting rooms, sports centers and hospitals was snuffed out by parliament, half of whose members are smokers, including one former health minister.

Magazine Articles

The New Republic 3/30 Editorial "Israelamok" Israel's recent behavior expresses a mixture of arrogance and foolishness, a cocky loss of perspective. Irangate robbed Israel of its moral and operational authority on terrorism. Not only did Israel traffic arms to the most repugnant regime in the region, it also coaxed the US to stay involved in this disgraceful activity. Meanwhile, the Israelis think they have nothing to apologize for even though they assisted the US in its most disgraceful hour. Pollard is disgraceful in in itself and in its aftermath. Avineri preposterously and a little perniciously suggested that those American Jews who are angry about Pollard "have to be emancipated." This is a loftier condescension that is responsible for Israel's many recent mistakes. It is not only an insult to Israel's most important ally, but an astonishing blow to its most valuable and loyal foreign friends. In words and deeds throughout the investigation and conviction of Pollard, the Israeli Gov't expressed nothing but contempt for the goodwill of the US. The US is no mere ally of Israel. America is Israel's protector and patron, the power without which Israel would have no security and no economy. The behavior of Israel has been morally unworthy and politically stupid. If the smart-asses in the corridors of Israeli power think they that are the Teflon nation, they may be in for a shock.

The New Republic 3/21 Editorial "The Untouchables" - The arrest of 6 Palestinians in LA and by targeting "alien activists" in the US, the INS has joined a broader attack on anyone in the US who supports Palestinian rights. In the current climate it has become acceptable to treat Arab-Americans like political untouchables.

Media Notes

NYT-Weinraub-Larry Speaks left his post at the White House 6 weeks ago but the Iran-Nicaragua scandal has plainly dominated his thoughts. He defends Regan and speaks fondly about the President. He says he never trusted Poindexter and is dismayed by North's activities.

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NYT-AP-Tom Brokaw, Robert McNeil and Dan Rather said at a seminar at Fordham University that the power of TV news anchors was largely mythical. Rather said that in the political process the power of TV is overstated. There is power to set the agenda but not to get people to think a certain way. (DN-Maskian)

NYT-Jones-Lawyers for four Black journalists in a Federal race discrimination case have concluded presenting evidence with a bitter attack on Daily News management. The Black journalists have accused the Daily News of giving them fewer promotions, worse assignments and lower salaries than comparable white journalists because of their race and also retaliating against them when they filed discrimination charges.

Cartoons

ND-Oliphant-A battered Uncle Sam asks Shamir and Rabin about what they know about the Pollard case and when did they know it. Shamir replies "Ve Vorge Rabin says..." "If we ever knew anything. Which we didn't" A little bird says "I foget where I've heard this all before."

NYP-Rigby Khomeini its at the 20/20 set of ABC News and says "Good evening and welcome to 20/20...Barbra Walters and I have swapped jobs."

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לשי מנכ"ל מדינה, לשי מנכ"ל, מא"פ, מצפ"א

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אפריקה הדרומית

להלן משיחה עם מנהל מח' אפריקה הדרומית במחמ"ד LANPHER (18.3):

1. דו"ח מחמ"ד - הוא ראה את הטיוטה שהופצה וציין כי זקוקה לשיפוצים רבים. לדבריו לפי הבנתו צריכה להתקבל בימים אלה החלטה לגבי אופן הגשת הדו"ח לקונגרס. אפשרות אחת היא הגשת נייר גלוי שימנה את המדינות המפרות את אמברגו הנשק על דרא פ ללא פרוט ו/או דרוג. האפשרות השניה היא הגשת דו"ח מסוג מפורט יותר בו ע"פי הבנתו ה- R VIOLATORS יהיו ישראל ו-3 לגואתי הופענה מדינות נוספות. הזכיר את מע' גרמניה ובריטניה. ההחלטה לא התקבל להערכתו לפני שובו של חת-המזכיר ארמקוסט בסוף השבוע החז"ל.

2. מוזמביק - סגן עוזר המזכיר FREEMAN חזר אמש מביקור במוזמביק עם פגש בין הדי אח צ'יסאנו וולוסו. לדברי לנפר נושא הקשרים הכלכליים עם ישראל עלה בשיחות ובני השיח המוזמביקים הגיבו בחיוב.

לנפר ציין כי לאחר שייפגש עם פרימן יעביר אלי פרטים נוספים והוסיף כי בכל מקרה נראה שפרימן יעלה את הנושא בשיחתו הצפויה בשבוע הבא עם המנכ"ל טמיר.

לנפר התייחס לממשלת מוזמביק במונחים חיוביים וציין גם שיש שיפור בשה"פ בין מוזמביק לדרא"פ.

3. דרא"פ - אין שינוי מהותי במצב ואין לצפות לשינוי לפני הבחירות. גם לאחר מכן לא ברור מה יהיה המנדט שתקבל מפלגת השלטון ומה ניתן לצפות מבוחר.

מבחינת לוח הזמנים הפוליטי אם לא יחולו אירועים דרמטיים בדרא"פ עצמה, חודשי הסתיו יכולים לבשר התעוררות מחודשת בענין בדרא"פ, גם בארה"ב וגם בפורומים אחרים. במקופה זו יהיה על הנשיא לדווח לקונגרס כמתבקש מחוק הסנקציות, על המצב בדרא"פ והקונגרס

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4. הטלת סנקציות ע"י מדינות העימות - מוזמביק ובוצואנה אינן שוקלות כלל הטלת סנקציות קאונדה (זמביה) ומוגבה (זימבבוואה) מדברים על כך אך טרם עשו זאת והמצבאות היא שדא"פ יכולה לשתק את כלכלותיהן. מוגבה גבעיה קשה גם אידיאולוגית - "הוא מאמין בכך כמעט בצורה מיסטיה" - וגם לאור מעמדו כנשיא הבלמ"ז מאידך הוא נתקל באופוזיציה להטלת הסנקציות בקרב מפלגתו ... ובקרב שרים ממשלתו.

5. ANC - המגעים עם הארגון נמשכים כבדרך שיגרה בעיקר בלוסקה-דאינס מושבים-ינתר התענינות מצד התקשורת.

אם יסע המזכיר בסתיו הקרוב לאפריקה הדרומית הוא ייפגש עם טמבו בלוסקה.

קוריאל

מגירות ישראל • וושינגטון

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דע - מקש"ח, לשכת מנכ"ל אוצר, הציר הכלכלי-כאן.

התקציב וסיוע החוץ
לטלנו 291

א. בית הנבחרים

(1) הקשיים בהכנת התקציב הולכים ומחמירים. הדמוקרטים בוועדת התקציב לא הצליחו לגבש עמדה אחידה, וכן לא הגיעו לעמק השווה עם עמיתיהם הרפובליקאים על יסוד **PROGRAM FREEZE** בסעיפים הראשיים בתקציב. (כפי שדווח במברקנו הנ"ל, הקפאה כזו תבטא בקיצוץ של כחצי ביליון בהקצבות לסיוע החוץ - 350 מיליון דולר במישור של ההוצאות בפועל).

(2) בנסיבות אלה, החליט יו"ר וועדת התקציב. המורשה ביל גריי, לשנות את הטקטיקה שלו, ועכשיו הוא מציע הפקאה בהוצאות בפועל בכל סעיף בלתי ~~מלא~~ בתקציב בגובה של ההוצאות בפועל השנה (FY 1987). פירוש הדבר מכה קשה מאד (אולי בלתי נסבלת) לסעיף 150 (ולסיוע החוץ שבתוכו). לפי תחזית ה- **CBO** ההוצאות בפועל בשנת 1988 אמורות להסתכם ב-16.8 ביליון דולר (על סמך מספר הנחות, "שיריונים" למיניהם וסכומים שאושרו מראש לתכנית רב - שנתיות). אם ההוצאות בפועל אכן יוקפאו ברמה של השנה (13.8), יחסרו כ-3 ביליון דולר, על כל המשתמע מכך לגבי "ניהול עניני חוץ" (שכולל בנוסף לסיוע תקציב מחמ"ד וכו').

(3) המשמעות המעשית דומה גם לגבי כל שאר הסעיפים הבלתי מוגנים אשר WILL **GO DOWN THE DRAIN** כפי שאומרים כאן. מעריכים שמהלכו של גריי אינו אלא מעשה של יאוש, ומטרתו היא למשוך תשומת הלב של הבית הלבן, כי הרי אין כגזר דין מוות ^{MIND} **TO CONCENTRATE THE** וזאת ע"מ לשכנע את הנשיא ריגן שבלי מסים חדשים, אין תקציב.

(4) מחר (19) בכוונתו של גריי לקיים MARK-UP על הבסיס הנ"ל ונראה שהוא יזכה לשיהוף פעולה הפסיבי של הרפובליקנים בוועדת ~~המחוקקים~~ להימנע **(TO VOTE PRESENT)** על כל הצעה שיעלה גריי.

ב. סגן

היום פתחה וועדת התקציב ב"דיון כללי" על הסעיפים הראשיים בתקציב לאור המלצות

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הוועדות המאשרות (ראו-נא שלנו 592 מ-24.2). הדיון על סעיף 150 התנהל ע"י כחצי
 זריסר סנטורים באוירה של אדישות מוחלטת - ועולה שאין איש בוועדה (מתוך 23 החברים
 שבה) שמוכן להגן על תכנית הסיוע ועל תקציב מחמייד (וזאת על אף העובדה שחברים רבים
 בוועדת החוץ וכן בוועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות הם גם חברים בוועדת התקציב).

(ג) כללי

- להמחשת המצב ולהשלמת התמונה, רציב שלוש כתבות מתושפוסט דיוס :
- (1) הטקטיקה החדשה של גריי.
- (2) הקיצוצים הצפויים בסעיף 150.
- (3) העברת חלק של סמכויותיו של דרווינסקי לתח המזכיר וויטהד.

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Democrats Try New Budget Strategy

Gray to Go Public and Involve GOP in Writing Resolution

By Tom Kanworthy
Washington Post Staff Writer

House Democratic leaders, tacitly acknowledging that their efforts to find a party consensus on the budget are foundering, yesterday embarked on a strategy to discredit President Reagan's budget while building support for modest deficit reductions that may include higher taxes.

House Budget Committee Chairman William H. Gray III (D-Pa.), who has spent three weeks struggling unsuccessfully to develop a consensus among budget panel Democrats for a spending plan that balances program cuts and revenue increases, said that, beginning Thursday, he would try to write a fiscal 1988 budget resolution in public with Republican participation.

The Democratic strategy is designed to pressure Republican House members to repudiate major aspects of Reagan's budget and simultaneously shore up support for an alternative that may include taxes among nervous House Democrats.

Gray said the departure point would be a freeze on spending at current levels, a maneuver that would achieve on paper the \$108 billion deficit level required by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law without increased taxes. To do that, however, would require sharp cuts

in defense and domestic spending that may cause many Republicans to squirm.

Gray's decision to depart from his usual practice of presenting a Democratic budget to the full com-

mittee came after a morning meeting where Democrats decided they must escalate their campaign to expose what Majority Whip Tony Coelho (D-Calif.) called "the little white lies" in Reagan's \$1 trillion budget request.

It also comes on the heels of two proposals by House Speaker Jim Wright (D-Tex.) to raise taxes, suggestions that have been received coolly in the House and by hostility at the White House where Reagan has said he steadfastly opposes new taxes.

According to one House leadership aide, the decision reflects Democrats' frustration at their limited success in building a public case that Reagan's budget—despite the president's contentions—fails to meet the deficit target and itself includes billions of dollars in revenue increases.

"We could get together ourselves, but there is a real desire to let the administration and Republicans have the opportunity to see what the difficulties are," said Rep. Ed Jenkins (D-Ga.), a member of the Budget Committee.

Calling the budget and deficit impasse "the most important crisis we have" and terming Reagan's

budget a "scam," Coelho accused the president of "refusing to engage" and his chief of staff, Howard H. Baker Jr., of "doing a rope-a-dope."

Democrats on the House budget panel had been trying in private caucuses to meet a budget outline pressed by Wright that would call for \$36 billion in deficit reductions—about \$27 billion less than required by Gramm-Rudman-

Hollings—through a combination of \$18 billion in spending cuts and a similar amount in new revenues. Half of the cuts would come from defense and half from domestic programs.

But a consensus has eluded the committee Democrats because conservatives have opposed the defense cuts and liberals have balked at the domestic reductions.

With Reagan threatening to tar Democrats with his "tax and spend" brush if they move to raise taxes, Wright has encountered considerable resistance to his revenue proposals. Coelho said yesterday that forcing Republicans on the Budget Committee to confront the president's revenue proposals would help establish in the public mind that Reagan himself had "impregnated the animal."

Wright's problems were illustrated yesterday by a speech Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.) gave to the Tax Executives Institute in

which he said that while he would support a tax increase, it faces an "uphill fight" without Reagan's blessing.

"Don't look for any profiles in courage" on Ways and Means, Rostenkowski said. "Members are reluctant to act unless they have some assurance that their increases will be endorsed on the House floor. They know a lot of their colleagues are sunshine patriots who are enthusiastic about tax hikes in general but head for cover when specific proposals are put on the table."

With his and the speaker's vote, Rostenkowski said, Wright "has just got to corral 216 more and the job's done."

Staff writer Anne Swardson contributed to this report.

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THE FEDERAL PAGE

Foreign Affairs Budget Facing Cut, Shultz Told

Secretary Sees 'Tragedy' in New Slashes

By Don Oberdorfer
 Washington Post Staff Writer

The State Department and foreign aid budgets probably will be cut further below their already reduced levels rather than rising substantially next year as the Reagan administration has proposed, a key lawmaker told Secretary of State George P. Shultz yesterday.

"We'll have to start withdrawing from the world. It's a tragedy," responded Shultz, who appears to have gained some sympathy but hardly any funds in a nine-month campaign to restore money cut from the nonmilitary foreign affairs budget.

Describing recent budget cuts as "a major foreign policy crisis" and the No. 1 problem facing U.S. diplomacy, Shultz has spoken on the issue dozens of times and spent many hours testifying before congressional committees and button-holing lawmakers.

Rep. Daniel A. Mica (D-Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on international operations, said at the end of a two-

hour hearing yesterday morning that the fiscal 1988 foreign affairs budgets probably would be cut from 1987 levels despite Shultz's pleas and Mica's belief that "diplomacy and the State Department are being

nibbled to death."

Shultz, noting that the State Department budget is dominated by personnel expenses, indicated that one result of such cuts may be the closing of 20 to 25 U.S. diplomatic posts abroad—or about one-tenth of the 249 embassies, consulates and special U.S. missions around the world.

Undersecretary of State for Management Ronald L. Spiers said the most endangered posts are U.S. consulates in France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Switzerland and other Western European countries.

"If we are frozen [at 1987 levels], much less cut, we are in deep trouble," said Spiers. "It would mean a restructuring of our foreign affairs establishment and deep reductions in our overseas diplomatic presence."

Congressional sources said that cuts of about 4.5 percent below the

1987 level are being discussed on Capitol Hill as a likely outcome for both foreign aid allocations and the State Department budget. Both those budgets suffered sharp reductions in fiscal 1986 and 1987.

Data compiled by the House Foreign Affairs Committee suggests that under the H. J. projections, the United States would fall close to \$1 billion short this year of meeting its promises to eight countries where

it has military base rights—Oman, Turkey, Portugal, Spain, Greece, the Philippines, Kenya and Somalia.

These countries have been promised a combined total of \$2.5 billion in aid in fiscal 1988, committee data indicated. The Reagan administra-

tion, in view of the budget crunch, had reduced its actual budget request for these countries to \$2.1 billion. A "freeze" level would award them a total of only \$1.650 billion, and the further cut of 4.5 percent being considered would bring down the level for "base rights" countries to \$1.585 billion, even with heavy cuts in other allocations.

There is little or no disposition in Congress to cut aid programs for Israel and Egypt, which this year will consume 47 percent of all U.S. foreign aid and an even larger proportion of all U.S. security assistance. Under a "freeze" plan, the Israel-Egypt aid total of \$5.3 billion would be more than twice as much as the

State Department would be allocated for all its personnel and worldwide operations—\$2.5 billion.

"Hardball in a pure sense is starting this week" on the foreign affairs budget, Mica told reporters following the hearing with Shultz. "The State Department, unless there is a

Secretary of State Shultz indicated that 20 to 25 U.S. diplomatic posts abroad may be closed because of the cuts.

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near-miracle, is going to be at the very, very short end of the stick, as is foreign aid, with the exception of Egypt and Israel."

Mica said that, despite Shultz's campaign, foreign affairs budgets have been caught between conservatives "who have not been that supportive" in the past and liberals who are tired of "being beat over the head" by conservative oppo-

nents for foreign spending votes. Some of those liberals, he said, want to use the overseas budgets "as a lever" against the Reagan administration in the overall budget battle.

A Power Shift for the Foreign Aid Program

By Joanne Omang
Washington Post Staff Writer

The State Department's No. 2 official, Deputy Secretary John C. Whitehead, will soon take the politically sensitive foreign aid program under his personal charge as part of an overhaul of the foreign operations budget process, according to congressional and State Department sources.

The shift, an apparent response to a frontal assault by Congress on State Department spending, may mean a significant reduction in workload for Edward J. Derwinski, a 24-year Illinois congressman who was named undersecretary for security assistance, science and technology last October.

The genial Derwinski, who moved to Foggy Bottom as a counselor in 1983, was nominated for the undersecretary slot in order to help State with its perennial battle to get foreign aid appropriations out of Congress. But key Capitol Hill and State Department officials said he has not been as effective as they had hoped.

"He's good at glad-handing but he doesn't know the program and doesn't really understand the problems it has," one Senate committee staff member said. "He's made several major mistakes in testifying."

As a result, the sources said, the two key numbers-crunchers on foreign aid in Derwinski's office, Ralph Boyce and Robert Bauerlein, are

slated to take their computers and the security assistance program to Whitehead's office, where they will also handle the State Department operating budget.

In addition, national security adviser Frank C. Carlucci last month raided Derwinski's office of a technology transfer specialist, Robert Dean, to help out with a new inter-agency coordinating unit to oversee all foreign aid and State Department and international security assistance spending.

State Department spokesman Charles E. Redman said the final decision on implementing the changes will probably be made this week.

Derwinski, 62, disputed any suggestion that he is being undercut. Whitehead will become "one layer of extra leadership or coordination," but will not take on full responsibility

for the security assistance program, Derwinski said. Reports that he has disagreed with administration policy at least three times during congressional testimony—once on Pakistan and twice on Greece-Turkey relations—were "misunderstandings," Derwinski said.

A firm backer of Greece when he was in Congress, Derwinski told a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee recently that the State Department "refuses to accept realism" about congressional resistance to a proposal to give supplemental aid to Turkey without providing a proportional amount to Greece.

The remark, which came just a few days before a visit to Washington by the Turkish foreign minister, infuriated State and Defense Department officials and led to a complaint

from the foreign minister on Monday that Derwinski had repudiated official policy.

"All I said was that I didn't think the votes were there in Congress," Derwinski said. "I did not say I opposed the policy."

He noted that he hasn't even been sworn in to his job yet—that is scheduled for next Tuesday—and that some changes were in the works before his appointment.

Derwinski's chief assistant, Irwin Pernick, said Derwinski is "persistently underrated" by career foreign service officers at State because he is a political appointee and a politician to boot. The two of them will continue to work Capitol Hill despite the flap, Pernick said. "This whole thing is personalities. It has nothing to do with policy."

(2)