

# מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

7

משרד

מס' תיק

מס' תיק: משרד ראש הממשלה  
שם התיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה  
שם תיק: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק שמיר - ארצות-הברית  
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מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה

BACKGROUND

SINCE 1967, A SUCCESSION OF ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS HAS SUPPORTED SETTLEMENTS AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, CITING VARIOUS SECURITY, RELIGIOUS, AND NATIONALISTIC JUSTIFICATIONS. THE JUNE 8, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CURRENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT INCLUDES A PROVISION THAT "SETTLEMENT IN ALL PARTS OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL IS A RIGHT AND AN INSEPARABLE PART OF NATIONAL SECURITY; THE GOVERNMENT WILL ACT TO STRENGTHEN, BROADEN, AND DEEPEN SETTLEMENT." THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, WHILE NOT ANNEXING THE WEST BANK OR GAZA STRIP, REFERS TO THEM AS "THE ADMINISTERED AREAS OF JUDAEA, SAMARIA, AND THE GAZA DISTRICT." SPOKESMEN FOR THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT HAVE FREQUENTLY STATED THAT THESE ARE ISRAELI LANDS THAT WILL NOT BE CEDED.

THE UNITED STATES HAS CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED SINCE 1967 ANY UNILATERAL STEPS TO ALTER THE STATUS QUO IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND THE EXPANSION OF EXISTING SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, LIKE PREVIOUS U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS, OPPOSES AS AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (THOSE TERRITORIES CAPTURED BY ISRAEL IN THE JUNE, 1967 WAR).

החלטה של ממשלת ישראל  
מיום 8 ביוני 1990

לפיכך תמכה ממשלת ישראל  
בפעילות יישובית.

החלטה של ממשלת ישראל  
מיום 8 ביוני 1990  
(1/11/90 חוק)

מסמך



ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY, IN AN OCTOBER 2, 1990  
LETTER TO SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER, PROVIDED CERTAIN  
ASSURANCES TO THE UNITED STATES REGARDING ISRAEL'S  
SETTLEMENT POLICY. THESE ASSURANCES, SUBSEQUENTLY  
ENDORSED BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, PROVIDE THAT:

(2)

-- THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S POLICY IS NOT TO DIRECT OR  
SETTLE SOVIET JEWS BEYOND THE GREEN LINE.

-- USES OF HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES PROVIDED BY THE UNITED  
STATES WILL BE RESTRICTED TO THE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS WHICH  
WERE SUBJECT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S ADMINISTRATION  
PRIOR TO JUNE 5, 1967.

-- NO SPECIAL INCENTIVES EXIST TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET JEWISH  
IMMIGRANTS TO SETTLE BEYOND THE GREEN LINE.

-- THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL PROVIDE THE U.S.  
PERIODICALLY WITH ITS BUILDING PLANS FOR HOUSING  
IMMIGRANTS, INCLUDING SPECIAL FINANCIAL INCENTIVES.

-- MINISTER LEVY WILL USE HIS BEST EFFORTS TO PROVIDE  
ANNUALLY AS COMPLETE INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON THE  
GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENT  
ACTIVITY, AND PERIODICALLY AS WELL TO INFORM THE U.S.  
GOVERNMENT OF ANY (ISRAELI) GOVERNMENT SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY.

#### CURRENT STATUS OF SETTLEMENTS

OVER 200,000 SETTLERS NOW RESIDE IN SOME 200 SETTLEMENT  
LOCALES, RURAL AND URBAN, IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES  
INCLUDING EXPANDED EAST JERUSALEM. JEWS NOW MAKE UP  
APPROXIMATELY 13 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF THE  
TERRITORIES. ABOUT ONE HALF OF THE LAND IN THE WEST BANK  
HAS BEEN DEDICATED BY THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES FOR ISRAELI  
USE, ALTHOUGH CURRENTLY ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS OCCUPY ONLY A  
FRACTION OF THIS LAND. ABOUT ONE THIRD OF THE LAND IN  
GAZA HAS BEEN RESERVED FOR ISRAELI USE.

IN THE WEST BANK, ROUGHLY 90,000 SETTLERS RESIDE IN  
APPROXIMATELY 150 RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITIES, INCLUDING RURAL  
AND URBAN SETTLEMENTS. THIS MARKS AN INCREASE OF SOME  
9-10,000 IN THE PAST YEAR, AND PERHAPS AS MUCH AS 40,000  
SINCE 1984. THE MAJORITY OF RECENT SETTLERS RESIDE IN  
"BEDROOM COMMUNITIES" WITHIN COMMUTING DISTANCE OF EITHER  
JERUSALEM OR TEL AVIV.

IN THE GAZA STRIP, 15 SETTLEMENTS HOUSE ABOUT 3,000



SETTLERS.

ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, ABOUT 12,000 SETTLERS RESIDE IN SOME 30 SETTLEMENTS.

IN EAST JERUSALEM AND THE EXPANDED BOUNDARIES OF THE MUNICIPALITY, ABOUT 120,000 JEWS RESIDE IN 12 JEWISH NEIGHBORHOODS.

SOVIET IMMIGRANTS

ON AVERAGE ABOUT 1,000 OF THE SOVIET IMMIGRANTS ARRIVING IN 1990 CHOSE TO RESIDE IN THE WEST BANK AND THE GOLAN, AND 5,830 IN EAST JERUSALEM. WHILE THE IMMIGRANTS GOING TO THE TERRITORIES OTHER THAN EAST JERUSALEM CONSTITUTE ONLY 1.2 PERCENT OF THE 1990 IMMIGRATION FLOW FROM THE SOVIET UNION, THEY REPRESENT APPROXIMATELY 20 PERCENT OF THE 1990 GROWTH IN SETTLEMENT POPULATION THERE. WITH THE ADDITION OF THOSE SETTLING IN EAST JERUSALEM, APPROXIMATELY 4 PERCENT OF THE 1990 SOVIET IMMIGRANTS ARE RESIDING BEYOND THE GREEN LINE.

ISRAELI GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT

THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PREPARE ITS BUDGET IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO MAKE THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE FIGURES POSSIBLE. NOR IS THERE AGREEMENT ON THE BEST MEASURE OF GOVERNMENT SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. THE ATTACHED TABLE SETS OUT THREE INDICATORS OF SETTLEMENT SUPPORT AND GROWTH - IDENTIFIABLE BUDGET ALLOCATIONS, HOUSING STARTS, AND POPULATION. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO CLEAR TREND IN THE NUMBER OF PUBLICLY-SPONSORED HOUSING STARTS, BUDGET ALLOCATIONS FOR AND POPULATION GROWTH IN SETTLEMENTS HAVE INCREASED STEADILY. ATTACHED MAPS INDICATE THE LOCATIONS OF EXISTING ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS.

BUDGET

THE BUDGET PROVIDES THE ONLY AUTHORITATIVE PUBLIC INFORMATION ON THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S INVESTMENT IN SETTLEMENTS. IT DOES NOT INCLUDE PRIVATE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENTS (E.G., JEWISH AGENCY OR SETTLERS' ORGANIZATIONS). THE ISRAELI EMBASSY HAS INFORMED THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE THAT SEPARATE BUDGETING OR BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURE FIGURES FOR AREAS BEYOND THE GREEN LINE DOES NOT EXIST FOR THE VARIOUS MINISTRIES.

THE BUDGET IS ONLY A PARTIAL INDICATOR OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S INVESTMENT IN SETTLEMENTS. IT DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL EXPENDITURES FOR HOUSING, ROADS, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND VARIOUS SERVICES IN SETTLEMENTS WHICH ARE PAID OUT OF ACCOUNTS THAT ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES. SINCE THE PUBLISHED

BUDGET DOES NOT CONTAIN SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO IDENTIFY ALL EXPENDITURES ON SETTLEMENTS, THE TABLE REPRESENTS ONLY A PARTIAL ESTIMATE OF BUDGET SUPPORT PROVIDED TO AND IN SUPPORT OF SETTLEMENTS. IN ISRAELI FISCAL YEAR (IFY) 1990, IDENTIFIABLE ALLOCATIONS FOR SETTLEMENTS EQUAL 92.5 MILLION. THE NINE-MONTH IFY 1991 BUDGET CONTAINS 40.2 MILLION FOR IDENTIFIABLE SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES. PROJECTED OVER TWELVE MONTHS, IDENTIFIABLE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON SETTLEMENTS WOULD REACH 54.5 MILLION IN THE COMING YEAR, BUT THIS ASSUMES NO SUBSEQUENT BUDGET SUPPLEMENTALS OR ALLOCATIONS TO SETTLEMENTS FROM BUDGET RESERVES AS HAS HAPPENED IN THE PAST.

ALLOCATIONS FOR SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES CAN BE IDENTIFIED IN THE BUDGETS OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING, AND THE WATER COMMISSION. EXAMPLES OF ACTIVITIES COVERED BY THESE ALLOCATIONS ARE: SOME PORTION OF PUBLIC HOUSING CONSTRUCTION, WATER AND ELECTRICITY CONNECTIONS, FEEDER ROADS, INFRASTRUCTURE, MAINTENANCE, AND DEBT REPAYMENT. THE TOTAL OF THESE IDENTIFIABLE ALLOCATIONS FOR SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA HAS INCREASED ROUGHLY IN LINE WITH ISRAEL'S RATE OF INFLATION IN RECENT YEARS.

THE MINISTRIES OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSTRUCTION AND THE WATER COMMISSION COVER THE BULK OF IDENTIFIABLE GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THERE IS ADDITIONAL FUNDING WHICH MAY BE ATTRIBUTED TO SETTLEMENTS BOTH WITHIN THESE MINISTRIES AND IN OTHERS THAT CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED FROM AVAILABLE ISRAELI BUDGET DOCUMENTATION. EXAMPLES OF SUCH ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT ARE: HOUSING EXPENDITURES IN EXCESS OF THOSE SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, LAND SUBSIDIES, SCHOOLS AND TEACHER SALARIES, SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS TRAINING, POLICE COSTS, MORTGAGE SUBSIDIES, ADDITIONAL ROAD CONSTRUCTION COSTS, AND

INFRASTRUCTURE EXPENDITURES FOR PARAPETITORS. NOT ALL OF THESE COSTS  
CONVERTED TO CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WOULD FUND EDUCATION AND  
RELIGIOUS TRAINING FOR ITS CITIZENS REGARDLESS OF THEIR  
RESIDENCE IN ISRAEL OR IN THE TERRITORIES.

#### INCENTIVES

IN ADDITION TO DIRECT EXPENDITURES FOR SETTLEMENTS, THE  
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OFFERS A WIDE RANGE OF INCENTIVES AND  
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ISRAELIS RESIDING IN "DEVELOPMENT  
TOWNS" IN ISRAEL AND SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED  
TERRITORIES. WHILE SUCH INCENTIVES ARE NOT LIMITED TO  
SETTLEMENTS, ONLY SOME COMMUNITIES IN ISRAEL ARE ELIGIBLE,  
WHEREAS ALL SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ARE  
ELIGIBLE, INCLUDING THOSE LOCATED WITHIN COMMUTING  
DISTANCE OF THE MAJOR ISRAELI URBAN CENTERS. THESE  
INCENTIVES INCLUDE PREFERENTIAL MORTGAGE TREATMENT; LOANS,  
OCCUPANCY GUARANTEES, AND DISCOUNTS ON ASSESSED LAND VALUE  
FOR HOUSING DEVELOPERS; FUNDING OF SITE PREPARATION AND  
LINKS TO MUNICIPAL SERVICES; GRANTS FOR EQUIPMENT,  
SUBSIDIZED INFRASTRUCTURE, AND REDUCED TAXES FOR INDUSTRY;  
INCOME TAX REDUCTIONS; AND ADDITIONAL MORTGAGE AND GRANT  
BENEFITS FOR ULTRA-ORTHODOX COMMUNITIES. THESE BENEFITS  
ARE NOT AVAILABLE, HOWEVER, IN ANNEXED EAST JERUSALEM  
(INCLUDING THOSE ANNEXED PORTIONS THAT ARE LOCATED BEYOND  
THE 1967 BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY). HEBREW LANGUAGE SCHOOLS  
FUNDED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED  
IN ELEVEN WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS; THREE SUCH SCHOOLS HAVE  
ALSO BEEN ESTABLISHED IN EAST JERUSALEM.

#### HOUSING STARTS

EXCEPT FOR 1986, REPORTED HOUSING STARTS IN THE  
TERRITORIES (EXCLUDING EAST JERUSALEM), BOTH PUBLIC AND  
PRIVATE, HAVE AVERAGED 1450 PER YEAR SINCE 1985. WE DO  
NOT HAVE COMPLETE DATA FOR ISRAELI FISCAL YEAR 1990, WHICH  
ENDS MARCH 31, BUT WE PROJECT THAT TOTAL HOUSING STARTS IN  
THE TERRITORIES FOR IFY 90 WILL BE ON THE SAME ORDER AS  
RECENT YEARS. THESE DATA ARE FOR PERMANENT HOUSING UNITS  
AND DO NOT INCLUDE MOBILE HOMES (CARAVANS). MOBILE HOMES,  
BECAUSE OF THE SPEED OF THEIR CONSTRUCTION, COULD BE A  
GOOD INDICATOR OF POPULATION GROWTH AND OF THE RATE OF  
EXPANSION OF SETTLEMENTS. ISRAELI STATISTICS ON MOBILE  
HOMES ERECTED IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ARE NOT  
AVAILABLE FOR PAST YEARS, BUT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS  
SAID THAT 285 MOBILE HOMES WERE PLACED IN THE WEST BANK  
AND GAZA BETWEEN APRIL 1 - DECEMBER 31, 1989.

DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS, URBAN SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST  
BANK HAVE EXPERIENCED RAPID POPULATION GROWTH AND  
EXTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW HOUSING IS UNDER WAY. THE  
LARGEST WEST BANK SETTLEMENT, MA'ALEH ADUMIM, HAS OVER  
1,000 NEW HOUSING UNITS IN VARIOUS STAGES OF CONSTRUCTION,  
AND THE SECOND LARGEST WEST BANK SETTLEMENT, ARIEL, HAS  
1,400. SOME OF THESE UNITS WERE STARTED MORE THAN A YEAR



THERE HAVE BEEN PRESS ANNOUNCEMENTS OF PLANS FOR A SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER NUMBER OF HOUSING STARTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HOWEVER, PAST EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT SUCH PLANS ARE OFTEN NOT MET AND THAT HOUSING STARTS TEND TO LAG BEHIND THE GOALS OF SETTLEMENT SUPPORTERS.

#### POPULATION

MORE THAN 200,000 SETTLERS NOW RESIDE IN SOME 200 SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; THIS IS APPROXIMATELY 13% OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF THE TERRITORIES. WE ESTIMATE THAT 90,000 ISRAELIS LIVE IN THE APPROXIMATELY 150 RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITIES ON THE WEST BANK. WEST BANK SETTLER POPULATION CONTINUES TO GROW AT AN ANNUAL RATE OF ABOUT 10% -- THE FASTEST GROWTH IN ALL THE TERRITORIES. THE POPULATION OF THE 12 JEWISH NEIGHBORHOODS IN EXPANDED EAST JERUSALEM HAS GROWN BY 14% SINCE 1988, REACHING AN ESTIMATED 120,000. THE 15 SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP CURRENTLY HOUSE ABOUT 3,000 SETTLERS, A MODEST INCREASE SINCE 1988. ANOTHER 12,000 SETTLERS ARE ESTIMATED TO RESIDE IN 30 SETTLEMENTS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. SINCE 1988, THE SETTLER POPULATION IN THE GOLAN HAS GROWN ABOUT 10% ANNUALLY.

#### EXPANSION VS. ESTABLISHMENT

THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT FORGED BETWEEN IABOR AND LIKUD IN 1984 STRICTLY LIMITED THE NUMBER OF NEW SETTLEMENTS TO BE ESTABLISHED. DESPITE ITS POLICY STATEMENT SUPPORTING SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY, THE NARROW LIKUD-LED GOVERNMENT FORMED IN 1990 HAS GENERALLY CONTINUED THIS POLICY.

SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY HAS PROCEEDED APACE, HOWEVER. THE

ATTACHED GRAPH DEMONSTRATES THAT WHILE THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF NEW SETTLEMENTS HAS FALLEN OFF SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE 1984, THE RATE OF CONSTRUCTION OF NEW HOUSING UNITS HAS REMAINED FAIRLY CONSISTENT. FOCUS HAS BEEN ON THE EXPANSION OF EXISTING SETTLEMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN EXPANDED EAST JERUSALEM AND THE WEST BANK. ELEMENTS OF THIS EXPANSION INCLUDE BUILDING ON NEW SITES ADMINISTRATIVELY LINKED, BUT NOT CONTIGUOUS WITH, EXISTING SETTLEMENTS ("SUBURB" SETTLEMENTS: IN SOME CASES, SUCH "SUBURBS" ARE SEVERAL MILES DISTANT FROM EXISTING SETTLEMENTS); LARGE-SCALE CONSTRUCTION ON PREVIOUSLY ABANDONED OR NEARLY ABANDONED SITES; IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVIOUSLY APPROVED PLANS; AND EXTENDING THE MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES OF ESTABLISHED SETTLEMENTS. POPULATION FIGURES ARE NOT AS PRECISE AS THOSE AVAILABLE FOR HOUSING UNITS, BUT ALSO APPEAR TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE EXPANSION OF THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES CONTINUES TO GROW AT A FASTER RATE THAN THE NUMBER OF NEW SETTLEMENTS WOULD OTHERWISE INDICATE.

אאא, חוזם: 76

אל: רהמש/27

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 617, תא: 280291, זח: 1844, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

28.2.91

שמור/מידי

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: ר' יחידת הקונגרס

הנדון: מליארד דולר סיוע חרום בטחוני

1. הנהגות הבתים וחברי קונגרס בודדים מנסים להגיע לנוסחא מקובלת על הממשל כדי להביא לאישור הסיוע הבטחוני ללא ברקים ורעמים פוליטיים בין ה"גבעה" לבין הממשל ובין ארה"ב לבין ישראל.

2. המסר אשר ה"גבעה" מעבירה לממשל הוא כפול: צרכיה של ישראל - בתחום ההוצאות הבטחוניות הקשורות ישירות ל"סופת המדבר" - ותפקודה מאז אוגוסט מצדיקים היענות לבקשתה שאינה מוגזמת.

3. הסיוע אשר ניתן למדינות אחרות; רווחי הנפט הניכרים של מפיקות הנפט הערביות, עיסקת הנשק הסעודית הראשונה וזו הצפויה, מחזקים תחושה זו.

4. הסכום הנדון - מליארד אחד - מתקבל כסביר, בתקופה של הוצאות עתק כגון: 50-100 מליארד דולרים השנה לכסוי נזקי ה-L ו-S, 3 מליארד דולרים לחודש ל"מגן המדבר" וכמליארד ליום בזמן "סופת המדבר".

5. מנהיגי הרפובליקנים מבהירים לממשל כי עמדה שלילית (כפי שבוטאה ע"י דארמן בשימוע בסנאט) משחקת לידי הדמוקרטים, אשר חלקם (כך טוענים הרפובליקנים) יפגינו אהדתם לישראל ע"י תמיכה בבקשתה לסיוע, גם כדי להפריך הרושם השלילי שנוצר ע"י הצבעתם בנושא ההרשאה להכריז מלחמה על עיראק.

יורם אטינגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור, מצפא, @ (מקשח/משהבט)

סססס



אאאא, חוזם: 40285

אל: רהמש/3237

מ-: המשרד, תא: 280291, זח: 1451, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

63976

סודי/מיד

103.01

אל: וושינגטון/הציר. עמרני

דע: השגריר/אדיס

הנדון: פגישת לובראני - השגריר בראון 27/2 השתתפו סגן השגריר ודיבון שרשם.

1. לובראני עדכן השגריר בתכן המסר/בקשה של הנשיא מנגיסטו (הוברק בנפרד) ובפניה אלינו בנושא איי הדחלק.

הוסיף שיתכן והאתיופים רואים בנוכחות רוסית באיים מכשול ליחסים עם ארה"ב ומכאן שמעוניינים בהסרתו של מכשול זה או לפחות לתת לאמריקאים את הרושם שמעוניינים בהסרת המכשול על מנת להפיק מכך תועלת מדינית ביחסים בין שתי המדינות.

לובראני סיפר ששאל את קאסה אם העניין הועבר לידיעת האמריקאים. תשובת קאסה היתה שהוא מניח שהאמריקאים מודעים להתפתחות זו בשל יכולת ההאזנה והמעקב שלהם באזור. לובראני ציין שהודיע לקאסה שיעביר מידע זה לאמריקאים. לובראני הבהיר לבראון שלנו אין עניין באיים והוסיף שאנו מעוניינים לדעת כיצד הם, האמריקאים, מסבירים את הפרשיה הנ"ל.

2. לובראני הרחיב הדיבור בסוגית היחסים הבילטרליים וקצב יציאת היהודים. למרות הקשיים שהאתיופים מערימים אנו עושים הכל כדי שהטפסים ימולאו כנדרש ללא ויכוחים. עתה אנו יכולים לאמר בכל הבטחון שלאתיופים כוונה לחזור למדיניות של עיכובים ומכאן החשש שמספר היוצאים החודש ירד. אנו כרגע בשלב של בדיקה עצמית, לודא שטענותינו באשר להצקותיהם מוצדקות. לאחר מכן קרוב לודאי שנזדקק לשירותיהם הטובים כדי שיבהירו לאתיופים שיש כאן חזרה מהבטחות הנשיא מנגיסטו להרמן כהן ולנו שכל הזכאים יצאו ללא כל הגבלה על המספרים.

לובראני ביקש להדגיש שמימד הזמן מקבל משנה חשיבות מאחר ושהייה ממושכת של היהודים באדיס בתנאי מצוקה מחריפים בעית התפוררות התא המשפחתי והתפרצות מגיפות ובכללן איידס. מכאן שזו קריאת הצלה להוציאם מהר ולא משיקולים פוליטיים. אנו מבקשים להבהיר לאתיופים שלא יוכלו לעשות שימוש פוליטי במצוקת יהודי אדיס. מכאן שמבקש לחשוב יחד עם האמריקאים, שתלות האתיופים בהם גדולה, על דרכים לפתור בעיה זו. לא נדרשת פעולה עתה אך נרצה לתאם עמדות.

מסר על מה ששמענו מה-AAEJ שהרמן כהן ישקול ביקור באדיס לאחר השלמת מילוי הטפסים.

להערכתנו תושלם העבודה (הטפסים) עד תחילת אפריל ואז הכדור יהיה במגרש האתיופי ואולי אז יהיה זה הזמן גם ללחץ אמריקאי.

3. בנושא בקשות אתיופיה לסיוע צבאי בעקבות מתקפות המורדים סבור לובראני ששגרירם מבין עכשיו ששום התפתחות לא תביא לשינוי בעמדתנו בכל הקשור לאספקת נשק. מצד שני האתיופים הלכו כבר דרך ארוכה בכל הקשור לשיחות עם המורדים בווינגטון כשנראה שהעמדות הנוקשות של ה-EPLF הן שהביאו להפסקת השיחות. האתיופים טוענים שזהו סימן לכך שכוונותיהם לא רציניות וכל שמעוניינים הוא לבחון כיצד יסתיים משבר המפרץ, מה יקרה למקורות המימון שלהם. אך על מנת שלא להאשים אותם בליבוי מעשי האלימות הם מעודדים את ה-TPLF לפעול.

יתכן שאם ה-EPLF ידעו שקיימת אי שביעות רצון אמריקאית מעמדותיהם והם

יתבקשו להפסיק הסתת ה- TPLF לפעול יהיה בכך כדי להפחית מהלחצים האתיופיים עלינו בכל הקשור לסיוע צבאי. אחרת קיים החשש שהקיצונים במשטרו של מנגיסטו יחליטו לחזור לקו הנוקשה והאליים. אין בדברים אלה משום לחץ על האמריקאים אך נסיון זה להעביר מחשבותינו לאמריקאים הוא אולי הדבר היעיל ביותר שאנו יכו לים לעשות עתה עבור האתיופיים.

4. השגריר בראון. הדיווחים שקיבל מוושנינגטון מצביעים שהשיחות היו די טובות. יש להיזהר מאופטימיות יתרה. אין פריצת דרך אך כבר יש אור בקצה המינהרה. הוגשו כמה ניירות עמדה והיתה הסכמה לגבי מפגש נוסף. כן סיפר שוושנינגטון איננה מופתעת מההתפרצות המחודשת של מעשי האלימות. את הסתייגותם ממהלכם של ה- EPLF הבהירו לארגון היטב והדגישו שבדרך זו לא ישיגו דבר. לעומת זאת מידת השפעתם על ה- TPLF קטנה אך ינסו לפעול באמצעות האיטלקים.

ציין שהאריתראים אמרו לאמריקאים שהם יהיו מוכנים להשתתפות רוסית בשיחות אלא שממאתיופיה הודיעה שהדבר לא בא בחשבון.

מא'פ 1/מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, הדס, מאפ1, בנצור,  
מצפא, @ (לוברני), @ (רם)

טסט

אאא, חוזם: 39788  
אל: רהמש/3210  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 280291, חז: 0904, מ: סג: שמ,  
בבב  
שמור/מידי  
103.55

אל: וושינגטון - ציר לקונגרס

הנדון: סיוע חירום - מכתב הסנטורים. למברק 1131

1. ברכות על המכתב.

2. שמנו לב במיוחד להעדרות ווארן רדמן מרשימת החתומים. נודה להסבר  
סתייגותו, בייחוד לאור הערכתך שהוא עשוי להתברג לעניינינו כמחליף לרודי  
בושביץ.

מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן,  
כלכליתב', אוצר

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 39992  
אל: רהמש/3219  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 280291, זח: 1225, דח: מ, סג: בל,  
בבב  
בלמ'ס/מיד

אל: וושינגטון

אנא העבירו מכתב הרב הראשי למענו:

לנשיא ארה"ב,  
השם ישמרהו ויחיהו

שא שלום וברכה מירושלים בפורים אשר הוא יום שמחה לישראל שנהפך לנו מאבל  
ליום טוב ומאפלה לאורה.

הנני שולח ברכה מקרב לב לאיש מורם מעם שליח הקדוש ברוך הוא להשמיד רשע  
מן העולם ולהרבות שלום ו'אשר נתן לך לב חכם ונבון'. (מלכים א' ג').

עלה והצלח ויהי השם עימך,

מרדכי אליהו  
הראשון לציון  
הרב הראשי לישראל

עד כאן.

מצפ'א

נפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, טקס

סססס



אאאא, חוזם: 40162

אל: רהמש/3226

מ-: המשרד, תא: 280291, זח: 1355, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבבב

שמור/בהול לבוקר

אל: וושינגטון-שגריר, ציר

הנדון: ביקור בייקר

1. שגריר ארה"ב ביקר הבוקר (28.2) אצל ס/מנכ"ל צפ"א ופר'ן והעביר אליו באורח פורמלי את נוסח נאום הנשיא בדבר השהיית האש במלחמת המפרץ.

2. אישר את כוונת המזכיר לבקר בישראל, בהוסיפו כי טרם קיבל פרטים לגבי עתוי ומשך הביקור. להערכתו יתקיים לקראת אמצע השבוע הבא ויארך עד כדי 24 שעות בלבד. באשר להמשך המסלול משער בראון שבייקר יבקר בכווית, סעודיה במצרים ואולי בסוריה. לדעתו ייתכנו גם תחנות באירופה (פריס, לונדון).

3. בנצור אמר שנשמח לקבל את המזכיר בישראל בצינו כי כמובן מאליו יהיה שר החוץ מארחו. כ'כ הציע שאם יתאפשר הזמן, מן הראוי להקדיש שתיים, -שלוש לסיוור(אולי מוטס), הואיל וזה ביקורו הראשון של המזכיר בארץ.

מנהל מצפ"א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס



אאאא, חוזם: 40522  
אל: רהמ"ש/3247  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 594, תא: 280291, חז: 1010, מ: סג: בל,  
בבב  
בלמ"ס/מיידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

THE WHITE HOUSE SPEECH BY PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH  
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: KUWAIT IS LIBERATED. IRAQ'S ARMY IS  
DEFEATED. OUR MILITARY OBJECTIVES ARE MET. KUWAIT IS ONCE MORE IN  
THE HANDS OF KUWAITIS IN CONTROL OF THEIR OWN DESTINY.

WE SHARE IN THEIR JOY, A JOY TEMPERED ONLY BY OUR COMPASSION  
FOR THEIR ORDEAL. TONIGHT THE KUWAITI FLAG ONCE AGAIN FLIES ABOVE  
THE CAPITAL OF A FREE AND SOVEREIGN NATION. AND THE AMERICAN FLAG  
FLIES ABOVE OUR EMBASSY.

SEVEN MONTHS AGO AMERICA AND THE WORLD DREW A LINE IN THE  
SAND. WE DECLARED THAT THE AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT WOULD NOT  
STAND. AND TONIGHT AMERICA AND THE WORLD HAVE KEPT THEIR WORD.

THIS IS NOT A TIME OF EUPHORIA. IT'S CERTAINLY NOT A TIME TO  
GLOAT. BUT IT IS A TIME OF PRIDE; PRIDE IN OUR TROOPS, PRIDE IN THE  
FRIENDS WHO STOOD WITH US IN THE CRISIS, PRIDE IN OUR NATION AND THE  
PEOPLE WHO'S STRENGTH AND RESOLVE MADE VICTORY QUICK, DECISIVE AND  
JUST. AND SOON WE WILL OPEN WIDE OUR ARMS TO WELCOME BACK HOME TO  
AMERICA OUR MAGNIFICENT FIGHTING FORCES.

NO ONE COUNTRY CAN CLAIM THIS VICTORY AS ITS OWN. IT WAS NOT  
ONLY A VICTORY FOR KUWAIT, BUT A VICTORY FOR ALL THE COALITION  
PARTNERS. THIS IS A VICTORY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, FOR ALL  
MANKIND, FOR THE RULE OF LAW, AND FOR WHAT IS RIGHT.

AFTER CONSULTING WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHENEY, THE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, GENERAL POWELL, AND OUR  
COALITION PARTNERS I AM PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE THAT AT MIDNIGHT TONIGHT  
-- EASTERN STANDARD TIME -- EXACTLY 100 HOURS SINCE GROUND  
OPERATIONS COMMENCED AND SIX WEEKS SINCE THE START OF OPERATION  
DESERT STORM, ALL UNITED STATES AND COALITION FORCES WILL SUSPEND  
OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS. IT IS UP TO IRAQ WHETHER THIS  
SUSPENSION ON THE PART OF THE COALITION BECOMES A PERMANENT CEASE-  
FIRE.

COALITION POLITICAL AND MILITARY TERMS FOR A FORMAL CEASE-  
FIRE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS. IRAQ MUST RELEASE  
IMMEDIATELY ALL COALITION PRISONERS OF WAR, THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS,  
AND THE REMAINS OF ALL WHO HAVE FALLEN. IRAQ MUST RELEASE ALL  
KUWAITI DETAINEES. IRAQ ALSO MUST INFORM KUWAITI AUTHORITIES OF THE  
LOCATION AND NATURE OF ALL LAND AND SEA MINES. IRAQ MUST COMPLY  
FULLY WITH ALL RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.  
THIS INCLUDES A RESCINDING OF IRAQ'S AUGUST DECISION TO ANNEX



KUWAIT. AND ACCEPTABLE -- AND ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF IRAQ'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PAY COMPENSATION FOR THE LOSS, DAMAGE AND INJURY ITS AGGRESSION HAS CAUSED.

THE COALITION CALLS UPON THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO DESIGNATE MILITARY COMMANDERS TO MEET, WITHIN 48 HOURS, WITH THEIR COALITION COUNTERPARTS AT A PLACE IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS, TO BE SPECIFIED, TO ARRANGE FOR MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. FURTHER, I HAVE ASKED SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER TO REQUEST THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MEET TO FORMULATE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS WAR TO BE ENDED.

THIS SUSPENSION OF OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS IS CONTINGENT UPON IRAQ'S NOT FIRING UPON ANY COALITION FORCES, AND NOT LAUNCHING SCUD MISSILES AGAINST ANY OTHER COUNTRY. IF IRAQ VIOLATES THESE TERMS, COALITION FORCES WILL BE FREE TO RESUME MILITARY OPERATIONS.

AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY I HAVE SAID TO THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ THAT OUR QUARREL WAS NOT WITH THEM, BUT INSTEAD WITH THEIR LEADERSHIP AND ABOVE ALL WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. THIS REMAINS THE CASE. YOU, THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ, ARE NOT OUR ENEMY. WE DO NOT SEEK YOUR DESTRUCTION. WE HAVE TREATED YOUR POW'S WITH KINDNESS. COALITION FORCES FOUGHT THIS WAR ONLY AS A LAST RESORT AND LOOKED FORWARD TO THE DAY WHEN IRAQ IS LEAD BY PEOPLE PREPARED TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS.

WE MUST NOW BEGIN TO LOOK BEYOND VICTORY AND WAR. WE MUST THE CHALLENGE OF SECURING THE PEACE. IN THE FUTURE, AS BEFORE, WE WILL CONSULT WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS.

WE'VE ALREADY DONE A GOOD DEAL OF THINKING AND PLANNING FOR THE POST-WAR PERIOD, AND SECRETARY BAKER HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO CONSULT WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS ON THE REGION'S CHALLENGES.

THERE CAN BE AND WILL BE NO SOLELY AMERICAN ANSWER TO ALL THESE CHALLENGES. BUT WE CAN ASSIST AND SUPPORT THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION AND BE A CATALYST FOR PEACE. IN THIS SPIRIT, AS SECRETARY BAKER WILL GO TO THE REGION NEXT WEEK TO BEGIN A NEW ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS.


THIS WAR IS NOW BEHIND US. AHEAD OF US IS THE DIFFICULT TASK OF SECURING A POTENTIALLY HISTORIC PEACE.

TONIGHT, THOUGH, LET US BE PROUD OF WHAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED. LET US GIVE THANKS TO THOSE WHO RISKED THEIR LIVES. LET US NEVER FORGET THOSE WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES. MAY GOD BLESS OUR VALIANT MILITARY FORCES AND THEIR FAMILIES. AND LET US ALL REMEMBER THEM IN OUR PRAYERS.

GOOD NIGHT, AND MAY GOD BLESS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

עד כאן.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, סולטן, בנצור, מצפא, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)



# official text

## BUSH ANNOUNCES SUSPENSION OF WAR WITH IRAQ (Text: Bush Oval Office speech) (930)

Washington -- President Bush has announced that the Gulf coalition forces will suspend their assault at 12 midnight EST February 27 (0500 GMT February 28) to give Iraq an opportunity to work out a formal cease-fire.

Making a televised speech from the White House Oval Office at 9 p.m. EST (0200 GMT), Bush said the aim of the war, the liberation of Kuwait, had been achieved.

Bush warned that the coalition would resume the assault if Iraqis continue to fight or launch missiles at any country.

He set conditions for a formal cease-fire, including the immediate release of all coalition prisoners of war, third-country nationals, and the remains of all who have fallen, and all Kuwaiti detainees., plus compliance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Following is the text of Bush's speech:

(begin text)

Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military objectives are met. Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis, in control of their own destiny.

We share in their joy -- a joy tempered only by our compassion for their ordeal. Tonight the Kuwaiti flag once again flies above the capital of a free and sovereign nation. And the American flag flies above our embassy.

Seven months ago, America and the world drew a line in the sand. We declared that the aggression against Kuwait would not stand. And



United States Information Service  
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63432 Tel. 654338  
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, P.O.B. 920, 91008 Tel. 252376



tonight, America and the world have kept their word.

This is not a time of euphoria; certainly not a time to gloat. But it is a time of pride -- pride in our troops, pride in the friends who stood with us in the crisis, pride in our nation and the people whose strength and resolve made victory quick, decisive and just. And soon we will open wide our arms to welcome back home to America our magnificent fighting forces.

No one country can claim this victory as its own. It was not only a victory for Kuwait, but a victory for all the coalition partners. This is a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law, and for what is right.

After consulting with Secretary of Defense Cheney, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, and our coalition partners I am pleased to announce that at midnight tonight -- Eastern Standard Time -- exactly 100 hours since ground operations commenced and six weeks since the start of Desert Storm, all United States and coalition forces will suspend offensive combat operations. It is up to Iraq whether this suspension on the part of the coalition becomes a permanent cease-fire.

Coalition political and military terms for a formal cease-fire include the following requirements. Iraq must release immediately all coalition prisoners of war, third-country nationals, and the remains of all who have fallen. Iraq must release all Kuwaiti detainees. Iraq also must inform Kuwaiti authorities of the location and nature of all land and sea mines. Iraq must comply fully with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. This includes a rescinding of Iraq's August decision to annex Kuwait. And acceptance in principle of Iraq's responsibility to pay compensation for the loss, damage and injury its aggression has caused.

The coalition calls upon the Iraqi government to designate military commanders to meet, within 48 hours, with their coalition counterparts at a place in the theater of operations, to be specified, to arrange for military aspects of the cease-fire. Further, I have asked Secretary of State Baker to request that the United Nations Security Council meet to formulate the necessary arrangements for this war to be ended.

This suspension of offensive combat operations is contingent upon Iraq's not firing upon any coalition forces, and not launching Scud missiles against any other country. If Iraq violates these terms, coalition forces will be free to resume military operations.

At every opportunity, I have said to the people of Iraq that our quarrel was not with them, but instead with their leadership and above all with Saddam Hussein. This remains the case. You, the people of Iraq, are not our enemy. We do not seek your destruction. We have treated your POWs with kindness. Coalition forces fought this war only as a last resort and looked forward to the day when Iraq is led by people prepared to live in peace with their neighbors.

We must now begin to look beyond victory and war. We must meet the

challenge of securing the peace. In the future, as before, we will consult with our coalition partners.

We've already done a good deal of thinking and planning for the post-war period, and Secretary Baker has already begun to consult with our coalition partners on the region's challenges.

There can be, and will be, no solely American answer to all these challenges. But we can assist and support the countries of the region and be a catalyst for peace. In this spirit, Secretary Baker will go to the region next week to begin a new round of consultations.

This war is now behind us. Ahead of us is the difficult task of securing a potentially historic peace.

Tonight, though, let us be proud of what we have accomplished. Let us give thanks to those who risked their lives. Let us never forget those who gave their lives. May God bless our valiant military forces and their families. And let us all remember them in our prayers.

Good night, and may God bless the United States of America.

(end text)  
NNNN



אאאא, חוזם: 39722  
אל: רהמש/ 3207  
מ-: ווש, נר: 2220, תא: 270291, זח: 2200, דח: מ, סג: סב,  
בבב  
סודי ביותר/ מיידי

אל : שה'ח

דע : שהב'ט  
רוה'מ

למכותבים בלבד וללא תפוצה נוספת

מאת: השגריר , וושינגטון

משיחה טלפונית עם סקורופט (271440)

בתשובה לשאלתי ציין סקורופט כי התביעות האמריקאיות כלפי עיראק, מה-22.2  
ללו באופן ברור הדרישה האולטימטיבית להמנע משיגור טילים ' ' לארצות  
אחרות ' ' (כלומר גם ישראל).

הוסיף שאחת הדרישות בעתיד תהיה שעיראק תשמיד את כל מצאי הארסנל הבלתי  
קונבנציונאלי שלה, כולל משגרים וטילים.

עד כאן. אודה על חיסיון הדברים.

שובל

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט)

סססס

# BUSH ANNOUNCES SUSPENSION OF COMBAT IN GULF WA

(Offers Iraq cease-fire terms)

By Alexander M. Sullivan

USIA White House Correspondent

Washington -- President Bush offered February 27 to end the 100-hour Gulf ground war provided Iraq bows to United Nations demands.

Speaking from the Oval Office to a nationwide television audience, the president said he was "pleased to announce that ... exactly 100 hours since ground operations commenced ... all United States and coalition forces will suspend offensive combat operations. It will be up to Iraq whether this suspension becomes a permanent cease-fire."

A senior administration official later told reporters Bush decided to make the evening address to the nation after his military advisers assured him in mid-afternoon that Iraq's "military backbone had been broken, that basically the artillery was gone, the tanks were gone, the heavy equipment was gone."

The suspension followed lightning-like strikes by armored and mechanized infantry units of the United States, France, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others in the 28-nation coalition, which swiftly breached formidable Iraqi fortifications and defeated an estimated 700,000-man Iraqi army. Military briefers said U.S. armored units defeated divisions of Iraq's elite military force, the vaunted Republican Guard, with comparative ease.

"Seven months ago America and the world drew a line in the sand," Bush said. "We declared that the aggression against Kuwait would not stand, and tonight America and the world have kept their word."

The president said the liberation of Kuwait and defeat of Iraq's army opened the way for considering post-war objectives.

"This is not a time for euphoria," he said, "certainly not a time to gloat."

Bush said, however, the United States could have pride "in our troops, in the friends who stood with us, in our nation and the people whose strength and resolve made victory quick, decisive and just."

The administration official said Bush had met with his military and security aides at 2:30 p.m. February 27, shortly after his session with British Foreign Secretary Hurd. Included in the meeting were Brent Scowcroft, Bush's national security adviser; General Colin Powell, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff;

Defense Secretary Cheney, and White House chief of staff John Sununu.

During the Oval Office session Powell telephoned General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of Operation Desert Storm, to make sure the steps Bush was to announce were "militarily sound," the official said.

In effect, he said, Powell and Schwarzkopf agreed on the terms for the suspension of combat operations.

Bush made the suspension contingent on immediate release of all coalition prisoners of war, third-country nationals and Kuwaiti detainees. Echoing his remarks of February 22, the eve of the ground campaign, the president also said Iraq must inform Kuwait of the location and nature of all land and sea mines and comply with all relevant U.N. resolutions.

"This includes a rescinding of Iraq's August decision to annex Kuwait and acceptance in principle of Iraq's responsibility to pay compensation for the loss, damage and injury its aggression caused," Bush said.

Bush said Iraq should designate within 48 hours a set of military commanders to work out with coalition military officers "the military aspects of a cease-fire."

Coalition forces, the president said, would be free to resume military operations if Iraq launched a Scud missile against any country or fired on coalition troops.

The administration official said that as a result of the unexpected swiftness of allied success on the battlefield in Iraq and Kuwait, Bush felt "the time was right to make the speech. He wanted to stop the shooting as soon as possible. He didn't want any unnecessary killing if it could be at all avoided. This looked like the earliest possible moment that could be done."

The official said Bush had been assured by his commanders that Iraq's "military backbone had been broken." The president was told there would be pockets of resistance and "stragglers that got through the wire, but as a fighting force, it was over" for the Iraqi troops.

"He wanted to be able to tell the American people," the official said, that their loved ones "were out of harm's way and that they would be coming home as soon as possible."

The official said military authorities in the field would still have to analyze the situation on the ground. "We won't know for several days when the first troops will be coming home," he said.



The stage for the president's dramatic announcement was set August 2 when Iraqi Republican Guard units rolled across the border into Kuwait. Within days, Baghdad had proclaimed the annexation of Kuwait as Iraq's Province 19. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein seized as hostages and later grudgingly released thousands of foreign nationals. Before the bloody end of his aggression, he had fouled the Persian Gulf with deliberate oil spills, had ordered a scorched-earth policy in Kuwait, and had apparently born responsibility for a series of atrocities inside Kuwait.

He had also set in motion an unprecedented international undertaking to force him to disgorge his illicit gains, first through enactment of economic sanctions, then through the use of extensive air attacks on his assets in Kuwait and Iraq, and finally in the ground campaign.

Along the way, the United States and the Soviet Union cooperated in the United Nations and in close bilateral consultations. Superpower agreement energized the peacekeeping function of the United Nations, opening the prospect of what Bush has called a "new world order" to be marked by the rule of law.

NNNN

BUSH ANNOUNCES SUSPENSION OF WAR WITH IRAQ

(Text: Bush Oval Office speech 2/27/91)

Washington -- President Bush has announced that the Gulf coalition forces will suspend their assault at 12 midnight EST February 27 (0500 GMT February 28) to give Iraq an opportunity to work out a formal cease-fire.

Making a televised speech from the White House Oval Office at 9 p.m. EST (0200 GMT), Bush said the aim of the war, the liberation of Kuwait, had been achieved.

Bush warned that the coalition would resume the assault if Iraqis continue to fight or launch missiles at any country.

He set conditions for a formal cease-fire, including the immediate release of all coalition prisoners of war, thirdcountry nationals, and the remains of all who have fallen, and all Kuwaiti detainees., plus compliance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Following is the text of Bush's speech:

(begin text)

Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military objectives are met. Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis, in control of their own destiny.

We share in their joy -- a joy tempered only by our compassion for their ordeal. Tonight the Kuwaiti flag once again flies above the capital of a free and sovereign nation. And the American flag flies above our embassy.

Seven months ago, America and the world drew a line in the sand. We declared that the aggression against Kuwait would not stand. And tonight, America and the world have kept their word.

This is not a time of euphoria; certainly not a time to gloat. But it is a time of pride -- pride in our troops, pride in the friends who stood with us in the crisis, pride in our nation, and the people whose strength and resolve made victory quick, decisive and just. And soon we will open wide our arms to welcome back home to America our magnificent fighting forces.

No one country can claim this victory as its own. It was not only a victory for Kuwait, but a victory for all the coalition partners. This is a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law, and for what is right.

After consulting with Secretary of Defense Cheney, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, and our coalition partners I am pleased to announce that at midnight tonight



-Eastern Standard Time -- exactly 100 hours since ground operations commenced and six weeks since the start of Desert Storm; all United States and coalition forces will suspend offensive combat operations. It is up to Iraq whether this suspension on the part of the coalition becomes a permanent cease-fire.

Coalition political and military terms for a formal cease-fire include the following requirements. Iraq must release immediately all coalition prisoners of war, third-country nationals, and the remains of all who have fallen. Iraq must release all Kuwaiti detainees. Iraq also must inform Kuwaiti authorities of the location and nature of all land and sea mines. Iraq must comply fully with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. This includes a rescinding of Iraq's August decision to annex Kuwait. And acceptance in principle of Iraq's responsibility to pay compensation for the loss, damage and injury its aggression has caused.

The coalition calls upon the Iraqi government to designate military commanders to meet, within 48 hours, with their coalition counterparts at a place in the theater of operations, to be specified; to arrange for military aspects of the ceasefire. Further, I have asked Secretary of State Baker to request that the United Nations Security Council meet to formulate the necessary arrangements for this war to be ended.

This suspension of offensive combat operations is contingent upon Iraq's not firing upon any coalition forces, and not launching Scud missiles against any other country. If Iraq violates these terms, coalition forces will be free to resume military operations.

At every opportunity, I have said to the people of Iraq that our quarrel was not with them, but instead with their leadership and above all with Saddam Hussein. This remains the case. You, the people of Iraq, are not our enemy. We do not seek your destruction. We have treated your POWs with kindness. Coalition forces fought this war only as a last resort and looked forward to the day when Iraq is led by people prepared to live in peace with their neighbors.

We must now begin to look beyond victory and war. We must meet the challenge of securing the peace. In the future, as before, we will consult with our coalition partners.

We've already done a good deal of thinking and planning for the post-war period, and Secretary Baker has already begun to consult with our coalition partners on the region's challenges.

There can be, and will be, no solely American answer to all these challenges. But we can assist and support the countries of the region and be a catalyst for peace. In this spirit,

Secretary Baker will go to the region next week to begin a new round of consultations.

This war is now behind us. Ahead of us is the difficult task of securing a potentially historic peace.

Tonight, though, let us be proud of what we have accomplished. Let us give thanks to those who risked their lives. Let us never forget those who gave their lives. May God bless our valiant military forces and their families. And let us all remember them in our prayers.

Good night, and may God bless the United States of America.

(end text)

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון  
טופס מברק

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1134 - נח

611 - גלחון

בלמ"ס/מידי

תאריך: 26 בפברואר 1991

שעת חיבור: 11.30

אלו תסוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

בהמשך לסקירת התקשורת, מצ"ב טור של הנר קיסניג'ר ב"וושינגטון פוסט" וטור של עמוס פרלמוטר ב"וושינגטון טיימס" על 'הסדר החדש' שניתן לצפות במזה"ת לאחר סיום המלחמה.

עיתונות

(28)  
שחה (2) סשהח (1) רהמ (1) מנכל (1) ממנכל (1) בנצור (1) מצפא (2) סולטן (1) רביב (1)  
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Henry Kissinger

## False Dreams of a New World Order

America has never been comfortable with fighting wars for limited objectives. World War I was cast as the war to end all wars; World War II was to usher in a new era of permanent peace to be monitored by the United Nations. Now, the Gulf War is justified in similar terms deeply embedded in the American tradition. In his speech of Jan. 16 announcing hostilities with Iraq, President Bush described the opportunity for building a new world order "where the rule of law . . . governs the conduct of nations," and "in which a credible United Nations can use its preeminent role to fulfill the promises and the vision of the U.N.'s founders."

I have greatly admired President Bush's skill and fortitude in building the coalition. But the new world order cannot possibly fulfill the idealistic expectations expressed by the president; I doubt indeed whether they accurately describe what happened during the Gulf crisis.

American idealism was most eloquently formulated by Woodrow Wilson in his attempt to replace the ever-shifting alignments of the balance of power with an overriding common purpose. In Wilson's words, peace depends "not on a balance of power but on a community of power. . . . Nations agree that there shall be but one combination and that is the combination of all against the wrongdoer." In this view, the conduct of international affairs follows objective criteria, not unlike those of the law. All nations are expected to respond to challenges to international order from a common perspective and by united opposition.

That hope was disappointed in the League of Nations and later by the United Nations. And not by accident. While every country has some

interest in elaborating a concept that it can invoke in its own defense, the willingness to run risks varies with history, geography, power, in other words, with national interest.

Despite the near unanimity of U.N. decisions, historians will in all likelihood treat the Gulf crisis as a special case rather than as a watershed. An unusual set of circumstances combined to foster consensus. The Soviet Union, wracked by domestic crises and needing foreign economic assistance, had no stomach for conflict with the United States. But this does not mean that Soviet objectives in the Middle East in the postwar period will necessarily be identical or even compatible with those of the United States. China, though wary of superpower military action, sought to demonstrate the advantages of practical cooperation despite Tiananmen Square and ideological conflict. For Beijing considers Washington an important partner in China's determination to resist either Soviet or Japanese hegemony in Asia.

France was torn by conflicting emotions: concern over the reaction of the 5 million Muslims resident in France, its quest for pre-emptive status in the Arab world and the desire to keep America linked to France should its nightmare of German resurgence come true. Thus, France for once resolved its ambivalence in favor of our view. But it would be unwise to treat a practical decision as a philosophical commitment. Among the permanent members of the Security Council, only Great Britain held views practically identical with those of the United States.

*"We do not have the resources for domination. . . .  
So we are brought back to a concept maligned in  
much of America's intellectual history—the  
balance of power."*

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Kissinger

The Gulf states and Saudi Arabia saw their very survival at stake and were not much concerned with the principle involved in safeguarding their existence. Syria's President Hafez Assad has been in mortal conflict with Saddam Hussein for 10 years preceding the Gulf crisis and will likely continue to struggle if Saddam remains in office after the war. As for Egypt, the rulers of the Nile competed with the rulers of Mesopotamia for 4,000 years before the doctrine of collective security was invented. The Persian-Arab conflict is of more recent vintage as history is measured in the Middle East; it is only 2,000 years old. This is why Iran will support the U.N. resolution only until it is manifestly weakened. After that Iran will probably continue its hostile quest for dominance in the Gulf by pressuring America to leave.

Even during the current crisis the principle of collective security was not applied uniformly. Israel was urged nearly unanimously not to avail itself of its right of self-defense under the U.N. Charter despite unprovoked Iraqi missile attacks on Israeli civilians. The nations of the world seemed afraid that the Arab members of the coalition would change sides.

Finally, two special nonrecurring circumstances facilitated the creation of the global alliance. The first was the obvious character of Saddam Hussein. Another aggressor is unlikely to present so unambiguous a challenge.

The key element was American leadership—symbolized by the extraordinary set of personal relations between President Bush and world leaders. Without that American role, the world community would almost certainly have reached different conclusions.

None of this is to depreciate the extraordinary achievement of the administration in coalition-building. It is to warn against counting on being able to repeat this pattern in the future.

Most poignantly, American preeminence cannot last. Had Kuwait been invaded two years later, the American defense budget would have declined so as to preclude a massive overseas deployment. Nor can the American economy indefinitely sustain a policy of essentially unilateral global interventionism—indeed, we had to seek a foreign subsidy of at least \$50 billion to sustain this crisis. Therefore, neither the United States nor foreign nations should treat the concept of the new world order as an institutionalization of recent practices.

Any reflection about a new world order must begin with noting its difference from the Cold War period. During the Cold War the principal fissure was between East and West. The ideological conflict led to a more or less uniform perception of the threat, at least among the industrial democracies which produce 72 percent of the world's GNP. The military and—for the greater period of time—technological predominance of the United States also shaped a common military policy. Economically, interdependence moved from slogan to reality.

The world into which we are moving will be infinitely more complex. Ideological challenges will be fewer; the danger of nuclear war with the Soviet Union will be sharply reduced. On the other hand, no one can know how well Soviet command and control arrangements for nuclear weapons will withstand domestic up-

heaval. Elsewhere, local conflicts will be more likely and, given modern technology, more lethal. The collapse of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the loosening of the Western Alliance have unleashed national rivalries not seen since World War I. The post-colonial period has spawned fanatical fundamentalist forces very hard for the comfortable, if not snug, industrial democracies to comprehend, much less to master. Economic rivalry among Japan, which is growing to superpower status, the European Community, which is becoming increasingly assertive, and the United States will no longer be restrained by overriding security concerns. The confluence of these elements will characterize the new era as one of turmoil, and will require major adjustments in how we think about international relations.

United States policy makers face a number of imperatives:

• They must recognize that it is not possible to deal with every issue simultaneously. America must be selective, husbanding its resources as well as its credibility. Three levels of threat must be distinguished: those we must be prepared to deal with alone if necessary, those we will deal with only in association with other nations and those threats that do not sufficiently challenge American interests to justify military intervention.

• They need to reexamine alliance policy and reallocate responsibility. Countries associated with us must be brought to understand that the United States' armed forces are not a mercenary force for hire. The special circumstances of the Persian Gulf left President Bush no choice except a disproportionate assumption of risk by the United States. As a general rule in the future, however, American military forces should be employed only for causes for which we are prepared to pay ourselves. That, in fact, is a good working definition of American national interest.

United States policy makers must recognize that the new world order cannot be an American imposition. America cannot lead a global system of community where it exists. But it has an opportunity for creating new limited communities based on a genuine sense of shared purpose. This is why part

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the most creative—if least well known—foreign policy initiative of the Bush administration is its effort to create a Western Hemispheric Free Trade Area, beginning with Mexico, Canada and the United States.

The list is illustrative, not exhaustive. In the end, the deepest challenge to America will be philosophical: how to define order. History so far has shown us only two roads to international stability: domination or equilibrium. We do not have the resources for domination, nor is such a course consonant with our values. So we are brought back to a concept glimpsed in much of America's intellectual history—the balance of power.

Of course it is possible to define the issue away by postulating the absence of clashing interests. I would welcome such an outcome, but find little support for it either in history or in the above analysis.

There is no escaping the irony that our triumph in the Cold War has projected us into a world where we must operate by maxims that historically have made Americans uncomfortable. To many Americans, the most objectionable feature of the balance of power is its apparent moral neutrality. For the balance of power is concerned above all with preventing one power or group of powers from achieving hegemony. Winston Churchill described it: "The policy of England takes no account of which nation it is that seeks the overlordship of Europe. It is concerned solely with whoever is the strongest or the potentially dominating tyrant. It is a law of public policy which we are following, and not a mere expedient dictated by accidental circumstances or likes or dislikes..."

A policy based on such concepts knows few permanent enemies and few permanent friends. In the current Gulf crisis it would avoid branding Iraq as forever beyond the pale. Rather, it would seek to balance rivalries as old as history by serving for an equilibrium between Iraq, Iran, Syria and other regional powers. In North-east Asia it would seek to maintain equilibrium between China, Japan and the Soviet Union. In Europe, where the old balance has collapsed, the shape of its successor will depend on the

*"The new world order cannot possibly fulfill the idealistic expectations expressed by the president."*

outcome of the Soviet Union's internal struggles, especially on the Soviet capacity to continue its historic role in Europe.

These balances all need a balancer—a role the United States can no longer play entirely by itself and in some circumstances may not choose to exercise at all. But it needs criteria to establish priorities.

It is a paradox that no nation is in a better position to contribute to a new world order than the United States: it is domestically cohesive, its economy is less vulnerable to outside forces, its military capacity for the foreseeable future is still the world's largest and most effective. Our challenge is the price of success: triumph in the Cold War has produced a world requiring adjustment of traditional concepts. But the price of success is one for which most other nations would envy us.

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AMOS PERLMUTTER

# What will rise from the rubble?

*Will there be a new order? It is not likely, nor is it likely that the Middle East will look very different from the way it is now constituted.*

There is a great deal of hopeful talk and speculation about what will happen in the Middle East with the termination of the Gulf war — as if with the certain defeat and perhaps passing, physically or politically, of Saddam Hussein, an atmosphere will be created in which the region's long intractable problems can be solved.

The termination of the war means the pursuit of larger political goals for the victors, goals that will certainly go beyond the liberation of Kuwait. President Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III have talked often about creating a new order in the region, although the dimensions and shape of that order remain vague.

Will there be a new order? It is not likely, nor is it likely that the Mid-

dle East will look very different from the way it is now constituted. The changes that are possible, as opposed to the expectations raised, may even come in surprising ways.

Among the major issues that can reasonably be expected to lend themselves to solution is the establishment of a balance of power in the Gulf at the end of the present war. The structuring of a new Iraqi regime, and one that will certainly be militarily weaker, looks hopeful, especially with the participation of the Gulf Arabs. It is wise to remember that after the failure and death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, an atmosphere was created in which Anwar Sadat could thrive.

After the war, the ties between the United States and the Gulf Arabs will immeasurably be strengthened as the United States proved its commitment to the survival of the Saudi dynasty beyond doubt. Egypt will once again become the linchpin between the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Syria, while it has

achieved domination over Beirut and most of Lebanon, also gained a number of bargaining chips and even a certain amount of respectability at relatively little cost by joining the coalition against Saddam.

These are small and predictable gains and outcomes. Some things will not happen, now or in the immediate future. The gap between the haves and the have-nots, a continuing source of resentment through the Middle East, will not be measurably closed by oil sheikdoms. Nor should we expect any sudden move toward democratization in the Gulf

see PERLMUTTER, page G4

Amos Perlmutter is a professor of political science and sociology at American University and editor of *The Journal of Strategic Studies*.

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# PERLMUTTER

From page G1

states, who will reward their allies financially but not their people politically.

The one long-standing conflict in the Middle East — the protracted Israeli-Palestinian struggle — offers no immediate solution, nor even signs that one is in the offing any time soon, even though Saddam tried mightily to link the Gulf war to the Palestinian problem.

There is much talk that the Palestinians, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat and the West Bank leadership were all discredited by their support and embrace of Saddam. True, the PLO's credit and reputation is at a low point, but it's doubtful that the survival-prone Mr. Arafat will be renounced by the Palestinian diaspora or by the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. He remains the only visible and recognized leader of the Palestinians, and the PLO is the champion of the cause. Whether the



United States and the Israelis like it or not, the PLO remains the only official candidate for future negotiations as a representative of the Palestinians. The war and its outcomes have not changed that situation. The war's chief losers, the Palestinians, will desperately cling to Mr. Arafat and their PLO.

Israel will emerge from the war with closer ties to the United States and a hardened attitude, backed by bargaining power it gained through its remarkable show of restraint in the face of continued Scud missile attacks. One victim of the Scuds was the political viability of moderation

in Israel. Its main concern now will be the settlement of Soviet Jews, which Mr. Gorbachev's drift to the right and toward dictatorship makes only more urgent. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has already anticipated and stifled all the predictable positions from the foreign offices in the United States, England and Saudi Arabia. There will be no negotiations with the PLO, no international conference, no independent Palestinian state. In short, there will be no foreseeable resolution of the Palestinian problem.

Mr. Shamir's position will be that there can be and will be no solution

to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict before there is an Arab-Israeli solution — that is, a formal peace treaty with an Arab state; that is, peace with Jordan, Syria or even Saudi Arabia.

Who is a likely partner for Israel? The answer is surprising. Jordan's King Hussein, often considered a likely candidate in the past, can hardly afford to be one today, even if he wanted to, caught as he is by the Palestinians, radicals and Jordanian fundamentalists in his country. Saudi Arabia may emerge from the war as the region's strongest power and might be encouraged by the United States to send out feelers toward Israel, but it is also sorely threatened by its new radicalized and restless masses.

Syria, oddly enough, looks promising. Certainly, it looks to be the only sensible candidate. A pragmatic and tacit alliance between Syria and Israel is not out of the realm of possibility because they share common concerns in southern Lebanon and are in proximity to each other. In some ways, Syria is even more hostile to the idea of Palestinian independence than Israel

and its Likud government. Its championship of the Palestinian was always a propaganda, rhetorical tool aimed against Israel. A Syria-Israeli deal — cynical as it no doubt would be — is the only promising conflict resolution outcome, although it's hardly an expected one.

The Palestinian problem has always been an Arab problem, before it became Israel's. No Arabs on their own have ever resolved any Middle East conflict without help, and the Gulf war is only the latest example of this. The only way the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be resolved is through an Arab initiative — that is, when an Arab regime is ready to deal with Israel.

Here, U.S. diplomacy can make itself felt, and Arab support of U.S. diplomatic efforts can bear fruit. The old approaches — dialogue with the PLO, the international conference and the Baker plan — are dead. The defeat of Iraq, the demise of Saddam Hussein, will not positively affect the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Only the emergence of a Sadat-style Arab leader will change the age-old conflict.

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SADDAM HUSSEIN TRYING TO CLAIM VICTORY, BUSH SAYS

(Text: Bush address to nation 2/26/91)

Washington -- Saddam Hussein is "trying to claim victory in the midst of a rout, and he is not voluntarily giving up Kuwait," President Bush says, adding, "and here, too, Saddam Hussein will fail."

Bush said the Iraqi leader is not withdrawing from Kuwait, but instead is "trying to save the remnants of power and control in the Middle East by every means possible."

He made the remarks in a brief televised address to the nation February 26, in response to Saddam Hussein's most recent speech. Calling that speech "an outrage," the president said, "Saddam is not interested in peace, but only to regroup and fight another day...."

Following is the text of the president's remarks:

(BEGIN TEXT)

I have a brief statement to make today. Saddam's most recent speech is an outrage. He is not withdrawing. His defeated forces are retreating. He is trying to claim victory in the midst of a rout, and he is not voluntarily giving up Kuwait. He is trying to save the remnants of power and control in the Middle East by every means possible. And here, too, Saddam Hussein will fail.

Saddam is not interested in peace, but only to regroup and fight another day, and he does not renounce Iraq's claim to Kuwait. To the contrary -- he makes clear that Iraq continues to claim Kuwait. Nor is there any evidence of remorse for Iraq's aggression or any indication that Saddam is prepared to accept the responsibility for the awful consequences of that aggression.

He still does not accept U.N. Security Council resolutions or the coalition terms of February 22, including the release of our POWs -- all POWs -- third-country detainees, and an end to the pathological destruction of Kuwait. The coalition will therefore continue to prosecute the war with undiminished intensity.

As we announced last night, we will not attack unarmed soldiers in retreat. We have no choice but to consider retreating combat units as a threat and respond accordingly. Anything else would risk additional U.S. and coalition casualties.

The best way to avoid further casualties on both sides is for the Iraqi soldiers to lay down their arms, as nearly 30,000 Iraqis already have. It is time for all Iraqi forces in the



# EDITORIAL: THE WAR'S FINAL PHASE

(Following is an editorial, broadcast by the Voice of America February 26, reflecting the views of the U.S. government.)

On Saturday, February 23, President George Bush expressed regret that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had failed to meet the deadline to withdraw from Kuwait in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 660. Instead of withdrawing, Saddam has been accelerating his efforts to destroy Kuwait and its people. Saddam's forces have set fire to hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells as well as to key buildings in Kuwait City. They have also stepped up their campaign of rape, torture and murder. Saddam's butchering of Kuwaiti men, women and children recalls the barbarism of the Dark Ages.

To eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait, President Bush has directed General Norman Schwarzkopf, in conjunction with coalition forces, to use all force available, including ground forces. The liberation of Kuwait has now entered the final phase. Over the weekend, General Schwarzkopf ordered a massive air, land and sea assault against Iraqi troop positions, both in Kuwait and in Iraq. Since then, allied commanders say their success has been remarkable. Thousands of Iraqi soldiers have surrendered without a fight, or after only token resistance. Under questioning, some of the Iraqi prisoners-of-war said that they had plenty of food, water and ammunition. They surrendered, they said, because they had no interest in fighting Saddam's war. They seemed happy to end their personal role in Saddam's misguided aggression.

Saddam warned Iraqi soldiers that if they accept defeat, they will be thrust into "a deep abyss." What Saddam failed to mention is that he is the one who has led the Iraqi army to the brink of that abyss. The U.S.-led coalition has no quarrel with the Iraqi people, nor with Iraqi soldiers innocent of war crimes. But those responsible for atrocities in Kuwait will be held accountable.

As President Bush said this week, "Kuwait will soon be free, and America's men and women in uniform will return home to the thanks and respect of a grateful nation."

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theater of operation, those occupying Kuwait, those supporting the occupation of Kuwait, to lay down their arms. And that will stop the bloodshed.

From the beginning of the air operation nearly six weeks ago, I have said that our efforts are on course and on schedule. This morning, I am very pleased to say that coalition efforts are ahead of schedule. The liberation of Kuwait is close at hand.

And let me just add that I share the pride of all of the American people in the magnificent, heroic performance of our armed forces. May God bless them and keep them.

(END TEXT)

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# BUSH CALLS SADDAM HUSSEIN MOVE ATTEMPT TO SAVE POWER

(Says Iraqi plan is to regroup, not withdraw)

By Dian McDonald

USIA White House Correspondent

Washington -- Warning that Saddam Hussein is not withdrawing from Kuwait to make peace but "to regroup and fight another day," President Bush pledged February 26 that the coalition will continue to prosecute the war to liberate Kuwait "with undiminished intensity."

"He is not withdrawing. His defeated forces are retreating. He is trying to claim victory in the midst of a rout, and he is not voluntarily giving up Kuwait," Bush declared in an address to the nation. "He is trying to save the remnants of power and control in the Middle East by every means possible. And, here, too, Saddam Hussein will fail."

In a radio statement February 26, the Iraqi leader said, "This day, our armed forces will complete their withdrawal from Kuwait." Saddam Hussein said "special circumstances" made Iraq's army withdraw "due to complications...including an aggression by 30 countries and the siege imposed on Iraq."

Speaking in the White House Rose Garden, Bush reported that the coalition's military effort in the gulf, Operation Desert Storm, is "ahead of schedule."

"The liberation of Kuwait is close at hand," he said.

Bush called on Iraqi soldiers to lay down their arms. "It is time for all Iraqi forces in the theater of operation, those occupying Kuwait, those supporting the occupation of Kuwait, to lay down their arms," Bush said. "And that will stop the bloodshed."

Saddam Hussein, he said, "is not interested in peace, but only to regroup and fight another day."

The Iraqi leader "does not renounce Iraq's claim to Kuwait," Bush noted. "To the contrary, he makes clear that Iraq continues to claim Kuwait. Nor is there any evidence of remorse for Iraq's aggression or any indication that Saddam is prepared to accept the responsibility for the awful consequences of that aggression."

Saddam Hussein "still does not accept U.N. Security Council resolutions" on the Persian Gulf crisis," Bush said. And the Iraqi leader, he added, rejects the terms set forth by the coalition on February 22 calling for the release of all allied prisoners of war and for "an end to the pathological destruction of Kuwait."



Bush said allied forces "will not attack unarmed soldiers in retreat." However he added, "We have no choice but to consider retreating combat units as a threat and respond accordingly. Anything else would risk additional United States and coalition casualties."

Bush said he shared "the pride of all of the American people in the magnificent, heroic performance of our armed forces."

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# DOCTORS SEE NO MALNUTRITION AMONG IRAQI CHILDREN

(W.H.O. officials on fact-finding mission)

By Robin Newmann

USIA European Correspondent

Geneva -- World Health Organization (W.H.O.) officials just back from a health fact-finding mission to Baghdad said they saw no malnutrition among Iraqi children during their week-long visit; no civilian casualties; and no disease epidemics.

However, they told reporters in Geneva February 23, soon after their return, epidemics of water-borne diseases such as cholera and typhoid "could arise in the future" because of problems of finding adequate supplies of safe water and of sanitation as a result of the war.

One of the leaders of the mission, Dr. Ali Khogali, from W.H.O.'s regional office for the Eastern Mediterranean, said that "one of the major problems" in Baghdad is that of safe water supply and sanitation, since currently only five percent of normal water supplies are available, and that water is often not safe to drink because of a shortage of water purification chemicals.

Combined with the problem of sewage disposal, Khogali said that "the records" in health care facilities they visited indicated that diarrheal disease outbreaks in children had gone up fourfold and that there was an increase in acute respiratory infections."

However, Khogali added, "we have not seen any malnutrition cases" among Iraqi children.

Dr. Anneke Verster, W.H.O.'s regional adviser on nutrition, who also took part in the visit, said "there are no hard figures to substantiate" reports of malnutrition among children in the country. "There are reports of children losing weight -- mothers state that the children are not eating as well as before," she said.

"Iraq was a country where there was no malnutrition at all in children -- children tend to be overnourished," she explained. "What you see at present is that the children are obviously eating less; they have much more diarrhea; they are very stressed, which will interfere with food intake."

The joint mission to Baghdad, by W.H.O. and the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), went to Iraq February 16-23, to assess the essential health care needs in Iraq and deliver a shipment of emergency medical supplies to assist in the care of children and mothers in all areas under Iraqi control.

Dr. Khogali said the supplies had been delivered to Iraqi

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S STATEMENT CHANGES NOTHING, U.S. SAYS  
(Text: Fitzwater statement 2/26/91)

Washington -- The White House said February 26 that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's radio statement pledging to withdraw from Kuwait by the end of the day "changes nothing."

"It does not annul the annexation of Kuwait or meet any of the coalition's other terms. The war goes on," White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said in a statement to reporters.

He said the radio statement "contained the same diatribe as previous comments, with no commitment to complying with the 12 United Nations resolutions."

Fitzwater said the president called the situation room at the White House at 5:20 a.m. (1020 GMT) February 26 to get an update on the developments in the Persian Gulf. He was informed of Saddam Hussein's radio speech at that point, and was subsequently given a text of the statement, Fitzwater said.

Following is the text of Fitzwater's statement:

(BEGIN TEXT)

Saddam Hussein's radio statement last night contained the same diatribe as previous comments, with no commitment to complying with the 12 United Nations resolutions. His speech changes nothing. It does not annul the annexation of Kuwait or meet any of the coalition's other terms. The war goes on.

(END TEXT)

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KELLY: TO END WAR, IRAQ MUST ACCEPT U.N. RESOLUTIONS.

(Iraqi statements on withdrawal incomplete)

By Rosalind Mandine

USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- The allied coalition will continue to prosecute the war in the Gulf until Iraq clearly accepts all 12 United Nations Security Council resolutions on its invasion of Kuwait, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs John Kelly said February 26.

The allied coalition "will continue to prosecute the war until there is a clear and unambiguous acceptance by Iraq of what the world community has called for" in the 12 resolutions, Kelly told reporters in Rabat, Algiers and Tunis during a WorldNet Dialogue program.

Recent Iraqi statements on withdrawal from Kuwait "are incomplete and ambiguous. These are not the words of someone complying with the U.N. Security Council resolutions," Kelly stressed.

He noted that Iraqi statements do not mention the restoration of the legal government of Kuwait, do not rescind Iraq's claim to Kuwait, nor speak of the release of prisoners of war and Kuwaitis being held in Iraq or compensation for the damage done in Kuwait.

Quoting parts of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's most recent speech that refer to Kuwait as being legally part of Iraq, Kelly said the speech "continues to defy the will of the United Nations Security Council."

While the allied coalition continues the prosecution of the war, Kelly reaffirmed President Bush's statement made earlier in the day that Iraqi forces which lay down their weapons will not be attacked by allied forces.

In response to repeated questions, Kelly underscored that the "United States is not aiming to destroy Iraq or its people." The coalition forces are "aiming for the total liberation of Kuwait and implementation of the United Nations resolutions," he stressed.

The United States and the United Nations "have made it clear that no matter what the outcome of the conflict, we strongly support the territorial integrity of Iraq," Kelly emphasized.

Asked whether the United States seeks to oust Saddam Hussein from power, Kelly said that "the future of the regime in Iraq is in the hands of the Iraqi people. It is not a stated objective of the United Nations nor the coalition to remove the regime in Baghdad."

The allied air campaign is "carefully directed against military targets, although regrettably there have been errors," Kelly said.

The air campaign has concentrated on taking out Iraq's supply lines and its command and control centers. The allied coalition has been "careful to avoid striking religious and holy and archaeological sites," Kelly noted.

Asked about the treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war by the allied coalition, Kelly said these POWs "have been and will be treated in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention."

The POWs have been visited by and will continue to be available to representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross to "verify their well-being and supply their names to the Iraqi government," Kelly reported. He pointed out that Iraq has not allowed the ICRC to visit coalition POWs being held in Iraq.

Kelly disputed the assertion of one questioner that the U.N. embargo against Iraq is starving the Iraqi people. "There is no starvation in Iraq," Kelly said, adding that recent film footage of Baghdad shows "plentiful supplies of food" in the marketplaces. However, there are shortages of food and mass looting of goods in the marketplaces inside Kuwait, Kelly said.

Questioned about the post-war period, Kelly said the "new world order should first of all be founded on the principle that aggression by one state against another is not acceptable. The new world order and any order in the Arab world should be founded on the principle that disputes should be solved peacefully."

Future security arrangements in the region must take these principles into account, Kelly said. "The United States believes very fundamentally that it must be the Arabs themselves that decide the terms of any new security arrangement in the region," he added.

There will be no "lasting stability" in the region without a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian question, Kelly said. "There is a need to address the United Nations resolutions that apply to the occupied territories" in the post-war period, he noted.

Once Kuwait is liberated, the government of Kuwait restored, and prisoners released, and the 12 UN resolutions are implemented, "the world community will turn its attention to other problems of peace and stability in the region," Kelly said.

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1991-02-26

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MASHABAT KESHER

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

שמור / מידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: מקש"ח, מנכ"ל אוצר  
בסמ"ח

מאת: ראש יחידת הקונגרס

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הסנאט - מיליארד דולר, סיוע וורום

1. מצ"ל מכתב אשר נשלח לנשיא ע"י 22 - מחורך 29 - ווברי ועונת ההקצבות של הסנאט.

2. הסנטורים אשר לא הצטרפו: יו"ר הועדה וסגנו, בידד והאספה ליד הסנטורים סאסר ודומיניצי (יו"ר וסגן יו"ר וע' התקציב), בוב קארל, דול"ץ פאולר ווארן ראדמאן.

3. המכתב משקף את התמיכה הרחבה - למידות הסתייגות מספר "אריזו" - וקיימת ב"גבעה" לסיוע החורום הבטחוני לישראל במסגרת התקציב המיון אשר נוגש ע"י הממשל ביום ששי.

יו"ם אשינגטון

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כהן סמית' אורן  
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1991-02-26 04:47

MASHABAT KESHER

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ATTN: JORDAN AAMM;

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WF-U02 02/26/91 (700)

U.S. AWAITS ASSURANCES WITHDRAWAL IS GENUINE  
 (MEANWHILE WAR CONTINUES, FITZWATER SAYS) (700)

WASHINGTON -- THE WHITE HOUSE CALLED ON SADDAM HUSSEIN  
 FEBRUARY 25 TO PUBLICLY AND PERSONALLY ACKNOWLEDGE DEFEAT  
 IF HE WANTS THE PERSIAN GULF COALITION TO SUSPEND  
 HOSTILITIES.

WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY MARLIN FITZWATER,  
 RESPONDING TO A BAGHDAD RADIO BROADCAST CLAIMING THAT  
 SADDAM HAD ORDERED A WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI INVADERS FROM  
 KUWAIT, DECLARED HOURS AFTER THE BROADCAST THAT THERE IS NO  
 EVIDENCE OF A WITHDRAWAL. HE CALLED ON SADDAM TO ACCEPT  
 THE CRITERIA FOR IMPLEMENTING UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS  
 SPELLED OUT BY PRESIDENT BUSH FEBRUARY 22.

TO PROTECT THE LIVES AND SAFETY OF COALITION FORCES,  
 HE SAID, THE WAR WILL GO ON, PENDING PUBLIC WORD FROM  
 SADDAM IN PERSON.

FITZWATER NOTED THAT THE BAGHDAD STATEMENT SAID THE  
 IRAQI FORCES WOULD "FIGHT THEIR WAY OUT" OF KUWAIT. "WE  
 WILL NOT ATTACK UNARMED SOLDIERS IN RETREAT," FITZWATER  
 PLEDGED ANEW. "WE WILL CONSIDER RETREATING COMBAT UNITS AS  
 A MOVEMENT OF WAR" AND SUBJECT TO ITS CONVENTIONS.

NOTING THAT COALITION TROOPS ARE NOW SPREAD THROUGH  
 KUWAIT AND PART OF IRAQ, FITZWATER DECLARED "WE CANNOT  
 SACRIFICE THE SAFETY OF COALITION FORCES" BY PERMITTING  
 IRAQI SOLDIERS TO KEEP THEIR WEAPONS. "LAYING DOWN THEIR  
 ARMS IS SIMPLE," HE SAID, "THEY SIMPLY WALK OUT" LEAVING  
 BEHIND TANKS AND MOTORIZED ARTILLERY.

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FITZWATER'S STATEMENT, ISSUED JUST BEFORE A CLOSED  
 SESSION OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, ASSERTED THAT "THE  
 ONLY WAY SADDAM HUSSEIN CAN PERSUADE THE COALITION OF THE  
 SERIOUSNESS OF HIS INTENTIONS WOULD BE FOR HIM PERSONALLY  
 AND PUBLICLY TO AGREE TO THE TERMS" OF THE FEBRUARY 22  
 PROPOSAL.

FITZWATER SAID SADDAM MUST ALSO "PERSONALLY AND  
 PUBLICLY ACCEPT EXPLICITLY ALL RELEVANT U.N. SECURITY  
 COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY" RESOLUTIONS 662  
 AND 674.

RESOLUTION 662, ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AUGUST 9, 1990,  
 DECLARED IRAQ'S ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT NULL AND VOID AND  
 CALLED ON BAGHDAD TO RESCIND ITS ACTION. RESOLUTION 674,  
 ADOPTED 13-0, DECLARED IRAQ IS RESPONSIBLE TO PAY  
 REPARATIONS TO KUWAIT AND OTHERS IT HAS DAMAGED AS A RESULT  
 OF THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT.

FITZWATER SAID THE COALITION HAS "NO EVIDENCE TO  
 SUGGEST THE IRAQI ARMY IS WITHDRAWING. IN FACT, IRAQI UNITS  
 ARE CONTINUING TO FIGHT."

HE RECALLED THE IRAQI PLOY AT KHAJJI EARLIER IN THE  
 WAR, WHEN IRAQI UNITS TURNED THE CANNON OF THEIR TANKS TO  
 THE REAR IN A PRETENSE OF SURRENDER, BUT FIRED ON U.S. AND  
 SAUDI TROOPS WHEN THEY MOVED INTO THE OPEN.

"WE REMEMBER THE SCUD ATTACKS (ON SAUDI ARABIA) TODAY,"  
 FITZWATER SAID, "AND SADDAM'S MANY BROKEN PROMISES OF THE  
 PAST. THERE ARE AT LEAST 22 DEAD AMERICANS TONIGHT WHO  
 OFFER SILENT TESTIMONY TO THE INTENTIONS OF SADDAM  
 HUSSEIN."

BUSH'S FEBRUARY 22 PLAN CALLED ON IRAQ TO  
 "AUTHORITATIVELY" NOTIFY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IT  
 WOULD WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT WITHIN A WEEK, AND FROM KUWAIT  
 CITY WITHIN 48 HOURS, OF NOON FEBRUARY 23. IT DEMANDED IRAQ  
 INFORM THE COALITION OF THE LOCATION AND NATURE OF MINES  
 AND BOOBY TRAPS IT HAD PLACED ON LAND AND SEA, AND THE

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHERS HELD  
 AGAINST THEIR WILL. BUSH ALSO DEMANDED THE QUICK RETURN OF  
 KUWAIT'S FORMER GOVERNMENT.

ASKED WHY THE COALITION HAS ADDED THE PERSONAL DEMAND  
 ON SADDAM TO THE FEBRUARY 22 TERMS, FITZWATER CITED THE  
 NATURE OF THE RADIO BAGHDAD BROADCAST AND SADDAM'S "MANY  
 BROKEN PROMISES." HE EXPLAINED THAT SADDAM, WHILE HE  
 "PURPORTS TO BE INTERESTED IN A WITHDRAWAL," HAS FAILED TO  
 FORMALLY NOTIFY EITHER THE UNITED NATIONS OR THE UNITED  
 STATES.

FITZWATER SAID THAT IF SADDAM TRULY WANTS TO WITHDRAW,  
 "WE ASK HIM TO BE UP FRONT PUBLICLY AND LET THE WHOLEWORLD  
 KNOW EXACTLY WHAT HIS INTENTIONS ARE."

HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION -- WHICH CALLED THE CLOSED-  
 DOOR U.N. SESSION -- HAS BEEN "HELPFUL" IN ATTEMPTING TO  
 OBTAIN AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. MOSCOW, ALTHOUGH NOT A  
 COALITION MEMBER, VOTED FOR ALL 12 U.N. RESOLUTIONS IN ITS  
 ROLE AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. "EVERY  
 DISCUSSION THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAS HAD WITH US,"  
 FITZWATER SAID, HAS INCLUDED A REASSERTION OF THE SOVIET  
 LEADER'S "COMMITMENT TO THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS." HE ADDED  
 THAT A U.N. REVIEW "IS ACCEPTABLE TO US."

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# BUSH PRAISES COALITION GROUND EFFORT AGAINST IRAQ

(But warns of battles, casualties to come)

By Alexander M. Sullivan

USIA White House Correspondent

Washington -- The gulf coalition is waging war against Iraq with "remarkable efficiency," President Bush told his Cabinet February 25.

In public and in private, the president provided an upbeat assessment of the coalition ground campaign to oust Iraqi invaders from Kuwait but cautioned that euphoria over the possibility of an early end to the war is premature.

Speaking to an East Room audience marking Black History Month, Bush asserted that coalition forces "are advancing on their objectives. Enemy prisoners are surrendering in large numbers. And thus far, thank God, U.S. and coalition casualties are few."

(Based on preliminary reports from the field, the coalition has taken more than 20,000 Iraqis prisoner; there are reports that U.S., French and Saudi troops have suffered a combined total of 10 persons killed in action. About two dozen coalition soldiers have been wounded, according to fragmentary reports. All of the combatants have clamped controls release of information.)

(According to news reports, coalition forces have thrust through the fortifications Iraq erected on the Kuwait-Saudi border and have reached the outskirts of Kuwait City on the east. On the west, allied armored units were said to be sweeping through southern Iraq with the aim of cutting the supply lines of Iraqi troops in Kuwait and preventing the Iraqi army's most elite units, the Republican Guard, from reinforcing elements in Kuwait.)

Bush, declaring the "liberation of Kuwait is on course and on schedule," told the East room gathering, "We have the initiative. We intend to keep it."

Warning there are "battles yet to come and casualties to be borne," Bush said there should be "no mistake. We will prevail. Kuwait will soon be free and America's men and women in uniform will return home...."

Bush has been following the progress of the allied effort with frequent briefings from Brent Scowcroft, his national security affairs adviser; Defense Secretary Cheney; and General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In addition, the president telephoned General Norman Schwarzkopf for an 11-minute discussion. Schwarzkopf is commander of Operation Desert Storm, the allied campaign to

free Kuwait and restore its legitimate government.

White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said Bush convened his Cabinet for a luncheon meeting to allow members not directly involved in the war effort the opportunity to be briefed by Cheney and Powell.

"The president believes the war is being conducted with remarkable efficiency," Fitzwater told reporters. "Diplomacy has worked extremely well in holding the coalition together. We are on our course, moving rapidly to pursue the enemy."

He said Bush emphasized to the Cabinet "that we have more to do and that caution is necessary. We can't allow ourselves to be overly optimistic. But at this point, he feels very good about the progress of the war to date."

Fitzwater said he was not aware of news reports that the Soviet Union is working on a new peace plan. He said there had been no recent telephone calls to or from President Gorbachev, and he expressed doubt that any Kremlin plan would initially be directed at U. S. acceptance. He said it was quite possible, given the Soviet interest in working for peace, that Moscow is at work in another forum, presumably with Iraq.

He turned aside questions relating to actions on the ground in Kuwait and Iraq, noting those are military matters better discussed by defense officials. He said again that the United States has no territorial demands on Iraq and any intrusion onto Iraqi soil is for the purpose of implementing the 12 United Nations Security Council resolutions. He noted that allied forces entered Iraq to cut off the supply lines of Iraq's troops in Kuwait. "We're pursuing the U.N. resolutions," he said, "and that's it."

Reminded that Saudi officials are now openly calling for war crimes trials against Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials, Fitzwater repeated the U.S. position -- that while evidence for possible use in such trials is being amassed, a decision on whether to conduct them awaits conclusion of the war.

He told a questioner he did not know if Iraq has special troops -- as opposed to line soldiers -- to carry out the atrocities being committed inside Kuwait.

Fitzwater told another questioner Arab support of the coalition and its war effort continues to be "solid and strong" as it has been from the outset. "The reports that there would be significant opposition to the coalition in the Arab world did not materialize," he noted.

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בבב

סודי / מיידי

אל: מצפ'א

דע: ציר כלכלי - כאן ( הועבר )

מאת: ק. לקונגרס, וושינגטון

פגישת השגריר עם הקונגרסמן אובי.

1. ב - 20.2 נפגש השגריר עם הקונגרסמן אובי, יו'ר ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות, שליד ועדת ההקצבות. נכחו מצידם: טרי פיל - יו'ר ועדת צוות העוזרים של להועדה, ג'ו קרפבה - ראש משרדו ומייק מריק - עוזרו האישי לענייני חו'ב.

מצידנו: הציר הכלכלי והח'מ.

2. הפגישה היתה ביוזמתנו במסגרת פגישות היכרות של השגריר ונקבעה לפני זמן רב.

3. א. לאחר שיחת היכרות קצרה, התייחסו השניים לאפשרות של פתיחת קרבות הקרקע במפרץ. לדעת אובי, הקרבות אכן יפתחו ואולם חושב שתהיה זו שגיאה. אין הוא מרוצה מהמצב, אולם 'הגשר כבר נחצה מזמן'. אובי שאל השגריר על הראיון שהעניק לרויטרס וגינוי המימשל. השגריר סיפר לו על השתלשלות העניינים.

ב. אובי הגיב כי איננו מופתע מרויטרס. 'הסיפור שלהם על הנאום שלי (ב-FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL - י.ד) היה משובש. הם אמרו שביקשתי לעכב סיוע ומה שבאמת אמרתי הוא - 'לא להגדיל סיוע'.

ג. אובי ביקש לשמוע על השאלות האחרונות של המימשל בנוגע לערבויות בסך 400 מ' דולר.

השגריר - התייחס ל - 3 השאלות של המימשל ולתשובותינו. אובי - אני אינני דיפלומט. נשאתי את הנאום שלי שכן אני חש בצורה חזקה מאד, שעכשיו כשדם אמריקני נשפך באיזור יש לנו מחוייבות כלפי הבנים שלנו. ועל כל אחד (באיזור להיות מוכן TO ADDRESS IT'S PROBLEMS. יודע כי יתבקשו (ארה'ב) לתת בסופו של דבר כסף משמעותי לאיזור. הוא אישית (אובי) לא יתמוך במתן סיוע כזה, אם לא ידע באיזו מדיניות יתמוך סיוע זה.

יהיה זה נאיבי להניח שסעודיה כוונת והמדינות הנהנות האחרות (מהמעורבות האמריקאית) אינן צריכות, לאחר המלחמה, לדבר עם ישראל בשאלות רלבנטיות, ביטול מצב הלוחמה ולמרות חיסולו של אש'פ וערפאת 'THEY SUCCESSFULLY MANAGED TO SEQUENCE THEIR SELVES OUT'.

הבעיה הפלסטינית איננה מחוסלת ויש לפותרה. תהיה זו שגיאה אם לא נכיר בצורך שצריך להיות להם מקום (התכוון ל'מולדת' כמו בנאומו. י.ד.) ברוב חלקי יו'ש ועזה. נקודה נוספת חשובה לגבי האיזור - יש להיות נוקשים למשל עם גרמניה וצרפת עד כדי סגירת שווקינו בפניהם אם ימשיכו למכור נשק לאיזור.

לא יתמוך בסיוע נוסף לתורכיה ישראל ירדן ואחרות עד שלא ידע בדיוק מהי מדיניות ארה'ב ב - 2-5 השנים הקרובות.

עלינו להתמודד עם בעיות לטווח ארוך. אינו מצפה שישראל תפעל חד צדדית או עצמאית. את הבעיה הפלסטינית יש לפתור ביחד. זוהי מחוייבתנו המוסרית כלפי הבנים הנלחמים. הוא (אובי) עייף מן העולם



הערבי, FOR USING THIS ISSUE AGAINST US תוך התעלמות ממצבם הכלכלי ותנאיהם של הפלסטינים.  
הבעיות המיידיות שתתקיימו בפניהם (קרי: ישראל) יהיו עם סוריה. אולם יש צורך TO REIGRRUITE את הבעיה הפלסטינית.  
לגבי יהודי בריה"מ, חשוב שנדע שלארה"ב האחריות המוסרית להוציאם מבריה"מ כמה שיותר מהר. אולם על ישראל מוטלת החובה המוסרית לא ליישב העולים מעבר לקו הירוק כדי לא ליצור TURMOIL.  
למרות שזו מדיניותם לא ליישב עלוים בשטחים, הרי כאשר אני שומע אפילו על התנחלות אחת נוספת, זה מקפיץ אותי. בקונטקסט של דברי, מוכן לתמוך בכל סיוע לאיזור, אולם לא לפני שאדע מה המדיניות שלנו (של ארה"ב).

שגריר - מסכים לגבי דברי אובי בנוגע למדינות הערביות חברות הקואליציה לאחר סיום המלחמה. מבקש לציין שלא נשפך דם של אף חייל אמריקני עבור ישראל, מקווה שלא ייעשה כך גם בעתיד.  
לארה"ב, יהיה בתום המלחמה, מנוף על מדינות ערביות ויש לשים קץ למצב עוינותם כלפי ישראל ומימון טרור על ידן. לגבי הבעיה הפלסטינית, התייחסנו כבר לבעיה פעמים רבות, למעשה מאז 1920 דרך ק"ד ויוזמת הממשלה האחרונה (מאי 89).

אובי - מסכים.

שגריר - אם רוצים לפתור הבעיה הפלסטינית, יש לפתור עם ישראל, ירדן השטחים. התנאי המוקדם הוא שלום עם הערבים. במקרה כזה, דאגות הבטחון שלנו לגבי השטחים יפחתו.  
המלחמה הוכיחה שרק טילים לא יצלחו והכרעת המלחמה מושגת על הקרקע. לכן, המימשל צודק כשדן בצורך לדון קודם כל בשלום בין ישראל למדינות ערב ואח"כ מעבר לפתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית.

אובי - אף אדם רציני אינו מצפה לפעול בנושא ללא פעולה מוקדמת עם מדינות ערב.  
אני מדבר על מה שישיראל צריכה להיות מוכנה לעשות לא כצעד ראשון אלא אחרון, ויש רבים בממשלת ישראל שאינם מסכימים לכך.

שגריר - ממישראל הינה ממשלה פרגמטית.  
לגבי העולמי - אין תמריצים לשטחים. רק 0.9 אחוז התיישבו בשטחים. ממישראל לא תוכל לפרסם הודעה על איסור מגורי יהודים בשטחים, אך הרוב ממילא מבקש להשתכן בת"א.  
המצב בברה"מ מסוכן מאוד, והיסטורית לא נוכל לשכוח לעצמנו שלא סייענו להם בשל חילוקי דעות.

אובי - גם ה-1 אחוז (של עולים המשתכנים בשטחים - י.ד.) IS .KRUCIAL העובדה היא שעולים עדיין הולכים לשטחים. לא כ"כ נורא לצפות ממישראל שתאסור מגורים שם, אפילו אם תעשה זאת באופן לא רשמי.  
אנו מאשרים בשעה קריטית זו 400 מ' דולר - AFTER WE FINESSED IT FOR A YEAR. אולם זהו מצב שישיראל מתבקשת לחשוב. ה-0.9 אחוז הוא נתון משמעותי ויש צורך באישורים נוספים. I HAVE  
MINIMUM FATE IN MY GOV. TO CHANGE TENDENCIES IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD.

נצטרך לקבל אישורים נוספים, במיוחד כאשר איננו נותנים לאנשים שלנו עבור דיוור תקומות עבודה וכו'. גם לממשלתנו יהיה קשה מאד להקציב כספים (או לתת ערבויות - י.ד.).

שגריר - לממישראל יהיה קשה לומר שיהודים לא יולכו להתיישב ביו"ש רק בגלל שהם יהודים. זהו אפרטהייד.

אובי - זוהי לא הנקודה.

שגריר - חשיבות העלייה:

1. ישנם עדיין ערבים רבים הסבורים שישיראל בסופו של דבר תיעלם. ככל שיגיעו יותר עולים תשתרש בתודעתם תחושת הקביעות של ישראל ורצונם להתקפה יפחת.

2. הבטחון האישי של הישראלים הולך וגדל כאשר רואים העולים הרבים המגיעים. אלה נקודות חשובות עבור הפוליטיקה העתידית בישראל, המשך העלייה גם בתקופת התקפות הטילים מהווה נס ממשי. הביע תודתו והערכתו על כל מה שנעשה עד כה.

אובי - מסכים לנקודות שהעלה השגריר. אולם באותה מידה חשוב שאותו 1 אחוז לא ישמש מכשיר להחייאת ערפאת או ANY OTHER SELF-STYLED PALESTINIAN LEADER. הוא עוקב אחר נושא ההתנחלויות זה זמן רב ומתנגד להן. שאלה אחרת: מה תעשה ישראל כדי לאפשר למנהיגות אלטרנטיבית לערפאת להתפתח.

שגריר - הצענו בחירות. נציע מחדש בחירות, פיקוח נשק ושת"פ איזורי. לגבי פיקוח נשק - הסביר שעדיין לא ברור לנו כיצד ניתן לפעול בנושא אולם אנו תומכים ברעיון. התייחס לבעיית מירוף החימוש והבעיה הכלכלית שהיא יוצרת עבורנו. לגבי השאלה הפלסטינית, נעלה שוב רעיון הבחירות אף שאיננו אופטימיים לגביו. אולי כאלטרנטיבה נציע בחירות מונציפליות חופשיות ואז אולי תוצר מנהיגות דה פקטו עמה ניתן יהיה להדבר. זאת כמובן בתנאי שאנשים אלה יהיו משוחררים מלחצי אש'פ/תוניס אחרת הם יפדו להדבר. הביע תקווה שתוצאות המלחמה יאפשרו זאת.

אובי - לא יעשו זאת אלא אם יובטח להם שזה אפשרי.

הפגישה שכאמור היתה פגישת היכרות, נמשכה שעה ארוכה באווירה טובה. לדברי עוזריו של אובי, הפגישה לדעתם היתה טובה, ולמרות הדברים הקשים שנשמעו מפי אובי, השיחה התקיימה בצורה הגונה וכנה.

התרשמו מהשגריר ותשובותיו לאובי.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

נ.ב. מתנצלת על האחור בדיווח.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, כהן

סססס



אאאא, חוזם: 36321  
אל: רהמש/ 2955  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 465, תא: 250291, חז: 1243, דח: מ, סג: בל,  
בבב  
בלמ"ס/ מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE/THE WHITE HOUSE/OFFICE OF THE PRESS  
SECRETARY/STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT/FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1991

WE REGRET THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN TOOK NO ACTION BEFORE THE NOON  
DEADLINE TO COMPLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. WE REMAIN  
DETERMINED TO FULFILL THE UN RESOLUTIONS. MILITARY ACTION CONTINUES  
ON SCHEDULE AND ACCORDING TO PLAN.

TEXT OF STATEMENT RELEASED BY WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY MARLIN  
FITZWATER FOLLOWING THE PASSAGE OF THE NOON DEADLINE FOR THE  
WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI TROOPS FROM KUWAIT/SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1991

CENTCOM REPORTS THAT THEY HAVE DETECTED NO MILITARY ACTIVITY  
WHICH WOULD INDICATE ANY WITHDRAWAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM KUWAIT.  
SIMILARLY, THERE HAS BEEN NO COMMUNICATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE  
UNITED NATIONS THAT WOULD SUGGEST A WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW UNDER  
THE CONDITIONS OF THE COALITION PLAN.

IRAQ CONTINUES ITS SCORCHED EARTH POLICY IN KUWAIT, SETTING  
FIRE TO OIL FACILITIES. IT'S A CONTINUING OUTRAGE THAT SADDAM  
HUSSEIN IS STILL INTENT UPON DESTROYING KUWAIT AND ITS PEOPLE, STILL  
INTENT UPON DESTROYING THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE GULF, AND STILL INTENT  
UPON INFLECTING THE MOST BRUTAL KIND OF RULE ON HIS OWN POPULATION;  
YET APPEARS TO HAVE NO INTENTION OF COMPLYING WITH THE UN  
RESOLUTIONS. INDEED, HIS ONLY RESPONSE AT NOON WAS TO LAUNCH  
ANOTHER SCUD MISSILE ATTACK ON ISRAEL.

THE COALITION FORCES HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO CONTINUE TO  
PROSECUTE THE WAR.

AS WE INDICATED LAST NIGHT, THE WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL THE  
SOVIETS DISCUSSED WITH TARIQ AZIZ IN MOSCOW WAS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE  
IT DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNEQUIVOCAL COMMITMENT TO AN IMMEDIATE AND  
UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL. THUS, THE IRAQI APPROVAL OF THE SOVIET  
PROPOSAL IS WITHOUT EFFECT.

PRESIDENT BUSH TODAY SPOKE WITH PRIME MINISTER KAIFU OF  
JAPAN, PRESIDENT OZAL OF TURKEY, AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV OF THE  
SOVIET UNION. THE PHONE CALL FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV OCCURRED AT  
11:15 A.M. AND LASTED FOR APPROXIMATELY 28 MINUTES. PRESIDENT  
GORBACHEV INFORMED THE PRESIDENT THAT HE ASKED FOR A U.N. REVIEW OF  
HIS PROPOSAL AND SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR AND  
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND ABOUT HIS PLAN. BOTH OF THE ALLIED LEADERS



INDICATED FULL SUPPORT FOR THE COALITION WITHDRAWAL PLAN. PRESIDENT BUSH THANKED PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FOR HIS EXTENSIVE EFFORTS AND REFLECTED OUR GENERAL DISAPPOINTMENT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS CHOSEN NOT TO RESPOND POSITIVELY.

END

עד כאן

עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, סולטן, בנצור, מצפא, רביב,  
מעת, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

ערביות לדיור - סקירה כרונולוגית

1. הטיפול בנושא ערביות אמריקניות להלוואות ישראליות לדיור לעולים החל לפני כשנה ומחצה. החקיקה בקונגרס בנושא זה עברה במאי 1990 אולם הממשל עמד על כך שהלוואות לא יופנו לגיבוי התנחלויות וכי לא ישחררו כספים לשם כך (Fungability).
2. בעת ביקור שה"ח בווינגטון (2.10.90) ובמענה למכתב בייקר כתב שה"ח:  
\* אין זו מדיניות ממשלת ישראל להפנות או ליישב יהודים סובייטים מעבר לקו הירוק.  
\* בהתאם להתחייבויות הקודמות והשוטפות של ישראל ל-AID, יוגבל השימוש בערביות להלוואה לשטחים הגיאוגרפיים שהיו בשליטת ממשלת ישראל לפני 5 ביוני 1967.  
\* אישור כי אין תמריצים מיוחדים לישוב מהגרים יהודיים סובייטים מעבר לקו הירוק ואין תכנון להעניק תמריצים כאלה בעתיד.  
\* הבעת נכונות לספק באופן פריודי תכניות הממשלה לבניה לעולים ולתמריצים כספיים מיוחדים, כן יעשה מאמץ במידת האפשר לספק מידע שנתי ופריודי על הסיוע הכספי לפעילות ההתנחלות.
3. באותו יום הצהיר בייקר במסע"ת כי ארה"ב קיבלה מישראל התחייבויות מרחיקות לכת שלא נתקבלו בעבר וכי לא תהיה בניה לעולים מעבר לקו הירוק וכי כספי ההלוואות לא יוצאו גם במזרח ירושלים.
4. בעקבות הויכוח שהתעורר הן בארץ והן בארה"ב עקב הצהרה זו, פירסמה מחמ"ד את נוסח מכתב שה"ח (10.10.90) בעקבות פרסום זה ודברים דומים שנאמרו על ידי בייקר ב- 16.10.90 נשלח מכתב שני של שה"ח לבייקר (17.10.90) בו נאמר:  
\* לא ניתנה כל התחייבות, ישירה או עקיפה, להמנע או להגביל את הבניה בירושלים או בכל מקום אחר כולל ביו"ש ועזה.  
\* בציטוט מדברי שה"ח בשיחתו עם בייקר נאמר כי אם סובר בייקר כי עקב הערביות תשנה ממשלת ישראל את בסיסה האידיאולוגי ותצהיר כי תעצור את מפעל ההתנחלות, הרי עליו לדעת כי זה לא יקרה.  
\* כן מצוטט בייקר שכתב (21.9.90) כי הוא מודע לעמדת שה"ח וכי, למרות התנגדותם להתנחלויות, לא יעמידו במצב בו יותקף עקרון בסיסי של ממשלתו.  
\* מוצהר במכתב כי אין להתחייבויות שניתנו כל קשר לנושא הריבונות על ירושלים שהיתה ותשאר ישראלית.  
דוברת מחמ"ד הודיעה (18.10.90) כי אין במכתב שה"ח כדי לשנות ההתחייבויות שניתנו ב- 2.10.90.

בראון העביר דברים אלה לשה"ח בשם בייקר (21.10.90) והוסיף גם תרומתו של בייקר על הסילופים בתקשורת וכי המזכיר לא יתייחס יותר לכך פומבית.

5. במקביל להתפתחויות אלה הוברר כי ניתנה הוראה ל- AID לעכב הטיפול בנושא הערבויות, זאת למרות הכחשות אמריקניות. כזכור עיקר העיסוק במישור הישראלי אמריקני היה, אותו זמן, בארועי הר הבית וההתפתחויות במועבי"ט, ובמהלך נובמבר רבו הדיבורים על שפל ביחסי ישראל ארה"ב. כן יש לזכור כי בארה"ב התחיל הטיפול בנושא התקציב האמריקני שהפך למוקד התנגשות בין הממשל לקונגרס.

6. בפגישת רה"מ עם הנשיא בוש (11.12.90) הועלה הנושא ובוש אמר כי "ארה"ב תסייע בקליטת העליה הגם שיש לה קשיים תקציבים. ניישם את הסכם 400 המיליון אבל צריך להיות ברור שגם הסכם לוי בייקר ייושם. איננו יכולים לתמוך בפעילות חד-צדדית, אנחנו מאד מעוניינים לתמוך בעליה וקליטה ולכן עלינו לדאוג שענין ההתנחלויות יוסר כנושא של מחלוקת". רה"מ ציין "שאנו מקיימים הבטחותינו... והבטחנו שלא נשלח יהודי בריה"מ להתנחל בשטחים... והסכם זה מיושם".

7. במהלך דצמבר שהו בארץ אנשי AID וקיימו דיונים עם אנשי האוצר במהלך הדיונים העלו הם רעיון לחלוקת ההלוואות לשני חלקים וכי תהליך המימוש יארך כשנה. בראשית ינואר הוגש למשלחת נייר תשובה מטעם האוצר שכלל:

- \* תיאור תהליכי התכנון מעבר לקו הירוק.
- \* תיאור תהליכי הקליטה ומציאת הדיור לעולים.
- \* תיאור הסיוע והמשכנתאות לעולים.

8. ב- 22.1.91 הציג שר האוצר בפני איגלברגר את צרכיה הכלכליים של ישראל (הדבר נתפס, גם ע"י האמריקנים, כהגשת בקשה רשמית לסיוע בסך 13 מיליארד דולר - דבר שהוכחש רשמית מאוחר יותר) בין השאר התלונן על הסחבת מצד AID וביקש להמנע מפיצול הערבויות לשני חלקים.

איגלברגר הבטיח עם שובו לווינגטון (4.2.91) כי הבעיות יוסדרו אולם במקביל נוצר קשר בין דרישת ישראל לסיוע לבין משבר המפרץ, והנשיא אמר לסטו אייזנשטדט (4.2.91) כי "הוא מכיר בכך שישראל תזדקק לעזרה בקליטת עליה אך חשוב שלא יוצר הרושם שישראל דורשת תמורה ומחיר על ה"פרופיל הנמוך".

9. בסוף דצמבר 1990 העביר בראון לרובין באופן בלתי רשמי מספר שאלות הבהרה בנוגע להצהרת השר שרון בועדת הכספים של הכנסת כי ביו"ש ועזה ייבנו 1200 בתים. במחצית ינואר 1991 העביר רובין תשובה שאמרה כי אין החלטות ממשלה ספציפיות בנוגע לבניה ביו"ש ועזה. בתשובה נמסרו גם נתוני הבניה ביו"ש ועזה בשנת 1990 והובהר כי בבניה זו אין מעורבות של כספים אמריקניים, כן הודגש בתשובה כי אין מדיניות ממשלתית של הפנית עולים ליו"ש ועזה וכי קיים מחסור ביחידות דיור הן בישראל והן ביו"ש ועזה.

בפברואר (6.2.91) התברר כי במחמ"ד דורשים מידע מלא בנושאים נוספים כגון:

- \* כמה התנחלויות עלו על הקרקע וכמה תושבים נוספו ב- 1990.
- \* מהי התמיכה והסיוע הממשלתי לכל התנחלות ולמתנחלים הנוספים.
- \* מה היקף ההשקעה בתשתית ומהו סך כל הפעילות הממשלתית ביו"ש ועזה ב- 1990.

באותו יום אמר המזכיר בועדת החוץ של ביהנ"ב כי יש צורך במידע נוסף מישראל



כדי שניתן יהיה לשחרר הערבויות.  
למחרת הופיע בניו-יורק טיימס מאמר על דרישות ארה"ב ועל תכנית ישראל בשטחים  
- דוברת מחמ"ד הודתה כי היא שהדליפה הסיפור כדי שיהיה ברור שהמימשל רציני  
בכוונתו .

10. בפגישות בקונגרס ובסנט (7-8.2.91) התייחס השגריר הן לערבויות והן לסיוע  
הכללי הדרוש לנו בעקבות מלחמת המפרץ. לקסטן ואינויה אמר השגריר כי "נושא ה-  
400 מיליון דולר משאיר לנו טעם רע בפה" קסטן ספר כי בייקר אמר לו כי "הם  
(ישראל) חתמו על המכתב ועכשיו עליהם לעמוד מאחורי החתימה ולספק את כל המידע  
שהובטח כתנאי לשחרור הערבויות להלוואות אעמוד על כך כפי שאני פועל לגבי  
התחייבויות בריה"מ, שיחה זו הודלפה ופורסמה מאוחר יותר בעתון ידיעות  
אחרונות.

בפגישתו עם הקונגרסמן לנטוס (8.2.91) ציין רה"מ כי "האמריקנים עושים יותר  
מדי בעיות בנוגע לערבות ה-400 מיליון" והזכיר כי "קרטר הבטיח לא לקשור  
תכתיבים וסייגים לסיוע הישראלי".

באותו יום ביקש רוס מנויבך את המידע הבא:

\* השקעות משרדי הממשלה מעבר לקו הירוק.

\* השקעות בכבישים.

\* כמה ישובים הוקמו מאז 1990 וכמה הורחבו.

ב-13.2.91 הועבר ע"י עמוס רובין המידע האפשרי לשגרירות בושינגטון. המידע  
התייחס לכבישים, לישובים חדשים ולהרחבות אך לא לתקציבים.

רה"מ התייחס למידע זה בשיחתו באותו יום עם מספר קונגרסמנים והביע אמונתו כי  
"עם קצת רצון טוב אפשר לסיים הפרשה", בפני סולרז ואקרמן הביע רה"מ את דעתו  
כי אין זה לגיטימי להשתמש בסיוע ללחץ בנושא ההתנחלויות.

11. ב-14.2.91 הופיע בושינגטון פוסט מאמרו של ג'קסון דיהל אשר תאר את תכניות  
הפיתוח וההתיישבות ביו"ש ועזה בהסתמכו על נייר שפרסמו חברי הכנסת צוקר  
ואורון.

דניס רוס הודיע לשובל באותו יום כי "על סמך ההצהרות הנוספות שקיבלו מאיתנו,  
אמנם התכוון המזכיר להודיע על אישור סופי לערבויות הדיור, אולם בעקבות  
המאמר הנ"ל... נמנע המזכיר מעשות כן". שובל הגיב בחריפות כי הוא אישית לא  
יעסוק בכך יותר וכי טיפולם בנושא משאיר טעם רע בפה. כן אמר כי רבים בארץ  
"חשים כאילו כל פעם מחפשים תירוץ חדש כדי לא לעשות דבר" שובל הוסיף כי  
ימליץ לממשלה "לא להוסיף מילה אחת ממה שכבר פירטה".

12. באותו יום התראיין השגריר לרויטר והביע אכזבה מהעיכובים ומן הסחבת  
"run around" למרות שישראל נענתה לבקשות המימשל וסיפקה מידע מפורט למימשל.  
כן אמר כי לישראל צרכים עצומים בקליטת עליה וכי סבלה הפסדים רבים בעקבות  
המלחמה במפרץ, לכן "אנו דורשים (demand) כי צרכים אלה יטופלו במהירות  
האפשרית".

אחה"צ נקרא שובל למזכיר בייקר שבטון חריף הדגיש כי נפגע מדבריו הפומביים של  
השגריר וכי "הוא מנסה להוביל מאמץ סיוע לטובת ישראל וכי מבחינת ישראל אין  
טעם לפעול באמצעות המחוקקים". המזכיר גם הביע תמיהה על הטענה כי לא קיבלנו  
שום סיוע כאשר "ארה"ב סיפקה לישראל סוללות פטריוט והצבא האמריקני נלחם  
לחיסול איום פוטנציאלי על ישראל... אין עושים כך למדינה ידידותית".

ב-15.2.91 הוציא דובר הבית הלבן הודעה, האומרת כי "הצהרות פומביות של

שגריר ישראל המבקרות את ארה"ב בין שערוריות ומחוז לתחומי ההתנהגות המקובלת של שגריר של כל מדינה ידידותית. המזכיר הבהיר זאת לשגריר אתמול והנשיא מחה על כך בפני רה"מ שמיר בשדר שנשלח הבוקר. אנו ראויים ליותר מכך משגריר ישראל".

להערכת גורמים שונים בווינגטון התגובה הברוטלית הזאת, הגם שיצאה מפי דובר הבית הלבן היתה ביזמת בייקר והיא מוסברת במרירות מצטברת על "העדר הערכה כביכול מצד ישראל על מה שארה"ב עושה למענה בחיסול האיום העיראקי (מברק 20.2.91.21.33). קימיט אמר לשילה כי את פרשת 400 מיליון הדולר יש לראות על רקע חילוקי הדעות העמוקים בין ישראל לממשל בנוגע להתנחלויות (22.2.91).

13. ב- 20.2.91 צלצל בייקר לשה"ח והודיע על שחרור הערבויות. ב- 22.2.91 כתב רוס לשגריר כי המזכיר מסכים שישראל עשתה מאמץ ראוי לציון בסיפוק המידע בהתאם למכתב שה"ח מ- 2.10.90, ועל בסיס זה החליט המזכיר לשחרר את 400 מיליון הדולר לערבויות דיור בבת אחת. המזכיר מאמין כי הממשלה תמשיך במידת האפשר באספקת מידע בנוגע לסיוע ממשלתי לפעילות בהתנחלות. רוס מזכיר במכתבו את ההתנגדות בממשל להתנחלויות וכי הוא מוטרד מדיווחים בעת האחרונה על כוונת ישראל להגביר את פעולת ההתנחלות רוס בהתייחסו לשיחת בראון עם בן-אהרן מזכיר כי קיבלו אישור מלשכת רה"מ כי התכניות לעיל אינן מהוות החלטות ממשלה רשמיות. חשוב כי ארה"ב תקבל אישור כי ישראל אינה מתכוונת להגביר את פעילות ההתנחלות וכי מקורות אמריקניים לא ישמשו לצורך זה.

אאאא, חוזם: 36320  
אל: רהמש/ 2956  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 466, תא: 250291, חז: 1244, דח: מ, סג: בל,  
בבב  
בלמ"ס/ מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH  
SPEECH FROM THE WHITE HOUSE  
10:00 P.M./ SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: GOOD EVENING. YESTERDAY, AFTER CONFERRING WITH MY SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORS AND FOLLOWING EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS, SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS GIVEN ONE LAST CHANCE, SET FORTH IN VERY EXPLICIT TERMS TO DO WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE DONE MORE THAN SIX MONTHS AGO: WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT WITHOUT CONDITION OR FURTHER DELAY AND COMPLY FULLY WITH THE RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL.

REGRETTABLY, THE NOON DEADLINE PASSED WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ TO MEET DEMANDS OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 660, AS SET FORTH IN THE SPECIFIC TERMS SPELLED OUT BY THE COALITION TO WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY FROM KUWAIT. TO THE CONTRARY, WHAT WE HAVE SEEN IS A REDOUBLING OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S EFFORTS TO DESTROY COMPLETELY KUWAIT AND ITS PEOPLE.

I HAVE THEREFORE DIRECTED GENERAL NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF, IN CONJUNCTION WITH COALITION FORCES, TO USE ALL FORCES AVAILABLE, INCLUDING GROUND FORCES, TO EJECT THE IRAQI ARMY FROM KUWAIT. ONCE AGAIN, THIS WAS A DECISION MADE ONLY AFTER EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITHIN OUR COALITION PARTNERSHIP.

THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT HAS NOW ENTERED A FINAL PHASE. I HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF THE COALITION FORCES SWIFTLY AND DECISIVELY TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION. TONIGHT, AS THIS COALITION OF COUNTRIES SEEKS TO DO THAT WHICH IS RIGHT AND JUST, I ASK ONLY THAT ALL OF YOU STOP WHAT YOU ARE DOING AND SAY A PRAYER FOR ALL THE COALITION FORCES AND ESPECIALLY FOR OUR MEN AND WOMEN IN UNIFORM WHO, THIS VERY MOMENT, ARE RISKING THEIR LIVES FOR THEIR COUNTRY AND FOR ALL OF US.

MAY GOD BLESS AND PROTECT EACH AND EVERY ONE OF THEM, AND MAY GOD BLESS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

END

עד כאן

עתונות



תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, סולטן, בנצור, מצפא, רביב,  
מעת, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

ACTION USIS INFO CG DPO POL ACC 5

VZCZCJUC701SYS453

24-FEB-91 TOR: 05:24  
CN: 28870  
CHRG: USIS  
DIST: USFO  
ADD:

OO RUFHJU

DE RUEHFC #1404 0350405

ZNR UUUUU

O 240405Z FEB 91

FM USINFO WASHDC

TO ALL WF MONITORING POSTS IMMEDIATE

RUEHIN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE

RUCNET/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

RUFHML/AMCONSUL MILAN

RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON

RUEHFR/USIS PARIS

INFO RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE

BT

UNCLAS

USINFO

ATTN: JORDAN AAMM;

USIS PAO/IO/EPAO;

AIT FOR CIS; FOR P AND C; FROM P/PFO

EO 12356 N/A

WF-U01 02/23/91 (442)

BUSH DIRECTS USE OF GROUND FORCES TO LIBERATE KUWAIT

(TEXT: BUSH STATEMENT AT WHITE HOUSE)

WASHINGTON -- PRESIDENT BUSH ANNOUNCED FEBRUARY 23 THAT HE HAD DIRECTED GENERAL NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF, IN CONJUNCTION WITH COALITION FORCES, "TO USE ALL FORCES AVAILABLE, INCLUDING GROUND FORCES, TO EJECT THE IRAQI ARMY FROM KUWAIT."

"THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT HAS NOW ENTERED A FINAL PHASE," THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED IN THE WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM AFTER RETURNING TO WASHINGTON FROM THE CAMP DAVID PRESIDENTIAL RETREAT.

ON FEBRUARY 22, BUSH GAVE IRAQ UNTIL NOON FEBRUARY 23 TO BEGIN AN "IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT" OR FACE AN ALLIED GROUND ATTACK.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT:

(BEGIN TEXT)

GOOD EVENING. YESTERDAY, AFTER CONFERRING WITH MY SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORS, AND FOLLOWING EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS, SADIAM HUSSEIN WAS GIVEN ONE LAST CHANCE, SET FORTH IN VERY EXPLICIT TERMS, TO DO WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE DONE MORE THAN SIX MONTHS AGO -- WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT WITHOUT CONDITION OR FURTHER DELAY AND COMPLY FULLY WITH THE RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL.

REGRETTABLY, THE NOON DEADLINE PASSED WITHOUT THE

AGREEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ TO MEET DEMANDS OF  
 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 660, AS SET  
 FORTH IN THE SPECIFIC TERMS SPELLED OUT BY THE COALITION TO  
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 EFFORTS TO DESTROY COMPLETELY KUWAIT AND ITS PEOPLE.  
 I HAVE THEREFORE DIRECTED GENERAL NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF,  
 IN CONJUNCTION WITH COALITION FORCES, TO USE ALL FORCES  
 AVAILABLE, INCLUDING GROUND FORCES, TO EJECT THE IRAQI ARMY  
 FROM KUWAIT. ONCE AGAIN, THIS WAS A DECISION MADE ONLY  
 AFTER EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITHIN OUR COALITION

THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT HAS NOW ENTERED A FINAL  
 PHASE. I HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF THE  
 COALITION FORCES SWIFTLY AND DECISIVELY TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR  
 MISSION.

TONIGHT, AS THIS COALITION OF COUNTRIES SEEKS TO DO  
 THAT WHICH IS RIGHT AND JUST, I ASK ONLY THAT ALL OF YOU  
 STOP WHAT YOU ARE DOING AND SAY A PRAYER FOR ALL THE  
 COALITION FORCES, AND ESPECIALLY FOR OUR MEN AND WOMEN IN  
 UNIFORM WHO THIS VERY MOMENT ARE RISKING THEIR LIVES FOR  
 THEIR COUNTRY AND FOR ALL OF US.  
 MAY GOD BLESS AND PROTECT EACH AND EVERY ONE OF THEM.  
 AND MAY GOD BLESS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THANK YOU  
 VERY MUCH.

(END TEXT)  
 (LENNINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED)

ITEM  
 AT  
 #1404

NNNN



U.S. GROUND FORCES BEGIN LIBERATION OF KUWAIT

(Text: Bush statement at White House)

Washington -- President Bush announced February 23 that he had directed General Norman Schwarzkopf, in conjunction with coalition forces, "to use all forces available, including ground forces, to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait."

"The liberation of Kuwait has now entered a final phase," the president announced in the White House briefing room after returning to Washington from the Camp David presidential retreat.

On February 22, Bush gave Iraq until noon February 23 to begin an "immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait" or face an allied ground attack.

Following is the text of the president's statement:

(BEGIN TEXT)

Good evening. Yesterday, after conferring with my senior national security advisors, and following extensive consultations with our coalition partners, Saddam Hussein was given one last chance, set forth in very explicit terms, to do what he should have done more than six months ago -- withdraw from Kuwait without condition or further delay and comply fully with the resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council.

Regrettably, the noon deadline passed without the agreement of the government of Iraq to meet demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 660, as set forth in the specific terms spelled out by the coalition to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait. To the contrary, what we have seen is a redoubling of Saddam Hussein's efforts to destroy completely Kuwait and its people.

I have therefore directed General Norman Schwarzkopf, in conjunction with coalition forces, to use all forces available, including ground forces, to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait. Once again, this was a decision made only after extensive consultations within our coalition partnership.

The liberation of Kuwait has now entered a final phase. I have complete confidence in the ability of the coalition forces swiftly and decisively to accomplish their mission.

Tonight, as this coalition of countries seeks to do that which is right and just, I ask only that all of you stop what you are doing and say a prayer for all the coalition forces, and especially for our men and women in uniform who this very moment are risking their lives for their country and for all of us.

May God bless and protect each and every one of them. And may God bless the United States of America. Thank you very much.

(END TEXT)

NNNN

אאא, חוזם: 35228

אל: רהמש/2905

מ-: ווש, נר: 2196, תא: 240291, ח: 2000, מ: ח, סג: סו ,

בבב

סודי/מיד

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

דע: לש' שה'ח, לש' רה'מ

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

שיחה עם מזכיר המדינה

=====

1. ערב תחילת המתקפה היבשתית התקשר עמי מזכיר המדינה כדי להודיענו בדבר החלטתה לפתוח בשלב היבשתי. בתשובה לשאלה ציין שמטרתם הרשמית סלוק העיראקים מכווית, אך מהמשך דבריו ניתן היה להבין, שמקווים ופועלים להשיג מטרות מעבר לכך.

2. המשיך בצינינו הערכתם הנמשכת למדיניות האיפוק שנוקטת ישראל. בדברי הבעתי איחולינו לנשיא, למימשל ולחיילי צבא ארה"ב הצלחה במבצע. בייקר ציין שישוחח טלפונית בנושא גם עם שה'ח וכי מזכיר ההגנה יתקשר עם שהב'ט.

3. לקראת סוף השיחה העלה המזכיר בקצרה את שיחתנו הקודמת וכן התייחס לתהליך השלום בתום המשבר במפרץ.

שובל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס



9

הצ"ח קלעים ארמון - אלביצים סל :

שן הכאנן : צ"ח

היילד קלמן לאומי : סקיקרובל

בן היילד קלמן לאומי : ג"ס

בנושאים רלנטיים למצב האחר.

CHENEY SEES WAR LASTING "RELATIVELY SHORT TIME"  
(Transcript: TV interview remarks) 24.2.91

Washington -- Secretary of Defense Cheney said February 24 that he foresees the Gulf war lasting a "relatively short time" but he expressed concern that the public may be too optimistic about an easy allied victory over Iraq.

2/24/91

Interviewed on the television news program "Face the Nation," Cheney said he was confident that when the war is over "Saddam Hussein will have lost a very significant part of his offensive military capability and Kuwait will have been restored to the people of Kuwait and the legitimate government of Kuwait will be back in power."

Among other topics, Cheney also discussed what should be the post-war role of the U.S. in the Gulf, and the state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

مجلس الوزراء

Q: And pull right out if we -- if we should cross over?

A: Again, our long-term interest is in getting him out of Kuwait, and I can't get into the business of speculating about exactly what force arrangements might be there once the campaign's complete, but we have no desire to occupy Iraq or take any Iraqi territory. We have no designs against Iraq other than to force them out of Kuwait.

Q: Can you assure everybody that you do have a good plan for getting our troops out?

A: We do.

Q: Okay. What about, though, leaving a presence in -- in the region after the whole thing is over? I've seen a report that says there's some planning for leaving a permanent ground force, 20,000, something like that, in the region. President Bush has always said he didn't want to do that. Is that thinking beginning to change?

A: No, I think that, clearly, the old security arrangements didn't work. August 2, there was a system in place, and it failed. Iraq took Kuwait.

The leading responsibility for putting together a new system will rest with the countries in the region. Our friends the Saudis, the Egyptians, the Gulf states, the Kuwaitis, they all have a major role to play in deciding how they want to organize themselves from the standpoint of their security. We're happy to help, we're happy to be of assistance.

2

We've got a major naval presence in the Persian Gulf -- we have had for over 40 years. We can be active with our own units and with training and with equipment and do things to help that security arrangement function. We do not have an interest, the president's made it clear we don't have an interest, in a longterm, major ground presence for US forces in the Gulf.

Q: Any -- you mean any ground presence? Major --

A: I'll -- I'll leave it exactly as I have -- as I've said. I mean, getting to the business of joint exercises. We may want to provide training assistance and -- and special technical assistance. We may want some pre-positioned equipment and stocks, but I think it's clear that what we want to do is -- is

basically what they want to do.

As -- as we said to King Fahd when he first agreed to receive US forces last August, we will come, we will stay as long as we're needed, we will leave when we're no longer needed, and that's the whole shebang.

Q: What about the Soviet Union? They complained this morning that George Bush rushed to war.

There are reports that the president, despite his public statements, one day had to bite his lip he was so angry at the Soviet Union. Publicly criticizing us today. Where does that relationship stand, in your opinion? Are we sort of moving in opposite directions when it comes to the situation in the Middle East, at this point?

A: First of all, I don't think that's an accurate portrayal of the president's views. Secondly, I think if we back off and look at all of the events of the last seven months and how they've affected US-Soviet relations, I think it's clearly been a plus.

And while there may, from time to time, have been differences on tactics, on how to proceed at any one particular moment, the bottom line is the Soviets have supported the United Nations' efforts. They voted for 12 UN Security Council resolutions, they voted for sanctions, they voted for the use of force, they agreed to shut off the flow of armament and -- and equipment to the Iraqis, one of their major clients --

Q: Did they?

A: -- so -- they did. They did.

Q: You're sure of that?

A: As best we can tell, they did.

So I think when you look at the overall pattern of -- of relationship, that this is -- has been a milestone in the postwar period in terms of US-Soviet cooperation. Now, at the tail end, you may have had some differences about exactly how to proceed to achieve the objective, but there hasn't been any fundamental disagreement on the objective, which is that Saddam has to get out of Kuwait.



SCOWCROFT SAYS MILITARY OPERATION GOING AS PLANNED

(Transcript: Scowcroft on "Meet the Press") 24.2.91

: 10/2/91 10:10

MR. RUSSERT: In this postwar period, will the United States lead a concerted effort to try to bring about a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict?

A: Yes, we certainly will.

MR. RUSSERT: In what form?

A: Well, I -- you know, I don't want to speculate about the form yet. But there are several problems in the area. The first problem is security, both short-term security for a liberated Kuwait and rearranging that zone; the general question of security, short-term and long-term in the Gulf, and in the Middle East as a whole; economic concerns; and then the other disputes in the area --

MR. COCHRAN: The occupied territories he will deal with?

A: Of course.

MR. COCHRAN: General, regarding the postwar period: The President has said he wants to guarantee the territorial integrity of Iraq. Now, what if, after this war, Iran or the Syrians or someone else tries to carve off a piece of Iraqi territory. Is the United States willing to defend Iraqi territory in the same way that it's defended Kuwaiti territory?

A: I don't -- I'm not sure the President ever said anything about guaranteeing territorial integrity. That's a pretty -- those are pretty strong terms. But we have --

MR. COCHRAN: He has said he wants to see Iraq keep the same borders.

A: That is correct.

MR. COCHRAN: Mmm-hmm. (In acknowledgement.)

A: That is correct. I think you have to remember that close to -- perhaps close to half of Iraq's armed forces are not involved in this conflict. The best of them are, but he has territorial forces, defensive forces around the borders with

Iran, with Turkey, and with Syria. Those forces would remain and would give him a -- I believe, an adequate defensive capability.

BUSH ADVISOR CAUTIONS AGAINST EXCESSIVE OPTIMISM

(Transcript: Gates on "Newsmaker Sunday") 24.2.91

Washington -- Although U.S. military leaders are pleased with the progress thus far in the ground campaign to get Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, "it would be very foolish to try and forecast how long this conflict might last," one of President Bush's national security advisors says.

Interviewed by Mary Tillotson on CNN's "Newsmaker Sunday" February 24, Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates disputed the suggestion that the United States had overestimated Iraq's military capabilities.

"Quite the contrary," he said, adding that one of the surprises in the air and ground campaign that began in January has been that Saddam Hussein had a larger military capability and more redundancy in his communications "than we anticipated."

At the beginning of the war, he said, Saddam Hussein "had the fourth largest army in the world," with "tremendous amounts of sophisticated military equipment" and "trained, battle-hardened soldiers."

"This is a man who had been building a military force for over 10 years," Gates said.

"This is a man who sank the wealth of Iraq over a dozen years into an extraordinary military machine," he continued. "And I think, frankly, it's more of a tribute to the skill of our own people and the effectiveness of our own battle planning that we have done as well as we have so far, rather than somehow that he was perhaps weaker than we had suspected."

הוא אכן מוכן להילחם

Q: I don't think anyone, at least in the alliance, thinks it is remotely possible that Saddam Hussein will win militarily. Can he survive, however, politically? What do you see as the

postwar landscape?

A: Clearly, the landscape in the Middle East is going to be very different than it was before August the 2nd. Of course, a big variable is whether Saddam Hussein personally survives. That has a lot to do with the resentment of his people, the resentment of his army at the position that he had put them in. There are clearly going to have to be measures to prevent the rearmament of Iraq --

Q: Might he not also be seen as a martyr?

A: I think not at this point. The defeats that he has led his country into over the past 10 years, almost nine years of warfare with Iran for nothing, at a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars, now the humiliation of the Iraqi army in Kuwait, I think that his people will hold him accountable for these crimes against Iraq.

Q: Will we -- if he survives, if he lives -- will we charge him with war crimes?

A: Well, I think that's a decision that will have to be addressed by the coalition once the war is over. I think that if he does survive, clearly, there will be some impact in terms of the sanctions and how long they last.

Q: More likely they will stay in place.

A: I think so.

Q: Will we rebuild Kuwait and Iraq, as we did Europe post-War II, Marshall Plan?

A: Well, there are very detailed plans for the Kuwaiti recovery. We've been working with the Kuwaitis, a number of other nations have. Actually, their plans for recovery are quite far advanced. I understand contracts have been let. So they are ready to go back in and reclaim their country, and we will obviously do as much to help as we can in that respect, although they obviously have the resources.

With respect to Iraq, Iraq is a wealthy country, as Saddam Hussein has tried to make something of this have-have not issue, but in fact, Iraq is a have nation, it has a great deal of wealth. The problem is he squandered it on arms. That wealth will remain and Iraq will have the means to rebuild itself, really.

Q: Is it, in part, a vengeful attempt to slow down any recovery that has him setting those Kuwaiti oil fields afire?

A: Well, this is what I was referring to as almost a medieval



practice. He is clearly trying to destroy what is left of the country he invaded and much of what he had destroyed already. It's something I think beyond the ken of civilized peoples that he is doing this to this country.

Q: Is it a bit disingenuous for the administration to dodge questions about increased Arab hatred for America coming out of this war? The cant is that the Arabs are on our side. It is clear not all Arabs are on our side in this, and those who are tending to loathe America are only apt to loathe us more, are they not?

A: Well, I think that a number of experts may have a heavy diet of crow once this thing is over. The truth of the matter is people expected an eruption in the Arab world when the war began, and it didn't happen. I think that the big story in terms of the Arab reaction is what has not happened, not what has, and the truth of the matter is Egypt, representing more than half of the Arab population, Syria, the gulf states, Saudi Arabia, all strongly support even what the coalition is doing.

Q: The last word is yours. Thanks very much, Bob Gates, and thank you as usual for having joined us, too. Have a pleasant weekend.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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TRANSMISSION OF THE SPECIAL FILE WILL FOLLOWS

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LOG, WIRELESS FILE SATURDAY EDITION, FEBRUARY 23:

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ENGLISH-LANGUAGE ITEMS

SFF601. LOG

SFF602. (FS) AZIZ: IRAQ ACCEPTS SOVIET PEACE PLAN FOR GULF  
(Transcript: Statement by Aziz).....490

SFF603. (FS) SOVIETS EXPLAIN PEACE PLAN FOR GULF  
(Transcript: Statement by Ignatenko).....1,820

SFF604. BUSH REGRETS SADDAM'S INACTION ON LEAVING KUWAIT  
(Transcript: White House statement)..... 100

SFF605. U.S. REPORTS TERROR CAMPAIGN GOING ON IN KUWAIT  
(Reports cite executions, other atrocities)....390

SFF606. COALITION WILL CONTINUE TO PROSECUTE WAR  
(Text: White House Press statement).....450

SFF607. U.S. DEPLORES COUP IN THAILAND  
(Text: Tutwiler statement on coup).....300

SFF608. TERROR CAMPAIGN GOING ON IN KUWAIT, PENTAGON SAYS  
(Transcript: a.m. Riyadh briefing).....4,810

SFF609. ARABIC WIRELESS FILE LOG  
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(Doomed Iraqi army can still resist).....650

SFF611. U.S, SOVIETS REPORT ON PROPOSALS TO IRAQ  
(U.N. continues to monitor gulf situation)...1,080

SFF612. PENTAGON SAYS GULF WAR AT "TURNING POINT"  
(Transcript: p.m. Pentagon briefing).....4,970

SFF613. NO FURTHER MATERIAL WILL BE TRANSMITTED.....10

SFF650. ATROCITIES AND REPENTANCE IN CHILE  
(U.S. Press: NYT editorial).....420

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(U.S. Press: NYT article by Gordon).....850

SFF652. HIGH NOON  
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SFF653. RANDOM ARRESTS OF KUWAITIS SCORNE  
(U.S. Press: NYT article by Miller).....780

SFF654. ALLIES ARE SAID TO CHOOSE NAPALM  
(U.S. Press: NYT article by Browne).....410

SFF655. OFFICIALS SEE SIGNS IRAQ IS "CRYING UNCLE"  
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SFF656. U.S. TROOPS BATTLING FRUSTRATION  
(U.S. Press: WPost article by Moore).....1,080

SFF657. TWO PLANS  
(U.S. Press: WPost editorial).....500

SFF658. DRUG POLICY TOPS COLOMBIAN'S AGENDA  
(U.S. Press: WPost article by Farah).....790

SFF659. U.S. GROUND PLAN AIMS  
(U.S. Press: WPost article by Smith).....1,130

SFF660. BURNING KUWAITI WELLS WON'T AFFECT WORLD OIL  
(U.S. Press: WPost article by Lippman).....830

SFF661. SHAMIR'S GOVERNMENT HAILS BUSH ULTIMATUM  
(U.S. Press: WPost article by Diehl).....660

SFF662. BUSH CASTS SADDAM AS THE VILLAIN  
(U.S. Press: WPost article by Dionne Jr)....1,090

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(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

AZIZ SAYS IRAQ ACCEPTS SOVIET PEACE PLAN FOR GULF  
(Transcript: Statement by Aziz) (490)

Washington -- Following is an unofficial transcript of a February 23 statement by Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Moscow accepting the Soviet peace plan for the Gulf.



(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Ladies and gentleman, good morning. I have a short statement to make this morning. Last evening, the Soviet government declared a proposal about the situation in the Gulf region and in order to achieve a peaceful settlement to that situation in accordance with the UN resolutions.

You are familiar with the points in that declaration, but anyhow, I am going to reiterate those points in English.

First, Iraq agrees to comply with resolution 660 and therefore to withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces from Kuwait to the positions in which they were located on the first of August 1990.

Second, the withdrawal of the forces shall begin on the day following the ceasefire and the cessation of all military operations on land, at sea and in the air.

Third, the withdrawal shall be completed within a period of 21 days, including the withdrawal from the city of Kuwait within the first four days of the said period.

Four, immediately upon the completion of the withdrawal of the troops from Kuwait, the grounds for which all the other resolutions of the Security Council were adopted will have been removed and thereby, those resolutions will cease to operate.

Five, all prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated within three days of the ceasefire and the cessation of all military operations.

The last point, the sixth, the ceasefire and withdrawal shall be confirmed, verified and supervised by observers and/or a peacekeeping force as determined by the Security Council.

These are the points of the plan, or the initiative that was declared by the Soviet government last evening. I am here to tell you that the Iraqi government fully endorses this plan and fully supports it.

Last night the Revolution Command Council issued a statement saying that Iraq supports the Soviet initiative and it appreciates the Soviets' efforts to reach a peaceful settlement to the situation. And we particularly appreciate the efforts of His Excellency President Mikhail Gorbachev and his government in this regard.

The second point I would like to address is the allegations made by the American government yesterday that Iraq has created a new ecological situation in Kuwait and you are aware of those allegations.

My government has strongly denied those allegations in the statement made last night. And the Iraqi government asks the Security Council to establish immediately a committee to investigate the situation in Kuwait. If the American authorities would like to use this pretext to justify their aggressive position, such a pretext has no grounds.

This is the short statement I wanted to make this morning and thank you very much and goodbye.  
(END TRANSCRIPT)

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(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

SOVIETS EXPLAIN PEACE PLAN FOR GULF  
(Transcript: Statement by Ignatenko) (1820)

Washington -- Following is an unofficial transcript of a February 23 news conference in Moscow by Vitaly Ignatenko, spokesman for Soviet President Gorbachev.

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

MR. IGNATENKO: (Through interpreter) -- (in progress) -- leadership of the countries who either directly or in some other way are involved into the conflict in the Persian Gulf. Today he had telephone conversations with President Mitterrand, with President Asad, with Prime Minister Major, with Andreotti, with Egypt's President Mubarak, and I believe at this time -- this very time or shortly, there will be a conversation -- a telephone conversation, with Chancellor Kohl. And on a private visit in Moscow is now Rajiv Gandhi, and he is now in the Cabinet of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

I believe that all of you understand that the main topic of today's conversations of the leader of the Soviet state is the Persian Gulf and those few hours that separate us from the last and tragic phase of the war, which could be a result of the whole of the tragic situation in the Gulf. It is no surprise, too, that the ultimatum is now riding out and in some time this tragic state could come into effect in the Persian Gulf.

If this happens, one could only feel deep regret and profound regret that the world and the world community would thus not be able to use

all the opportunities that it had in order to avoid this tragic phase of the events so as not to cause additional losses of life, so as not to cause a rise in the number of widows and those mothers who would lost (sic) their sons.

All those with whom Mikhail Sergeyevich talked today expressed to him their sincere gratitude for those efforts undertaken by the President of the Soviet Union and everyone expresses deep appreciation for these efforts and understanding. All of them said that they understand the reasons behind it and the good reasons behind it.

The telephone conversation which lasted for more than one hour and a half with US President Bush, as far as that conversation is concerned, I would like to emphasize that in that conversation was emphasized the importance of the attitude taken as regards the aggression against Kuwait that made it possible to adopt all those UN resolutions, and everything that happened could not have been possible if there had been no improvement in the US-Soviet relations.

President Gorbachev said and expressed deep understanding on the fact that the American people had put on themselves a heavy burden of implementing the will of the international community in overcoming a serious obstacle to international peace which the aggression against Kuwait by Iraq constituted. Naturally, in all those talks and during the conversation, telephone conversation with President Bush, it was -- President Gorbachev expressed his readiness to continue working towards ensuring peace. It was emphasized that of primary importance for both of our countries are such relations of trust -- of personal trust.

And the President of the Soviet Union -- (inaudible). He emphasized that could undermine this choice taken by the leaders of the two countries. All those talks and conversations that took place, which were characterized by profound philosophical content, I believe that we have, on the basis of all those talks, we have a vision of a new world, of a new policy, to which we will someday arrive at, and I believe that this day is not far away. And if we are talking today about the almost -- the chance that has almost -- and I would like to use this word "almost" -- been not used or not -- which has almost passed by -- it is of a special importance, that trust which exists now between the leaders of our two countries. And in the basis of these is the realization that we all have to understand that the fate of the peoples depends on how developments will be -- will be that continuing and developing.

Now, questions. Canadian Television, please.

Q: Question from Canadian Broadcasting. You told us yesterday that the six-point plan was the maximum that you could achieve under the circumstances. Is that, in Moscow's view -- the maximum position --



is that as far as Iraq is prepared to go? Do you have any indication that Iraq intends to move any further in order to fulfill the conditions of the US ultimatum? And also, is there any negotiation underway, or as far as Moscow is concerned, is that the end of the negotiating process?

MR. IGNATENKO: I believe that Iraq still has some time to act, but unfortunately it is not days, not months, but hours and minutes. Tariq Aziz, just before boarding his plane, he got into contact with our president, and he heard from our president the last words of advice, that is to weigh everything and to think over what could -- this last stage of the war could bring. And I -- as far as the authority, I don't believe that the foreign minister had all the authority in order to resolve all those issues in the spirit in which they were -- President Bush's --

Q: (Through interpreter.) What was the attitude to the -- to the statement made today that no one has a right to present an ultimatum save the United Nations?

MR. IGNATENKO: Well, it seems to me that President Bush, in all his activities, especially in trying to find a peaceful way to resolve this conflict, shows that in such difficult matters an ultimatum is indeed a means of last resort, because up to the last moment one has to find ways to save the world from bloodshed. And all the actions that our president has taken testify to that. It seems to me that today if there was an extraordinary meeting of the Security Council where the international community having before it on the table all those proposals that have been put forward, either by the Soviet Union or the United States, if the international community could integrate, if it could choose the best from those proposals, we could have arrived at a better turn of events. I hope that the remaining hours would not be lost in vain and that something will be done.

Q: (Through interpreter.) You just said that Tariq Aziz -- you said he had the authority to resolve those issues included into the ultimatum. The Soviet Union suggested further, harsher measures, but Iraq wanted to reject them.

MR. IGNATENKO: Well, what you have in these six points is the maximum which was possible to achieve.

Q: A question from the Chicago Tribune. As the negotiations have proceeded, it seems that the important vote, the important veto in these talks, was not the Soviet or the Iraqis, but the Americans, since President Bush, speaking for the coalition, said your plan was not enough. Do you now wish that you had been working closer with the American side all along so that the proposal put forth in Moscow would have been acceptable to the American side and to the coalition instead of only to the Soviets and the Iraqis? Thank you.

MR. IGNATENKO: Yes, we've been working very closely with the Americans and we are maintaining a constant communications link, not only with President Bush. And this is indeed with -- Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh also has a constant contact with his counterpart, his American counterpart. I believe that this is a matter-of-fact and businesslike and very (?) contact. And what I am telling to you right now is what has been done in attempts to find a mutually acceptable solution. And it seems to me that in that process, not only mutual interests were taken into account, but also the interests of the entire world.

Q: Question from CBS News. If you are in such close contact with the United States, and if you keep talking about -- (inaudible) -- why is it that the White House came out today and said that the Iraqi acceptance of the six points was absolutely meaningless? Are you doing one thing in private and another thing in public?

MR. IGNATENKO: No, I don't want you to understand the situation in these terms, because we are doing everything in public, and nothing was done, as you said, through private channels, so to say, because all of our actions have been made public. They are known to the United States, to a number of other countries, and primarily to those who are prominent members of the Security Council. But the other thing is to accept them or not to accept them. But as to openness -- and it's indeed in this way. Steve, your question, please.

Q: A question from CNN. I wanted to make sure that in your list of people Mr. Gorbachev had contacted today that President Bush was not among them. And if that is the case, are there any plans for Mr. Gorbachev to talk again with Washington with some sort of last-minute appeal to put off this deadline and the ultimatum?

MR. IGNATENKO: I don't exclude such a possibility.

Q: Polish Newspaper Express. What was the reaction of Gorbachev to the American ultimatum? And the second question: Will there be an opportunity to -- for Hussein to get an asylum in the Soviet Union if he asks for it?

MR. IGNATENKO: The second question is indeed a wonderful one. The first one is simply a good one. Well, I believe that I've given the response a number of times to your first question. Indeed, the proposal made by President Bush has been under very careful study on our side. And following the conversation with George Bush, we learned about that proposal and we understand fully the proposal. So I believe you understand that. Another thing is how to integrate them into that program which could lead our world, today or tomorrow, to a peaceful solution in the Persian Gulf. That is a very important problem. We don't yet have such a possibility of integration. But if

you study carefully the two programs, you don't find much difference because the difference is as regards the timing and the -- the strict character. But we have to take into account the entire situation in the Persian Gulf.

Q: (Through interpreter.) ABC question. What is the theoretical basis we are talking about? President Bush has declared an ultimatum in his own name, on behalf of the United States, or of the United Nations? That is my first question. Now, the second question is, will the Soviet Union continue to support the present policies of the United States as regards the conflict in the Persian Gulf?

MR. IGNATENKO: First, of course -- well, I forgot about the previous answer. Yes, the -- (End of available audio/satellite feed interrupted.)  
(END TRANSCRIPT)

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BUSH REGRETS SADDAM'S INACTION ON LEAVING KUWAIT  
(Transcript: White House statement) (100)

Washington -- President Bush says he regrets that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein did not begin to withdraw his troops from Kuwait by a 1700 GMT deadline February 23.

"Military action," Bush said in a statement released by the White House February 23, "continues on schedule and according to plan."

Following is a transcript of Bush's statement:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

"We regret that Saddam Hussein took no action before the noon deadline to comply with the United Nations resolutions. We remain determined to fulfill the UN resolutions. Military action continues on schedule and according to plan."

(END TRANSCRIPT)  
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U.S. REPORTS TERROR CAMPAIGN GOING ON IN KUWAIT  
(Reports cite executions, other atrocities) (390)

Washington -- A terror campaign is going on within Kuwait and Kuwait City, the U.S. Central Command said February 23.

"We are hearing a lot about executions and other atrocities," Brigadier General Richard Neal of the Command told reporters at a briefing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

"Some of the reports we're receiving," Neal said, are that "there seems to be a systematic campaign of execution, particularly people that they may have tortured previously that they're sort of destroying the evidence, I guess, for lack of a better term."

"There's a systematic campaign of grabbing Kuwaitis along the streets and byways of Kuwait City and executing them -- summarily executing them," Neal said.

"We knew that they were executing people on a routine basis, and they weren't people connected with the resistance or anything of that nature," Neal said.

"They were just taking people they had interrogated and during those interrogation process they had tortured these folks, and I think of late when maybe they think the game is up they are trying to destroy the evidence ... of these people that they have captured and that they have tortured in the process of that captivity."

"Atrocities and executions are ongoing," he said.

Neal termed the continuing oil fires in Kuwait "a systematic campaign of destruction of wellheads, gathering facilities and shipping terminals." He said that 190 fires were burning as of early February 23. "Approximately 25 percent of Kuwait is covered with varying degrees of smoke," he said.

Neal, speaking to reporters less than two hours before President Bush's 1700 GMT deadline to Saddam Hussein to begin withdrawing his troops from Kuwait, said the allied forces were continuing their campaign against Iraq.

"We are just going on with the campaign plan," Neal said. "We are continuing our aggressive patrolling, our reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance. Training is involved. We continue to do as we have been doing for 37-38 days now."

"We have stuck to our guns, so to speak, on saying that Iraq will abide by the UN resolutions, and will completely withdraw from Kuwait," Neal said. "And I think that anything that our national command authority has said is right in line with those resolutions."

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COALITION WILL CONTINUE TO PROSECUTE WAR  
(Text: White House Press statement) (450)

Washington -- Saying there has been no indication of an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater announced February 23 that coalition forces have "no alternative but to continue to prosecute the war."

In a written statement, Fitzwater said there has also been "no communication between Iraq and the United Nations that would suggest a willingness to withdraw under the conditions of the coalition plan."

The withdrawal proposal recently discussed between the Soviets and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Moscow, he said, is "unacceptable" because it does not "constitute an unequivocal commitment to an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Thus, Iraqi approval of the Soviet proposal is without effect," he added.

Iraqi troops also continue, he said, to follow a "scorched earth policy" in Kuwait which is "intent upon destroying Kuwait and its people."

Following is the text of the Fitzwater statement:

(BEGIN TEXT)

Centcom reports that they have detected no military activity which would indicate any withdrawal of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Similarly, there has been no communication between Iraq and the United Nations that would suggest a willingness to withdraw under the conditions of the coalition plan. Iraq continues its scorched earth policy in Kuwait, setting fire to oil facilities. It's a continuing outrage that Saddam Hussein is still intent upon destroying Kuwait and its people, still intent upon destroying the environment of the Gulf, and still intent upon inflicting the most brutal kind of rule of his own population; yet appears to have no intention of complying with the U.N. resolutions. Indeed, his only response at noon was to launch another Scud missile attack on Israel.

The coalition forces have no alternative but to continue to prosecute

the war.

As we indicated last night, the withdrawal proposal the Soviets discussed with Tariq Aziz in Moscow was unacceptable because it did not constitute an unequivocal commitment to an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Thus, the Iraqi approval of the Soviet proposal is without effect.

President Bush today spoke with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan, President Ozal of Turkey, and President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. The phone call from President Gorbachev occurred at 11:15 a.m. and lasted for approximately 28 minutes. President Gorbachev informed the president that he asked for a U.N. review of his proposal and said that he had talked to Prime Minister Major and President Mitterrand about his plan. Both of the allied leaders indicated full support for the coalition withdrawal plan. President Bush thanked President Gorbachev for his extensive efforts and reflected our general disappointment that Saddam Hussein has chosen not to respond positively.

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U.S. DEPLORES COUP IN THAILAND

(Text: Tutwiler statement on coup) (300)

Washington -- The United States "deeply regrets the overthrow of Thailand's democratically elected government" and urges "immediate steps" to return that country to civilian democratic rule, State Department spokesman Margaret Tutwiler announced February 23.

In a written statement released to the press, Tutwiler added that "we deplore the change of government and constitution by military means," and have therefore suspended military and economic assistance to that country."

"We have long supported peaceful, democratic evolution in Thailand -- which has contributed to the country's dramatic economic growth in recent years," she said.

Following is the text of the Tutwiler statement:

(Begin Text)

On February 23, 1991, forces of the Thai military took power in an apparently bloodless coup d'etat in Thailand. The leaders of these



forces have announced the abolition of the constitution, dissolution of the appointed senate and elected national assembly, and declaration of martial law. We understand that Prime Minister Chatchai and others were detained.

The United States strongly supports constitutional rule and deeply regrets the overthrow of Thailand's democratically -- elected government. We have long supported peaceful, democratic evolution in Thailand -- which has contributed to the country's dramatic economic growth in recent years. We deplore the change of government and constitution by military means. Consistent with U.S. policy and law, we have therefore suspended military and economic assistance to Thailand.

We urge immediate steps to return Thailand to civilian, democratic rule.

We are following developments closely. We are of course concerned about the safety of Prime Minister Chatchai and members of his government. There appears to be no increased danger to American citizens stemming from the coup, but we will issue a revised travel advisory to update the public on the current situation.

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TERROR CAMPAIGN GOING ON IN KUWAIT, PENTAGON SAYS

(Transcript: a.m. Riyadh briefing) (4810)

Washington -- Brigadier General Richard Neal of the U.S. Central Command said February 23 that a terror campaign is going on within Kuwait and Kuwait City.

He told reporters at a briefing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that "there seems to be a systematic campaign of execution, particularly people that they may have tortured previously that they're sort of destroying the evidence."

Following is an unofficial transcript of the briefing:

((BEGIN TRANSCRIPT))

BRIG. GEN. NEAL: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. This is the 38th day of Operation Desert Storm.

Air operations continue. Our focus remains on battlefield preparation, destruction of the Republican Guard, interdiction of his lines of communication, selected attacks and re-attacks of selected strategic targets, and a continuation and an aggressive counter-Scud

campaign.

During this 24-hour period, air operations were not interrupted by any weather. The weather was clear over most of Iraq and Kuwait. We flew over 2,900 sorties during this reporting period, bringing our total to 94,000 sorties to date.

There were no friendly aircraft losses -- combat losses, during this reporting period, nor were there any enemy aircraft shot down by U.S. or coalition forces. Additionally, no aircraft have attempted to flee to Iranian air space.

Yesterday at about 1630, a Navy SH-60 helicopter experienced engine failure on take-off from the USS Halberton (ph), and made an emergency landing in the water. All three crew members were rescued; the helicopter was lost. Also, yesterday at approximately 2100, a Navy H-46 helicopter from the USS Seattle experienced engine problems in the North Red Sea. Three crewmen were rescued and one crewman is missing. The search continues for that missing crewman. This brings the total of U.S. non-combat aircraft losses to 20; six fixed-wing and 14 rotary.

Turning to the Kuwaiti theater of operations, today we flew over 1200 sorties. For those who keep track, that is a new record. We also flew approximately 100 sorties against the Republican Guard forces. Since the beginning of our focus of effort and the preparation of the battlefield, I have new numbers for you on the destruction of tanks, artillery pieces and armored personnel vehicles.

We recorded as of early this morning 1,685 tanks destroyed, 925 armored personnel vehicles, and over 1,485 artillery pieces.

At approximately 0500 this morning, a single Scud was fired toward eastern Saudi Arabia. The missile appears to have broken up in flight, landing somewhere in the desert or remote area. We have no reports of any damage or any injuries. That brings the total number of 73 Scuds fired since this campaign began.

As you know, counter-Scud activity remains a vital element of our campaign plan. We use F-15s and F-16s almost principally. Over the last night, we had a B-52 strike against a Scud-suspected site. There were numerous secondary explosions experienced or seen by the B-52 crew. During the last 24 hours, we flew approximately 100 sorties against Scud and Scud-related targets. They were additionally augmented by an approximate 200 additional sorties by armored reconnaissance, A-10 aircraft.

Turning to ground operations, coalition forces continue to engage Iraqi forces with artillery attack helicopters and tactical aviation throughout the border area. Last night, I mentioned that the Marine

forces had reported the capture of approximately 100 EPWs, but that the action was ongoing. Subsequent to that engagement and review of the after-action reports, the number is now 87, as I think was reported to you this morning.

This morning at approximately 0900, a Marine patrol engaged 12 Iraqi tanks. Four tanks were destroyed by a tow missile fire; others turned and fled, and they were engaged by air and artillery fire. I have no further BDA on that. During this engagement, the Marine forces also took an additional 143 EPWs. I think you're going to appreciate the dynamic nature of the EPW count, not counting the 143 that I just spoke to. We have 532 EPWs in U.S. control right now, and we have turned over 427 EPWs to our host nation. The total EPW count is over -- in excess of 2,100 under coalition control at this time.

Early this morning at approximately 0200, a U.S. Army patrol engaged an Iraqi AAA sites -- anti-air sites with small arms and supporting multiple launcher rocket system, destroying several AA pieces and two trucks. There were no friendly casualties. In a separate engagement, also early this morning, U.S. Army attack helicopters destroyed two tanks and a truck during an armed reconnaissance along the border area. We continue, as would be implied from the results recorded, in an aggressive patrolling reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance campaign.

Naval forces. Our naval forces continued to support the air campaign to provide on-call naval gunfire support to the ground forces to conduct mine counter measures and to participate in maritime interception operations.

On the subject of the oil fires, last night I reported to you that over 170 oil fires had been set by Iraqi forces. Further inspection and more current collection results indicate that that is now 190 known fires burning as of 1400 today. There seems to be a systematic campaign of destruction of wellheads, gathering facilities and shipping terminals. Approximately 25 percent of Kuwait is covered with varying degrees of smoke. Fortunately, -- I guess, fortunately, there's a northwest wind out over that area and a lot of that smoke is being blown into the Arabian Gulf area.

I brought along a couple of charts that I hope might help just give you a graphic depiction of what we have found during this last 24 hours. (Referring to chart) The broken well indicates that that is destroyed, but the fire has gone out. The rest of these indicate active fires going on in the Kuwaiti -- in Kuwait.

The next one, Jim. These will be available for you afterwards. Why don't you put that down there so they can see it.

Essentially, this shows you the cloud cover and the fires. This is the



extent of the fires. You can see basically following the general trace of the Kuwait oil fields that are on fire at this particular time. And you can see these separate individual fires. Those are actually wellheads. This is taken from actual pictures taken by overhead collection assets. And these are actual wellheads, and the pictures are really -- I've got some pictures underneath that I can show you that -- they're a little bit -- probably difficult to see from a TV point of view, but once we've concluded the brief, you'll be able to see them up close and personal. Take down the next one there and put that over here.

You'll have an opportunity, as I say, to take a look at these at the conclusion of the brief, but you'll see that they're independent fires being systematically set, and you can see the actual wells on fire. And you can see the actual burning here. And these three pictures are from this area right here. And I want to make sure that you understand, this is not just well fires. They are also attacking the terminals and also the production capability.

Initial reports are also that it seems like a campaign, a terror campaign is going on within Kuwait, and Kuwait City in particular. And we're hearing a lot about executions and other atrocities. So, -- and we'll keep you updated on that as we go along.

That should bring you up to date on the oil fires, and the pictures will be available at the conclusion of the presentation. I'm now prepared for any questions.

GEN. NEAL: Yes, Richard.

Q: It's -- it's now about an hour and 40 minutes before President -- President Bush's deadline for Iraq to start withdrawal from Kuwait or to signify that -- that it is. Do you have any intelligence or any information to suggest that Iraqi troops are in any way retreating or preparing to retreat?

GEN. NEAL: No, I don't. No.

Yes? Yes.

Q: Can you tell us a little bit more about --

GEN. NEAL: (Harry ?).

Q: --these atrocities, executions that you've picked up in Kuwait, sir?

GEN. NEAL: Some of the reports we're receiving are -- there seems to be a systematic campaign of execution, particularly people that they may have tortured previously that they're sort of destroying the

evidence, I guess, for lack of a better term, and then there's a systematic campaign of grabbing Kuwaitis along the streets and byways of Kuwait City and executing them -- summarily executing them. Beyond that, I wouldn't want to comment.

Q: When did you start noticing this?

GEN. NEAL: Well, we've kind of had indication of it through Kuwaiti Resistance reports and just other collection means, but it seems to have become endemic now in the last 24 to 48 hours.

Q: (So it ?) coincides with the -- with the policy of setting these wells on fire?

GEN. NEAL: I'm not sure if I would leap to that conclusion that they're coincidental, but I think probably a -- a terror campaign -- this is terrorism at its finest hour, so I think you could probably make that connection.

Q: Do you -- do you have intelligence sources on these executions and these atrocities to which you give more credence than you do to the Kuwaiti resistance information?

GEN. NEAL: Are you asking if I -- I'm not following your question, Richard.

Q: In other words, the Kuwaiti resistance have -- have their own axe to grind, so to speak --

GEN. NEAL: Mm-hmm (acknowledgement).

Q: -- and they -- there's a question, you know, sometimes of how --

GEN. NEAL: Yeah.

Q: -- legitimate that might be because of their commitment. Do you have other intelligence sources, information that are giving you details on these things that you put more -- you credit more than you do the -- the Kuwaiti Resistance?

GEN. NEAL: No, I wouldn't want to say that I credit more. I just -- it may be corroborating evidence, and I would just say that we are very comfortable with the statement that I just made, that, in fact, atrocities and executions are ongoing.

Q: Can you tell us a little bit more detail about the 140- odd EPWs in that last action that you mentioned and also talk for a minute about what this is telling you about these further groups that we get every day now?

GEN. NEAL: I don't have any real specific details, other than the spot -- that I read -- the -- the spot report that -- that comes in with the details.

Essentially what it seems like is that when the tanks retreated -- well, the destruction of four and then the tanks withdrew, the remaining -- I think there were 12, so eight -- eight tanks were retreating to the north. These -- this left the EPWs or the infantry that were operating with them uncovered, and they just -- I think they saw the best course of action was probably surrendering.

I can't attach if they were -- if it was just a -- something planned that they were going to become an EPW, I can't attach that to it.

Q: This is a follow. Are you seeing any significance in the fact that we seem to have these groups almost every day now -- 50, 80, a hundred, more than a hundred?

GEN. NEAL: I think we have a -- a good feeling that the result of our air campaign is -- is -- is paying -- paying dividends. I mean, it's been going on now for 37 days, I think. It's been intensive. We've coordinated that with artillery fire, attack helicopter fire, and just our aggressive patrolling campaign -- I think all of these things are coming together and the results are bearing fruit.

Q: Two questions. First of all, as this deadline approaches, can -- can you tell us what -- what your mood is as this deadline approaches for Saddam Hussein to move out, otherwise threatened with ground combat, your personal feelings?

And, secondly, as one military man to a -- to another, any -- any advice you would like to give Mr. Hussein at this moment?

GEN. NEAL: I think you give him too much credit calling him a military man. I consider myself a military professional, and I'm not sure I'd attach that title to him.

Number two, we're just going on with the campaign plan. I don't want to use the term "business as usual." I would just say that we're continuing our aggressive patrolling, our reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance. Training is involved. We continue to do as we've been doing for 37, 38 days now. And -- and beyond that I wouldn't want to comment any further.

Q: Is it just business as usual? I mean, we're hearing about record numbers of sorties against the Kuwaiti Theater of Operation, we're hearing about intensive bombing of Baghdad overnight, we're hearing about sorties across the border and possibly bases being established inside Iraq. I mean, it doesn't exactly sound like business as usual.



GEN. NEAL: No, I wouldn't -- well, I would stick with the business as usual. I mean, I said I didn't want to use that term. I don't think that we're doing anything extraordinary or different than what we have been doing in this battlefield preparation phase over the past, I think, about three weeks.

As to bases inside Iraq or Kuwait, I can tell you that's not so. Our operations continue to go across the border as we see necessary to further define the enemy lines in front of us, and -- and we've been very successful to date in those endeavors. But no, I think if you look at the total of sorties, we haven't changed that much. We've been, I think -- air sorties have gone around 26 (hundred) to probably 29 (hundred), 3,000 for the last 36, 37 days.

Q: General, you've showed us the pictures of the smoke, but the question is, what effect is it having on operations? Yesterday, we got some indication from the British that it might be causing problems. How is it for the Americans?

GEN. NEAL: I think the only problems, Rick, is on, sometimes in close air support, target recognition coming in. As I said, the northwest wind has kind of dissipated a lot of this. I think from -- if you would have put it on the ground-unit commander's point of view, I think it really has no significant impact for ground-force operations if, in fact, we execute a ground -- ground attack.

Number one, we're the attacking unit. The initiative is in our hands. He's in fixed positions. We can elect to bypass those areas that we think, number one, we can't see well in or that we think that the troops aren't of a significant nature that they could affect the overall goals or the mission that the forces are assigned to.

So, from an impact point of view, I wouldn't attach real significance to it.

Yes, sir.

Q: Could you -- could you give us some interpretation of the -- of the new figures you've given us on tank, APC, and artillery destruction? Are you pleased with them? Is it disappointing? I mean, I -- I know you're careful about figures, so perhaps you can interpret them for us. (Laughter.)

GEN. NEAL: Obviously, every one -- every tank, every artillery piece, every APC destroyed we're very pleased with. We think we're -- we're -- the results are speaking for themselves.

We've been very successful in the tactics that we've employed in destroying these pieces of equipment. Those tactics are continuing as we speak tonight. Good weather is assisting us.

I think it -- it -- it's a good sign when you're talking about 60 percent -- you know, getting him down into the 60s and 50 percents against those figures that I give you early on is he had around 4,200 tanks. Now we're talking about we've taken out almost 1,700 of those tanks. That's a pretty good attrition. I -- if I were going to war, I wouldn't be very happy if I were down in the 60 percent category of my tanks being destroyed.

Q: What about --

GEN. NEAL: Now, what you have to do is you have to put that into perspective. You can't label, you can't put that 60 percent against each organization. Some organizations may be attrited as far as 90 percent, and some maybe at 75, 80, or even 90 percent in strength. So you have to -- you have to be very cautious when you grab these numbers and you try to make a -- a blanket assessment across the battlefield.

What these numbers are is -- is really to you folks to give you a feel of the success of the campaign. What they are to the military planner is just another thing that figures into the equation as to what he should be looking out for in his attack plan and the development of his attack plan.

Q: The rate of destruction seems to have slightly slowed from the previous week. Is there any significance in that?

GEN. NEAL: No, I wouldn't make that -- I wouldn't attach that comment to the -- to the numbers themselves. I would -- quite frankly, we have got -- we have gotten better at making sure that the numbers are correct, and what I'm saying is some of the numbers that I gave you before might have been -- instead of being a tank, it might have been an artillery piece. Or instead of being a tank, it might have been a truck.

And so we -- if we have erred at all, it's in favor of caution. So we're very comfortable with the numbers.

And another thing I might add to that is there's a very good chance that -- I would like to know how much we've damaged. His maintenance and repair capability I think is gone or nonexistent, and so you can have -- that Howitzer might be sitting there in a gun revetted position, but if it's -- if it's capability to elevate or to traverse is gone, then that capability is nonexistent, so I think those -- those numbers, I guess -- a long-winded answer to your question -- they make me very comfortable.

Q: General, may I follow up on that question?

GEN. NEAL: Okay.

Q: Just -- there's been an ongoing dispute in Washington for the last week or so about BDA figures between CentCom and the CIA and the DIA, with the -- with the intelligence agencies coming in with much lower numbers than you all have. Are these your numbers, their numbers, somewhere in the middle, and can you comment on this discrepancy that we've been seeing or hearing, at least out of Washington, on the -- the BDA figures?

GEN. NEAL: Yeah, I've read some of the articles also, and I can tell you, quite frankly, the agencies, both the CIA, the DIA, and CentCom, work these numbers. We share data with them and they share data with us.

I think some of the agency numbers are dated. In other words, they aren't as time-sensitive as ours are. They may be as many as four and five days behind us. I don't think there's any real big disagreement between the numbers.

I think -- I think all agencies are contributing to the effort, and I think -- I think the numbers -- the numbers are representative of what I think all of the agencies and CentCom agree upon.

Q: (You mean ?) this is a hybrid number? You've gone together, put your heads together, and come up with this --

GEN. NEAL: It's not a hybrid number. It's through photo interpretation, through pilot -- pilot reports, and through various other means that we use for determining BDA, but I think General Kelly's made the best comment. It's -- it's an art, not a science, and we use scientific methods to do it, but it's very difficult.

Q. Can you tell us anything else you know about what's happening inside Kuwait City? Are they going after water supplies, wrecking buildings, dealing with hospitals? Can you tell us anything else of what's going on in there?

GEN. NEAL: Well, I think everything that you just pointed out they've been doing. There may be a higher tempo of operations unfortunately going on in there. But beyond what my initial comments were, I probably wouldn't want to speculate. We had some reports -- or we were looking into some reports on water supply, the takedown of possible desalinization plants, but I don't have that as firm evidence, so I can't pass that on to you.

Q: General?

GEN. NEAL: Yes, sir?



Q: Could you tell us, please, whether you have any idea regarding the atrocities, the alleged atrocities -- do you have any idea of which units are carrying out these atrocities? In other words, when this campaign comes to a conclusion, do you know who to go after regarding the atrocities?

GEN. NEAL: No, I don't. No, I don't.

Q: General, as far as these fires are concerned, are these fires going to burn themselves out in a couple of days? Is the oil actually flowing from the wells? Or is it just what is at the surface?

GEN. NEAL: I honestly don't know. I have to really defer to the picture, and you'll see in the picture that they're actually burning. Now, that would indicate to me, and I'm not an oil expert, it would indicate to me that the oil is coming up, it's been lit off by explosive means, and that, in fact, it is burning. Whether they burn themselves out, I don't think that's the way --

Q: Is it being pumped and burning? Or is it just what is in the system flowing now will burn and then it will cease to flow anymore?

GEN. NEAL: I don't even dare speculate. I don't know, honestly.

Q: General, the hundred sorties on the Republican Guard, is that in Kuwait or Iraq or both? And has there been any change --

GEN. NEAL: It's in the Kuwaiti theater of operations.

Q: But specifically in Kuwait can you say? Or -- and has there been any change in the deployment of the Guard?

GEN. NEAL: No. They have not -- we have not noticed to date any significant movement by the Republican Guard forces.

Q: I understand that you're still collecting information about the situation in Kuwait City, but that's a pretty open-ended report as it now stands. Is there evidence that they're moving to mass executions, that they're simply taking citizens out, or that they're just selecting specific people or randomly across -- along the street?

GEN. NEAL: I don't want to say mass executions, Peter, but I would say that there are earlier reports, and I will caveat that with "early reports" but frequent reports, indicate to us that they are carrying out a campaign of terror within Kuwait, principally Kuwait City. We knew that they were executing people on a routine basis, and they weren't people that were connected with the resistance or anything of that nature. They were just taking people that they had interrogated, and during those interrogation processes, they had tortured these folks. And I think, of late, when maybe they think the game is up,

they are trying to destroy the evidence, and that evidence are these people that they have captured and that they have tortured in the process of that captivity.

Q: Any -- with regard to these people who have been tortured, any rough numbers, orders of magnitude?

GEN. NEAL: No. I don't have that. We can -- I can try to see if we can further define that problem, but I can't -- well, I can have these guys check and see what we can do.

Q: General, as we get close to the deadline, I'd just like to ask you a question about the concept of the cease-fire which we are told is necessary to prevent Iraq's forces from regrouping or from resupplying. Is it true that we have the capacity with our intelligence apparatus and with the air superiority to see whatever they do? And isn't there any way that we can give them some leeway without endangering the troops?

GEN. NEAL: I'm trying to get the basis of your question.

Q: What I'm saying is that, since we have the ability to see whatever they do -- if they start to regroup, if they start to resupply, we would see it -- is there not any way to give them a couple of hours of leeway to start their withdrawal without endangering the possibility that they can be doing what you're afraid they'll be doing?

GEN. NEAL: Well, that's a national command decision. But, you know, Kuwait is a big -- and the Kuwait theater of operations is a big area. Now, for us to -- for you to say, "Well, we can keep an eye on these folks and make sure that they don't resupply or reposition forces," I think doesn't have a sense of the magnitude of this area of operation. Any time -- if there is a pause, then the -- there is always that opportunity that that could increase their war-fighting capability, which could lead to US or coalition forces casualties. So I don't think I would support that type, or hope we wouldn't do that. I think we've given him -- the national command authority has given him the points that he has to agree to, and I think I would leave it at that.

Q: General, my question is regarding the Scud launching. You know, it's reported that this morning, early this morning, the Scud came from the -- from somewhere center of Baghdad and probably from the civilian areas. Do you think that the potential threat of a Scud launching from Iraq still exists? And it's also reported that some of the Scud launchers or mobile launchers have been moved towards north of Iraq in the forest areas. So what is your assessment, sir?

GEN. NEAL: Well, we did report that some of the Scud launchers recently -- the most recent Scud launchers -- were from residential



areas. And I think it's just a continuation of his campaign of using the civilians and the -- and civilian facilities as a method of safe haven for his war-fighting capability. The one last night was not from a civilian area. That was from south of Baghdad, and so it was not from a civilian area.

Q: General, what are you doing to Failaka Island? And do you have authority to do a ground offensive from Washington yet?

GEN. NEAL: Failaka Island is one of many targets we have in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. Beyond that, I wouldn't want to get into operational activities.

Q: Part two, have you got any authority from Washington for the ground offensive?

GEN. NEAL: Any authority from -- for the ground --

Q: Do you have the President's approval to go ahead with a ground offensive?

GEN. NEAL: No. We're continuing the campaign as we've -- as we're currently taking it on.

Q: General, could I ask you, what does it tell you when you see an army which is killing civilians and blowing up oil wells? It sounds to the non-expert as if that's an army that's ready to run away. Is that your assessment?

GEN. NEAL: I'm not sure you could make that statement as a stereotype of the entire Iraqi forces. And I don't think we've got a firm enough -- no, I think I would leave it at that. I don't think we could make a statement across the board that they're ready to run away. I think they're going to -- there are elements in there that are going to fight and fight well. I also think there are elements that are out there that are going, upon the initiation of hostilities if and when it comes, that they will, in fact, be willing to become EPWs in a hurry.

Q: General, given the rejection of the Soviet proposals and the tough conditions, withdrawal conditions, put by the White House, would it be fair to conclude that one of the targets of this war now is to topple Saddam Hussein?

GEN. NEAL: No. I wouldn't make that -- I think we have stuck to our guns so to speak on saying that Iraq will abide by the UN resolutions and will completely withdraw from Kuwait. And I think anything that our national command authority has said is right in line with those resolutions.



Thank you very much.  
(END TRANSCRIPT)  
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ARABIC WIRELESS FILE LOG  
FOR SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1991

- 601 LOG (80)  
602 BUSH REGRETS SADDAM's INACTION ON LEAVING KUWAIT  
(Transcript: White House statement)  
(SFF 604) (100)  
603 COALITION WILL CONTINUE TO PROSECUTE WAR  
(Text: White House press statement)  
(SFF 606) (450)  
604 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 22  
(Iraq/diplomat, ICRC/POWs)  
(SFF 502) (400)  
605 U.S. FORCES PREPARED TO EXECUTE BUSH's ORDERS  
(Ready for land campaign, Neal says)  
(POL 503) (1040)  
606 IRAQIS SABOTAGE KUWAIT OIL FACILITIES  
(Pentagon briefer sees scorched earth policy)  
(SFF 504) (520)  
607 BUSH ENERGY PLAN MEETS WITH SKEPTICISM IN CONGRESS  
(Critics cite need for higher fuel efficiency)  
(NEA 408) (800)

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6? \*SFF610 02/23/91  
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Re  
PENTAGON SAYS GULF WAR AT "TURNING POINT"  
(Doomed Iraqi army can still resist) (650)  
By Bruce Carey  
USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- Defense Department spokesmen said February 23 that the expired deadline set by President Bush for Saddam Hussein's forces to leave occupied Kuwait constitutes a turning point in the conflict.

But they cautioned that many Iraqi ground units remain dangerous despite devastating coalition force attacks by air, artillery and naval gunfire.

"We have clearly reached a turning point in this whole operation with the expiration of the noon deadline today," Assistant Defense Secretary Pete Williams said. With the expiration of the hour set by President Bush, he told reporters, the Pentagon would no longer publicly discuss communications among high-ranking officials and military officers.

"Security of the operation is paramount," he said. "We are not going to say anything" that may risk American and coalition lives in the Arabian peninsula.

Army Lieutenant General Tom Kelly told reporters that the Iraqi army is by no means on the verge of collapse. Coalition attacks have rendered Iraq's air force useless and destroyed an estimated 39 percent of Iraq's tanks, 32 percent of its armored vehicles and 48 percent of its artillery in the Kuwaiti war zone, he said. Nevertheless, he added, predicting imminent collapse of the Iraqi army "would be very dangerous.

"We tend not to underestimate the task at hand," he said. "There are units in the area of operations that have the capability to resist. We do not think that they have the capability to prevail."

Navy Rear Admiral Mike McConnell said the materiel harm done to Iraqi ground forces has been largely confined to its best 12 divisions, but that the remaining 30 divisions are less damaged.

Asked when the allied coalition will know a ground war has been effectively won, General Kelly said: "We will know we have won when we have driven the Iraqi army -- or what is left of it -- from Kuwait. We are not going to be satisfied while any portion of it is active and viable in Kuwait."

The natural advantage of Iraqi forces dug into fixed positions will be negated by their complete lack of maneuverability, Kelly said. Those positions could be bypassed.

"I think it is not going to be a long and extended campaign," he told reporters.

"Desertions and surrenders would increase" once the land campaign starts, he predicted, adding that Iraqi troops who give up will be treated properly in accordance with the Geneva and Hague Conventions.

But Kelly warned as he has before that Iraqis responsible for the use of chemical weapons against coalition troops would pay the price for violating international laws prohibiting such activity.

"They need to reflect at some length on the wisdom of using chemical weapons against us, because we will not take that lightly," he said.

"They would be making a real mistake."

Kelly said coalition forces have used napalm to ignite oil in ditches guarding Iraqi military positions. But he added that the ditches are some distance from the Iraqi troops and that the napalm is not likely to have generated casualties.

Iraqi torching of Kuwaiti oil fields is "a spiteful act" with no military application, and added, "It is not going to slow us down."

Other Iraqi crimes against Kuwait are evident as well, Admiral McConnell said. "There is enough evidence to give us high confidence" that Iraqi units are "rounding up...Kuwaiti citizens for execution and torture."

"For whatever reason," Kelly added, "the regime in Iraq has not allowed the press in nor have they allowed the international Red Cross in at all. I think that is a hint" that Iraq is committing war crimes.

"We will launch a ground war when the time comes and the perpetrators of those crimes will have to answer for it," he said.

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Re

U.S, SOVIETS REPORT ON PROPOSALS TO IRAQ

(U.N. continues to monitor gulf situation) (1080)

By Judy Aita

USIA United Nations Correspondent

United Nations -- As the February 23 noon deadline to prevent a ground war in the gulf passed without a response from Iraq, the Security Council heard reports from the United States and the Soviet Union on their proposals for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering officially notified the council of the terms set forth by the United States on behalf of the allied coalition cooperating with Kuwait the previous day.

The council has scheduled continued bilateral and full consultations throughout the weekend. However, diplomats said that most council members indicated during the closed door session that they could not accept the concept contained in the Soviet proposal in which the Security Council resolutions would be automatically canceled by an Iraqi withdrawal.



Pickering told journalists outside the meeting, the allied position "meets all the requirements" of Security Council Resolution 660. The U.S. statement February 22 "defines very clearly the coalitions' view about how to fulfill the resolutions as rapidly as possible to secure an end to the conflict," he said.

Resolution 660, passed August 2, 1990 just hours after the Iraqi invasion, demands that Iraq "withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on August 1, 1990" and called on Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediate negotiations to resolve their differences. Between August 2 and November 29, the council passed 11 more resolutions that demanded Iraq rescind its annexation of Kuwait; established economic and military sanctions and an air embargo; and set the stage for Iraq to be held responsible for reparations for material damage and for war crimes.

Pickering said the Soviet proposal "falls short in two major areas: in the area of meeting the standard of immediacy in 660, particularly relating to time deadlines" and it also "falls short in terms of conditionality."

He singled out the provision in the Soviet proposal which would cancel all the U.N. resolutions after the withdrawal.

"Those resolutions contain very many important points including the question of the requirement to nullify the annexation of Kuwait and many other issues of great importance," the U.S. envoy said.

Soviet Ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov said he felt it was "entirely possible and maybe even advisable" for the council to try to integrate the Moscow and coalition proposals into an "integrated plan of withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait."

"We see some similarities; the other things could be reconciled in further discussion and the ultimate result would be a unified plan for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait," Vorontsov said.

However Pickering and British Ambassador Sir David Hannay, while not rejecting the Soviet proposal outright, were cool to the suggestion.

"The Security Council is a good forum for dealing with resolutions but (world) capitals have been engaged in this particular process and that certainly is our view where the process of communication on such a proposal should continue," Pickering said.

He said the Soviet Union and the United States "couldn't have different goals. We are both committed legally to those goals" in the resolutions.

Hannay said the Soviet Union "carried the Iraqi government a very long

way" in trying to get an unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, but the Soviet proposal is "quite seriously defective."

The United Kingdom "stands firmly by the position the alliance communicated," he said. "The council has authorized the allies in resolution 678 to implement the resolutions using all necessary means. That is exactly what they are doing and there is no need of further action from the council unless by any chance Iraq comes into full compliance with those resolutions. In that case there will be a great deal of work to be done following up what was in those resolutions."

"Not sensible or manageable," Hannay said, was "the idea that the Security Council resolutions would be non-operational just because Iraq was withdrawing from Kuwait....only the Security Council, in any case, could take a position on its own resolutions."

Diplomats who attended the closed council meeting said the majority of the council members had problems with the automatic canceling of the resolutions with an Iraqi withdrawal and said any proposal must contain Iraq's acceptance of all 12 Security Council resolutions.

"There are a full range of issues dealt with in those resolutions," Hannay said. "Matters relating to the release of third country nationals held against their will -- 10,000 to 20,000 Kuwaitis are being held in Iraq against their will. It is absolutely crucial that provisions of Security Council resolutions with which Iraq must one day comply should not be wiped from the slate."

Egyptian Ambassador Amre Moussa, who is not a council member but whose country is a member of the coalition, said there was no time left for negotiations or "any room" to negotiate. "Immediate withdrawal -- that is the point we have to work to, a commitment for immediate withdrawal, a formal one."

"We were very clear," Moussa said, "an immediate withdrawal is needed to save the situation."

Vorontsov caused a stir just after the meeting began when word filtered out from the session that he had reported that Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz said in Moscow that he looked positively on the U.S. statement.

Vorontsov played down the importance of the report to journalists afterwards, saying that Tariq Aziz's comment was "not a very elaborate statement" about which he had no details.

Kuwaiti Ambassador Mohammad Abulhasan also informed the Council that Iraqi occupation forces are rounding up all Kuwaitis they encounter and shipping them to Iraq.

Iraqi occupation forces "are rounding up any Kuwaiti man, woman or child on the streets, blindfolding and transporting them in vehicles to Iraq," Abulhasan said. "These vehicles were parked, as well, outside mosques awaiting those attending Friday prayers."

The Kuwaiti ambassador also said that every atrocity "you can image and things you can't" are being perpetrated against Kuwaitis. "Just name it and unfortunately you will see it" in occupied Kuwait.

Abulhasan said Kuwait "will not accept anything short of a letter from the Government of Iraq to the secretary general of the United Nations informing him officially that Iraq accepts all the resolutions."

Iraq must recognize Kuwait as an independent state, he said.  
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PENTAGON SAYS GULF WAR AT "TURNING POINT"  
(Transcript: P.M. Pentagon briefing) (4,970)

Washington -- A "turning point" in the gulf conflict has "clearly (been) reached" with Iraq's rejection of President Bush's deadline to begin their withdrawal from occupied Kuwait, Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams told reporters in an afternoon briefing February 23.

However, Williams would not elaborate on future actions, noting that "anything we say at this point, having reached that turning point, is just the kind of detail we are not going to get into now because of the fact that security of the operation is paramount."

"We don't want to put anything out that is going to cause any further speculation, lead anybody in any direction that would in any way jeopardize an operation or put at risk the lives of the troops," he said.

Another Defense Department spokesman, Army Lieutenant General Tom Kelly, cautioned reporters that the Iraqi army is by no means on the verge of collapse.

Coalition attacks have rendered Iraq's air force useless and destroyed an estimated 39 percent of Iraq's tanks, 32 percent of its armored vehicles and 48 percent of its artillery in the Kuwaiti war zone, he said. Nevertheless, he added, predicting imminent collapse of the Iraqi army "would be very dangerous."



Following is an unofficial transcript of the briefing:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

PETE WILLIAMS: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Our briefers today will be Lt. General Tom Kelly, who's Director of Operations for the Joint Staff, and Rear Admiral Mike McConnell, Director of Intelligence for the Joint Staff.

General Kelly will walk you through the usual statistics and bring you up to date on the operation. Admiral McConnell has a few words to bring you up to date on what we know about the -- what the President yesterday and the Secretary called the "Saddam Hussein scorched-earth policy in Kuwait," the setting on fire of Iraqi oil facilities and oil wells. And then we'll take your questions.

Let me just also say that you've obviously seen the two statements from the White House today regretting that Saddam Hussein has taken no action to comply with the U.N. resolutions, and as the White House said the military action continues on schedule and according to plan.

Secretary Cheney said last night that we're not going to get into the business of predicting exactly when we might begin the next phase of the campaign. He did say clearly we are preparing to begin that phase. And none of us today, neither Admiral McConnell nor General Kelly nor I, can speculate with you on what might happen next or whether the ground phase might begin, and I'm sure you all understand that.

Q: I think you need to clear up some remarks which have been attributed to a senior Pentagon official about this question of whether or not some sort of green light has been given. This Pentagon official is basically quoted as saying that there was no need for a green light because authority has existed all along for the Central Command to take whatever steps are necessary to evict Iraq from Kuwait. But the Secretary of Defense has been saying all along that the decision to launch a ground offensive is a presidential decision.

MR. WILLIAMS: Sure.

Q: Those two don't match.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, I don't want to say whether they match or not, but let me say this. I've seen lots of reports out of here this week on whether there's a green light or not, whether the window is open or not, and all sorts of other metaphors. I think we've clearly reached a turning point in this whole operation with the expiration of the noon deadline today. All kinds of people have said all sorts of things this week, in the last few days, about how everything works and

what the chain of command is. But we're just not going to discuss that -- that sort of thing anymore. I realize we've done that before, but we're not going to do it now.

We've reached a turning point in this campaign and we're just not going to get into the question of whose authority and what has to happen when and what has to fall into place. I understand the curiosity about that, but when the time comes -- and again, you know, we're not making any predictions about whether it's hours or days or when it might happen -- but I'm sure when the time comes, the appropriate announcements will be made. But anything that we say at this point, having gotten past the noon deadline, you know, little pieces of the puzzle that could be put together is something that we want to avoid.

Q: Well, let me try it. What are we supposed to make of that senior official's remarks?

MR. WILLIAMS: My impression is that that senior official was trying to get everybody off the idea of, you know, definite timetables and green lights and red lights and windows opening and closing, and trying to steer anybody away from the idea that decisions had been made right after the noon deadline. So we're not going to get into that sort of stuff.

Q: Has the President given to General Schwarzkopf the authority to launch the ground campaign at his discretion?

MR. WILLIAMS: Fair question. I understand it perfectly, and it's what we're not going to discuss. As I said before, we've reached a turning point in the operation with the expiration of the noon deadline today. It's a perfectly honest, straightforward question. But anything we say about that -- I mean, we're -- we're clearly always going to be honest with you here in the briefing room, and anything we say at this point, having reached that turning point, is just the kind of detail we're not going to get into now because of the fact that security of the operation is paramount. We don't want to put anything out that can cause any further speculation, lead anybody in any direction that would in any way jeopardize an operation or put at risk the lives of the troops.

Q: I'm not -- not fishing here, but it is important, particularly when senior Pentagon officials are giving flat contradictory guidance, to have this cleared up, up to a point. Now, if you are -- if you are prepared to say that there has been no presidential order issued today or somehow clear up the different factual statements that were made in background situations, but where it was fully anticipated that they would be reported, I think that would wipe this slate clean and we'd all respect not trying to injure the security of our troops. That's the last thing that anybody here wants to do.

MR. WILLIAMS: Sure, and I understand that; I know. But here's the situation. There was a report out of this building, a news report out of this building earlier today, that said that the President had taken some action to give a green light. And then I know I was asked, other Pentagon officials here may have been asked, "Is that true?" And that's just not the kind of thing that we're going to get into at this point. We -- you know, I can't be in a position of having to respond to everything that somebody in this building reports or says may or may not have happened today. I understand that you have questions based on what those statements are, but at this point I can't -- I can't be required to say, you know, to every report that comes out of the Pentagon, "Is this true, is this true, is that true?" We just don't want to get into the business now of further discussing what kind of orders have to go or anything like that, because we've clearly reached a turning point with the expiration of the noon deadline. And all bets are off on that sort of stuff.

Q: Pete, how soon after the ground war starts will we know that it has started, meaning -- "we" meaning the press, the American people?

MR. WILLIAMS: I don't have an answer to that. Let me preamble -- add this preamble again, that I can't predict -- not going to be in the business of predicting whether -- you know, how far away it may be. My impression is that once we get to that point, then the appropriate announcements will be made. How long after or by whom? I don't know the answer to that.

Q: Pete, are you concerned, though, that -- it seems that there are a lot of loose cannons running around the Pentagon, high-level officials that -- I mean, there needs to be some type of command and control of information out of this building. Are you concerned about that?

MR. WILLIAMS: Neil, I've been concerned about that since the day I succeeded Dan Howard in this job. And, you know, there are lots of people who know what's happening and lots of people who don't know what is happening, and speculate anyway. And one prominent journalist in the Pentagon press corps refers to this as the building "ventilating." But we just have to do the best we can.

Q: Pete, from a historical perspective, looking back, would it be safe to say that the President at some point gave the commander in the field the authority to go ahead with the ground war and that that authority would take effect at noon if Iraq did not decide to abide by the terms set by the President?

MR. WILLIAMS: Thelma, it's a good question. It's a variation on David's earlier question, and I'm just going to have to beg off of it.

Mark? Let me just take a couple more and then bring on General Kelly



and Admiral McConnell.

Q: As a matter of process, is a new national security directive needed?

MR. WILLIAMS: I don't want to get into that detail.

Q: (Inaudible.)

MR. WILLIAMS: I don't want to get into that detail. I'm sure at some appropriate point down the line, you know, that'll all become clear. But we just can't discuss it now.

Q: Pete, could you at least tell us then, are we now at a point where it's no longer a question of whether or not there will be a ground war, but simply a question of when?

MR. WILLIAMS: I think the Secretary said pretty clearly last night on your broadcast; he said, "We're not going to get into the business of predicting exactly when we might begin the next phase of the campaign," and he said, "We clearly are preparing to begin the next phase."

Q: So your answer is yes.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, I don't need to interpolate what the Secretary said. I think his words are quite clear.

Q: I'm not asking when it would begin, but is it now no longer a question of whether or not there will be a ground campaign?

MR. WILLIAMS: And I would refer you back to what the Secretary said last night. I think his answers are pretty clear.

Okay, with that, now that I've done this great warm-up act for you, General Kelly and Admiral McConnell.

GEN. KELLY: Thank you, my son. And I would like to make it quite clear that we are not senior Pentagon officials. (Laughter.)

This is Day 38 of the campaign. There are over 533,000 troops in the Theater. Two Scuds were fired in the last 24 hours, as you probably know; one at 21:03 last night, Eastern Standard -- my times are Eastern Standard Times -- at 9:03; broke up in flight. And one was launched at 11:48 this morning, just before the deadline; the one last night towards Saudi Arabia, the one today towards Israel. A total of 74 Scud launches have been fired, 38 towards Saudi Arabia, 36 towards Israel. The weekly summary for Week 6 is six Scuds so far. Yesterday we reported that Scud debris fell in Qatar. That was a mistake. It actually fell in Bahrain.

Targeting continues to be Scuds, battlefield preparation, Republican Guards, lines of communications and strategic strikes and restrikes. The coalition has flown over 94,000 sorties to date, 2900 in the last 24 hours, 1200 in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, 100 against the Republican Guard and 100 against the Scuds, with an additional 200 A-10 sorties for armed reconnaissance against the Scuds.

In the last 24 hours, there have been zero Iraqi flights. This is the 13th day of no operations at all for the Iraqi air force.

Casualties are 94. There were no additional casualties in the last 24 hours, but some of the numbers have changed. KIAs have gone down one to 23. Wounded has gone up one to 34, and that's bookkeeping. Twenty-eight MIAs and nine POWs.

Aircraft losses for Iraq: 98 total. That's up seven from yesterday. It remains at 42 in air-to-air combat; 36 fixed wing, six helicopters; and 56 in air-to-ground combat. There were no new aircraft that went to Iran, so we hold 137 there to date.

There were no U.S. combat losses in the past 24 hours, and we remain at 23 aircraft.

On enemy prisoners of war -- and these numbers are dynamic because they're taking them probably -- even as we speak, there are 532 in U.S. custody. And as General Neal mentioned this morning, the Marines had taken an additional 143, so that's 675. And the sum of the Saudi Arabians and Turks is 2875. So that's a total of about 3550.

Ground equipment destroyed was updated. And I said -- I kept saying 1200 tanks yesterday, and that was obviously a mistake. It was 1400, and I apologize for that. And actually the Admiral should have reminded me. (Laughter.)

Sixteen hundred and eight-five tanks, which represents 39 percent of the tank force that was in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. Recall we had the base of 4200 there, roughly.

ADM. MCCONNELL: Sixteen-eighty-five.

GEN. KELLY: What'd I say?

ADM. MCCONNELL: (Off-mike.)

GEN. KELLY: Sixteen-eight-five; and 925 armored vehicles, which represents 32 percent of those in the Kuwaiti Theater; and 1485 artillery pieces, which represents 48 percent of those in the Theater.

Admiral McConnell will have something more to say on the oil fires

just as soon as I'm through the statistics.

Ground operations are continued by continued aggressive patrolling, reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance operations. A U.S. Marine Corps patrol, as you heard earlier, engaged 12 tanks. Four were destroyed. The rest fled and were engaged by tactical air. However, we have no additional BDA -- bomb damage assessment -- on that. And the Marines have taken 143 prisoners, as I said.

We were asked a question yesterday relative to the bunkers that were seized on Wednesday. What was in them? And the answer I have for you is it was a typical small unit, assortment of small weapons. The bunkers were living and fighting positions. There was no NBC gear in them, interestingly enough. And the sanitation was quite bad.

Now I'd like to ask Admiral McConnell to talk about the fires.

ADM. MCCONNELL: Just a quick update on the numbers. We have a little bit of refinement on the number of oil wells in Kuwait, and that is about 1200, approximately 1200. And currently, there -- we have identified for sure there are 100 oil wells that have been sabotaged, burned, destroyed, and then gone out, are not currently burning. And there are currently 200 that are burning. So that's -- complete (?) with the math, that's 25 percent of the oil fields in Kuwait have either been destroyed or are currently burning. So the systematic destruction of the oil wells, the oil production facilities, the gathering points, continues.

Q: General Kelly, you like to refer to yourselves as an operator, you always talk about being the operator. As an operator, would you say that now that Saddam Hussein will have to leave Kuwait on the U.S. terms or the allied forces' terms versus his terms, which you may have talked about yesterday?

GEN. KELLY: I would say the answer to that is yes, because it's what the President said yesterday, and remember we always agree with him, and -- and, to my knowledge, the terms have not nor will they change, so yes, I would say he is going to have to leave on those terms.

Q: As a follow-up to that, so we can say that the U.S. forces will be able to drive him out of Kuwait in different -- in a different manner that they have been exercising in the campaign up to this point?

GEN. KELLY: I would say U.S. forces have a capability to force him to comply with the conditions that were established, yes.

Q: General Kelly, would you and the Admiral give us now your assessment of what these new numbers mean in terms of the fighting effectiveness of the Iraqi army, is it -- I mean you add that all up together and it comes out to pretty close to a force that's about 60



percent of what it once was -- it is accurate now to describe this force as an army on the verge of collapse?

GEN. KELLY: No, I would not characterize it that way. I would characterize it as an army that has had some severe losses. Remember, as General Neal pointed out today, that does not mean that the losses are even across the board. Some units may have lost most of their equipment, others may still have 70, 80, 85, 90 percent of it. There are units in the theater of operations that have the capability to resist. I do not think that they have the capability to prevail -- as a matter of fact, I am certain they don't -- but they do have the capability to persist, and to say that a force of that many men with that many tanks left, and they can do some internal reorganization, is on the verge of collapse would be very dangerous, and as a matter of fact, you know, we tend not to underestimate the task at hand anyway. We give them credit for having a lot of capability. If we are wrong and they don't, that turns out to be fine; if we do it the other way, and we were wrong, it turns out to be a disaster. So we would never want to do that.

ADM. MCCONNELL: If I could just add as a follow-up, we are all grasping for a way to measure the combat effectiveness, and what I would highlight for you is these are things we can see that have been destroyed, and it's only tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers. There are 42 divisions in the Kuwaiti theater and there are only 12 of those that are armored units, so we are looking at a measure of a relatively small part -- an important part certainly. There are maneuver units and the ones that would be involved in an attack or counter-attack. But at the same time, there are things we can't measure, as General Kelly has gone over several times, the effectiveness of the maintenance, the effectiveness of the ability to put the vehicles on the road in a fighting condition. That's the hardest part to measure. And what we can't see would be the troops in the foxholes, are they -- what's their fighting will.

Q: General Kelly, we've heard a lot about the shaping -- the shaping of the battlefield, the heavy artillery is going to be nothing in comparison to the launching of the air-land battle. Can you give us some general sense, appreciation, of what that difference is going to be -- what it's going to be like when it starts?

GEN. KELLY: Big. What we've had to date were some itinerant artillery forays across the border, all of which had a purpose -- and maybe the use of the word itinerant is bad. We've had artillery exchanges and some where there was no exchanges because the Iraqis elected not to shoot back. But, as General Schwarzkopf said a couple of weeks ago when he indicated the best was yet to come, a considerable additional amount of violence is available to the commander should it be decided to use that violence, and that's what they will see. And as I said a couple of times, if the ground attack

occurs, there will be no doubt in anybody's mind, and especially in the minds of the Iraqi soldiers, that it has occurred. I would get into the how of it if I went any further, which I don't want to do.

Q: Could I just ask the Admiral a follow-up, as part of the ground war, we have been hearing that this -- the allied troops have been warned that chemical weapons will be used and that the Iraqi commanders have the authority to use those. Have we been able to convey some sort of message to the Iraqi commanders about what our response is going to be and the extent of it if chemical weapons are launched?

GEN. KELLY: Well, that's really an operational question about what our response -- Mike, if you want to say something, feel free to.

ADM. MCCONNELL: No. I would just say that we have said here repeatedly -- and this is being listened, this is being monitored in Baghdad -- that those commanders will be held personally responsible for use of chemical weapons.

GEN. KELLY: And to indicate what our response would be, it would be rapid, it would be violent. The President has the full range available to him, as Secretary Cheney has said, but we are not going to say before the fact what that response will be.

Q: General Kelly, from a military point of view, dealing with military objectives, how do you know when you have won? What are your standards of measurement?

GEN. KELLY: Measures of effectiveness. I think we will know that we've won when we have driven the Iraqi army or what's left of it from Kuwait. We are not going to be satisfied while any portion of it is still active and viable in Kuwait. When we have driven them out, we will have been successful, and I think concurrently, there won't be much of them left.

Q: General, this probably is for the Admiral. There was a report out of Saudi that executions are now taking place in Kuwait City. Do you have any information on that?

ADM. MCCONNELL: I just monitored the news or press conference that came out of Riyadh earlier, and I would just add that there are a series of reports, some of the numbers are quite high, in some cases 100,000 Kuwaitis have been detained, tortured, and so on. But there is enough evidence to give us high confidence that what is currently happening, rounding up of Kuwaiti citizens for execution and torture is in fact happening.

GEN. KELLY: An indicator of that, by the way, is that for whatever reason, the regime in Iraq has not allowed the press in, nor have they

allowed the International Red Cross into Kuwait at all, and that sure is a hint.

Q: General, given that the Iraqis have apparently announced their intention to withdraw, albeit on their own schedule and not on the United States schedule, have you observed any physical signs whatever of preparation to do so?

GEN. KELLY: We have seen no movement at all.

Q: General, if the Iraqis undertake a measure to withdraw after a major ground war commences, would they be fired upon, would they run the risk of being fired upon as they withdraw?

GEN. KELLY: That would be a decision for the President, and he would make it at that time, and you know, there's a million different things that could happen and we just can't predict what would --

Q: General, earlier you had said that if the ground phase begins you thought it would be over fairly quickly, and you amended that later to say

GEN. KELLY: Short order to good order, yes.

Q: -- to good order. Given the fills that you have today on tanks and artillery and everything else you know, what do you look for now in terms of the duration of the final phase in minimizing Desert Storm casualties?

GEN. KELLY: I'll stick with good order. Predicting the length of wars has not been very successful in the past and I would not want to tie it to something. I think that it's not going to be a long and extended campaign, but I can't tell you right now how long it's gonna take. I think we'll do a good job.

Q: General Kelly, I have a couple of questions for Admiral McConnell. You mentioned in giving the figures on the oil field fires that there had been a hundred oil field fires that you had counted that had burned out. Do you have any estimate of the duration of the 200 that are burning out now, how long would expect them to be burning, and I have a second question?

ADM. MCCONNELL: Some of the wells that are burning now are high pressure oils, and left to their own devices they'd burn for an extended period of time. Looking at what it would take to extinguish each fire, each could take as much as a week to a month.

Q: And that was the case in the first one hundred?

ADM. MCCONNELL: No. The first one hundred were low pressure wells.



Some of those were extinguished by themselves.

Q: The second half of that question. When you first informed us that 50 Kuwaiti oil well fires were underway, you said that there was as possibility that some of those had been set by our own bombardment. Of the 200, you want to hazard to guess as to how many might have been caused as a result of artillery or air bombardment?

ADM. MCCONNELL: I would strictly be guessing, but based on the information and the evidence that we've compiled to date, it looks like the vast majority were deliberately set. Recall back at the beginning each well, each facility had been loaded with explosives, and it appears now that that's a very systematic decision and they're working them off one at a time.

Q: But some may have been set off by --

ADM. MCCONNELL: That's possible.

Q: -- an allied bombardment.

GEN. KELLY: Yes, sir.

Q: General, do you know of any reason to hold off the ground campaign right now?

GEN. KELLY: Well, the main reason I would think of would be because the President said so. No, you know, we can start it, we cannot start it. We've already said we're not gonna get into it, so I don't think I really should go any further. Okay. Yes, ma'am.

Q: General, can you comment on the use of napalm bombs? Are those bombs being used against Iraqi troops?

GEN. KELLY: Napalm has been used already against the oil ditches in order to ignite them, and I would not want to speculate on the future use of napalm, no.

Q: Are there troops -- are troops around these ditches or --

GEN. KELLY: There are troops near them because that's the reason that this was dug in the first place in order to protect the troops, but not close enough to where they should be a casualty as a result of bombing the ditch, and I just would not want to speculate on what our future plans are.

MR. WILLIAMS: General and Admiral, thank you very much.

Q: Can I ask him to clarify one thing he said -- to become clear.

MR. WILLIAMS: Sure. One last clarification, General.

Q: You said earlier, General, that since they did not accept the President's offer, they will not withdraw on their own time scale. Did you mean to be foreclosing any prospect that they --

GEN. KELLY: No, I did not.

Q-- can now withdraw --

GEN. KELLY: What I meant to say was that they're not gonna set up some schedule and adhere to it. We will have to agree to whatever it is that we want them to do. The President was quite direct yesterday in telling them what the terms were. They didn't accept those terms and now they'll live with it.

Q: What's the mood in the Command Center?

GEN. KELLY: Calm and professional.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. I have no other announcements for you. Are there any further questions?

Q: Will there be a briefing tomorrow?

MR. WILLIAMS: I can't hear you.

Q: Will there be a briefing tomorrow?

MR. WILLIAMS: We don't have a briefing scheduled here in Washington. We don't ordinarily brief on Sundays. I'm not precisely certain what the Riyadh briefing schedule will be, but we'll get some word for you on that.

Q: Any plans for the Secretary to travel to Camp David?

MR. WILLIAMS: Not that I know of. No, the Secretary came in this morning. He had a meeting with the board, I think of the American Red Cross, that was previously scheduled, and he's been here in the Pentagon, but I don't know of any plans for him to go anywhere else today.

Q: What about Powell's schedule, and what is he doing today?

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, I don't know. The last time I talked to him he was home, but I don't know -- or in quarters, as they say in the military. I don't know where -- what his plans are. I just don't know. Perhaps, Col. -- (inaudible) -- would know.

Q: Thank you.

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אל: רהמש/2839

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בלמס/מיד

אל: מנהל מצפא

דע: הרי הורביץ, לשכת רוה'מ

לשכת השגריר

ציר הסברה וושינגטון

מאת: קונכל לוס אנג'לס

בעת בקורו לאחרונה של יועץ רוה'מ, הרי הורביץ, נידונה האפשרות שרוה'מ יבקר  
כאן במסגרת נסיעתו הקרובה בארה'ב. אנא, עדכון בנדון.

רן רונן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 35461  
אל: רהמש/2920  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 250291, זח: 1249, דח: ר, סג: בל,  
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אל : הקונכ'ל - לוס אנג'לס

ביקור רוה'מ.שלך 134.

בדקנו הנושא בלישכת רוה'מ - ואין חדש. במידה ותהא התפתחות נעדכנך.

מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

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אאא, חוזם: 35461  
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מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס



ACTION USIS INFO CG DFO POL ACC 5

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02

USINFO

ATTN JORDAN AAMM

USIS PAC/IO FROM P/PFN

EO 12356 N/A

SUBJECT: 2/21 FITZWATER STATEMENT ON SOVIET PROPOSAL

NE-U01 02/21/91 (1160)

THE FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE

FEBRUARY 22 NEWS CONFERENCE WITH WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN

MARLIN FITZWATER REGARDING THE SOVIET PEACE PROPOSAL ON THE

GULF:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

MR. FITZWATER: PRESIDENT GORBACHEV CALLED PRESIDENT

BUSH AT 6:47 P.M. THIS EVENING TO DISCUSS HIS CONVERSATION

WITH IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER, TARIQ AZIZ. PRESIDENT

GORBACHEV OUTLINED ALL OF THE MAJOR POINTS OF THE SOVIET

INITIATIVE DEVELOPED BY HIMSELF AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

PRESIDENT BUSH THANKED PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FOR HIS

INTENSIVE AND USEFUL EFFORTS BUT RAISED SERIOUS CONCERNS

ABOUT SEVERAL POINTS IN THE PLAN.

PRESIDENT BUSH SAID THE UNITED STATES WILL CONSULT

WITH ITS COALITION PARTNERS ON A PROPOSAL. WE ARE IN THE

PROCESS OF EXAMINING THE SOVIET INITIATIVE TONIGHT. THE

UNITED STATES AND ITS COALITION PARTNERS CONTINUE TO

PROSECUTE THE WAR.

THAT IS THE SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF THE SITUATION THAT WE

HAVE AT THIS POINT. I'LL TRY TO ANSWER A FEW QUESTIONS.

Q: DID PRESIDENT GORBACHEV GIVE ANY INDICATION THAT

ONCE PRESIDENT BUSH GAVE HIM THESE CONCERNS, THAT HE WAS

GOING TO TAKE THOSE BACK TO AZIZ? AND DID HE LEAVE ANY

HOPE THAT THERE MAY BE SOME GIVE ON THE PART OF IRAQIS ON

THESE POINTS THE PRESIDENT RAISED?

MR. FITZWATER: THEY DIDN'T DISCUSS FOLLOW-ON

PROCEDURES. PRESIDENT BUSH DID SAY THAT WE WOULD BE

1/2 UNCLASSIFIED USINFO 221603Z FEB 91/01

1/2 UNCLASSIFIED USINFO 221603Z FEB 91/01

EXAMINING THESE POINTS TONIGHT AND WE WILL BE CONSIDERING,  
 THEN, HOW WE INTEND TO RESPOND. I WOULD NOT EXPECT  
 ANYTHING -- ANY RESPONSE TONIGHT -- ANYTHING BEFORE  
 TOMORROW. BUT IN TERMS OF WHAT HAPPENS THEN, THAT REALLY  
 IS CONTINGENT UPON HOW WE VIEW THE VARIOUS POINTS IN THIS  
 PLAN AND WHAT ACTION NEEDS TO BE TAKEN AT THAT TIME.

Q: WHAT ARE THE CONCERNS? WHAT ARE THE CHIEF

DRAWBACKS AS THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD SEE IT?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WE DON'T WANT TO GO INTO THE

INDIVIDUAL POINTS. OF COURSE, THIS PLAN WAS JUST ANNOUNCED

BY THE SOVIETS A SHORT TIME AGO. THE TELEPHONE

CONVERSATION LASTED APPROXIMATELY 33 MINUTES. AND ALTHOUGH

THEY DID GET A CHANCE TO GO THROUGH THE MAJOR POINTS, WE

OBTAIN A CONSIDERABLE ANALYSIS TO DO.

BUT I WOULD EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT AS THEY WENT THROUGH

THE VARIOUS POINTS, PRESIDENT BUSH DID STATE THE CONCERNS

THAT HE FELT THE COALITION WOULD HAVE ON THIS MATTER, BOTH

IN TERMS OF POINTS THAT ARE IN THE PLAN THAT WE HAVE

PROBLEMS WITH, AS WELL AS ISSUES THAT ARE NOT INCLUDED. SO

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ISSUES TO RESOLVE.

Q: BUT THIS DOES HOLD UP THE GROUND WAR, DOESN'T IT?

MR. FITZWATER: THE GROUND WAR IS A MATTER THAT IS

STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION. THE WAR ITSELF CONTINUES. WE

WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK COMPLIANCE WITH THE UN RESOLUTIONS.

AND THE PRESIDENT WILL MAKE DECISIONS CONCERNING THE GROUND

WAR AS APPROPRIATE. THIS PROCESS -- THAT IT WAS INITIATED

BY THE SOVIETS IS CONTINUING AT A BATHER INTENSIVE PACE,

BUT THERE IS NO CHANGE AT THIS POINT IN OUR SCHEDULE FOR

PROSECUTION OF THE WAR.

Q: DURING THE MEETING ITSELF -- WAS AZIZ IN

COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRESIDENT? WAS THERE ANY TWO-WAY ON

THAT?

MR. FITZWATER: NO. THERE WAS NO ONE ELSE ON THE

PHONE CALL AND NO OTHER COMMUNICATIONS.

Q: DOES PRESIDENT BUSH SEE NOW HERE A CHANCE FOR THE

FIRST TIME SINCE AUGUST 2 TO REVERSE THE INVASION OF KUWAIT

AND ACTUALLY COME ABOUT THIS WITHOUT LAUNCHING A GROUND

WAR?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, THERE HAVE BEEN INNUMERABLE

CHANGES SINCE AUGUST 2 IN THE SENSE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02

COULD HAVE PULLED OUT AT ANY TIME. THAT STILL IS THE  
 FASTEST AND MOST EFFICIENT WAY TO END THIS WAR. IN TERMS  
 OF THIS INITIATIVE, IT'S JUST TOO SOON TO CHARACTERIZE IT.  
 WE NEED TO TAKE A LOOK AT IT, BUT I WOULD SAY AGAIN THAT WE  
 HAVE HAD OUR HOPES RAISED BEFORE. AFTER A SERIOUS  
 EXAMINATION, THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS, AND  
 CERTAINLY THE PRESIDENT HAS INDICATED THERE COULD WELL BE  
 SOME DIFFICULTIES HERE. BUT WE ARE TAKING A LOOK AT IT.

Q: HOW COULD HE PROSECUTE A GROUND WAR IF, INDEED,

THE TALKS ARE PROCEEDING IN MOSCOW?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, THAT'S NOT A ISSUE AT THE

MOMENT. WE ARE PROCEEDING THE WAR -- THE AIR WAR

CONTINUES. THERE'S BEEN NO DECISION ON THE GROUND WAR AT

THIS TIME. AND WE CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE MATTER IN THE

PERSIAN GULF IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT MILITARY

WAY POSSIBLE.

Q: THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID ALL ALONG THAT THE 12 UN

RESOLUTIONS ARE WHAT SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST LIVE UP TO. IN

THE POINTS THAT THE PRESIDENT RAISED THAT HE DOESN'T LIKE,

THE POSSIBILITY SOUNDS LIKE THERE MAY BE A NEGOTIATION

UNDERWAY TO DROP ONE OR MORE OF THOSE POINTS. CAN THE

PRESIDENT LIVE WITH ANYTHING LESS THAN FULL ACCEPTANCE OF

ALL 12, AS LONG AS IRAQ PULLS OUT OF KUWAIT?

MR. FITZWATER: THERE IS NO NEGOTIATION UNDERWAY WITH

REGARD TO THE UNITED STATES. I REMIND YOU AGAIN THAT THIS

IS A MATTER BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND IRAQ, THAT WE ARE

COMMENTING ON THEIR PROPOSAL, AND WE ARE NOT DIRECTLY

INVOLVED IN THAT SENSE. I WOULD REPEAT ONCE AGAIN AS WELL

THAT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE 12 UN RESOLUTIONS IS THE GOAL

WE SEEK, AND THE -- THOSE ARE THE GUIDELINES THAT WE WOULD

USE IN JUDGING ANY CONSIDERATION OF WITHDRAWAL.

Q: ARE YOU WILLING TO GO BEYOND THOSE 12, THOUGH, TO

SCALE BACK ANY OF THOSE 12?

MR. FITZWATER: WE HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY THAT WE MUST

HAVE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE 12 UN RESOLUTIONS. THERE'S

NO CHANGE IN THAT SITUATION.

Q: MARLIN, ASIDE FROM RAISING SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS

HERE, YOU SAID THAT "WE'VE HAD OUR HOPES RAISED BEFORE."

IN THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING THIS, DO YOU AT LEAST SEE THAT

THERE IS SOME HOPE HERE, THAT THIS PEACE PROPOSAL COULD

WORK IF SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT THE PRESIDENT SEES ARE

WORKED OUT?

MR. FITZWATER: I JUST DON'T WANT TO GIVE IT ANY

CHARACTERIZATION UNTIL WE'VE HAD A CHANCE TO GIVE IT THE

FULL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. LET'S TAKE

ONE MORE QUESTION.

Q: HOW CAN YOU SAY THERE ARE NO NEGOTIATIONS GOING ON

WHEN GORBACHEV TELLS YOU HIS POINTS AND YOU TELL HIM WHICH

ONES ARE OBJECTIONABLE, AND BASICALLY ASK HIM TO GO BACK TO

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TARIQ AZIZ AND SAY ABOUT THESE POINTS. ARE THOSE NOT

NEGOTIATIONS? IS HE NOT NEGOTIATING ON YOUR BEHALF?

MR. FITZWATER: WE HAVEN'T ASKED HIM TO DO ANYTHING.

HE'S ASKED OUR VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS. WE WILL PROVIDE

THEM, AS WE HAVE IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, BUT I REITERATE

AGAIN THAT THIS IS A MATTER BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND IRAQ,

AND WE ARE APPRECIATIVE OF THE COMMUNICATION THAT TOLD US

OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, BUT WE ARE NOT A PART OF THE

NEGOTIATIONS.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

(ALGIERS, AMMAN, LOHA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED)

ITEM

BT

#1374

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2/2 UNCLASSIFIED USINFO 221603Z FEB 91/02



תאריך : 23.02.91

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2.34127:0310

אל: המשרד

י' עד'ים:רהמש/2829.מצב/3990.בטח/3435

10:10. 2:17. 1600:17. 220291:18. 2184:17. 11:17. -2

תח: @ דג: צפא

@:74

סודי / מיידי

7N : סמל ל' צפ' א' פ' ג'

דע: לשכת רוהמ' , לשכת שה'ח, לשכת שהב'ט , לשכת שר האוצר

מאת: לשכת השגריר, וושינגטון

בהשת"ס"י

ראו נא מכתב השגריר למזכיר המדינה בנושא מה- 22.2.91

לש' השגר' יר

להלו המכתב:

FEBRUARY 22, 1991

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

1 HAVE THE HONOR TO WRITE TO YOU FOLLOWING COMMUNICATIONS  
BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR AND PRESIDENT BUSH, AND FURTHER  
TO TALKS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN WASHINGTON AND ISRAEL CONCERNING  
THE URGENT DEFENSE NEEDS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

I HAVE . MR. SECRETARY, BEEN INSTRUCTED BY MY GOVERNMENT TO  
APPLY FOR URGENT EMERGENCY DEFENSE AIR TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL  
IN THE AMOUNT OF 1 BILLION DOLLAR.

AS YOU KNOW, SINCE AUGUST 2, 1990, ISRAEL HAS HAD TO BE IN A STATE OF PREPAREDNESS -- OUT FORCES HAVE BEEN ON HIGH ALERT, OUT PILOTS IN THEIR COCKPITS, WE WERE TRANSFORMED, IN FACT, INTO A FRONTLINE STATE. DESPITE OUT NOT BEING MEMBERS OF THE

**משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר**

COALITION.

WITH MY RECENT LETTER TO YOU OF FEBRUARY 12, I ENCLOSED A DETAILED LIST OF OUR IMMEDIATE DEFENSE RELATED EXPENDITURES. THESE EXPENDITURES ARE OVER AND ABOVE THE 500 MILLION DOLLAR INCREASE IN OUR DEFENSE BUDGET, LEGISLATED AS AN EMERGENCY BUDGET OUTSIDE THE EXISTING BUDGETARY FRAMEWORK.

I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY, ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT, TO EXPRESS OUR PROFOUND APPRECIATION FOR THE WORDS OF THE PRESIDENT, AS WELL AS YOUR OWN STATEMENTS IN RECOGNITION OF THE URGENT NEEDS OF ISRAEL. AND WE ARE MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EFFORTS IN EXPLORING WAYS TO ASSIST ISRAEL.

WE TRUST THAT THE CRITICAL SITUATION WHICH ISRAEL IS FACING AS A RESULT OF THE WAR, WILL RECEIVE YOUR FULL AND SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING.

WITH BEST PERSONAL REGARDS.

SINCERELY YOURS.

ZALMAN SHOVAL  
AMBASSADOR

THE HONORABLE  
JAMES A. BAKER I I I  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

17

17

תפ: שהח (2), סשהח (1), רהמ (0), מנכל (1), ממנכל (1), שהבט (0), אוצר (3), בנצור (1), מצפא (4)

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 HD:0 AD:XQH  
 LF:0

WILEY-INTERSCIENCE

REVISED: 08-11-05 09:08:11

地址: 天津经济技术开发区 泰达 5 号路 天津泰达国际大酒店 天津泰达国际大酒店

地址: 10000 工厂街, 上海 200000

15000 2014

UNIT ON SCIENCE POLICY & SOCIETY, 100-10000, 19-0-00

Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the study population

## 5.5. DISCUSSION

FEBRUARY 1991

8. 1994年12月31日 3元 34.50

THE URGENT DEBATE NEEDS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL.  
TO TALKS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN WASHINGTON AND ISRAEL CONCERNING  
BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR AND PRESIDENT BUSH. AND FURTHER  
I HAVE THE HONOR TO WRITE TO YOU FOLLOWING COMMUNICATIONS

IN THE AMOUNT OF 1 BILLION DOLLAR;  
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40171-403

OUTSIDE THE EXISTING BUDGETARY FRAMEWORK.  
INCREASE IN OUR DEFENSE BUDGET. LEGISLATED AS AN EMERGENCY BUDGET  
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UNDERSTANDING.

10TH GREAT PERSECUTION, 1949-1950.



אאאא, חוזם: 34127  
אל: רהמש/ 2829  
מ-: ווש, נר: 2184, תא: 220291, זח: 1600, דח: מ, סג: סו,  
בבב  
סודי / מיידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

דע: לשכת רוהמ', לשכת שה'ח, לשכת שהב'ט, לשכת שר האוצר

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SINCERELY YOURS,

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AMBASSADOR

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JAMES A. BAKER I I I  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), אוצר, בנצור,  
מצפא

ססס

אאאא, חוזס: 34127  
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תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), אוצר, בנצור,  
מצפא

ססס



תאריך : 23.02.91

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אל:המשרד

י' עד' ים: רהמש/2832, מצב/3993

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סודי / מיידי / למכותבים בלבד

7N : סמך ל' צפ' נ'

דע: לש' שה'ח

לש' רנה' מ

= למכונות ב' =

עֲרֵבוּ יוֹת לַדִּיּוֹר

רצ'ב מכתבו של דניס רוס לשגריר בעקבות החלטת המזכיר בנושא.

לש' שגג'ר

להלו המכתב:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR , POLICY PLANNING STAFF  
WASHINGTON

FEBRUARY 22, 1991

DEAR ZALMAN:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 13 FORWARDING SOME OF THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WE REQUESTED RELATED TO HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES AND HAVE SHOWN IT TO SECRETARY BAKER.

THE SECRETARY AGREES THAT YOU HAVE BEGUN TO MAKE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO MEET OUR REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATING TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS OUTLINED BY FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY IN HIS OCTOBER 2, 1990 LETTER. ON THAT BASIS, THE

## משדד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

SECRETARY HAS DECIDED TO RELEASE THE 400 MILLION DOLLAR IN HOUSING  
LOAN GUARANTEES IN A SINGLE TRANCHE. HOWEVER, HE TRUSTS THAT  
YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL AS AGREED CONTINUE TO USE ITS BEST EFFORTS  
TO PROVIDE AS COMPLETE INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON ISRAEL'S  
FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY, IN PARTICULAR A  
BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURES BY MINISTRY TO THE EXTEN POSSIBLE,  
AND PERIODICALLY TO UPDATE THE INFORMATION ALREADY PROVIDED AND  
TO INFORM US OF ANY GOVERNMENT SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY.

AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE THIS ADMINISTRATION FROM THE PRESIDENT ON DOWN HAS EXPRESSED ITS STRONG OPPOSITION TO SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IN THIS REGARD, THE ADMINISTRATION WAS VERY DISTURBED BY RECENT REPORTS THAT SUGGESTED ISRAEL WAS INTENT ON INTENSIFYING SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. SUBSEQUENTLY WE HAVE BEEN REASSURED THROUGH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR'S OFFICE THAT THESE PLANS OF PROPOSALS DO NOT REPRESENT FORMAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS. THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE CONTINUE TO BE REASSURED THAT ISRAEL IS NOT GOING TO ENGAGE IN INTENSIFIED SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. AND IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE KNOW THAT US RESOURCES WILL NOT BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE THAT BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES ATTACH TO THE ISSUE OF THE ABSORPTION OF SOVIET JEWS AND THE CHALLENGES WE FACE IN THE GULF. I AM GLAD THAT THE ISSUE OF THE 400 MILLION DOLLAR IN HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES HAS NOW BEEN RESOLVED.

SINCERELY YOURS.

DENNIS B. ROSS

HIS EXCELLENCY  
ZALMAN SHOVAL,  
AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL,  
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL,  
WASHINGTON D.C.

לבח

17

תפ: שהח(2), רהמ(0), מנכל(1), בנצור(1)

[illegible]

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**TEST SCORES:**

1927-28 250

THE SECRETARY AGREES THAT YOU HAVE BEGUN TO MAKE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO MEET OUR REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATING TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS OUTLINED BY FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY IN HIS OCTOBER 2, 1950 LETTER. ON THAT BASIS, THE

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BRUCE Y. YOUNG

1108 J. B. P. ZWIERS

THE EXCELLENCE  
OF THE SHOW  
AND THE QUALITY OF THE  
WORK OF THE  
FACULTY OF THE  
UNIVERSITY OF  
WASHINGTON

52

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אאא, חוזם: 34197  
אל: רהמש/ 2832  
מ-: ווש, נר: 2189, תא: 220291, זח: 1925, דח: מ, סג: סו,  
בבב  
סודי / מיידי / למכותבים בלבד

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

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לש' רוה'מ

= למכותבים בלבד =

ערבויות לדיוור

רצ'ב מכתבו של דניס רוס לשגריר בעקבות החלטת המזכיר בנושא.

לש' שגריר

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DIRECTOR , POLICY PLANNING STAFF  
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לבח

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 34197  
אל: רהמש/2832  
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דע: לש' שה'ח  
לש' רוה'מ

= למכותבים בלבד =

ערבויות לדיוור

רצ'ב מכתבו של דניס רוס לשגריר בעקבות החלטת המזכיר בנושא.

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I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 13 FORWARDING SOME OF THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WE REQUESTED RELATED TO HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES AND HAVE SHOWN IT TO SECRETARY BAKER.

THE SECRETARY AGREES THAT YOU HAVE BEGUN TO MAKE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO MEET OUR REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATING TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS OUTLINED BY FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY IN HIS OCTOBER 2, 1990 LETTER. ON THAT BASIS, THE SECRETARY HAS DECIDED TO RELEASE THE 400 MILLION DOLLAR IN HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES IN A SINGLE TRANCHE. HOWEVER, HE TRUSTS THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL AS AGREED CONTINUE TO USE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO PROVIDE AS COMPLETE INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON ISRAEL'S FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY, IN PARTICULAR A BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURES BY MINISTRY TO THE EXTEN POSSIBLE, AND PERIODICALLY TO UPDATE THE INFORMATION ALREADY PROVIDED AND TO INFORM US OF ANY GOVERNMENT SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY.

AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE THIS ADMINISTRATION FROM THE PRESIDENT ON DOWN HAS EXPRESSED ITS STRONG OPPOSITION TO SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IN THIS REGARD, THE ADMINISTRATION WAS VERY DISTURBED BY RECENT REPORTS THAT SUGGESTED ISRAEL WAS INTENT ON INTENSIFYING SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. SUBSEQUENTLY WE HAVE BEEN REASSURED THROUGH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR'S OFFICE THAT THESE PLANS OR PROPOSALS DO NOT REPRESENT FORMAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS. THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE CONTINUE TO BE REASSURED THAT ISRAEL IS NOT GOING TO ENGAGE IN INTENSIFIED SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. AND IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE

KNOW THAT US RESOURCES WILL NOT BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE THAT BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES ATTACH TO THE ISSUE OF THE ABSORPTION OF SOVIET JEWS AND THE CHALLENGES WE FACE IN THE GULF, I AM GLAD THAT THE ISSUE OF THE 400 MILLION DOLLAR IN HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES HAS NOW BEEN RESOLVED.

SINCERELY YOURS,

DENNIS B. ROSS

HIS EXCELLENCY  
ZALMAN SHOVAL,  
AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL,  
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL,  
WASHINGTON D.C.

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור

סססס



מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס מ ס ו ו ג

אאא, חוזם: 23435  
אל: רהמש/ 1971  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 130291, זח: 1749, דח: מ, סג: שמ,  
בבב  
3553  
שמור/מידי

אל: וושינגטון - השגריר, הציר

הנדון: ערבויות

לידיעתכם יועץ רוה'מ לענינים כלכליים מעביר היום (13.2) לידי הציר  
הכלכלי אינפורמציה במענה לפניית רוס לשגריר ב-7 דנא (מברק נויבך נר-179  
מיום 8.2).

מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן

סססס

אאא, חוזה: 23435  
אל: רהמש/1971  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 130291, זח: 1749, דח: מ, סג: שמ,  
בבב  
3553  
שמור/מיד

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הנדון: ערבויות

לידיעתכם יועץ רה"מ לענינים כלכליים מעביר היום (13.2) לידי הציר  
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מיום 8.2).

מצפ"א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 23119

אל: רהמש/1957

מ-: רהמש, נר: 6, תא: 130291, חז: 1433, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

9,811904

13.2.91

ש - 182

- ש מ ו ר -

אל: מר אמנון נויבך, ציר כלכלי וושינגטון

דע: לשכת שר החוץ

מצפ"א

לשכת שר האוצר

ר' אגף התקציבים, משרד האוצר

לשכת שר הבינוי והשיכון

מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ

מזכיר הממשלה

מאת: עמוס רובין

מילוי התחבובות שר החוץ הישראלי למזכיר המדינה האמריקני

1. אינפורמציה על סיוע כספי של ממשלת ישראל לפעילות התישבותית, דווחה ע"י האוצר ל-A.I.D., - עמ' 2 בתזכיר. (פירוט "הלוואת מקום", (40.000 ש"ח); שכונה מועדפת (25.000 ש"ח) או הלוואה ל"בנייה חדשה" (14.500 ש"ח) - בישראל וביש"ע.

2. יש"ע אינו מופיע כמחוז או מחוזות בפני עצמם בתקציב ובסטטיסטיקות של ישראל, משום שלא סופחו לישראל. ישובים (COMMUNITIES) ישראלים ביש"ע נהנים מאותן תמיכות של ממשלת ישראל כמו ישובים דומים בישראל גופא, במסגרת התקציבים הכוללים. תשובה ברוח זו ניתנה בזמנו ע"י אנשי האוצר לאנשי A.I.D. נושא התקציבים לא עלה מחדש אלא לאחר דברי מזכיר המדינה בקונגרס, בבקשה שהגיש דניס רוס לשגריר שובל.

3. במסגרת האינפורמציה על בנייה פיזית, נמסרו בתזכיר הנ"ל ל-A.I.D. ע"י האוצר נתונים על התחלות בניית קבע בישובים עירוניים בישראל וביש"ע (לוח 1, עמ' 13), ונתונים על התקשרויות חוזיות לבניית קבע בישראל וביש"ע (לוח 2, עמ' 14).

4. בנוסף לכך דיווחתי לשגרירות ארה"ב בישראל (אחרי ברורים מיוחדים) על התחלות בנייה בישובים כפריים ביש"ע ועל הצבת קרוונים ביש"ע בשנה התקציבית השוטפת. (בהמשך לסטטיסטיקה המופיעה בפיגור בשנתון הסטטיסטי לישראל, שם יש נתונים עד סוף 1989).

5. בשיחות שקיימו אנשי האוצר עם אנשי A.I.D. והיועץ הכלכלי לראה"מ עם שגרירות ארה"ב בתקופה האחרונה ועד רגע זה ממש, לא הבנו שמצפים מאיתנו לאינפורמציה נוספת.



(להמחשת הדברים:- בפנייה האחרונה אלינו (ב- 28.1.91), נשאלנו וענינו לשגרירות ארה"ב בנושאי הצהרת ראה"מ על אי הפניית עולים לישראל, וכן, בהקשר לדברי השר שרון בועדת הכספים בכנסת, שאין (בינתיים) החלטת ממשלה על היקף עתידי של בנייה בישראל).

6. לבקשתו של דניס רוס לשגרירנו בווינגטון מ- 7.2.91:

(1) להוצאות כספיות של המשרדים השונים מעבר לקו הירוק. - כבר ענינו שאין לנו תקצוב נפרד.

(2) אינפורמציה על כבישים, ישובים והרחבות בישראל, להלן:

א. סלילת כבישים חדשים - במהלך 1990 הוחל בסלילת 3 כבישים חד מסלוליים ביו"ש:-

(1) כביש נילי - שילת, כ- 8 ק"מ.

(2) עוקף (DETOUR, BYPASS) טול כרם, כ- 8 ק"מ.

(3) עוקף עזון, כ- 6 ק"מ.

ב. הקמת ישובים חדשים או הרחבות מהותיות של ישובים קיימים - במהלך 1990:-

(1) הוחל בעבודת הכשרת קרקע לישוב חדש, קרית ספר (באזור מודיעין), בשטח יו"ש.

(2) הוחל בפתוח שכונות חדשות בישובים קיימים כדלהלן:-

(א) אריאל - "רובע ב'".

(ב) כפר אדומים - "שכונת אלון".

(ג) מעלה אדומים - "שכונת 03".

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, כהן, כלכליתב', אוצר, @ (שרהשיכון)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 23119

אל: רהמש/1957

מ-: רהמש, נר: 6, תא: 130291, זח: 1433, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

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ש - 182

- ש מ ו ר -

אל: מר אמנון נויבך, ציר כלכלי וושינגטון

דע: לשכת שר החוץ

מצפ"א

לשכת שר האוצר

ר' אגף התקציבים, משרד האוצר

לשכת שר הבינוי והשיכון

מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ

מזכיר הממשלה

מאת: עמוס רובין

מילוי התחבובות שר החוץ הישראלי למזכיר המדינה האמריקני

1. אינפורמציה על סיוע כספי של ממשלת ישראל לפעילות התישבותית, דווחה ע"י האוצר ל-A.I.D., - עמ' 2 בתזכיר. (פירוט "הלוואת מקום", (40.000 ש"ח); שכונה מועדפת (25.000 ש"ח) או הלוואה ל"בנייה חדשה" (14.500 ש"ח) - בישראל וב"ש"ע.

2. יש"ע אינו מופיע כמחוז או מחוזות בפני עצמם בתקציב ובסטטיסטיקות של ישראל, משום שלא סופחו לישראל. ישובים (COMMUNITIES) ישראלים ב"ש"ע נהנים מאותן תמיכות של ממשלת ישראל כמו ישובים דומים בישראל גופא, במסגרת התקציבים הכוללים. תשובה ברוח זו ניתנה בזמנו ע"י אנשי האוצר לאנשי A.I.D. נושא התקציבים לא עלה מחדש אלא לאחר דברי מזכיר המדינה בקונגרס, בבקשה שהגיש דניס רוס לשגריר שובל.

3. במסגרת האינפורמציה על בנייה פיזית, נמסרו בתזכיר הנ"ל ל-A.I.D. ע"י האוצר נתונים על התחלות בניית קבע בישובים עירוניים בישראל וב"ש"ע (לוח 1, עמ' 13), ונתונים על התקשרויות חוזיות לבניית קבע בישראל וב"ש"ע (לוח 2, עמ' 14).

4. בנוסף לכך דיווחתי לשגרירות ארה"ב בישראל (אחרי ברורים מיוחדים) על התחלות בנייה בישובים כפריים ב"ש"ע ועל הצבת קרוונים ב"ש"ע בשנה התקציבית השוטפת. (בהמשך לסטטיסטיקה המופיעה בפיגור בשנתון הסטטיסטי לישראל, שם יש נתונים עד סוף 1989).

5. בשיחות שקיימו אנשי האוצר עם אנשי A.I.D. והיועץ הכלכלי לראה"מ עם שגרירות ארה"ב בתקופה האחרונה ועד רגע זה ממש, לא הבנו שמצפים מאיתנו לאינפורמציה נוספת.

(להמחשת הדברים: - בפנייה האחרונה אלינו (ב- 28.1.91), נשאלנו

וענינו לשגרירות ארה"ב בנושאי הצהרת ראה"מ על אי הפניית עולים ליש"ע, וכן, בהקשר לדברי השר שרון בועדת הכספים בכנסת, שאין (בינתיים) החלטת ממשלה על היקף עתידי של בנייה ביש"ע.

6. לבקשתו של דניס רוס לשגרירנו בווינגטון מ- 7.2.91:

(1) להוצאות כספיות של המשרדים השונים מעבר לקו הירוק. - כבר ענינו שאין לנו תקצוב נפרד.

(2) אינפורמציה על כבישים, ישובים והרחבות ביש"ע, להלן:

א. סלילת כבישים חדשים - במהלך 1990 הוחל בסלילת 3 כבישים חד מסלוליים ביו"ש:-

(1) כביש נילי - שילת, כ- 8 ק"מ.

(2) עוקף (DETOUR, BYPASS) טול כרם, כ- 8 ק"מ.

(3) עוקף עזון, כ- 6 ק"מ.

ב. הקמת ישובים חדשים או הרחבות מהותיות של ישובים קיימים - במהלך 1990:-

(1) הוחל בעבודת הכשרת קרקע לישוב חדש, קרית ספר (באזור מודיעין), בשטח יו"ש.

(2) הוחל בפתוח שכונות חדשות בישובים קיימים כדלהלן:-

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(ב) כפר אדומים - "שכונת אלון".

(ג) מעלה אדומים - "שכונת 03".

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, כהן, כלכליתב', אוצר, @ (שרהשיכון)

סססס



אל: מר אמנון נויבר, ציר כלכלי וושינגטון

דע: לשכת שר החוץ

מצפ"א

לשכת שר האוצר

ר' אגף התקציבים, משרד האוצר

לשכת שר הבינוי והשיכון

מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ

מזכיר הממשלה

מאת: עמוס רובין

מילוי התחביות שר החוץ הישראלי למזכיר המדינה האמריקני

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(להמחשת הדברים:- בפנייה האחרונה אלינו (ב- 28.1.91), נשאלנו וענינו לשגרירות ארה"ב בנושאי הצהרת ראה"מ על אי הפניית עולים לישראל, וכן, בהקשר לדברי השר שרון בועדת הכספים בכנסת, שאין (בינתיים) החלטת ממשלה על היקף עתידי של בנייה בישראל).

6. לבקשתו של דניס רוס לשגרירנו בווינגטון מ- 7.2.91:

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(2 אינפורמציה על כבישים, ישובים והרחבות בישראל, להלן:

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(2 עוקף (DETOUR, BYPASS) טול כרם, כ- 8 ק"מ.

(3 עוקף עזון, כ- 6 ק"מ.

ב. הקמת ישובים חדשים או הרחבות מהותיות של ישובים קיימים - במהלך 1990:-

(1 הוחל בעבודת הכשרת קרקע לישוב חדש, קרית ספר (באזור מודיעין), בשטח יו"ש.

(2 הוחל בפתוח שכונות חדשות בישובים קיימים כדלהלן:-

(א אריאל - "רובע ב'".

(ב כפר אדומים - "שכונת אלון".

(ג מעלה אדומים - "שכונת 03".

אל: מר אמנון נויבר, ציר כלכלי וושינגטון

דע: לשכת שר החוץ  
מצפ"א  
לשכת שר האוצר  
ר' אגף התקציבים, משרד האוצר  
לשכת שר הבינוי והשיכון  
מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ  
מזכיר הממשלה

מאת: עמוס רובין

מילוי התחביות שר החוץ הישראלי למזכיר המדינה האמריקני

1. אינפורמציה על סיוע כספי של ממשלת ישראל לפעילות התישבותית, דווחה ע"י האוצר ל-A.I.D., - עמ' 2 בתזכיר. (פירוט "הלוואת מקום", (40.000 ש"ח); שכונה מועדפת (25.000 ש"ח) או הלוואה ל"בנייה חדשה" (14.500 ש"ח) - בישראל וביש"ע.
2. יש"ע אינו מופיע כמחוז או מחוזות בפני עצמם בתקציב ובסטטיסטיקות של ישראל, משום שלא סופחו לישראל. ישובים (COMMUNITIES) ישראלים ביש"ע נהנים מאותן תמיכות של ממשלת ישראל כמו ישובים דומים בישראל גופא, במסגרת התקציבים הכוללים. תשובה ברוח זו ניתנה בזמנו ע"י אנשי האוצר לאנשי A.I.D. נושא התקציבים לא עלה מחדש אלא לאחר דברי מזכיר המדינה בקונגרס, בבקשה שהגיש דניס רוס לשגריר שובל.
3. במסגרת האינפורמציה על בנייה פיזית, נמסרו בתזכיר הנ"ל ל-A.I.D. ע"י האוצר נתונים על התחלות בניית קבע בישובים עירוניים בישראל וביש"ע (לוח 1, עמ' 13), ונתונים על התקשרויות חוזיות לבניית קבע בישראל וביש"ע (לוח 2, עמ' 14).
4. בנוסף לכך דיווחתי לשגרירות ארה"ב בישראל (אחרי ברורים מיוחדים) על התחלות בנייה בישובים כפריים ביש"ע ועל הצבת קרוונים ביש"ע בשנה התקציבית השוטפת. (בהמשך לסטטיסטיקה המופיעה בפיגור בשנתון הסטטיסטי לישראל, שם יש נתונים עד סוף 1989).
5. בשיחות שקיימו אנשי האוצר עם אנשי A.I.D. והיועץ הכלכלי לראה"מ עם שגרירות ארה"ב בתקופה האחרונה ועד רגע זה ממש, לא הבנו שמצפים מאיתנו לאינפורמציה נוספת.



(להמחשת הדברים:- בפנייה האחרונה אלינו (ב- 28.1.91), נשאלנו וענינו לשגרירות ארה"ב בנושאי הצהרת ראה"מ על אי הפניית עולים לישראל, וכן, בהקשר לדברי השר שרון בועדת הכספים בכנסת, שאין (בינתיים) החלטת ממשלה על היקף עתידי של בנייה בישראל).

6. לבקשתו של דניס רוס לשגרירנו בווינגטון מ- 7.2.91:

(1 להוצאות כספיות של המשרדים השונים מעבר לקו הירוק. - כבר ענינו שאין לנו תקצוב נפרד.

(2 אינפורמציה על כבישים, ישובים והרחבות בישראל, להלן:

א. סלילת כבישים חדשים - במהלך 1990 הוחל בסלילת 3 כבישים חד מסלוליים ביו"ש:-

(1 כביש נילי - שילת, כ- 8 ק"מ.

(2 עוקף (DETOUR, BYPASS) טול כרם, כ- 8 ק"מ.

(3 עוקף עזון, כ- 6 ק"מ.

ב. הקמת ישובים חדשים או הרחבות מהותיות של ישובים קיימים - במהלך 1990:-

(1 הוחל בעבודת הכשרת קרקע לישוב חדש, קרית ספר (באזור מודיעין), בשטח יו"ש.

(2 הוחל בפתוח שכונות חדשות בישובים קיימים כדלהלן:-

א) אריאל - "רובע ב'".

ב) כפר אדומים - "שכונת אלון".

ג) מעלה אדומים - "שכונת 03".

1991-02-22

09:54

MASHABAT KESHER

1409065

01

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

21/2/91

שמור / מידוי

אל: מנהל מצפ"א.  
דע: קונס"ל אטלנטה

מאת: הסברה רוש'

הנשיא קרטר

1. בימים שנעדרתי מושינגטון לרגל ועידת בקרא"ק הגיע מכתב אישי חתום מקרטר לרוה"מ במצורף למכתב המצ"ב מקו שטיין. המכתב הועבר בדי"פ ע"י מזכירתי.

2. מאז פרוץ המלחמה פנו לקרטר יהודים נכבדים מאטלנטה בבקשה להתבטאות, כאשר היה ברור שינסה "לאזן" הגינותי לירי הטילים ע"י עיראק עם ביקורת על ישראל בנושא הפלסטיני. בסופו של דבר שיגר המכתב המצ"ב לארזון זאבאן והחיר השימוש בו.

3. שמא אפשר לקבל עותק ממכתבו לרוה"מ.

3/13  
פלג  
10031  
2  
10031  
4  
10031  
4  
10031  
4

END

1991-02-22

03:57

MASHABAT KESHER

1409095

01

FEB.21 '91 14:46 CONSULATE OF ISRAEL

P.22

105.05

JIMMY CARTER

1111  $\frac{2}{4}$ 

January 29, 1991

To Erwin Zaban

Enclosed are the OpEd pieces I have written during the last six months. Not attempting to please everyone, I have expressed my strong feelings as clearly as possible.

Now that the decision has been made to go to war, my own contrary views will be given with reluctance and much greater reticence. I intend to comment only in answer to questions in Emory's classrooms and a few public forums, and will be fully supportive of our troops overseas with prayers that they will conclude their mission successfully, expeditiously, and with minimum casualties. I consider Saddam Hussein's deliberate attacks on Israel and on civilian targets to be unjustified and criminal in nature. Israel's restraint has indeed been admirable. It is quite likely that Iraqi SCUD missile launchers are being systematically destroyed, so that these relatively ineffective attacks can be terminated before chemical warheads are used.

When the war is over in the Middle East, I will renew my efforts to support any viable peace effort. As you probably know, my hope is that a Gulf peace will lead to resolution of the Palestinian issue and a new and harmonious relationship with Israel's other neighbors. The Gulf crisis may provide a new incentive. I am not alone in this hope. The New Republic magazine states: "In effect, even Israel accepts that 'linkage' of a kind exists between the Gulf crisis and the Palestinian issue..." I agree with the further statement that Saddam Hussein and his friends should not dictate the terms and that future progress should be based on the principles of the Camp David accords.



1991-02-22 04:01  
FEB.21 '91 14:47 CONSULATE OF ISRAEL

MASHABAT KESHER


1409095  
P.03

02

Page 2

I appreciate hearing your views. As a friend, your comments  
and suggestions have always been constructive and helpful.

Sincerely,

1111  $\frac{3}{4}$ 

Mr. Erwin Zaban  
1180 Peachtree Street, N.E.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30309

1991-02-22

04:03

MASHABAT KESHER

1408085

03

THE  
CARTER CENTER  
OF EMORY UNIVERSITY1111  $\frac{4}{4}$ 

February 18, 1991

David:

I hope all is well with you. Please send this letter from President Carter to Prime Minister Shamir through the diplomatic pouch. It is a personal letter as there is no copy for you to have for the record.

Ellen and Andrew and Todd send their regards,  
Thank you for your help.

Yours, Jack Stein

אאא, חוזם: 34126

אל: רהמש/2828

מ-: ווש, נר: 2183, תא: 220291, זח: 1555, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי / מיידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

מאת: השגריר וושינגטון

היזמה הסוביטית

1. התקשר אלי אמש (21/2) רוס בעקבות פרסום היזמה הסוביטית לאמר שבהנחית המזכיר מבקש להביא לידיעתנו ולעדכננו בעמדתם. לדבריו, הנקודות שבהצעה אינן מספקות במתכונת הנוכחית ( CLEARLY NOT SUFFICIENT ) גם בגלל ההתניות במשתמע לנסיגה עיראקית מכווית. הוסיף, שארהב' אינה מסכימה לנקודה הקוראת להפסקת הסנקציות וביטול החלטות האו"ם. כמו-כן, חסרה התייחסות לנושא הפיצויים. בשאלת לוח הזמנים ציין, שאינו נראה להם. רוס המשיך ואמר שהנשיא יעמוד בקשר עם גורבצ'וב להבהיר ולברר שאלות נוספות ובשלב זה תכנית המלחמה בעינה. עם זאת, ציין שזהו צעד רציני ופוטנציאלית בעל חשיבות (POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT).

2. מעניין לעניין וגומר, באחת מרשתות הרדיו כאן דווח כאילו הסובייטים העבירו מכתב לערפאת, בו הבטיח שלמרות שבהצעתם אין לינקאג', יעמדו על העלאת הנושא הפלשתיני.

עד-כאן.

שובל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזאר, סולטן

סססס



בלמס

אל:המשרד

יְעֲדִים: נִיּוֹי וִוְרָק/2066, לוֹסֶאֱנֶגֶלס/1418, בוֹסְטוֹן/1315, מִיאַמִּי/1439,  
פֶּרְנַצִּיקוֹ/1298, שִׁיקָגוֹ/1349, יוֹסְטוֹן/1283, אַטְלַנְטָה/1301, פִּילַדֶּלְפִּיה/1289,  
אוֹרְטֶיב/1406, טוֹרוֹנְטוֹ/1358, מוֹנְטְרִיאָל/1340, רֶהֶמְשׁ/2789, בֹּטְחוֹן/3390, מַצַּב/3920,  
אֲבִיב/3295, מְנַמֵּת/3083  
מִ-: ווֹשִׁינְגְטוֹן, נֶר: 437, תֵּא: 220291, זֶח: 1241, דַּח: מ, סֶג: בֶּל  
תַּח: @ גֶּס: צַפֵּא  
@: דַּ

בלמ"ס/מ'י'ד'

תאריך: 22 פברואר 1991

משעה 12.30 : ח' ב' ו' :

אז: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: קונב"ל'ים

מאת : ענת נון      שולחן : שולחן

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT BUSH THE WHITE HOUSE ROSE GARDEN, 10:40  
A.M. (EST) FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: GOOD MORNING. THE UNITED STATES AND ITS COALITION ALLIES ARE COMMITTED TO ENFORCING THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS THAT CALL FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY LEAVE KUWAIT. IN VIEW OF THE SOVIET INITIATIVE, WHICH VERY FRANKLY WE APPRECIATE, WE WANT TO SET FORTH THIS MORNING THE SPECIFIC CRITERIA THAT WILL ENSURE SADDAM HUSSEIN COMPLIES WITH THE UNITED NATIONS MANDATE.

WITHIN THE LAST 24 HOURS ALONE, WE HAVE HEARD A DEFIANT UNCOMPROMISING ADDRESS BY SADDAM HUSSEIN, FOLLOWED LESS THAN 10 HOURS LATER BY A STATEMENT IN MOSCOW THAT, ON THE FACE OF IT, APPEARS MORE REASONABLE.

I SAY "ON THE FACE OF IT," BECAUSE THE STATEMENT PROMISED UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. ONLY TO SET FORTH A

NUMBER OF CONDITIONS. AND NEEDLESS TO SAY, ANY CONDITIONS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION AND WOULD NOT BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 660'S DEMAND FOR IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL.

MORE IMPORTANTLY AND MORE URGENTLY, WE LEARNED THIS MORNING THAT SADDAM HAS NOW LAUNCHED A SCORCHED EARTH POLICY AGAINST KUWAIT, ANTICIPATING PERHAPS THAT HE WILL NOW BE FORCED TO LEAVE. HE IS WANTONLY SETTING FIRES TO AND DESTROYING THE OILWELLS, THE OIL TANKS, THE EXPORT TERMINALS, AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS OF THAT SMALL COUNTRY. INDEED, THEY ARE DESTROYING THE ENTIRE OIL PRODUCTION SYSTEM OF KUWAIT. AND AT THE SAME TIME THAT THAT MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE WAS GOING ON AND IRAQ'S FOREIGN MINISTER WAS TALKING PEACE, SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS LAUNCHING SCUD MISSILES.

AFTER EXAMINING THE MOSCOW STATEMENT AND DISCUSSING IT WITH MY SENIOR ADVISERS HERE LATE LAST EVENING AND THIS MORNING AND AFTER EXTENSIVE CONSULTATION WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS, I HAVE DECIDED THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO MAKE PUBLIC WITH SPECIFICITY JUST EXACTLY WHAT IS REQUIRED OF IRAQ IF A GROUND WAR IS TO BE AVOIDED.

MOST IMPORTANT, THE COALITION WILL GIVE SADDAM HUSSEIN UNTIL NOON SATURDAY TO DO WHAT HE MUST DO, BEGIN HIS IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. WE MUST HEAR PUBLICLY AND AUTHORITATIVELY HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THESE TERMS. THE STATEMENT TO BE RELEASED, AS YOU WILL SEE, DOES JUST THIS, AND INFORMS SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT HE RISKS SUBJECTING THE IRAQI PEOPLE TO FURTHER HARDSHIP UNLESS THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT COMPLIES FULLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE STATEMENT. WE WILL PUT THAT STATEMENT OUT SOON. IT WILL BE IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL, AND THAT'S ALL I'LL HAVE TO SAY ABOUT IT RIGHT NOW. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

END

17°N

תפ: שהח(2), סשהח(1), רהמ(0), שהבט(0), מנכל(1), ממנכל(1), ר/מרכז(1), רס(0),  
אמן(1), ממד(8), בנצור(1), מצפא(4), סולטן(1), גוברין(1), מזאר(2), רביב(1),  
מעט(4), הסברה(3), דוצ(0), נוה/משהבט(0)

[illegible]







נכנס \*\*

שומר

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חוזם: 2,34083

אל: המשרד

יעדים: לוסאנגלס/1424, רהמש/2835, בטחון/3439, מצב/3999, אביב/3347,

מנמט/3128

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 451, תא: 220291, חז: 1559, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: & גס: צפא

נד: &

שומר / מיידי

22/2/91

אל: מצפ"א, קונכ"ל סן פרנסיסקו, (יועבר בדיפ') קונכ"ל ל.א.

מאת: צבאית, קונגרס

מפגשים עם הסנטור טד סטיבנס וריצ'רד קולינס.

1. הסנטור טד סטיבנס, הרפובליקני הבכיר בתת-ועדת ההקצבות לענייני הגנה, וראש צוות העוזרים הרפובליקנים בוועדת ההקצבות ותת-הועדה לענייני הגנה, קית' קנדי, אשר חזרו זה עתה מבקור בחצי האי ערב ובישראל:

- הבקור בישראל הביא לשנוי חיובי עמוק בהבנת המועקות והצרכים של ישראל.  
- האהדה לארה"ב והכרת התודה הישראלית לארה"ב מורגשים בכל צעד ושעל.  
צוותי ה"פטריוט" חשים כבני בית לכל דבר.

- ארבעת הסנטורים (נאן, ווארנר, אינווייה, וסטיבנס, שהם הנהגת הסנאט בתחום הבטחון) משוכנעים בצורך להעניק לישראל מליארד דולרים במסגרת התקציב המיוחד ל- DESERT STORM.

- אם ימנע הממשל מהכללת הסעיף הישראלי בבקשתו לתקציב המיוחד, יוסיף זאת הקונגרס כתקון לתקציב.

- סטיבנס ער לצרכים החורגים ממיליארד דולרים, אך מציין כי צפוי תקציב מיוחד נוסף לצרכי בטחון, וכמו כן מתקרב מועד תקציב 1992 אשר יהוו "טרמפים" ראויים לתשובה נאותה לצרכיה הלגיטימיים של ישראל.

- מפציר להימנע מניפוח הבקשות ולהיצמד - כפי שהיה בעת הבקור - להוצאות הלגיטימיות. חושש מן האפשרות שסנטורים מסוימים עלולים להפוך הסיוע לישראל לכדור משחק פוליטי אשר יגרום לעבוי מלאכותי של סכום הסיוע. כדי להימנע מתופעות שליליות אלו יש להגיע להסכמה מוקדמת הן ברמת קונגרס - ממשל והן ברמת קונגרס - קונגרס.

- התרשם מאד מהצגת נושא ה"חץ", יתגיס לזרוז המו"מ על ה- MOA, מעריך שקימת הסכמה עקרונית לגבי המשך בסיס חלוקת הממון (80:20), וסבור שגם נושא המגבלות על יישום הטכנולוגיות יבוא על מקומו בשלום.

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2. ריצ'רד קולינס, ראש צוות העוזרים של תת-ועדת ההקצבות לענייני תקציב הפנטגון, מקורבו (בהא' הידיעה) של יו"ר תת-הועדה, דניאל אינווייה, וה"קטר" המוביל ב"גבעה" בנושא תקציב הבטחון:

- אינווייה (כנראה יחד עם קסטן) שולחים מכתב לנשיא ומפצירים בו לכלול את הסעיף הישראלי (כנראה עם התורכי) בתקציב המיוחד אשר יוגש אולי כבר ביום שישי (22/2/91) או ביום שני (25/2/91).

- ישראל תזכה למענק בסך מיליארד דולרים בין אם יגיש זאת הממשל (עדיף) או בין אם יאלץ הקונגרס להוסיף זאת כתקון לתקציב המיוחד.

- קימת אפשרות שהממשל ינצל את מתקפת כוחות הקרקע הצפויה כרקע ותמריץ לדיון מהיר בתקציב המיוחד, במקרה זה, ידרוש הממשל להגביל התקציב אך ורק לצרכי היחידות האמריקאיות בשטח, ולדון תוך שבוע-שבועיים בתקציב מיוחד נוסף לצרכים אחרים (כולל ישראל!). עמדת הסנאט תהייה, כנראה, שאפשר לנהל דיון מהיר גם אם הסעיף הישראלי יהיה כלול בתקציב המיוחד, משום שקימת תמיכה רחבה בישראל.

- הסנטור אינווייה ממשיך לפעול לשפור השת"פ הנוכחי בין שתי המדינות.

- קשה להעריך המשקע החיובי של "חוות מסכות הגז" בכל הקשור להזדהות עם חרדות וצרכי ישראל. חווית האזעקה בעת תדרוך שהב"ט, וקולות הנפץ אשר ליוו אותה, לא יישכחו במהרה.

- קולינס מעריך שיו"ר תת-ועדת ההקצבות לענייני תקציב הפנטגון בביהנ"ב, ג'והן מרת'ה, יזום הצגת התיקון, אם ימנע מכך הממשל.

- מעריך שהקונגרס יענה על צרכיה המיידים של ישראל, אך מודאג מן התדמית של HOUSE DIVIDED בישראל. חרד להשפעת תופעה זו על יכולתה של ישראל לקבל החלטות ולתפקד כראוי, ועל מעמדה של ישראל (לטווח הארוך) בארה"ב.

- מוחה על תגובתו הבלתי-פרופורציונאלית של הממשל לדברי השגריר בנושא 400 המליון. תוהה לגבי המניעים שהביאו לצעד בלתי-מוצדק זה. חושש שהכוונה היתה לשלוח מסר מרגיע לקואליציה הערבית.

אברהם בן-שושן יורם אטינגר

17

תפ: שהח(2), סשהח(1), רהמ(0), שהבט(0), מנכל(1), ממנכל(1), ר/מרכז(1), רס(0), אמנ(1), ממד(8), בנצור(1), מצפא(4)





משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

54126

תאריך : 23.02.91

נכנס \*\*

סודי

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חוזם: 2.34126

אל: המשרד

יעדים: רהמש/2828, בטחון/3434, מצב/3989, אביב/3343, מנמח/3125

מ-: ווש, נר: 2183, תא: 220291, זח: 1555, דח: מ, סג: ס

תח: גס: צפא

נד: ג

סודי / מיידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

מאת: השגריר וושינגטון

היזמה הסוביטית

1. התקשר אלי אמש (21/2) רוס בעקבות פרסום היזמה הסוביטית לאמר שבהנחית המזכיר מבקש להביא לידיעתנו ולעדכננו בעמדתם. לדבריו, הנקודות שבהצעו, אינן מספקות במתכונת הנוכחית ( CLEARLY NOT SUFFICIENT ) גם בגלל ההתניות במשתמע לנסיגה עיראקית מכווית.

הוסיף, שארהב' אינה מסכימה לנקודה הקוראת להפסקת הסנקציות וביטול החלטות האו'מ. כמו-כן, חסרה התייחסות לנושא הפיצויים. בשאלת לוח הזמנים ציין, שאינו נראה להם. רוס המשיך ואמר שהנשיא יעמוד בקשר עם גורבצ'וב להבהיר ולברר שאלות נוספות ובשלב זה תכנית המלחמה בעינה.

עם זאת, ציין שזהו צעד רציני ופוטנציאלית בעל חשיבות (POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT).

2. מעניין לעניין וגומר, באחת מרשתות הרדיו כאן דווח כאילו הסובייטים העבירו מכתב לערפאת, בו הבטיח שלמרות שבהצעתם אין לינקאג', יעמדו על העלאת הנושא הפלשתיני.

עד-כאן.

שובל

17

תפ: שהח(2), סשהח(1), רהמ(0), שהבט(0), מנכל(1), ממנכל(1), ר/מרכז(1), רס(0), אמנ(1), ממד(8), בנצור(1), מצפא(4), גוברין(1), מזאר(2), סולטן(1)





ADD STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20  
(Loan guarantees for Israel)

Washington -- Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman February 19 released the following statement regarding the release of the 400 million dollars in housing loan guarantees for Israel:

(BEGIN TEXT)

This afternoon, Secretary Baker called Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy to inform him of the United States' decision to release the 400 million dollars in housing loan guarantees. The secretary determined that the guarantees would be released in a single tranche. Secretary Baker thanked Foreign Minister Levy for his personal help in this effort.

(END TEXT)

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地址：上海南京路

11 FEBRUARY 1995

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## DISCUSSION

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来源: 转引自《中国现代文学史》。

THE NORTH EXPLORING PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE  
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世界五

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\*NXE502 02/22/91

# U.S. SENATORS PRAISE ISRAELI COURAGE, RESTRAINT

(Transcript: Tel Aviv press conference 2/20/91) (2160)

Tel Aviv -- Four U.S. senators experienced a Scud attack firsthand while visiting Israel February 19, and they praised Israeli courage and restraint during a departure news conference here the following day.

Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat of Georgia), who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, told reporters that members of the delegation "have a greater understanding of the agony and the apprehension that your country's gone through."

John Warner, (Republican of Virginia), a ranking member of the same committee, said the legislators had "witnessed firsthand the true grit, the courage the people of this great nation have shown throughout this period: courage in the restraint not to strike back. And indeed it may well be that the restraint is the key element that could bring about in the not distant future some resolution of this conflict."

Also part of the delegation were Senators Daniel Inouye (Democrat of Hawaii) and Ted Stevens (Republican of Alaska).

The following is an unofficial transcript of the news conference at Ben Gurion International Airport February 20:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Senator Nunn: We've had a very good visit. It's been a brief visit, but to be able to come to Israel, a friend and a trusted ally, at a critical time in the history of both of our countries is indeed a great honor and, frankly, an educational experience.

We have a chance to meet with the defense minister and his team of top military leaders, intelligence people. We had a chance to visit this morning the damage from the Scud missile attacks. We have a greater understanding of the agony and the apprehension that your country's gone through. We've had a real experience in that respect, having been here during an actual Scud missile attack. So we have a much better understanding now and appreciation of what you're going through. And I think, indeed, the television and communications in our country have made all of our people in America aware of the real problems you face in terms of the missile attacks. There's a great deal of public feeling in America about what you are going through here in Israel.

On the third part of your two-part question, Ben -- (laughter) -- the question of continuing the sanctions I think is a very good one. And I -- at this point, I wouldn't want to speak as though there's been a decision made, because there hasn't been. But I would think the world clearly has an interest in seeing to it that Saddam Hussein or whatever government is in power in Baghdad does not again, in the near future, threaten its neighbors the way this government has. And the heart of that threat has been the buildup of enormous military capability far beyond anything that was required for the defense of Iraq, the kind of capability that embodied chemical and biological weapons, a budding nuclear capability, and an enormous offensive military force in terms of tanks, et cetera.

I would think that it's clear that the Iraqis are going to need access to outside technology and equipment to be able to rebuild the infrastructure of their country, restore their power grid and their transportation system, et cetera, that in doing that, in agreeing that they can have access to the kinds of equipment and so forth that they need to acquire from the rest of the world, that requires us to lift those sanctions. And I would hope that part of that is a very clear understanding that this nation, which after all sits on the second-largest reserve of oil in the world, second only to Saudi Arabia, that there's a clear-cut understanding that we're not going to be in the business of opening up those sanctions only to see them re-acquire all of that military capability that is, in fact, at the heart of the problem that we're forced to deal with today.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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We had a chance to visit the Patriot missile task force that is being jointly manned by your Israeli defense forces and American defense forces. It's a real tribute to our nation that we were able to respond as quickly as we have been able to; the ambassador tells us 26-and-a-half hours from the time the order was given until we were actually operational here in Israel. We have great young men and women in America manning those units, and they are very high in their praise of the Israeli defense forces they are working with. They are working together as a team; it's a team effort, and frankly I think we are learning from each other, and we'll probably make more improvements in the Patriot missile capability over the next several weeks than we would have made otherwise in five or six years.

So it's great to be here. We have with us the appropriation (committee) chairman of the defense subcommittee, Senator Inouye; Senator Stevens, the ranking Republican; and Senator Warner, the ranking Republican on (the) armed services (committee); and I'll ask them to say whatever they would like to at this point in time; then we'll open it to questions.

Inouye: All I can add is to say that the joint task force on the Patriot battery is the highest demonstration of U.S.-Israeli friendship.

Warner: Last night when we were with the defense minister and the attack came, speaking for myself and I think the others, it was a very humbling experience. And indeed we witnessed firsthand the true grit, the courage the people of this great nation have shown throughout this period: courage in the restraint not to strike back. And indeed it may well be that the restraint is the key element that could bring about in the not distant future some resolution of this conflict.

Stevens: I think those of us who have been in the service and understand the tension of being on alert full-time, stand in admiration of the Israeli forces that have been on alert now since August the second of last year. And we're really grateful for all of the patience that these people have had as they've stayed on that alert and yet maintained their position in response to the request of the United States. It's a great privilege to be back here again.

I want to say however, that Senator Warner is a little bit modest: that was his birthday present last night (laughter) and we were all glad the Patriots worked.

Q: If the United States and Iraq end their hostilities in the war between the two countries, in a scenario in which Saddam Hussein withdraws from Kuwait, but maintains his power base in Iraq; if at some future point Iraq and Israel become engaged in some way which is the theory here, don't you find yourself --



The U.S. finds itself in a "loose/lose" proposition? If you cut off aid or withhold it to Israel, you betray an ally -- trusted ally, as you said -- and yet if you pay, you become a party in the war.

Nunn: I'm not sure I followed all that. There were two if's and three hypotheticals, and I'm not sure what the final question was. Would you just paint the question for me?

Q: The final question: if Iraq and Israel in some post-war scenario get involved, doesn't it make it difficult if not impossible for the United States in terms of appropriations to figure out what to do?

Nunn: If Iraq and Israel get involved in a conflict in the future, what will we do? I think we would support our friend Israel, as we've done in the past, over and over and over again. Our country is dedicated to the security and the survival and the sovereignty of Israel as a state, and I think we'll continue to be.

I hope that after this is over the best case coming out of this -- we got a real challenge after this war is over, and it is going to be concluded, and it is going to be concluded successfully; we are going to prevail, the alliance is. And we are going to have the U.N. mandate fulfilled. But after it's over, our diplomatic community and, in fact, in the United States, indeed with our allies in Israel and the whole peoples of the Middle East are going to have to do just as good a job in the aftermath as our military forces have done in fighting the war.

We're going to have some severe problems in the aftermath, and I think it's going to be up to all of us to work together. We're going to have economic problems, we're going to have population problems, we're going to have resource problems, we're going to have a lot of feelings left over from the war, and we're going to have continued problems that we have before the war. So we all are going to have to work together once it's over, and I hope that we can do that.

The best case coming out of this -- maybe it's hopeful or wishful thinking on my part, but the best case is that we'll have some Arab countries that will be willing to negotiate directly with Israel. I'm hoping that will be the case. If so, we'll begin to make progress towards peace.

Q: One for Senator Stevens. You said the Patriot worked last night. Do you know that they in fact hit the missile (inaudible) here from Iraq?

Stevens: I don't know what the classification is in the briefing we've just had. It didn't hit where we were; let's

put it that way (laughter). The missile didn't hit where we were.

Q: (inaudible) The Patriot and the Scud?

Stevens: We just had a briefing at the Patriot Battery that gave us an understanding of the workings of the Patriot and its relationship to these incoming scuds, and again. I've got to tell you I believe in classification. Until someone tells me that it's not classified. I can't answer that question.

Q: For Senator Nunn: You've sat through a Scud attack. It interrupted the Senator's birthday party.

Nunn: Actually, it really did not. We were having a discussion, and the discussion continued. In fact, during the attack we flipped on the television for a moment just to see what the reports were publicly. But the Scud attack did not interrupt the meeting; it continued.

Q: Okay, but over-all, how many more missiles, how much more damage, how many more deaths is it going to have until Israel can legitimately go ahead and retaliate?

Nunn: Israel's a sovereign country; they have to make that decision themselves. We cannot impose our will on anyone. We have appreciated the great restraint and the great patience the Israeli government and the Israeli people have displayed. We hope that restraint and patience will continue.

Speaking only for myself, if there is a response from Israel, I'll understand it. We hope that restraint will continue however, because we do believe that the end of this conflict is in sight. I think that we will prevail, and it's very important that we be able to hold the world alliance together. But if there's a response, then I'll understand that it's a response of the sovereign country and of a people who have been very patient.

Warner: On that point, this is a critical period. We are where we are because of the commitment of the United States and other allied forces military to back up a situation which now the diplomats may be able to step in. It's only through that strength of commitment militarily, and Israel's restraint not to retaliate, that we are where we are now. As our president said, he's keeping the door open waiting to see whether or not somehow diplomatically this can be resolved. So at this point in time, I would hope Israel would exercise even greater restraint.

Nunn: Let me just add one point to that. We've visited our American military forces in Saudi Arabia; we've visited our air forces. And we know that they have as a top priority the



continued patrols of the entire area where missile attacks could come from against Israel. That is one of the top priorities in the entire conflict for our U.S. military. So we are doing everything we can, and we'll continue to, in Saudi Arabia and in this country with the Patriot battalions, to protect against Scud attacks.

Q: Could you answer a question with regard to an argument that is going now. Would you accept the argument that the United States armed forces are now defending Israel and that Israel has lost its strategic value to the U.S.

Nunn: I would say the answer to that is we're working together in partnership as we always have and will continue to in the future.

Q: Senator, was the president right to reject an offer from the Soviets, which was never -- the proposals were never made public, and isn't now the time to talk peace?

Warner: I think it's great that our president is keeping the door open for diplomacy.

Q: But not for peace?

Warner: The way to peace is for Saddam Hussein to comply with the resolution of the United Nations and when he does, we would support -- I would personally support the president continuing the effort to eject him militarily.

Nunn: I do not know the details of the Gorbachev proposal; we've been on the road, we've heard bits and pieces of it; we've got a partial briefing here today from the ambassador. I would not know the conditions under which that (decision) was made. I think the president of the United States has to make that decision in every way. And all of us want peace, but it's got to be peace that is brought about by the U.N. mandate being fully complied with, and that means unconditional withdrawal. Until that time, I do not think we ought to have a cease-fire.

Q: Do you believe that Israel's lack of reaction will make it appear more vulnerable to the Arab world and therefore (inaudible) its long-term security interest?

Nunn: No, I don't think there are any illusions in the Arab world about Israel's willingness and ability to respond and defend itself now and in the future. I think that kind of deterrence will continue as it has in the past. There is no country in the world that has a reputation for being able to defend itself better than Israel.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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אל: רהמש/2625  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 404, תא: 200291, זח: 1922, דח: מ, סג: בל,  
בבב  
9,666385  
9,03269906

בלמ"ס / מיידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: סגן שר העבודה, אלון-הסתדרות

מאת: עבודה/ וושינגטון

הנדון: אקזקיוטיבה של AFL-CIO - המשך

כמחווה יוצא דופן, ובעזרת ידידנו הנשיא JAY MAZUR, אורגנה היום בפני האקזקיוטיבה הופעתו של עמוס ערן (שבא עתה מהארץ), המשמש כראש פעילויות ההסתדרות בצפון אמריקה.

דבר זה, איפשר לנו להופיע בעת ישיבת האקזקיוטיבה, בה נשא עמוס את דבריו הקצרים שזכו להפגנת אהדה. בתום דבריו, נעשתה מעין מגבית לקופ"ח בין חברי האקזקיוטיבה, המייצגים את מירב האיגודים המקצועיים בארה"ב.

ארוע זה, איפשר לחברינו להעלות על סדר היום, הצעה מיוחדת לתמיכה בישראל ובהסתדרות, שקבלתה עמדה לרגע בסימן שאלה עקב הבעיות הפנימיות בארגון שאינן קשורות כלל בישראל, אלא, להתנגדות חלק מהאיגודים למלחמה במפרץ.

הופעתו של שליח מיוחד מההסתדרות, "איפשרה" להפריד בין הנושאים, ולהעביר את ההצעה בנושא שלנו תחת הכותרת - תמיכה בהסתדרות.

כאמור, דיווח מלא בתום הכינוס.

אלי כהן-קגן

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן,  
כלכליתב', רביב, מעת, הסברה, @סגןשר/עבודה,  
@ (מנכלעבודה), @ (הסתדרות)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 31552  
אל: רהמש/2624  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 403, תא: 200291, זח: 1907, דח: מ, סג: בל,  
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בלמ"ס / מידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: סגן שר העבודה, אלון - הסתדרות

מאת: עבודה / וושינגטון

הנדון: אקזקיוטיבה של AFL-CIO

כידוע, מידי שנה בשנה, מתקים בחודש פברואר הארוע המרכזי בחיי האיגודים המקצועיים - ישיבת האקזקיוטיבה של AFL-CIO במיאמי. דיווחים מלאים אודות הארוע, יועברו בסיומו.

יצויין, שלאחר מאמצים רבים ובעזרת ידידנו ברנרד רפפורט, אורגנה הופעה של טום דיין (מנכ"ל איפא"ק), בפני צמרת AFL-CIO בעת ארוחת צהרים רבת משתתפים.

להלן, מספר נקודות מנאומו:

- למרות שאיפא"ק איננו ארגון מפלגתי, מאז ומתמיד שמר על קשר עם ה-LABOR והשתדל לתאם את פעולותיו, כמיטב יכולתו.

- הוא מעריך מאד, את תמיכתו של ה-LABOR ושל ליין קירקלנד בישראל, והצהרותיו בנושא.

- התמיכה בישראל שהיתה תמיד איתנה - עתה גברה.

- למרות התמיכה הציבורית, אין לו אמון בממשל הנוכחי ובתוכניותיו שלאחר המלחמה.

- הוא חזק את ידיו של השגריר שובל.

- נוכח המגמה הנוכחית של הממשל (שלילית כלפי ישראל), עומדות בפני איפא"ק מטלות רבות וביניהן:

1. לתרגם את התמיכה הציבורית באמצעות הקונגרס לסיוע, הנחוץ במיוחד נוכח ההוצאות הנגרמות לישראל (הנ"ל גם פרט את בקשתו של שר הבטחון בעת ביקורו).

2. השגת חקיקה לגבי ערבויות ל-10 מיליארד דולר ל-5 שנים, עוד לפני ה-30 בספטמבר 1991 (תוך שימת דגש, שאז הנושא איננו מהווה חלק מהתקציב).

3. מאמצים להשגת תמיכה קונגרסאלית שאיננה כספית כגון: לחץ על בעלי-הברית הנוכחיים של ארה"ב להכיר בישראל, וכמובן דיסקרדיטציה של אש"ף.

מנכ"ל איפא"ק חזר והדגיש את הבעיות עמן מתמודדת ישראל, וכ"כ את הבעיות בהן נתקבל איפא"ק בממשל הנוכחי, שאינו אוהד לדבריו את ישראל. הוא גם

הדגיש, את חשיבות שיתוף הפעולה עם AFL-CIO בנושאים פוליטיים, במיוחד בדרג של ועידות המפלגה הדמוקרטית במדינות השונות (ראה דיווחינו הקודמים בנושא זה).  
יצוין, שזכה לקבלת-פנים חמה, וללא ספק, הופעתו הינה נדבך חשוב בבניית בסיס לתמיכת האיגודים המקצועיים.

כאמור, דיווחים נוספים במידה ולא יהיו דחופים, יועברו בסוף הכנס.

אלי כהן-קגן

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן, כלכליתב', רביב, מעת, הסברה, @סגןשר/עבודה, @ (מנכלעבודה), @ (הסתדרות)

סססס



\*NXE502 02/22/91

# U.S. SENATORS PRAISE ISRAELI COURAGE, RESTRAINT

(Transcript: Tel Aviv press conference 2/20/91) (2160)

Tel Aviv -- Four U.S. senators experienced a Scud attack firsthand while visiting Israel February 19, and they praised Israeli courage and restraint during a departure news conference here the following day.

Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat of Georgia), who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, told reporters that members of the delegation "have a greater understanding of the agony and the apprehension that your country's gone through."

John Warner, (Republican of Virginia), a ranking member of the same committee, said the legislators had "witnessed firsthand the true grit, the courage the people of this great nation have shown throughout this period: courage in the restraint not to strike back. And indeed it may well be that the restraint is the key element that could bring about in the not distant future some resolution of this conflict."

Also part of the delegation were Senators Daniel Inouye (Democrat of Hawaii) and Ted Stevens (Republican of Alaska).

The following is an unofficial transcript of the news conference at Ben Gurion International Airport February 20:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Senator Nunn: We've had a very good visit. It's been a brief visit, but to be able to come to Israel, a friend and a trusted ally, at a critical time in the history of both of our countries is indeed a great honor and, frankly, an educational experience.

We have a chance to meet with the defense minister and his team of top military leaders, intelligence people. We had a chance to visit this morning the damage from the Scud missile attacks. We have a greater understanding of the agony and the apprehension that your country's gone through. We've had a real experience in that respect, having been here during an actual Scud missile attack. So we have a much better understanding now and appreciation of what you're going through. And I think, indeed, the television and communications in our country have made all of our people in America aware of the real problems you face in terms of the missile attacks. There's a great deal of public feeling in America about what you are going through here in Israel.

On the third part of your two-part question, Ben -- (laughter) -- the question of continuing the sanctions I think is a very good one. And I -- at this point, I wouldn't want to speak as though there's been a decision made, because there hasn't been. But I would think the world clearly has an interest in seeing to it that Saddam Hussein or whatever government is in power in Baghdad does not again, in the near future, threaten its neighbors the way this government has. And the heart of that threat has been the buildup of enormous military capability far beyond anything that was required for the defense of Iraq, the kind of capability that embodied chemical and biological weapons, a budding nuclear capability, and an enormous offensive military force in terms of tanks, et cetera.

I would think that it's clear that the Iraqis are going to need access to outside technology and equipment to be able to rebuild the infrastructure of their country, restore their power grid and their transportation system, et cetera, that in doing that, in agreeing that they can have access to the kinds of equipment and so forth that they need to acquire from the rest of the world, that requires us to lift those sanctions. And I would hope that part of that is a very clear understanding that this nation, which after all sits on the second-largest reserve of oil in the world, second only to Saudi Arabia, that there's a clear-cut understanding that we're not going to be in the business of opening up those sanctions only to see them re-acquire all of that military capability that is, in fact, at the heart of the problem that we're forced to deal with today.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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We had a chance to visit the Patriot missile task force that is being jointly manned by your Israeli defense forces and American defense forces. It's a real tribute to our nation that we were able to respond as quickly as we have been able to; the ambassador tells us 26-and-a-half hours from the time the order was given until we were actually operational here in Israel. We have great young men and women in America manning those units, and they are very high in their praise of the Israeli defense forces they are working with. They are working together as a team, it's a team effort, and frankly I think we are learning from each other, and we'll probably make more improvements in the Patriot missile capability over the next several weeks than we would have made otherwise in five or six years.

So it's great to be here. We have with us the appropriation (committee) chairman of the defense subcommittee, Senator Inouye; Senator Stevens, the ranking Republican, and Senator Warner, the ranking Republican on (the) armed services (committee); and I'll ask them to say whatever they would like to at this point in time; then we'll open it to questions.

Inouye: All I can add is to say that the joint task force on the Patriot battery is the highest demonstration of U.S. Israeli friendship.

Warner: Last night when we were with the defense minister and the attack came, speaking for myself and I think the others, it was a very humbling experience. And indeed we witnessed firsthand the true grit, the courage the people of this great nation have shown throughout this period: courage in the restraint not to strike back. And indeed it may well be that the restraint is the key element that could bring about in the not distant future some resolution of this conflict.

Stevens: I think those of us who have been in the service and understand the tension of being on alert full-time, stand in admiration of the Israeli forces that have been on alert now since August the second of last year. And we're really grateful for all of the patience that these people have had as they've stayed on that alert and yet maintained their position in response to the request of the United States. It's a great privilege to be back here again.

I want to say however, that Senator Warner is a little bit modest: that was his birthday present last night (laughter) and we were all glad the Patriots worked.

Q: If the United States and Iraq end their hostilities in the war between the two countries, in a scenario in which Saddam Hussein withdraws from Kuwait, but maintains his power base in Iraq; if at some future point Iraq and Israel become engaged in some way which is the theory here, don't you find yourself --



The U.S. finds itself in a "loose/lose" proposition? If you cut off aid or withhold it to Israel, you betray an ally -- trusted ally, as you said -- and yet if you pay, you become a party in the war.

Nunn: I'm not sure I followed all that. There were two if's and three hypotheticals, and I'm not sure what the final question was. Would you just paint the question for me?

Q: The final question: if Iraq and Israel in some post-war scenario get involved, doesn't it make it difficult if not impossible for the United States in terms of appropriations to figure out what to do?

Nunn: If Iraq and Israel get involved in a conflict in the future, what will we do? I think we would support our friend Israel, as we've done in the past, over and over and over again. Our country is dedicated to the security and the survival and the sovereignty of Israel as a state, and I think we'll continue to be.

I hope that after this is over the best case coming out of this -- we got a real challenge after this war is over, and it is going to be concluded, and it is going to be concluded successfully; we are going to prevail, the alliance is. And we are going to have the U.N. mandate fulfilled. But after it's over, our diplomatic community and, in fact, in the United States, indeed with our allies in Israel and the whole peoples of the Middle East are going to have to do just as good a job in the aftermath as our military forces have done in fighting the war.

We're going to have some severe problems in the aftermath, and I think it's going to be up to all of us to work together. We're going to have economic problems, we're going to have population problems, we're going to have resource problems, we're going to have a lot of feelings left over from the war, and we're going to have continued problems that we have before the war. So we all are going to have to work together once it's over, and I hope that we can do that.

The best case coming out of this -- maybe it's hopeful or wishful thinking on my part, but the best case is that we'll have some Arab countries that will be willing to negotiate directly with Israel. I'm hoping that will be the case. If so, we'll begin to make progress towards peace.

Q: One for Senator Stevens. You said the Patriot worked last night. Do you know that they in fact hit the missile (inaudible) here from Iraq?

Stevens: I don't know what the classification is in the briefing we've just had. It didn't hit where we were; let's

put it that way (laughter). The missile didn't hit where we were.

Q: (inaudible) The Patriot and the Scud?

Stevens: We just had a briefing at the Patriot Battery that gave us an understanding of the workings of the Patriot and its relationship to these incoming scuds, and again. I've got to tell you I believe in classification. Until someone tells me that it's not classified. I can't answer that question.

Q: For Senator Nunn: You've sat through a Scud attack. It interrupted the Senator's birthday party.

Nunn: Actually, it really did not. We were having a discussion, and the discussion continued. In fact, during the attack we flipped on the television for a moment just to see what the reports were publicly. But the Scud attack did not interrupt the meeting; it continued.

Q: Okay, but over-all, how many more missiles, how much more damage, how many more deaths is it going to have until Israel can legitimately go ahead and retaliate?

Nunn: Israel's a sovereign country; they have to make that decision themselves. We cannot impose our will on anyone. We have appreciated the great restraint and the great patience the Israeli government and the Israeli people have displayed. We hope that restraint and patience will continue.

Speaking only for myself, if there is a response from Israel, I'll understand it. We hope that restraint will continue however, because we do believe that the end of this conflict is in sight. I think that we will prevail, and it's very important that we be able to hold the world alliance together. But if there's a response, then I'll understand that it's a response of the sovereign country and of a people who have been very patient.

Warner: On that point, this is a critical period. We are where we are because of the commitment of the United States and other allied forces military to back up a situation which now the diplomats may be able to step in. It's only through that strength of commitment militarily, and Israel's restraint not to retaliate, that we are where we are now. As our president said, he's keeping the door open waiting to see whether or not somehow diplomatically this can be resolved. So at this point in time, I would hope Israel would exercise even greater restraint.

Nunn: Let me just add one point to that. We've visited our American military forces in Saudi Arabia; we've visited our air forces. And we know that they have as a top priority the



continued patrols of the entire area where missile attacks could come from against Israel. That is one of the top priorities in the entire conflict for our U.S. military. So we are doing everything we can, and we'll continue to, in Saudi Arabia and in this country with the Patriot battalions, to protect against Scud attacks.

Q: Could you answer a question with regard to an argument that is going now. Would you accept the argument that the United States armed forces are now defending Israel and that Israel has lost its strategic value to the U.S.

Nunn: I would say the answer to that is we're working together in partnership as we always have and will continue to in the future.

Q: Senator, was the president right to reject an offer from the Soviets, which was never -- the proposals were never made public, and isn't now the time to talk peace?

Warner: I think it's great that our president is keeping the door open for diplomacy.

Q: But not for peace?

Warner: The way to peace is for Saddam Hussein to comply with the resolution of the United Nations and when he does, we would support -- I would personally support the president continuing the effort to eject him militarily.

Nunn: I do not know the details of the Gorbachev proposal; we've been on the road, we've heard bits and pieces of it; we've got a partial briefing here today from the ambassador. I would not know the conditions under which that (decision) was made. I think the president of the United States has to make that decision in every way. And all of us want peace, but it's got to be peace that is brought about by the U.N. mandate being fully complied with, and that means unconditional withdrawal. Until that time, I do not think we ought to have a cease-fire.

Q: Do you believe that Israel's lack of reaction will make it appear more vulnerable to the Arab world and therefore (inaudible) its long-term security interest?

Nunn: No, I don't think there are any illusions in the Arab world about Israel's willingness and ability to respond and defend itself now and in the future. I think that kind of deterrence will continue as it has in the past. There is no country in the world that has a reputation for being able to defend itself better than Israel.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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\*NXE208 02/19/91

# U.S. WILL RESUME SEARCH FOR PEACE AFTER GULF WAR

(Excerpts: Quayle remarks to Jewish group) (1090)

Miami -- Once the Persian Gulf war is over, says Vice President Quayle, "we will resume the search for a just peace, and a real reconciliation, between Israel, the Arab states and Palestinians."

Speaking to the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council in Miami February 19, Quayle said that "such a peace, if it is to endure, must emerge through negotiations between the parties themselves."

Following are excerpts of the vice president's prepared remarks:

(begin excerpts)

We have witnessed Saddam Hussein's quest for power. He launched two wars of aggression, against Iran and against Kuwait, at a cost of some one million casualties -- thus far. He built the fourth largest army in the world with some of the most modern weapons. He acquired a sizeable stockpile of ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and biological weapons. He used chemical agents against Iran and against his own people -- Iraqi Kurds -- in the 1980s. And he launched an intensive program to acquire nuclear weapons.

I am sure that you know, we did not want war. But war was forced upon us, and after a month of this war, our aims are exactly what they were at its outset. We seek to expel Saddam's forces from Kuwait; to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait; and to ensure the stability and security of this critical region. Iraq must withdraw without conditions. There must be full implementation of all 12 Security Council resolutions. And let me emphasize -- there will be no linkage to other problems in the area.

Last week, Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council issued a statement that claimed to accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 660, which calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Unfortunately, as the president said, this proved to be a cruel hoax. Not only was the "offer" full of unacceptable old conditions, but it contained several unacceptable new ones, as well.

The fact is that Saddam knows full well how to stop this war. He knew how to invade Kuwait -- he knows how to withdraw. Saddam knows he cannot win this war militarily. His military strategy is really a political strategy. It is a strategy for

a political victory for Saddam through propaganda, through falsehood -- and through sheer survival.

Saddam's recent propaganda alleging that we had deliberately bombed a civilian shelter, followed by his false gesture for peace, illustrates the point. Like the ancient Babylonian King who was weighed in the balance and found wanting, Saddam Hussein can see the handwriting on the wall; he sees that a military success for the coalition is inevitable. He therefore is looking to bring about a cease-fire, before he is forced to comply with the U.N. Resolutions. His terror campaign, including his Scud missile attacks against civilian targets and his deliberate oil spills, also reveals his political strategy -- his hope that he can split the coalition and break its will to fight. Saddam may think his ace in the hole is his ability to manipulate the mass media -- thereby producing global sympathy for Iraq and undermining global support for the coalition.

Saddam is quite willing to encourage Western Journalists to visit Iraq and allow censored pictures to be broadcast to the world. Unfortunately, the pictures are more powerful than the occasional small print saying "cleared by Iraqi censors." But in viewing the pictures that Saddam wants us to see, we should never forget the pictures Saddam doesn't want us to see: pictures of the brutality and murder in Kuwait since August 2. Pictures of the premature babies in Kuwait who have been removed from their incubators and left to die. Pictures of the Kuwaitis who have been killed for simply loving their country, and displaying its flag. Most recently, President Bush said he had been told by the Emir of Kuwait about an incident in Kuwait in which 200 young people, 15-20 years of age, had been mutilated and killed by Iraqi forces. But while their pictures have never been seen by the American public, their suffering has not gone unnoticed -- and their sacrifice will not be forgotten.

The United States has not been surprised by Saddam Hussein's behavior during this war. And let me say this: His political strategy, like his military strategy, is doomed to failure. The coalition is strong; American public opinion is not deceived by his propaganda; and the Iraqi people increasingly see through his lies, and clearly yearn for peace.

So, once again, Saddam Hussein has miscalculated. He will not succeed in his aggression either through military or political means.

In particular, Saddam Hussein has tried to weaken the coalition arrayed against him by trying to involve Israel in the war. But to Israel's immense credit, she declined to play into Saddam's hands. Israel has chosen to absorb Saddam's missile strikes and to defer its clear right of retaliation. President



Bush has praised Israel for its restraint. He said that Prime Minister Shamir and his government "have shown great understanding for the interests of the United States and the interests of others involved in this coalition." Israel has proven itself a true friend -- a trustworthy friend.

Although Operation Desert Storm is not over, it's not too early to begin learning some of its lessons. Perhaps the most important lesson has to do with the centrality of human rights. The United States has long maintained that our concern for human rights is not just an after-thought to our overall foreign policy. Rather, it is the basic foundation of our foreign policy. For we know that tyrants who abuse the rights of their own people will also seek to abuse the rights of others. Terror at home will be exported abroad.

Let us not forget how Saddam came to power. He came to power through conspiracy, terror and violence. He maintains power through repression and terror. Saddam's foreign policy -- his repeated acts of aggression against his neighbors -- is a logical extension of his domestic policy. To deter future Saddams, we had better stand up against human rights violators whoever and wherever they are.

We are a steadfast partner in the search for peace. Once the current war is over, we will resume the search for a just peace, and a real reconciliation, between Israel, the Arab states and Palestinians. Such a peace, if it is to endure, must emerge through negotiations between the parties themselves. It cannot -- it will not -- be imposed from without.

(end excerpts)

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(end excerpts)

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תאריך: 20 פברואר 1991

שעת חיבור: 11.00

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

ADDRESS OF VICE PRESIDENT DAN QUAYLE TO NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY  
RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL/MIAMI, FLORIDA/TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1991

VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE: (IN PROGRESS) -- DEAL WITH DIVERSE  
INTERESTS OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY -- HUMAN RIGHTS, SOCIAL  
JUSTICE, THE FATE OF WORLD JEWRY, AND OF COURSE, THE SECURITY OF  
ISRAEL.

THOUGH THERE ARE MANY DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF  
GREAT CONCERN TO YOU, MY REMARKS TODAY FOR OBVIOUS REASONS WILL  
CONCENTRATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. I WAS WITH THE PRESIDENT THIS  
MORNING FOR TWO HOURS. HE KNOWS THAT I AM HERE. AND HE WANTED TO  
ME TO SAY TO YOU, VERY DIRECTLY AND SINCERELY, THANK YOU FOR THE  
SUPPORT THAT YOU ARE GIVING TO HIM IN GETTING SADDAM HUSSEIN OUT OF  
KUWAIT. (APPLAUSE.)

TOGETHER, WE HAVE SHOWN AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE LESSONS OF  
HISTORY: APPEASEMENT NEVER WORKS AND AGGRESSION SHALL NEVER BE  
REWARDED -- (APPLAUSE). AND THE RULE OF LAW MUST PREVAIL OVER THE  
RULE OF THE JUNGLE.

IN LOOKING TO THE PAST FOR GUIDANCE, TO THE FUTURE IN  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, WE ARE REMINDED OF THE TEMPTATION OF  
ISOLATIONISM. IN THE 1930S, THERE WAS A SENTIMENT IN THIS COUNTRY  
FOR AN ISOLATIONIST FOREIGN POLICY. SOME ASKED -- "WHY SHOULD WE  
CONCERN OURSELVES WITH THE PROBLEMS OF EUROPE? AND WHY IN THE FACE  
OF HITLER'S AGGRESSION SHOULD WE RALLY TO THE DEFENSE OF GREAT  
BRITAIN AND EUROPE?" BUT, FOR THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY ALONG  
WITH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE VAST MAJORITY OF AMERICAN PEOPLE,  
THEY FIRMLY REJECTED SUCH ARGUMENTS. YOU UNDERSTOOD BACK THEN THAT  
OUR FATE AS A NATION WAS INTIMATELY CONNECTED WITH THE SECURITY OF  
EUROPE, AND THAT HITLER POSED A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO THE  
ENTIRE WORLD.

IN THE AFTERMATH OF IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT, MANY OF THE SAME  
OLD ARGUMENTS MADE BY THE ISOLATIONISTS IN THE 1930S WERE DUSTED OFF  
AND TROTTED OUT ALL OVER AGAIN. "WHY," IT WAS ASKED, "SHOULD WE  
COME TO THE DEFENSE OF KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA? WHY DON'T WE JUST  
SIT BACK AND ENJOY THE POST-COLD WAR PEACE DIVIDEND?" ONCE AGAIN,  
HOWEVER, THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY ALONG WITH PRESIDENT BUSH AND

THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AGAIN WISELY REJECTED THE ARGUMENTS OF ISOLATIONISM -- (APPLAUSE). YOU HAVE RECOGNIZED FROM THE VERY BEGINNING THAT SADDAM'S REMARKS HAVE NOT BEEN AND SADDAM'S AMBITIONS HAVE NOT BEEN CONFINED TO KUWAIT. RATHER, HIS GOAL, STATED AND OTHERWISE, HAS BEEN TO CONTROL THE ENTIRE PERSIAN GULF REGION.

SADDAM DESIRES TO USE THE AREA'S VAST WEALTH TO REPRESENT HIMSELF AS THE GREATEST ARAB HERO OF MODERN TIMES, THE LEADER, IF YOU WILL, OF A NEW ARAB SUPER POWER. AND WE HAVE CERTAINLY WITNESSED SADDAM'S QUEST FOR THIS POWER. HE HAS LAUNCHED TWO WARS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAN AND KUWAIT AT THE COST OF SOME ONE MILLION CASUALTIES SO FAR. HE HAS BUILT THE FOURTH LARGEST ARMY IN THE WORLD WITH SOME OF THE MOST MODERN WEAPONS THAT WE KNOW. HE HAS ACQUIRED A SIZEABLE STOCKPILE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. HE HAS USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST HIS OWN PEOPLE, THE KURDS, AND AGAINST IRAN. AND HE HAS LAUNCHED AN INTENSIVE CAMPAIGN TO TRY TO OBTAIN THE NUCLEAR WEAPON.

I'M SURE THAT YOU KNOW THAT PRESIDENT BUSH DID NOT WANT TO SEE THIS WAR COME; HE FAVORED PEACE NOT WAR. BUT WAR WAS FORCED UPON US. AND AFTER A MONTH OF THIS WAR OUR AIMS ARE EXACTLY WHAT THEY WERE AT THE OUTSET. WE SEEK TO EXPEL SADDAM'S FORCES FROM KUWAIT, THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT, AND PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA. IRAQ MUST WITHDRAW WITHOUT CONDITIONS. (APPLAUSE.) THERE MUST BE AND THERE WILL BE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL 12 UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. AND LET ME BE VERY CLEAR ON THIS POINT: THERE WILL BE NO LINKAGE TO ANY OTHER PROBLEM IN THE REGION. (APPLAUSE.)

LAST WEEK IRAQ'S REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL ISSUED A STATEMENT THAT CLAIMED TO ACCEPT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 660, WHICH CALLS FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT. UNFORTUNATELY, AS THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED, THIS WAS NOTHING BUT A CRUEL HOAX. NOT ONLY WAS THE OFFER FULL OF UNACCEPTABLE OLD CONDITIONS BUT IT CONTAINED SEVERAL UNACCEPTABLE NEW ONES AS WELL. THE FACT IS IS THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN KNOWS FULL WELL HOW TO STOP THIS WAR. HE KNEW HOW TO INVADE KUWAIT AND HE KNOWS HOW TO GET OUT OF KUWAIT. (APPLAUSE.)

AND AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAS HAD SOME RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ. BUT AS PRESIDENT BUSH SAID THIS MORNING, THE IDEAS THAT HAVE BEEN FLOATED THUS FAR FALL FAR SHORT OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

SADDAM HUSSEIN KNOWS FULL WELL THAT HE CANNOT PREVAIL MILITARILY. HIS MILITARY STRATEGY, CAREFULLY ANALYZED, IS NOTHING BUT A POLITICAL STRATEGY. IT IS A STRATEGY FOR A POLITICAL VICTORY FOR SADDAM THROUGH PROPAGANDA, THROUGH FALSEHOOD, AND THROUGH SHEER SURVIVAL. SADDAM'S RECENT PROPAGANDA ALLEGING THAT WE HAD DELIBERATELY BOMBED A CIVILIAN SHELTER FOLLOWED BY HIS FALSE GESTURE FOR PEACE ILLUSTRATES MY POINT.

LIKE THE ANCIENT BABYLONIAN KING WHO WAS WEIGHED IN THE BALANCE AND FOUND WANTING, SADDAM HUSSEIN CAN SEE THE HANDWRITING ON THE WALL. HE SEES THAT A MILITARY SUCCESS FOR THE COALITION IS INEVITABLE. HE IS THEREFORE LOOKING TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE BEFORE HE IS FORCED TO COMPLY WITH THE UN RESOLUTIONS. HIS TERROR CAMPAIGN, INCLUDING HIS SCUD MISSILE ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGETS AND HIS DELIBERATE OIL SPILLS ALSO REVEALS HIS POLITICAL STRATEGY. HIS HOPE: THAT HE CAN SPLIT THE COALITION AND BREAK ITS WILL TO FIGHT.



AND SADDAM MAY THINK THAT HIS ACE IN THE HOLE IS HIS ABILITY TO MANIPULATE THE MASS MEDIA, THEREBY PRODUCING GLOBAL SYMPATHY FOR IRAQ AND UNDERMINING GLOBAL SUPPORT FOR THE COALITION. SADDAM IS QUITE WILLING TO ENCOURAGE WESTERN JOURNALISTS TO VISIT IRAQ AND ALLOWED CENSORED PICTURES TO BE BROADCAST TO THE WORLD. UNFORTUNATELY, THESE PICTURES ARE FAR MORE POWERFUL THAN THE OCCASIONAL SMALL-PRINT, SAYING "CLEARED BY IRAQI CENSORS".

BUT IN VIEWING THE PICTURES THAT SADDAM WANTS US TO SEE, WE SHOULD NEVER FORGET ABOUT THE PICTURES THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN DOESN'T WANT US TO SEE; PICTURES OF THE BRUTALITY AND THE MURDER IN KUWAIT SINCE AUGUST 2ND. PICTURES OF PREMATURE BABIES BEING TOSSED OUT OF THEIR INCUBATORS AND LEFT TO DIE. PICTURES OF THE KUWAITIS WHO HAVE BEEN KILLED FOR SIMPLY LOVING THEIR COUNTRY AND DISPLAYING IT'S FLAG. AND, MOST RECENTLY, PRESIDENT BUSH SAID HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE EMIR OF KUWAIT ABOUT AN INCIDENT IN KUWAIT IN WHICH 200 YOUNG PEOPLE 15 TO 20 YEARS OF AGE HAD BEEN -- (AUDIO BREAK) -- AND KILLED BY IRAQI FORCES. WELL, WHILE THEIR PICTURES MAY NEVER BEEN -- MAY NEVER HAVE BEEN SEEN BY THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, THEIR SUFFERING HAS NOT GONE UNNOTICED, AND THEIR SACRIFICE WILL NOT BE FORGOTTEN.

THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT BEEN SURPRISED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN'S BEHAVIOR DURING THE WAR. AND LET ME SAY THIS: HIS POLITICAL STRATEGY, LIKE HIS MILITARY STRATEGY, IS DOOMED TO FAILURE. (APPLAUSE.) THE COALITION IS STRONG. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION IS NOT DECEIVED BY HIS PROPAGANDA, AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE INCREASINGLY SEE THROUGH HIS LIES AND THEY CLEARLY YEARN FOR PEACE. SO, ONCE AGAIN, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS SIMPLY MISCALCULATED. HE WILL NOT SUCCEED IN HIS AGGRESSION, EITHER THROUGH MILITARY OR POLITICAL MEANS.

IN PARTICULAR, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS TRIED TO WEAKEN THE COALITION ARRAYED AGAINST HIM BY TRYING TO INVOLVE ISRAEL IN THE WAR. BUT TO ISRAEL'S IMMENSE CREDIT, SHE DECLINED TO PLAY INTO SADDAM'S HANDS. (APPLAUSE.) ISRAEL HAS CHOSEN TO ABSORB SADDAM'S MISSILE STRIKES AND TO DEFER ITS CLEAR RIGHT OF RETALIATION. PRESIDENT BUSH HAS PRAISED ISRAEL FOR HER RESTRAINT. HE SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR AND HIS GOVERNMENT HAVE SHOWN GREAT UNDERSTANDING FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTEREST OF OTHERS INVOLVED IN THE COALITION. ISRAEL ONCE AGAIN HAS PROVEN ITSELF TO BE A TRUE ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES AND A DEAR FRIEND. (APPLAUSE.)

JUST WITHIN THE LAST HOUR, TWO SCUD MISSILES HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED AGAINST ISRAEL. EARLY REPORTS ARE THAT THERE IS NO DAMAGE, BUT WE DON'T KNOW FOR CERTAIN. ONCE AGAIN, SADDAM HUSSEIN DEMONSTRATES HIS FEELINGS TOWARD PEACE BY LAUNCHING THESE MISSILES AGAINST ISRAEL. THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS, WE HAVE BEEN, AND WE REMAIN, IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH ISRAEL, AND AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. AND, DESPITE SOME OCCASIONAL GLITCHES -- NO NAMES, MR. AMBASSADOR -- (LAUGHTER, APPLAUSE) -- THIS CONTACT HAS BEEN FRUITFUL AND POSITIVE. WE HAVE DEVOTED SPECIAL EFFORTS TO DESTROY IRAQ'S SCUDS AND THEIR LAUNCHERS IN WESTERN IRAQ. AND WE HAVE SENT ISRAEL BATTERIES OF PATRIOT MISSILES, SOME WITH AMERICAN CREWS, TO HELP HER DEFEND AGAINST SCUD ATTACKS.

ALTHOUGH OPERATION DESERT STORM IS NOT OVER, IT'S NOT TOO EARLY TO BEGIN TO LEARN AND UNDERSTAND SOME OF ITS LESSONS. AND PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSON HAS TO DO WITH THE CENTRALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG MAINTAINED THAT OUR CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS JUST NOT AN AFTERTHOUGHT OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE. RATHER, IT IS THE BASIC FOUNDATION OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. FOR WE KNOW THAT TYRANTS WHO ABUSE THE RIGHTS OF



THEIR OWN PEOPLE WILL ALSO SEEK TO ABUSE THE RIGHTS OF OTHER PEOPLE. TERROR AT HOME WILL BE EXPORTED ABROAD.

AND LET US NOT FORGET HOW SADDAM HUSSEIN CAME TO POWER. HE CAME TO POWER THROUGH CONSPIRACY, TERROR, AND VIOLENCE. HE MAINTAINS POWER THROUGH REPRESSION AND TERROR. SADDAM'S FOREIGN POLICY, HIS REPEATED ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST HIS NEIGHBORS, IS A LOGICAL EXTENSION OF HIS DOMESTIC POLICY.

TO DETER FUTURE SADDAMS, WE HAD BETTER STAND UP AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS, WHOEVER AND WHEREVER THEY ARE. (APPLAUSE.)

YOU KNOW, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE'S A KIND OF NETWORK LINKING ADVOCATES OF REPRESSION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, AND THAT'S WHY NEO-NAZI GROUPS HAVE REPORTEDLY OFFERED THEIR SERVICES TO SADDAM. AND THAT'S WHY SADDAM AND OTHER -- AND THE OTHER FORMER DICTATOR OF ROMANIA, NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, WERE SUCH CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDS. AND THAT'S WHY SOVIET REACTIONARIES ARE TRYING TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO CHANGE HIS GULF POLICY IN IRAQ'S FAVOR.

THEY ALL RECOGNIZE THAT WHEN ONE REPRESSIVE REGIME IS IN DANGER, THEY ALL ARE AT RISK. AND WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS GOES ON -- IN EASTERN EUROPE, IN THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE BALTICS, AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST. (APPLAUSE.) WE MUST TRULY BECOME OUR BROTHER'S KEEPER, NOT SIMPLY FOR OUR BROTHER'S SAKE, BUT FOR OUR SAKE.

A SECOND LESSON OF THIS WAR IS THE SPECIAL AND ENDURING CHARACTER OF OUR FRIENDSHIP WITH ISRAEL. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SUPPORT ISRAEL BECAUSE ISRAEL IS A DEMOCRACY, A NATION WHOSE VALUES AND IDEALS ARE SO VERY SIMILAR TO OUR OWN. WE SUPPORT ISRAEL BECAUSE WE ADMIRE ISRAEL'S COURAGE AND VALOR. ISRAEL IS A STRONG AND RELIABLE AMERICAN ALLY, A FORCE FOR STABILITY AND RESTRAINT IN A VIOLENT AND DANGEROUS REGION. THE BONDS OF THE AMERICAN AND ISRAELI PEOPLE ARE GENUINE, AND YES, THEY COME FROM THE HEART. (APPLAUSE.)

FAR FROM HARMING OR UNDERMINING OUR TIES WITH THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL, SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SAVAGE AND CRIMINAL MISSILE ATTACKS HAVE ONLY STRENGTHENED THEM. MAKE NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT, MY FRIENDS, STRENGTHENING AMERICAN-ISRAELI FRIENDSHIP IS THE ONLY ACHIEVEMENT THAT WILL SURVIVE SADDAM'S SURE AND CERTAIN DEFEAT. (APPLAUSE.)

FORTY-THREE YEARS AGO THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL FOR MORAL AND HUMANITARIAN REASONS. WE BELIEVED THAT AFTER THE UNSPEAKABLE HORRORS COMMITTED BY THE NAZIS, JEWS NEEDED A LAND THAT THEY COULD CALL THEIR OWN. THEY NEEDED A LAND IN WHICH THEY COULD LIVE WITHOUT FEAR, WHERE THEY COULD LIVE IN PEACE AND HARMONY WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS. AND THAT IS WHY WE ARE COMMITTED AND WE WILL ALWAYS REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. (APPLAUSE.)

WE ARE COMMITTED TO HELPING ISRAEL PROTECT ITSELF AGAINST ANY COMBINATION OF AGGRESSORS. WE WILL ALWAYS MAKE CLEAR TO THE WORLD THROUGH OUR MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT THAT WE ARE A PERMANENT AND UNSHAKEABLE ALLY OF ISRAEL. WE ARE A STEADFAST PARTNER WITH ISRAEL IN SEARCH FOR PEACE. AND ONCE THIS CURRENT WAR IS OVER, WE WILL RESUME OUR SEARCH FOR A JUST PEACE AND A REAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS. (APPLAUSE.) SUCH A PEACE, IF IT IS TO ENDURE, MUST BE MERGED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES THEMSELVES. (APPLAUSE.) IT CANNOT AND IT WILL NOT BE IMPOSED FROM OUTSIDE. (APPLAUSE.)



YET ANOTHER LESSON OF THE CURRENT WAR IS THAT THOSE OF US WHO HAVE ADVOCATED THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSES AGAINST MISSILE ATTACK HAVE BEEN VINDICATED BY WHAT THE ISRAELIS CALL "PATRIOTIM," THE PATRIOTS. (LAUGHTER, APPLAUSE.)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: GOOD HEBREW WORD.

VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE: YEAH, YEAH.

I HAPPEN TO KNOW THE ISSUE OF MISSILE DEFENSE HAS BEEN A CONTENTIOUS ONE IN AMERICAN POLITICS. BUT PERHAPS IN THE WAKE OF THIS WAR, WE CAN FORM A NEW CONSENSUS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF MOVING AHEAD WITH OUR PROGRAM OF MISSILE DEFENSE. THE PATRIOT WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO SHOOT DOWN LARGE, SLOW-MOVING AIRPLANES. IT WAS UPGRADED TO HAVE MODEST CAPABILITY AGAINST LARGE, SLOW-MOVING BALLISTIC MISSILES, BUT IT DIDN'T EVEN HAVE THAT MUCH CAPABILITY UNTIL LAST YEAR.

MANY IN CONGRESS, PARTICULARLY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TRIED TO KILL AND EVEN LIMIT THE PATRIOT UPGRADE PROGRAM SEVERAL TIMES. THEY OPPOSED IT NOT BECAUSE OF ITS COST OR ITS CAPABILITY BUT BECAUSE IT DEFENDS AGAINST MISSILES. THE ARGUMENT OF OUR CRITICS HAS BEEN THAT YOU ARE SAFER WITHOUT DEFENSES AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES THAN WITH THEM. THEY HAVE ARGUED THAT DEPLOYING MISSILE DEFENSES ONLY PROVOKES THE AGGRESSOR TO BECOME MORE AGGRESSIVE; THAT MISSILE DEFENSE IS DESTABILIZING. THEY'RE WRONG. AND HERE'S WHY.

THINK ABOUT WHAT THE WORLD'S GOING TO LOOK LIKE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, LONG AFTER THE ALLIED VICTORY OVER SADDAM HUSSEIN. WILL THERE BE MORE OR FEWER COUNTRIES THAT WILL HAVE BALLISTIC MISSILES? WILL THERE BE MORE -- WILL THESE MISSILES BE MORE OR LESS MODERN THAN THE SCUDS WE ARE FACING TODAY? WILL THEY BE MORE ACCURATE, HAVE A LONGER RANGE CAPABILITY THAN THE SCUD MISSILE THAT WE SEE TODAY? AND WILL THE WEAPONS THEY CARRY BE MORE OR LESS DESTRUCTIVE THAN THE ONES THAT ARE CARRIED BY SCUDS? I THINK EVERYONE HERE KNOWS THE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS.

BUT LET ME BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT MY OWN CONCERNS. SOON MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WILL HAVE NOT LIQUID-FUELED MISSILES LIKE THE SCUD BUT SOLID-FUELED MISSILES LIKE OUR MINUTEMEN OR THE SOVIET SS-24 AND SS-25. AND THAT MEANS THAT THEY CAN BE ON ALERT, READY TO FLY ON A MOMENT'S NOTICE IN SECONDS, NOT MINUTES OR HOURS LIKE THE LIQUID-FUELED SCUDS. AND AS TIME GOES ON, MODERNIZATION WILL MEAN THAT MORE COUNTRIES WILL HAVE MORE MISSILES THAT ARE BIGGER, FASTER, MORE ACCURATE AND MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO INTERCEPT.

THESE MISSILES WILL BE WELL BEYOND THE CAPABILITIES OF THE CURRENT PATRIOT DEFENSE SYSTEM. THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO ABOUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS IS A DIFFICULT ONE, BUT ONE THING SEEMS CLEAR. IN THE FUTURE, WE WILL NEED MORE THAN A QUICK FIX TO THE VULNERABILITY OF A 25-YEAR OLD AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM LIKE THE PATRIOT. WE WILL NEED TO BE ABLE TO DEFEND AN ENTIRE THEATER OF OPERATION AGAINST A VARIETY OF MISSILE THREATS, TO PROTECT OURSELVES AGAINST AN ENEMY'S LONGER-RANGE CAPABILITIES AND TO PROTECT OUR ALLIES WHO MIGHT BE AFFECTED BY THE HOSTILITIES.

IN SHORT, I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL NEED PRESIDENT BUSH'S VERSION OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, JUST AS WE WILL NEED ISRAEL'S ARROW DEFENSE PROGRAM. (APPLAUSE) DEFENDING OUR NATION AND ITS ALLIES AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACK THREATENS NO ONE. MOVING AHEAD ON THE SDI IS TECHNOLOGICALLY FEASIBLE, STRATEGICALLY



NECESSARY AND MORALLY IMPERATIVE.

AND THAT BRINGS ME TO ANOTHER LESSON IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. THE NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES NOW AND IN THE FUTURE TO BE STRONG ENOUGH TO DEFEND ITSELF AND TO HELP DEFEND OUR ALLIES. KEEPING OUR NATION STRONG IS NOT A LIBERAL ISSUE OR A CONSERVATIVE ISSUE, IT'S NOT A REPUBLICAN ISSUE OR A DEMOCRATIC ISSUE, IT HAPPENS TO BE AN AMERICAN ISSUE AND LIKE OPERATION DESERT STORM, IT IS AN ISSUE THAT DESERVES FULL BIPARTISAN SUPPORT.

THERE'S ONE FURTHER LESSON OF THE CURRENT WAR THAT I'D LIKE TO TOUCH UPON THIS AFTERNOON; THE NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES TO REMAIN INVOLVED AND ENGAGED ON BEHALF OF ITS IDEALS AND ITS INTERESTS. DESPITE THE AMAZING PROGRESS OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY AROUND THE WORLD, DESPITE THE ENCOURAGING PROSPECTS FOR EVEN GREATER PROGRESS TOMORROW, OUR NATION IS STILL THE INDISPENSABLE BEACON FOR PEACE AND LIBERTY AROUND THE WORLD. (APPLAUSE)

LET US THEREFORE EXERCISE OUR LEADERSHIP WITH WISDOM AND WITH PATIENCE, AND LET US LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES ALIKE TRY TO SEE THINGS AS THEY ARE AND NOT AS WE MIGHT WISH THEM TO BE. WHERE THERE IS A GENUINE WILL TO PEACE, LET US FIND WAYS TO ENCOURAGE IT. WHERE THERE IS HATRED AND MALICE LET US NOT FEAR TO CONFRONT IT. AND WHEREVER DEMOCRACY STANDS EMBATTLED LET US NEVER HESITATE TO SUPPORT IT. (APPLAUSE.)

THANK YOU VERY MUCH, AND THANK YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT, AND GOD BLESS YOU, AND GOD BLESS OUR BRAVE MEN AND WOMEN SERVING US IN THE PERSIAN GULF. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. (APPLAUSE.)

END

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), @ אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס



אאאא, חוזם: 31435  
אל: רהמש/2593  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 385, תא: 200291, זח: 1557, דח: מ, סג: שמ,  
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9,244448  
שמור/מידי

אל: לשכת שר החוץ  
לשכת רוה"מ  
מצפ"א  
לשכת העתונות הממשלתית

מאת: השגריר

כדאי להמליץ לדוברים הישראלים השונים המופיעים בתקשורת לא לדבר על  
"חיסול" סדאם חוסיין (במובן האישי והפיזי).

הדבר איננו מתקבל כאן טוב ויוצר תגובות שליליות מבחינת ההסברה.

השגריר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור,  
מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה, @ (לעמ), מקצב2

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 31512

אל: רהמש/2631

מ-: ווש, נר: 2165, תא: 200291, זח: 1715, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי / בהול לבוקר

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

בשעה 11:15 בלילה (שעונכם) צלצל דניס רוס ודיווח על שיחת המזכיר עם  
שה'ח ועל שחרור הערבויות.

שילה.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס





## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Embargoed until delivered -- February 19, 1991, 1:30 p.m. EST

## PREPARED TEXT OF REMARKS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL  
CHAIRMAN'S LUNCHEON

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MIAMI, FLORIDA

The National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council is a unique organization. You are a partnership of local and national Jewish organizations throughout the country that deals with the diverse interests of the American Jewish community: human rights, social justice, the fate of world Jewry and the security of Israel. Though there are many domestic and international issues of great concern to you, my remarks today, for obvious reasons, will concentrate on the Middle East.

Let me begin, on behalf of the President, with a hearty thank you for your steadfast support of our efforts to get Iraq out of Kuwait. Together, we've shown an understanding of the lessons of history: appeasement never works; aggression must be resisted; and the rule of law must prevail over the rule of the jungle.

In looking to the past for guidance to the future in international relations, we are reminded of the temptation of isolationism. In the 1930's, there was sentiment in this country for an isolationist foreign policy. Some asked, why should we concern ourselves with the problems of Europe? And why, in the face of Hitler's aggression, should we rally to the defense of

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### Great Britain and Europe?

But the American Jewish community, along with President Roosevelt and the vast majority of American people, firmly rejected such arguments. You understood, back then, that our fate as a nation was intimately connected with the security of Europe, and that Hitler posed a clear and present danger to the entire world.

In the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, many of the same old arguments made by the isolationists in the 1930's were dusted off and trotted out all over again. Why, it was asked, should we come to the defense of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia? Why don't we just sit back and enjoy the post-cold war 'peace-dividend'?

Once again, however, the American Jewish community, along with President Bush and the overwhelming majority of American people, wisely rejected such arguments. You recognize that Saddam's ambitions have not been confined to Kuwait. Rather, his goal has been to dominate the Persian Gulf region. Saddam desires to use the area's vast wealth to represent himself as the greatest Arab hero of modern times, the leader of a new Arab superpower.

We have witnessed Saddam Hussein's quest for power. He launched two wars of aggression, against Iran and against Kuwait, at a cost of some one million casualties--thus far. He built the fourth largest army in the world with some of the most modern weapons. He acquired a sizeable stockpile of ballistic missiles,



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chemical weapons and biological weapons. He used chemical agents against Iran and against his own people -- Iraqi Kurds -- in the 1980's. And he launched an intensive program to acquire nuclear weapons.

I am sure that you know, we did not want war. But war was forced upon us, and after a month of this war, our aims are exactly what they were at its outset. We seek to expel Saddam's forces from Kuwait; to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait; and to ensure the stability and security of this critical region. Iraq must withdraw without conditions. There must be full implementation of all twelve security council resolutions. And let me emphasize -- there will be no linkage to other problems in the area.

Last week, Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council issued a statement that claimed to accept U.N. Security Council resolution 660, which calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Unfortunately, as the President said, this proved to be a cruel hoax. Not only was the "offer" full of unacceptable old conditions, but it contained several unacceptable new ones, as well.

The fact is that Saddam knows full well how to stop this war. He knew how to invade Kuwait -- he knows how to withdraw. Saddam knows he cannot win this war militarily. His military strategy is really a political strategy. It is a strategy for a political victory for Saddam through propaganda, through falsehood -- and through sheer survival.



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Saddam's recent propaganda alleging that we had deliberately bombed a civilian shelter, followed by his false gesture for peace, illustrates the point. Like the ancient Babylonian King who was weighed in the balance and found wanting, Saddam Hussein can see the handwriting on the wall; he sees that a military success for the coalition is inevitable. He therefore is looking to bring about a cease-fire, before he is forced to comply with the U.N. Resolutions. His terror campaign, including his Scud missile attacks against civilian targets and his deliberate oil spills, also reveals his political strategy -- his hope that he can split the coalition and break its will to fight. Saddam may think his ace in the hole is his ability to manipulate the mass media -- thereby producing global sympathy for Iraq and undermining global support for the coalition.

Saddam is quite willing to encourage Western journalists to visit Iraq and allow censored pictures to be broadcast to the world. Unfortunately, the pictures are more powerful than the occasional small print saying "cleared by Iraqi censors." But in viewing the pictures that Saddam wants us to see, we should never forget the pictures Saddam doesn't want us to see: pictures of the brutality and murder in Kuwait since August 2nd. Pictures of the premature babies in Kuwait who have been removed from their incubators and left to die. Pictures of the Kuwaitis who have been killed for simply leaving their country, and displaying its flag. Most recently, President Bush said he had been told by the Emir of Kuwait about an incident in Kuwait in which 200 young

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people, 15-20 years of age, had been mutilated and killed by Iraqi forces. But while their pictures have never been seen by the American public, their suffering has not gone unnoticed -- and their sacrifice will not be forgotten.

The United States has not been surprised by Saddam Hussein's behavior during this war. And let me say this: His political strategy, like his military strategy, is doomed to failure. The coalition is strong; American public opinion is not deceived by his propaganda; and the Iraqi people increasingly see through his lies, and clearly yearn for peace.

So, once again, Saddam Hussein has miscalculated. He will not succeed in his aggression either through military or political means.

In particular, Saddam Hussein has tried to weaken the coalition arrayed against him by trying to involve Israel in the war. But to Israel's immense credit, she declined to play into Saddam's hands. Israel has chosen to absorb Saddam's missile strikes and to defer its clear right of retaliation. President Bush has praised Israel for its restraint. He said that Prime Minister Shamir and his government "have shown great understanding for the interests of the United States and the interests of others involved in this coalition". Israel has proven itself a true friend -- a trustworthy friend.

Throughout this crisis, we have been -- and we remain -- in close contact with Israel at the highest levels of government. Despite occasional glitches, this contact has been fruitful and



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positive, and we have devoted special efforts to destroy Iraq's Scuds and their launchers in western Iraq. And we have sent Israel batteries of Patriot missiles -- some with American crews -- to help her defend against Scud attacks.

Although Operation Desert Storm is not over, it's not too early to begin learning some of its lessons. Perhaps the most important lesson has to do with the centrality of human rights. The United States has long maintained that our concern for human rights is not just an after-thought to our overall foreign policy. Rather, it is the basic foundation of our foreign policy. For we know that tyrants who abuse the rights of their own people will also seek to abuse the rights of others. Terror at home will be exported abroad.

Let us not forget how Saddam came to power. He came to power through conspiracy, terror and violence. He maintains power through repression and terror. Saddam's foreign policy -- his repeated acts of aggression against his neighbors -- is a logical extension of his domestic policy. To deter future Saddams, we had better stand up against human rights violators wherever and whenever they are.

You know, it sometimes seems to me that there's a kind of network linking advocates of repression the world over. That's why neo-Nazi groups have reportedly offered their services to Saddam. That's why Saddam and the former dictator of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, were such close friends. And that is why Soviet reactionaries are trying to persuade Mr. Gorbachev to



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change his Gulf policy in Iraq's favor. They all recognize that when one repressive regime is endangered, all are at risk. And we must recognize that the struggle for human rights goes on -- in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union, in the Baltics, and in the Middle East. We must truly become our brother's keeper -- not simply for our brother's sake, but for our own.

A second lesson of this war is the special and enduring character of our friendship with Israel. The American people support Israel because Israel is a democracy, a nation whose values and ideals are so very similar to ours. We support Israel because we admire Israel's courage and valor. Israel is a strong and reliable American ally -- a force for stability and restraint in a violent and dangerous region. The bonds that bind the American and Israeli people are genuine and come from the heart.

Far from harming or undermining our ties with the people of Israel, Saddam Hussein's savage and criminal missile attacks have only strengthened them. Make no mistake about it: strengthening American-Israeli friendship is the only achievement that will survive Saddam's sure and certain defeat.

Forty three years ago, the United States supported the creation of the state of Israel for moral and humanitarian reasons. We believed that after the unspeakable horrors committed by the Nazis, Jews needed a land they could call their own. They needed a land in which they could live without fear, in peace and harmony with their neighbors.

That is why we are committed, and will always remain

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③  
committed, to the security of the state of Israel. We are committed to helping Israel protect itself against any combination of aggressors. We will always make clear to the world, through moral and material support, that we are a permanent and unshakable ally of the state of Israel.

We are a steadfast partner in the search for peace. Once the current war is over, we will resume the search for a just peace, and a real reconciliation, between Israel, the Arab States and Palestinians. Such a peace, if it is to endure, must emerge through negotiations between the parties themselves. It cannot-- it will not--be imposed from without.

Yet another lesson of the current war is that those of us who have advocated the development of defenses against missile attack have been vindicated by what Israelis call "hanatriotim" - the Patriots. I know the issue of missile defense has been a contentious one in American politics, but perhaps in the wake of this war we can form a new consensus on the desirability of moving ahead with our program of missile defense.

The Patriot was originally designed to shoot down large, slow-moving airplanes. It was upgraded to have modest capability against large, slow-moving ballistic missiles -- but it didn't even have that much capability until last year. Yet many in Congress, particularly in the House, tried to kill even this limited Patriot upgrade program several times.

They opposed it not because of its cost or its capability, but because it defends against missiles. The argument of our



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critics has been that you are safer without defenses against ballistic missiles than with them. They have argued that deploying missile defenses only provokes the aggressor to become more aggressive -- that missile defense is destabilizing.

They're wrong -- and here is why: Think about what the world will look like in the 21st century -- long after the allied victory over Saddam Hussein. Are there more or fewer countries that will have ballistic missiles? Will these missiles be more or less modern than the Scuds we are facing today? And will the weapons they carry be more or less destructive than the ones carried by Scuds? Everyone here knows the answers to these questions.

But let me be a bit more specific about my own concerns. Soon, many Third World countries will have, not liquid fueled missiles like the Scud, but solid fueled missiles like our Minuteman or the Soviets' SS-24 and SS-25. That means that they can be on alert, ready to fly on a moment's notice -- in seconds, not minutes or hours, like the liquid fueled Scuds.

As time goes on, modernization will mean that more countries will have more missiles that are bigger, faster, more accurate and much more difficult to intercept. They will be well beyond the capabilities of current day Patriots.

The question of what we should do about these developments is a difficult one. But one thing seems clear: in the future we will need more than a "quick fix" to the vulnerability of a 25 year old air defense system like the Patriot. We will need to be



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able to defend an entire theater of operation against a variety of missile threats; to protect ourselves against an enemy's longer range capabilities; and to protect our allies who might be affected by hostilities.

In short, we will need President Bush's version of the Strategic Defense Initiative, just as we will need Israel's Arrow defense system. Defending our nation and its allies against ballistic missile attack threatens no one. Moving ahead on the SDI is technologically feasible, strategically necessary and morally imperative.

This brings me to yet another lesson of the current crisis: The need for the United States, now and in the future, to be strong enough to defend itself, and to help defend our allies. Keeping our nation strong is not a liberal issue, and it's not a conservative issue; it's not a Democratic issue and it's not a Republican issue. It's an American issue. And like Operation Desert Storm, it's an issue that fully deserves bipartisan support.

There is one further lesson of the current war that I would like to touch on this afternoon: The need for the United States to remain involved and engaged on behalf of its ideals and its interests. Despite the amazing progress of freedom and democracy around the world, despite the encouraging prospects for even greater progress tomorrow, our nation is still the indispensable beacon for peace and liberty around the world.

Let us therefore exercise our leadership role with wisdom

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and with patience. And let us all -- liberals and conservatives alike -- try to see things as they are, and not as we might wish them to be. Where there is a genuine will to peace, let us find ways to encourage it. Where there is hatred and malice, let us not fear to confront it. And where democracy stands embattled and besieged, let us never hesitate to support it.

Thank you, God bless you, and God bless our brave servicemen and women in the Gulf.

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QUESTIONS FOR VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE

1. Harb Wander

My name is Herbert Wander and I'm from Chicago.

Yesterday this body unanimously adopted a resolution calling upon the Administration to expeditiously implement the \$400 million in US loan guarantees authorized last year by the Congress. We all have read the reports of "technical" issues holding up the guarantees. In light of the pressing needs in Israel for help in resettling the hundreds of thousands of immigrants and the general understanding worked out between the US and Israel over questions related to the use of loans backed by these guarantees, please explain why it has not yet been possible to resolve these remaining "technical" matters?

2. Anita Gray

My name is Anita Gray and I'm from Cleveland.

With the exception of Egypt, the Arab states have maintained a state of war with Israel since its birth in 1948. There is hope in Israel and in the American Jewish community that a number of Arab states, particularly those in the allied coalition, will



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(B)

reverse this longstanding posture and engage in "new thinking." What specific steps do you believe the Arab states should be expected to take in order to persuade the Israeli people that indeed a new page is being turned on their relationship with Israel?

3. Maynard Ungerman

My name is Maynard Ungerman and I'm from Tulsa, Oklahoma.

We understand that Israel will not be included in the Supplemental Appropriation bill to be submitted to the Congress by the Administration.

It is also our understanding that Turkey might not be included in the Desert Storm Supplemental. If neither Israel nor Turkey are included, will the Administration declare an emergency so that it might submit an additional Supplemental Appropriation to assist both Israel and Turkey in covering costs associated with the current Persian Gulf crisis?

אאא, חוזם: 29603

אל: רהמש/2441

מ-: המשרד, תא: 190291, ח: 1715, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

98421

סודי/מיד

אל: וושינגטון

ק.קונגרס

היום (19/2) נפגש שה'ח עם חבר הקונגרס אואנס. אואנס חזר מירדן ומצרים וסיפר כי נפגש עם המלך חוסיין הנראה הרבה יותר בטוח בעצמו מאשר בפגישתם בדצמבר. לדעתו מרגיש המלך שהוא שולט בעניינים והוא מתכוון לאחר המלחמה לייצג את 'הערבים העניים' כדבריו, לדעתו הוא מרגיש שהוא יכול למלא תפקיד במו'מ לשלום בין הפלסטינים וישראל ומאמין שיוכל לייצגם. שה'ח הדגיש כי חוסיין נהנה מכל העולמות, ישראל וארה'ב אינן מקשות עליו ולמעשה ישראל אף הדגישה שיש לנהוג עמו במתינות, הוא גם מופיע כאנטי אמריקאי וצובר אהדה בקרב תומכי האחים המוסלמים.

אנחנו מקווים כי בעתיד יהיה המלך בן שיח לישראל אך ללא אש'פ והוא חייב לצאת מהמצב בו הוא נמצא בשל מדיניותו.

השר ציין כי מדינות ערביות רבות אינן רואות כעת אפשרות למדינה פלסטינית.

ס/מנהל מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, סולטן, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 18477  
אל: רהמש/1549  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 080291, זח: 2027, ב, סג: בל,  
בבב  
3521  
בלמ'ס/בהול

אל: לשכת רוה'מ

הנדון: ביקור המורשה וויין אוואנס

חבר בית הניבחרים האמריקאי W. OWENS (דמוקרט-יוטה) מגיע ארצה לביקור בין  
ה-10-14/2/91.

אוואנס (מורמוני) מרבה לבקר באזורנו.

ניתבקשנו ע"י יוזמי הביקור לארגן פגישה עם רוה'מ בימים ד'-ה' (13-14/2).  
הטיפול בביקור בידי הגב' אניטה מזור מהמחלקה לאורחים רשמיים במשה'ח,  
טל'-303717. נודה להתייחסותכם.

מצפ'א - משה'ח  
א. בן-מתתיהו

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), מצפא, מאור

סססס



אאאא, חוזם: 22355  
אל: רהמש/1878  
מ-: גנבה, נר: 94, תא: 120291, חז: 1800, דח: ב, סג: שמ,  
בבב  
שמור/בהול לבוקר

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: ג'נבה

הנדון: חבר הקונגרס - WAYNE OWENS

1. ביום 8.2.90 ביקר הנ'ל אצל השגריר. הוא דמוקרט מיוטה שהיה עוזרו של קנדי משך מספר שנים לפני שרץ בעצמו.

כיום חבר בועדת החוץ כולל הועדה למז'ת ועומד להצטרף לועדת המודיעין.

2. ביקר בארץ 11 פעמים בשלוש השנים האחרונות וכן במדינות ערב. סיפר על פגישותיו עם הנשיא אסאד וגישתו האסטרטגית של האחרון הדוגלת בסגירת הפערים בין סוריה וישראל וגם על קירבתו לנסיך חסן הירדני. כמו-כן סיפר על נסיונותיו ליצור שת'פ כלכלי בין ישראל למדינות ערב בסיוע אמריקאי.

3. סיפר כי התאכזב שלא התקבל ע'י רוהמ' לאחר השיחה האחרונה עם הנשיא אסאד שארכה כ-4 שעות וביקש המלצתנו על קיום פגישה הפעם.

4. קיבל הסברים מפורטים מהשגריר על נושאים אקטואליים במזת'.

5. הנ'ל היה אמור להגיע ארצה ביום א' ותוכניתו בידי השגריר בראון.

כרס.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן,  
ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רס), אמן

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 30090  
אל: רהמש/ 2488  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 363, תא: 190291, זח: 1739, מ: סג: בל,  
בבב  
9, 244448  
9, 035271092  
9, 699227  
בלמ"ס/ מיידי

תאריך: 19 פברואר 1991

שעת חיבור: 17.30

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH ON THE MIDEAST PEACE PROPOSAL  
OFFERED BY SOVIET PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, REMARKS MADE DURING A  
PHOTO OPPORTUNITY AT THE WHITE HOUSE, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: I DO APPRECIATE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S  
PROVIDING ME A COPY OF HIS PROPOSAL -- OF THE IRAQI PROPOSAL, OF HIS  
PROPOSAL TO IRAQ, ACTUALLY, CONCERNING THE GULF -- THE CONFLICT  
THERE. AND WE PROVIDED LAST NIGHT COMMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION.  
LET ME JUST REITERATE -- AS FAR AS I'M CONCERNED, THERE ARE NO  
NEGOTIATIONS -- THOSE HAVE BEEN SET OUT. THERE WILL BE NO  
CONCESSIONS; WE'RE NOT GOING TO GIVE. AND SO, ON HIS PROPOSAL  
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV ASKED THAT I KEEP THE DETAILS OF IT CONFIDENTIAL  
AND I'M GOING TO DO THAT. I WILL RESPECT THAT REQUEST IN THE  
INTERESTS OF THOROUGHLY EXPLORING THE INITIATIVE.

BUT VERY CANDIDLY, IT -- AND I'VE BEEN FRANK WITH HIM ON  
THIS, WHILE STRESSING APPRECIATION FOR HIS SENDING IT TO US, IT  
FALLS WELL SHORT OF WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED.

END

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WITH PRESIDENT BUSH DURING PHOTO OPPORTUNITY  
WITH BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS FROM THE HOUSE AND SENATE, THE  
CABINET ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1991

Q MR. PRESIDENT, IS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ACCEPTABLE TO YOU?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, LET ME -- LET ME JUST MAKE ONE COMMENT  
AND THEN I WON'T TAKE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. BUT I DO APPRECIATE  
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S PROVIDING ME A COPY OF HIS PROPOSAL -- NOT THE  
IRAQI PROPOSAL -- OR HIS PROPOSAL TO IRAQ, ACTUALLY -- CONCERNING  
THE GULF, THE CONFLICT THERE. AND WE PROVIDED LAST NIGHT COMMENTS  
TO THE SOVIET UNION.

LET ME JUST REITERATE, AS FAR AS I'M CONCERNED, THERE ARE NO  
NEGOTIATIONS. THE GOALS HAVE BEEN SET OUT; THERE WILL BE NO

CONCESSIONS. WE'RE NOT GOING TO GIVE. AND SO ON HIS PROPOSAL, PRESIDENT GORBACHEV ASKED THAT I KEEP THE DETAILS OF IT CONFIDENTIAL AND I'M GOING TO DO THAT. I WILL -- WILL RESPECT THAT -- THAT REQUEST IN THE INTEREST OF THOROUGHLY EXPLORING THE INITIATIVE.

BUT VERY CANDIDLY, IT -- AND I HAVE BEEN FRANK WITH HIM ON THIS -- WHILE STRESSING APPRECIATION FOR HIS SENDING IT TO US, IT FALLS WELL SHORT OF WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED. AND I WOULD LEAVE IT RIGHT THERE FOR NOW.

Q DOES THAT MEAN WE'RE GOING TO HAVE A GROUND WAR?

PRESIDENT BUSH: THAT MEANS I'M GOING TO LEAVE IT RIGHT THERE FOR NOW.

STAFF: (TO PRESS) OKAY, LIGHTS PLEASE. THANK YOU.

END

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
ממד, @ (רס), אמן, רביב, מעת, הסברה, @ (לעמ),  
@ (לעמ/תא), @ (דוצ), דוצ-ים, צנזורצבאי,  
אומן, @ (עמיקס/כנסת), מקצב2, סייבל, משפט, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזאר

טטטט



אאאא, חוזם: 30029

אל: רהמש/2483

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 355, תא: 190291, זח: 1605, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / מיידי

אל : מצפ"א

מאת: לשכת השגריר

פגישת ס/הנשיא - השגריר

1. בתום נאום ס/הנשיא בפני ועידת נקרא"ק נפגש השגריר לפגישה של 20 דק' עם ס/הנשיא. מצדם השתתף גם קריסטול.

2. השגריר הודה לס/הנשיא על דבריו החמים בועידה ועדכן אותו על ההתפתחויות האחרונות. ס/הנשיא העלה על נס היחסים בין שתי המדינות והדגיש שיחסים אלה יימשכו. עוד, בעקבות דברי ס/הנשיא על פתוח החץ הודה השגריר לס/הנשיא על מנהיגותו בתחום זה ותרומתו הרבה.

לשכת השגריר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 27434

אל: רהמש/ 2287

מ-: ווש, נר: 2152, תא: 170291, זח: 1815, דח: ב, סג: סו ,

בבב

סודי / בהול לבוקר

אל: רוה' מ, שה' ח

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

אגרת רוה' מ נמסרה לנשיא.

שילה.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 28135

אל: רהמש/2310

מ-: המשרד, תא: 180291, זח: 1558, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

98143

שמור/מיד

103.12

אל: קישור לקונגרס, וושינגטון

הנדון: ביקור סולארז ואקרמן.

1. הנ"ל ביקרו כמתוכנן (14.2-11) וקיימו לו'ז פגישות צפוף ופעלתני. השגרירות האמריקאית כאן היתה אחראית לתאום וניוד האורחים, כאשר אנו תאמנו את הפגישות עם השרים. לפני הגעת האורחים בדקנו נושא הלווי עם השגרירות, ונמסר לנו ש'לא יהיה מקום' עבור מלווה מטעמנו במכונית שהועמדה לרשותם. לאור זאת הלווי מטעמנו היה פסיבי ונכחנו בפגישות עם השרים בלבד.

2. שה'ח -

א. ההבלגה: סולארז ציין את מעמדנו האיתן בתקשורת ובדעת הקהל בעקבות האירופה שגזרנו על עצמנו ככזה שאינו זכור לו בשנות שרותו בגבעה. ביקש לשמוע מהשר על הגבול בו יסתיים איפוקנו, ועל השיקולים המנחים אותנו במדיניות ההבלגה, כאשר אקרמן מוסיף ותוהה מה יכולים אנו לעשות שלא נעשה על ידי כוחותיהם. השר פרט גישתנו לענין מדיניות האירופה בהדגישו את הקושי להמשיך ולחיות עם שיגור טילים הפוגעים ומשבשים את אורחות חיינו.

ב. ערבויות: סולארז העלה הנושא והדגיש כי הוא מנסה לעזור. הזכיר את שימועי המזכיר בבית הנבחרים ועמדנו כי ממתין לתשובות על שלוש שאלות:

- היכן נבנו יחידות הדיור הקבועות והניחות בשטחים בשנת 90.

- כמה הושקעו בתשתית ובדיור בשנת 90.

- כמה נשקיע בתשתית ובדיור במשך 91. השר פרט גישתנו בנושא ואמר כי למיטב ידיעתו הועברה האינפורמציה ע"י יועצו הכלכלי של רה"מ. הזכיר את מכתבו לבייקר בענין הערבויות והטעים כי לא ניתן באמצעות זאת לקבוע מדיניותנו.

ג. העידן שלאחר המלחמה - האורחים ביקשו לשמוע את גישת השר באשר לתסריטים אפשריים אחר המלחמה. השר פרט באריכות ונגע בענין הצורך לפתרון כולל במז'ת התלות הערבית היום במערב לאור אבדן החסות הסובייטית ופסילת אש'פ.

ד. הליך השלום - סולארז השמיע משנתו באשר לתהליך השלום וצפה התפתחות שלוש מערכות של מו'מ בחסות שתי המעצמות:

- פירוז בין ישראל למדינות האזור בהנחה שיש להגיע לנירמול היחסים.

- מו'מ בילטרלי של ישראל עם מדינות האזור.

- מו'מ ישיר בין ישראל לפלשתינאים מקובלים.

השר העלה את הקושי שתביא סרבנות של מדינה ערבית אחת, אופיה ופעילותה של סוריה וכן הצורך בהתפתחות היחסים בין בריה"מ לישראל. סולארז שאל לגבי נציגים פלשתינאים המתגוררים בירושלים ובשטחים, וכן מגורשים שלא מזוהים עם אש'פ. השר הטעים שהמדובר בנוסחא אש'פית ישנה והצורך להקפיד שערפאת יצא מהמשבר ללא כל הישג.

3. רה"מ

בשיחה הועלו כל הנקודות שנידונו עם שר החוץ. סולארז הוסיף וציין כאן כי קיימות מחשבות חדשות בעולם הערבי וסיפר על שיחותיו עם השגריר הסעודי



והכוותי שמצידם התייחסו בחיוב לאפשרות קיום שיחות עם ישראל. נקודה נוספת שהעלה סולארז בסוף השיחה היתה לענין הבקשה ל-10 בליון דולר ערבויות אמריקאיות שמפאת קוצר הזמן לא דנו בה לעומק.

4. שר השיכון : (השתתף גם יועצו הכלכלי של רה"מ - ע. רובין) האורחים ביקשו הערכות השר בקשר להתפתחויות המלחמה כאשר השר שיבח את הפעילות האמריקאית והדגיש כי ביכולתנו להוסיף למאמץ השמדת הסקאדים, ופרט הנזקים והצרכים המיוחדים לנו כתוצאה מהמשבר. האורחים עמדו על הפופולריות של צעדי הממשלה בציבור (באשר למדיניות ההבלגה) וביקשו לשמוע את הערכות השר על הצבא העירקי, משך זמן המלחמה, ובאיזה שלב יש להפסיקה. סולארז חזר והציג בפני השר את שאלות בייקר בקשר לערבויות הדיוור והשר הטעים כי לדעתו הממשל מפעיל מהלכי סרק שכן באמתחתם כל המידע הרלוונטי הדרוש. רובין הוסיף והדגיש כי כל הפרטים הועברו ושאלות אלו עלו רק בשימועים בפני בית הנבחרים, ותיאר בפני האורחים את השתלשלות העניינים בנושא. האורחים קיבלו הסברים מפורטים על יישוב העולים החדשים ופיזורם בארץ. אקרמן העלה את נושא יהודי אתיופיה ואמר כי מצטייר הרושם נעשה די לקליטתם, דבר שעלול לשמש כלי לניגוח בנו אצל מספר חברים בבית הנבחרים. השר סיפר על נסיונו בפרויקט העליה מאתיופיה ומורכבות הנושא, כאשר אקרמן המשיך ואמר כי יתכן ויחפשו דרך לעזור בהקצבות בנושא זה. הועלה נושא העברת עולים לשיכון ארעי במלון אינטרקונטיננטל במזרח ירושלים - ואקרמן הציע להימנע מלעשות זאת שכן זה מתכון בדוק להעלאת ענין הישוב מעבר לקו הירוק - דבר שמן הראוי היה להימנע מלעשותו עת מוזרמים תקציבים גדולים לענין.

#### 5. הנשיא

השיחה היתה ידידותית וחמה (סולארז והנשיא מכירים מזה שנים) כאשר סולארז ביקש לשמוע מפי הנשיא של של הצבא העירקי לצבאות והערבים שעמדו מולנו בעבר. הנשיא סיפר על התנגשויות קודמות שהיו עם הצבא העירקי והביע דעתו שזו נוסחה מער לכל פרופורציות וכי לכוחות הברית יהיה יותר קל במלחמת הקרקע מהמתואר. השיחה נסובה אודות נשק ההשמדה ההמוני השכונה המז'תית, האפשרויות והתגובות להפעלת נשק כימי ומדיניות ההבלגה הישראלית.

#### 6. מנכ"ל משה'ח

השיחה שאמורה היתה להתמקד בענייני העולם השלישי הפכה וביוזמת סולארז לתישואול בנושאי מלחמת המפרץ, המז'ת, תהליך השלום וכו'. סולארז ביקש לקבל הערכות באשר לשרידתו של סדאם אחרי המלחמה והאפשרות של נגיסת המדינות השכנות בעירק המוחלשת. המנכ"ל ניתח את האפשרויות והביע דעתו כי עירק תמשיך לתפקד והציע לסכל תאבון יתר של התורכים באשר לחלקים בעירק הצפונית.

סולארז שאל באשר להתנהגות ירדן ועמדות סוריה ומצרים והתסריטים להתפתחות הליך השלום כאשר המנכ"ל פרט באריכות לגבי כל אחת מהנ"ל והציע לחפש הסכמים בנושאים שוליים תחילה לצורך בניית בטחון ואמון, תוך שיחרור ישראל מסכנה קיומית. סולארז הציע מו"מ תחת מטריה סובייטית אמריקאית ונענה שהיחסים בין בריה"מ וישראל אמורים להבשיל לפני שנוכל לפתח מודל כזה של שיחות שלום. האורח העלה גם אפשרות של שיחות בסגנון ועידת הלסינקי.

7. כמו כן נפגשו האורחים עם הח'כים פרס ורובין, איתמר רבינוביץ, הקונכ"ל אמריקאי (ופלשתינאים), סעדו עם חנוך סמית, קליימן (AJCON) ח'כ אליאב ואהרון יריב. בפגישותיהם במשרד הבטחון (שהב"ט, אמ"ן) הצטרפו אליהם הקונגרסמנים סקסטון וווקסמן ועל כך בנפרד.

מצפ"א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן, כלכליתב', רביב, מאור, ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רס), אמן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 33173

אל: רהמש/2735

מ-: ווש, נר: 2145, תא: 160291, זח: 1630, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי / בהול לבוקר

אל: מנהל מצפ' א

דע: סמנכ' ל צפ' א, יועצת תקשורת שה' ח

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

על סמך שיחותי הרבות עם עתונאים בכל התקופה האחרונה, ובעיקר בשבוע האחרון מבוסס הדוות הבא:

# 1. הערכה:

אין ספק כי את הודעת הבית הלבן מאמש יש לראות בקונטקסט רחב יותר ובתגובה להצטברות של ארועים, ולא רק כתגובה ישירה לדברי השגריר בראיון לרויטר. את התגובה החריפה יש לפרש כתגובה לצירוף אירועים בישראל והתבטאויות גורמים ישראליים, שייצרו רוגז וכעס מצטברים במימשל, כשדברי השגריר הם רק התוספת השולית האחרונה שהביאו לתגובה החריפה וחסרת התקדים.

את הודעת הבית הלבן יש לראות (גם) כאינדיקציה ליחס המימשל לישראל.

2. את תחילת הרצף המצטבר - כמגמה הפוכה להתקרבות וההבנה הטובה ביחסי ישראל-ארה"ב מאז תחילת המשבר ('ירח הדבש') - יש למקם בפרשת שיחת שר-האוצר ותת מזכיר המדינה ו' הולדת' הסכום של 13 בליון כסכום הסיוע שישראל מבקשת/תבקש מהמימשל. פרשה זו גרמה לתהודה תקשורתית רעה (כמדוות אז במברקנו) שבהכללה ניתן לסכמה במשפט שנאמר ע'י עתונאים ובמאמרים (כמו מאמר המערכת ב - CT): ישראל מגישה חשבון על מדיניות האיפוק שלה.

על רקע זה נולדה השאלה: מי חייב למי? רוצה לומר: האם ארה"ב 'חייבת' לישראל פצוי-כספי, מדיני או אחר - על מדיניות האיפוק של ממשלת ישראל, על-כך שישראל הסכימה לבקשת המימשל ובהתחשב באינטרסים המדיניים של ארה"ב, לספוג התקפות טילים מבלי להגיב עד כה... או שמא ישראל 'חייבת' לארה"ב על כך שכוחות הקואליציה כותשים את האוייב המשמעותי ביותר שקם לישראל, מבלי שהצבא הישראלי יהיה מעורב - על כך, ש'חיילים אמריקניים מסכנים חיהם למען (גם) אינטרסים ישראליים' (כפי שנכתב בכמה מקומות). זה הינו הסדק הראשון בהבנה הביטחונית הטובה שנוצרה, והמשקע שנותר ייצר את הפיקציה והפיקסציה של הסכום 13 בליון, שלמרות כל הסברינו והכחשותינו נותר כסכום הסיוע שישראל מבקשת.

ב. האירוע השני שיש לראות בהקשר זה הוא פרשת המעצר המינהלי של סרי נוסייבה, על רקע אירועי אותם ימים: הדווחים על המחסור במסיכות הגז לתושבי השטחים, על העוצר המתמשך, על נפילת הסקאדים בשטחים, ובמידה שולית יותר - בעצם ימי הגשת דו"ח ז'א. את האימפקט של ארועים אלה יש לראות בקונטקסט הציבורי - תקשורתי - אמריקני והרגישות לנושא זכויות הפלסטינים בשטחים. המשקע שנותר היה כפול: ישראל עלולה 'לנצל' מצב המלחמה במפרץ לביצוע מעצרים, גירושים וכו' - לנקוט באמצעים שאינם מקובלים על המימשל - מתוך הנחה שדעת-הקהל לא תוסב לנושא בגלל אירועי המפרץ. הדבר השני: סמליותו של סרי נוסייבה בארה"ב כמנהיג פלסטיני-מקומי מתון שבבוא היום הדיאלוג הישראלי-פלסטיני ימלא תפקיד מפתח.

ג. צירוף תנועת 'מולדת' לממשלה שהתקבלה כאן כהקצנה פוליטית ישראלית צירוף רעיון הטרנספר שאינו קביל לחלוטין - יוצאת, למרות ההתבטאויות הברורות של בכירי הממשלה כי הממשלה ממשיכה להתנגד למדיניות זו. המקטרגים, ראו במעצרו של נוסייבה ובצירוף 'מולדת' לממשלה כ'הכנת הקרקע' וכאיתות למה שיבוא בסיום המלחמה במפרץ: ישראל אינה באמת מתכוונת



למו'מ עם הפלסטינים, וחיזוק האלמנט הימני קיצוני בממשלה יבטיח זאת.

3. הסימן הברור הראשון שבדיעבד בישר את הצפוי ואת שבא לידי בטוי בהודעת הבית הלבן מאמש, היה ב'ספינ' התקשורת הברור והאינטנסיבי שעשה הממשל בסיום ביקורו של שהב'ט (על - כך דווח בהרחבה במברקי המסכם על התקשורת שלאחר ביקור שהב'ט): דוברי הממשל בחרו להתמקד בנושא אחד, ולא במרכזי שביניהם, שהעלה שהב'ט ולתת לו PLAY-UP משמעותי שהחזיר באחת את הנושא המוכר בעל הנימה השלילית מבחינתנו:

ישראל מבקשת פצוי כספי על מדיניות האיפוק שלה, ישראל מגישה לארה'ב חשבון של 13 בליון - כל זאת, למרות שהיה ברור שסכום כזה לא נדון כלל, וכי לא כך הוצגו הדברים בפני הממשל. דוברי הממשל בחרו להציג זאת כך בפני התקשורת, והמאמרים הרבים שסיכמו ביקור שהב'ט שיקפו זאת היטב.

4. הודעת הבית הלבן ששחררה לפירסום אתמול בשעה 17:30 (זמן מקומי) גרמה לזעזוע ואף שערוריה בקרב הכתבים המדיניים והדיפלומטיים בושינגטון. באחת, הפכה ההודעה החריפה וחסרת התקדים ל'אירוע' שפרץ - וזאת ביום של חדשות משמעותיות בעניין המלחמה במפרץ - לכל מהדורות החדשות הלאומיות והמקומיות, כאחת. עשרות הכתבים שהתקשרו קבלו את תגובתינו: 'אין תגובה' - בהבנה. מרביתם התקשרו שוב, לאחר גמר כתיבת הידיעה, כדי להביע זעזועם מאירוע שאינם זוכרים כדוגמתו וכדי לנסות לברר ולהבין מה בעצם קרה וכיצד התגלגל העניין, אמנם חריג, אך לא מזעזע לכדי מימדים כאלה. עוד ניסו להבין, כיצד פרשה של התבטאות, גם אם 'לא מקובלת' אומנם של שגריר שלמעשה אמורה היתה לבוא לידי סיומה בזימון השגריר לשיחה אצל מזכיר המדינה, ולא להמשך עד לפרסום הודעה חריפה כל-כך של הבית הלבן, כמעט 24 שעות לאחר ההתבטאות הראשונית. התשובה אולי טמונה בדבריו של כתב בכיר מאוד, וותיק בשטח, שאמר:

YOU SHOULDN'T BE FOOLED: DON'T THINK THAT IT'S A REACTION  
TN WHAT THE AMBASSADOR SAID. THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT IS VERY  
INDICATIVE OF WHAT THIS ADMINISTRATION THINKS OF ISRAEL

## 5. המלצות:

א. אנו כאן נמנעים, כאמור, מלהגיב ולהדרש עוד לפרשה זו. חשוב לנסות ולסיימה ולהסירה מהעניין התקשורתי בהקדם. השגריר בימים הקרובים ימנע מראיונות עתונאיים - הן למקומיים והן לישראלים.

ב. חשוב שהכתבות מהארץ תהיינה אף הן ברוח דומה: להוריד הנושא מסדר היום התקשורתי מבלי ל'לבות' פומבית היחסים בין שתי המדינות וכל זאת, תוך תמיכה בשגריר.

ג. זהירות רבה בהתבטאויות כאן ובארץ. ציטוטיו של דיפלומט ישראלי כאן בכתבתו של רן דגוני ב'מעריב' אתמול כי '... ישראל נואשה למעשה מן הממשל ועובדת רק עם הקונגרס...' או 'שגרירות ישראל פתחה במסע צבורי נגד הממשל...' - כל אלה יש בהם משום נזק אמיתי לעניין, ולא קידום האינטרסים של ישראל.

ד. הכרחי/חשוב להשתמש בתיקשורת לקידום המסרים המדיניים שלנו - אך יש לעשות זאת בצורה זהירה, מתוחכמת ומושכלת.

רות ירון.



סססס

WHITE HOUSE REPORT, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15  
(Israel, women's conference delegation)

#### WHITE HOUSE DENOUNCES ISRAELI CRITICISM

The White House has rejected Israeli Ambassador Zalman Shoval's February 14 comments criticizing the United States as "outrageous and outside the bounds of acceptable behavior by the ambassador of any friendly country."

Secretary of State Baker "made this clear to the ambassador yesterday (February 14), and the president protested to Prime Minister Shamir by cable this morning," White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said. "We deserve better from Israel's ambassador," Fitzwater added in a statement released February 15.

Press reports said Shoval alleged that the United States was giving Israel the "runaround" on housing aid for Soviet Jewish immigrants. In an interview with Reuters, Shoval also reportedly complained that Israel has received no compensation for huge losses incurred as a result of the Persian Gulf conflict.

Following is the text of Fitzwater's statement:

(begin text)

Public statements made yesterday by Israeli Ambassador Zalman Shoval criticizing the United States are outrageous and outside the bounds of acceptable behavior by the ambassador of any friendly country. The secretary of state made this clear to the ambassador yesterday, and the president protested to Prime Minister Shamir by cable this morning.

We deserve better from Israel's ambassador.

אאאא, חוזם: 26504  
אל: רהמש/2238  
מ-: בוסטון, נר: 43, תא: 150291, זח: 1200, דח: ר, סג: שמ,  
בבב  
שמור/רגיל

אל: תפוצות, מצפא, ק.לקונגרס (ביצור)

המורשה אטקינס-יהדות סוריה

א. בפגישתנו (14) ציין העניין שיש לו בנושא וכוונתו לנסוע לסוריה לעמוד  
על מצבם של היהודים, לא ציין עתוי.

ב. לידיעתכם.

יעקב לוי

תפוצה: מנכל, @ (רהמ), כנצור, מצפא, תפוצות, @ (רס), סולטן,  
מזתים

סססס



26345:חוזם,אאא

אל:רהמש/2206

מ-:וושיןגטון,נר:325,תא:150291,זח:1537,חמ:סג:בל,

בבב

9,244448

בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושיןגטון

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY BY THE REVOLUTIONARY  
COMMAND COUNCIL OF IRAQ, WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM, 8:30 AM (EST)  
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1991

MARLIN FITZWATER: WE HAVE NOT YET EXAMINED A FULL OFFICIAL  
TEXT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL'S STATEMENT. BUT IT  
CLEARLY CONTAINS CONDITIONS FOR IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT.

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ARE CLEAR IN  
THEIR INSISTENCE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL BE COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL.  
PROMISES ALONE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT. THERE MUST BE NOT ONLY AGREEMENT  
TO COMPLY WITH ALL UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, BUT  
ALSO IMMEDIATE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS ON THE GROUND.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

עד כאן.

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@ (רהמ),@ (שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס),אמן,ממד,בנצור,מצפא,סולטן,רביב,  
מעט,הסברה,@ (לעמ),מקצב2

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 26034

אל: רהמש/2177

מ-: המשרד, תא: 150291, זח: 1654, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

3576

סודי/בהול

אל : וושינגטון

הציר

הנדון: ביקור השר ארנס

נא להעביר בחוזר :

א. הדיווח המלא על שיחת שר הבטחון עם הנשיא בוש.

ב. דיווח מורחב ומשלים על שיחת שהב'ט עם המזכיר בייקר.

ג. מכתב השגריר למזכיר יחד עם פירוט עלויות המלחמה לישראל.

מנהל מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 26034  
אל: רהמש/2177  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 150291, זח: 1654, דח: ב, סג: סו,  
בבב  
3576  
סודי/בהול

אל : וושינגטון  
הציר

הנדון: ביקור השר ארנס

נא להעביר בחוזר :

- א. הדיווח המלא על שיחת שר הבטחון עם הנשיא בוש.
- ב. דיווח מורחב ומשלים על שיחת שהב'ט עם המזכיר בייקר.
- ג. מכתב השגריר למזכיר יחד עם פירוט עלויות המלחמה לישראל.

מנהל מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס



ישראל

מ ב ר ק   נ כ נ ס   מ ס ו ר ג

אאא, חוזם: 26440

אל: רהמש/ 2221

מ-: ווש, נר: 2140, תא: 150291, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי / מיידי

אל: מז'ת 2, תפוצות (ביצור)

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

יהודי סוריה

ממאטרה (סוריה, N.E.A) ב - 15.2:

עפ'י מידע שמקורו בקהילת יהודי סוריה מוחזקים עתה בכלא הסורי שני נערים. האחד מקומישלי והאחר מחלב, שנעצרו בעוון נסיון להימלט מסוריה (נוסף לארבעה העצורים זה מכבר).

הדגיש כי עדיין אין להם אישור למידע זה.

אמיתי.

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), מנכל, סולטן, מזתים, תפוצות, @ (רס)

סססס

1991-02-14 21:19 KESHER\*NEW-YORK 1409144 01

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בלם יס 7/גיל  
210.02  
אל: ארבע 2  
מצפ יא

מאת: דליה סיגן, נאו ים.

הנדון: דווח ארבע על מחלק המלחמה.

1. רציב מכתבו של פיקרינג אל נשיא מועבי יס, בו הוא מדווח על מחלק המלחמה עד 8 דנא (משום מה הופץ המכתב רק חיום).
2. המכתב מציין ההקפדה על הימנעות מפגיעה במכנים אזרחיים ובאזרחים, ומפרט סוגי המטרות שהופצו בכל אחד משלושת שלבי ההפצות. כן מוזכרים קרב חיבשה בחפני, פעילות כוחות חצי ומספר החללים וחשבוים מקרב הכח האמריקני.
3. פיקרינג מזכיר ירי חטילים לסעודיה ולישראל ואומר שמאמצים חילות האויר של הקואליציה והצלחת טילי הפטריוט גרמו לירידה דרמטית במספר התקפות חטילים.
4. כן מפורט מספר החשבוים העיראקים שביחס אליהם נשמרים כללי אמנת ג'נבה. עיראק לעומת זאת מפירה את החוק הבינלאומי הן ביחס לחשבוים, הן בירי טילים אל מטרות אזרחיות והן בגרימה מכוונת של נזק אקולוגי.
5. כן מתייחס פיקרינג במכתבו למסוסיס העיראקיים שעברו לאיראן ולמאמצים לבלום התפשטותו של כתם חנפס במפרץ.

דליה סיגן, נאו ים.  
14 פברואר 1991

זהה סלשה זהה אנל אנל  
הנצנה אפכה ואחרת אמר רם - אנל  
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UNITED  
NATIONS

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## Security Council

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1159Distr.  
GENERALS/22216  
13 February 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO  
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In accordance with paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 678 (1990), I wish, on behalf of my Government, to submit the following report on actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of that resolution up to 7 February 1991, further to our report submitted on 30 January.

Since that report, the military forces of the coalition, including United States military forces, acting in accordance with resolution 678 (1990), have continued their air action against Iraq's military targets. Over 52,000 coalition air sorties have been carried out since hostilities began on 16 January. These sorties were not flown against any civilian or religious targets or against the Iraqi civilian population. Coalition forces have taken every precaution to minimize collateral damage to civilian facilities. Despite the destructive potential of modern warfare, collateral damage has been extremely limited.

In the third week of hostilities aimed at the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the commander of the forces in the Gulf gave the following explanation of our objectives in the war. The first phase of allied attacks targeted command and control, air defence, combat aircraft in the air and on the ground, nuclear, biological and chemical storage facilities, and the Republican Guards.

Once the first phase was completed, coalition forces were to target air defence radars and missiles in Kuwait to achieve undisputed control of the air and to target the supply lines leading from Iraq into Kuwait. The third phase, in which we are now involved, includes extensive attacks on the Republican Guard and other ground troops in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. Despite a decrease in the priority given to most other targets in Iraq, surface-to-surface missile capabilities remain as high priority targets.

On 29 and 30 January, Iraqi forces supported by tanks and artillery invaded Saudi Arabia at four points. Coalition forces counter-attacked and, after heavy fighting, forced the Iraqi forces to withdraw after suffering heavy losses.

As of 7 February, United States forces have lost 16 aircraft in combat action. Other coalition forces have also suffered losses. In addition, 14 United



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English

Page 2

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3 1159

States military personnel have been killed in action and 27 United States military personnel have been reported as missing in action, 8 of whom have been classified as prisoners of war.

The naval forces of the United States and the allied coalition have continued to engage Iraqi patrol and mine-laying craft in the Northern Arabian Gulf. Fifty-five Iraqi vessels have been confirmed to have been sunk or disabled since the opening of hostilities.

As of 7 February, Iraq has fired 57 surface-to-surface missiles - 29 at Saudi Arabia and 28 at Israel. However, the efforts of the coalition air forces, coupled with the success of the Patriot air defence system, have been effective in bringing about a dramatic decrease in the number of such missile attacks.

United States forces are currently holding 44 members of the Iraqi armed forces. One hundred and eighty-six Iraqi prisoners of war, who had been visited and registered by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War, have been transferred to the Saudi authorities to be housed appropriately. More than 500 Iraqi soldiers have been captured by other members of the allied coalition, largely as a result of the Iraqi attack on Khafji. The coalition forces are granting ICRC timely access to all Iraqi prisoners of war.

Iraqi authorities have continued to ignore the standards of the Geneva conventions in blatant disregard for international law. They have denied access to coalition prisoners of war by ICRC, deliberately exposed them to combat danger, and otherwise abused them for propaganda purposes. They have targeted civilian areas for attack by surface-to-surface missiles, and have deliberately caused serious damage to the natural environment of the region. They have also continued to disregard their obligations towards the population of occupied Kuwait.

Iraqi aircraft continue to fly to airfields in Iran. As of 7 February over 130 Iraqi aircraft are in Iran. The Government of Iran has given clear assurances that it will detain these aircraft until the conclusion of the current conflict.

We are pleased to be able to report that the flow of oil caused by Iraqi forces from the facilities at al-Ahmadi in Kuwait has been halted (at least temporarily). We continue to monitor other oil facilities that may be leaking into the waters of the Gulf and will take action if necessary to prevent further such damage to the region.

The United States has sent a supplemental advisory team to Saudi Arabia to help coordinate efforts to counteract the massive oil slick caused by the Iraqi forces. A key priority has been to protect desalinization and industrial plants that may be disrupted by the oil. The weather has been cooperative, allowing protective booms to be placed around these sites. The grave damage to the environment by this act has yet to be fully evaluated.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Thomas R. PICKERING

אאאא, חוזם: 26850  
אל: רהמש/2249  
מ-: ווש, נר: 2127, תא: 140291, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סו,  
בבב  
סודי/מיידי.

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופרנ'

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

שלך 3254.

אכן טיפלתי בנייר באמצעות רוס לו, העברתי המידע, העתק מכתבי אליו  
בדיפ'.

בינתיים בוודאי ראית דיווח שיחת הטלפון שלי עמו (שלנו 2126) ומסכים  
בהחלט להערכתך שהממשל חורג בבקשותיו מהסכום שהשגנו עימם במכתב שה'ח  
למזכיר מה-2/10.

שובל.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), @מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

סססס



מס' 24804

## מ ב ר ק   נ כ נ ס   מ ס ו ר ג

α

אאאא, חוזם: 24804

אל: רהמש/2075

מ-: המשרד, תא: 140291, זח: 1606, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

62993

סודי/מיד

910.00

אל: וושינגטון

השגריר, ציר, שטיין

הנדון: ערבויות לשיכון

א. זה זמן שהנני בדעה שבנושא הערבויות לשיכון חורג המימשל בהרבה בבקשותיו למידע מן המוסכם במכתב שה'ח - בייקר מה-2/10/90, ומהמוסכם במו'מ שקדם לשגור מכתב זה.

ב. גם איגלברגר הכיר בעובדה שהשאלות החוזרות ונישנות של המימשל באמצעות A.I.D. הן נקרניות ובלתי נסבלות אך משום מה בפגישת הנשיא עם המנהיגים היהודים חזר בו מקביעתו זו.

ג. יתר על כן לשאלות המוצגות ע"י המימשל בשלב זה אין כל בסיס ויסוד המעוגנים בהסכם או הבנה כלשהם. שהרי כל פעילות התנחלותית ב-1990 נעשתה שלא במימון בערבות אמריקאית האמורה להקנות למימשל מעמד בהצגת בקשה למידע. לפיכך המידע הניתן עתה למימשל מומצא מכח היחסים השוטפים בין שתי מדינותינו ולא מתוקף התחייבות זו או אחרת. בטוחני שהדבר ניתן להוכחה גם מהבחינה המשפטית.

ד. לאור הנ"ל שבדאי נהיר בעיקרו למימשל נשאלת השאלה לפרש העיכוב והבדיקה המתמשכת של A.I.D. לכך יתכנו ההסברים דלהלן:

1. המימשל מעכב מתן הערבויות כחלק מסרובו הכולל - כפי שמשתקף עד כה - מלהעניק לישראל סיוע כספי מעבר לסיוע הכספי השנתי וזה הנובע מיוזמת חקיקה קונגרסיונלית - מתוך מיגוון סיבות ומנעים.

2. שהמימשל - ואנו נוטים להניח שזו הסיבה העיקרית - אוסף מידע על הפעילות ההתנחלותית - במסווה של איסוף מידע מכח ההסכם על הערבויות - למעשה, לצורך הגשת הדוח של המימשל לקונגרס במרוצת חודש זה כפי שנצטווה לעשות כן בדוח הלוואי של חבר הקונגרס אובי, (יו"ר ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות בבית הנבחרים) להגיש דוח המסכם את הכספים שממשלת ישראל משקיעה ביש'ע לצורך התנחלויות, כחלק מחוק הסיוע עבור ישראל לשנת 1991.

בנצור

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן, כלכליתב'

סססס





סודי-

14/2/91

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

אל: השגריר  
נמאת: ראש יחידת ק. קונגרס

הנדון: הצעת מסגרת לתכנית עבודה שנתית  
עיבורי סיוע החוץ של 1991 ו-1992.  
עדכון

תוכן עניינים:

1. כללי  
א. ההקשר האסטרטגי.  
ב. ההקשר הושינגטוני.
2. יעדים מבניים (קונצפטואליים) לקראת הדיון הקונגרסיונאלי על סיוע החוץ 1992.  
א. יעדים כמותיים.  
ב. יעדים ערכיים.
3. פעולות לממוש וניצול מירבי של הכלים התחקייתיים הקיימים.  
א. חוק תקציב הפנטגון 1991.  
ב. חוק סיוע החוץ 1991.
4. תחיקות פוטנציאליות במסגרת תקציבי 1991 ו-1992.  
א. סעיפים בטחוניים.  
ב. סעיפים אזרחיים.  
ג. סעיפים מדיניים.
5. לו"ז.
6. מגבלות.  
א. ארוכות טווח.  
ב. קצרות טווח.
7. הגדרת צבורי היעד.  
א. לחקיקה והוצאה לפועל.  
ב. איפ"ק.  
ג. צבורי יעד לתגבור מאמץ החקיקה וההוצאה לפועל.



## שגרירות ישראל

### ושינגטון

8. צוותי פעולה.  
א. שגרירות.  
ב. צוותי סיוע חוץ-שגרירותיים.

9. דרכי פעולה.

10. סיכום.

11. נספח ( סעיפים ישראלים בחוקי סיוע החוץ והפנטגון 1991 ).  
א. חוק סיוע החוץ.  
ב. חוק תקציב הפנטגון.

12. מרשם זרימה.

### כללי:

#### א. ההקשר האסטרטגי

אם עד לפלישת עיראק לכווית השתעשעו חוגים רבים בקונגרס באשליה כי הרפזית המתח הבינגושי מבשרת רגיעה משמעותית במישור הבינלאומי, הרי בא צדאם חרטיין והיטב חשומת לב ה- INSIDE THE BELTWAY לעובדה כי התלקחות סכסוכים אזוריים אינה חלויה במעצמות, ואולי אף מלוכה ע"י ההפשרה הבינגושית. בעוד שעד לעימות המפרץ עלה ענין ה- LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT כנושא תאורטי, הרי שבאה הפלישה לכווית ומיקדה את חשומת הלב בתופעה זו ובדגש על RAPID DEPLOYMENT, CONVENTIONAL FORCES והיבטים נוספים של סכסוכים אזוריים, להבדיל מעימותים אסטרטגיים. אם עד הפלישה שורה נטיה להעביר מרכז הכובד מסיוע צבאי לאזרחי, הרי שבא צדאם והבהיר חיוניות ה-FMS והשת"פ הבטחוני.

#### ב. ההקשר הושינגטוני

האזירה הציבורית כלפי ישראל - לאור ההרט הנגרם ע"י טילי הסקאד, ולאור נכונות ישראל לרטן עצמה - יחד עם התבטאויות חיוביות של הממשל בנידון, כסוי תקשורתי יובי והתיצבות מלוכדת של הקהילה היהודית מאחורי ישראל, פותחים צוהר של רצון טוב כלפי ישראל. הצוהר אף מאופיין ע"י השרשת הדימויים האפלים של מדינות ערב בתודעת הציבור ונבחריו. לדברי ותיקי ה"גבעה", "חייב הממשל לישראל" הן עקב השפעת תמיכתה במדיניות הממשל מאז אוגוסט על תוצאות הצבעת הקונגרס בדיון על זכות הנשיא להכריז מלחמה על עיראק, הן עקב הריסון חסר התקדים והן עקב ההשפעה הממתנת של מתקפת הטילים נגד ישראל על תנועת המחאה (ובמיוחד על פעיליה היהודיים) נגד המלחמה. מן הראוי לציין כי הממשל אינו פעיל לאחרונה כקטליזטור לעבוי סיוע החוץ לישראל, אלא דווקא כבלם בפני "יוזמות ישראליות" של ה"גבעה". הממשל אף מעכב ממוש מספר חתיקות, הסכמים ועסקות חיוניות לישראל בנימוקים שונים המבטאים, כנראה, מגמה מדינית, יותר מאשר שיקול לגופו של עניין. הצוהר הנוכחי עלול להישאר פתוח לטרוח הקצר, או עשוי לגדול לטרוח הארוך. למען



ממוש מקטימלי של הפוטנציאל הטמון בצורה יאור עמדת הממשל כלפי בקשת ישראל לסיוע מיוחד, ועל רקע שריכת הרגליים של הממשל לגבי ממוש תחיקות קיימות, יש להתייחס אל הצוהר כאילו הוא עומד להיסגר עם תום "סופת המדבר". קיימת האפשרות שבעקבות המלחמה במפרץ יחזור הממשל להתמקד בנוסחאות של "כימיה אישית", זכויות אדם, בעיה פלסטינית, "טרבנות ישראלית", וכו'.

## (2) יעדים מבניים (קונצפטואליים) לקראת הדיון הקונגרסיונלי על סיוע החוץ 1992:

### א. יעדים כמותיים

- השלמת הצרכים הבטחוניים המידיים כפי שיידרש מן ההתפתחויות במפרץ, כפי שנגזר מממוש האיום הבליסטי, מן ההוצאות הבטחוניות הקשורות ל"סערת המדבר" (מאז הפלישה לכווית) ומהשפעת עסקות נשק עם מדינות ערב על המאזן הצבאי במז"ת, כפי שמתבקש התעצמות אפשרית של האיום הסורי ומן התהפוכות המתפרצות במדינות ערב (אם אכן תרחשנה, לפי תרחישים אפשריים).

הצגת צרכי בטחון ארוכי טווח הנגזרים מן הכרסום ביתרון האיכותי של צה"ל ומן המצוקה של התעשיות הבטחוניות בישראל. המשמעות המצטברת הנובעת מכך היא תכנית רב-שנתית להצטיידות, והענקת תאוצה למו"פ הבטחוני.

- הבהרת הצרכים האזוריים בכלל, והוצאות קליטת העליה המידיים וארוכי הטווח בפרט (כולל תשתית כלכלית נאותה), אשר קידומם מקבל משנה דחיפות עקב ההזדמנות ההיסטורית בברה"מ (העלולה לחלוף במהרה). הצרכים האזוריים הנובעים מכך מסתכמים ב- 10 מיליארד דולרים של ערבויות להלוואות למשך 5 שנים, אשר אין להם השפעה תקציבית אם יאושרו במסגרת תקציב 1991.

- בלימת ו/או כרסום במכירות נשק לסעודיה (שלב 2) ולמדינות ערב אחרות.

### ב. יעדים ערכיים

- המחשת התרומה לבטחון הלאומי של ארה"ב (על רקע העימות במפרץ וההפשרה הבינגושית), הנובעת מעיבוי משמעותי ורב-שנתי של השת"פ עם (והסיוע הבטחוני ל-) ישראל.

- המשך הפעילות להפסקת הדו-שיח בין ארה"ב לאש"ף.

- שימוש מושכל במשבר המפרץ הפרסי ובתהליך ההפשרה הבינגושית - העלולים לפגוע במעמד ישראל בעיני ארה"ב (למרות הפוטנציאל החיובי הטמון בהם) - כדי להתגבר על משוכות תפישתיות (PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS) כגון: הגדרת האיום כ- DEADLY ולא רק PAINFUL (גם בינערכי וקונבנציונלי ולא רק עיראקי ובליסטי); צרכי הבטחון של ישראל ייחודיים; למרות הפרופיל הנמוך מהווה ישראל שותף אסטרטגי בכיר; פלישת עיראק לכווית ומדיניות צדאם משקפות את השכונה המז"תית כולה ולא מהוות חריג; קואליציה בינערבית או ערב-מערב איננה VIABLE; ישראל מהווה, בהקשר העימות במפרץ, FRONT LINE STATE; בעקבות העימות - יהא אשר יהא סופו - קיימת האפשרות שלמזה"ת צפויה תקופת ועדועים ולא דוקא - כפי שאנו מקווים - תקופת צינון; ישראל דבקה





במדיניות שלום; אש"פ ותהליך השלום מנוהלים זה לזה; פתרון הסכסוך ערב-ישראל חייב להקדים (או לפחות להתרחש במקביל ל-) פתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית; חידושים יש"ע לבטחון ישראל גדלה על רקע הפלישה לכורית.

3) פעולות למימוש וניצול מירבי של הכלים התחקיטיים הקיימים:

א. חוק תקציב הפנסגון 1991:

- קידום חמשת ה-STUDIES בנושאי השת"פ (מחייב "חריש" עמוק כדי שיתורגמו לסיוע) ליישום טכנולוגיות מישראל בפרויקטים אמריקאים בחחומי האוירונאוטיקה, טכנולוגיות החלל, מו"פ בטחוני, לוחמה בטרור ולוחמה בסמים. הממצאים יוגשו לקונגרס ע"י הפנסגון, לא יאוחר מ-9.91. משהב"ט יקבע את הפרויקטים והטכנולוגיות המתאימים, ויזין (בנוסף לתעשיות וטחוניות) את השגרירות ברעיונות (המלווים בנתונים מדויקים, אסמכתאות, שבלאות, אפים, סרטי וידיאו וכו'), המקדמים את ה-STUDIES. השגרירות תשתמש בחומר במגעים עם הפנסגון, ה"גבעה" וציבורי יעד אחרים (נא ראה סעיף 7) אשר ישולבו במערכה לעיבוי סיוע החוץ. המטרה חייבת להיות: תירגום ממצאי ה-STUDIES ללשון חקיקה תקציבית לקראת הכנת תקציב 1992 (כלומר, לקראת קיץ 1991 ועד הסתיו). רעיונות בנושא שת"פ טרור יגויסו מסוני פיינברג, יגאל כרמון, אריאל מרז; בנושא לוחמה בסמים - מסוני פיינברג, בני ארד, איתן גורני; וכו'.
- ניצול חקיקת ה-OVERSEAS WORKLOAD PROGRAM לתחרות (התעשייה האוירית ואחרים) על מכרזים בתחום תחזוקה, תיקונים, שיפוצים והמרות של ציוד צבאי אמריקאי המוצב במערב אירופה. יתנהל מעקב אחר ממצאי ה-STUDY של הפנסגון בנושא היקף הפוטנציאל הישראלי (מיקום, מומחיות, יציבות) להעשרת ה-OWP. משהב"ט והתעשייה האוירית יזינו את השגרירות, ודרכה את הפנסגון וה"גבעה", בנתונים רלבנטיים וניסיון לתרגם הממצאים ללשון חקיקה תקציבית. (מחייב "חריש" עמוק כדי שתתורגם לשפת מעשה).
- לוודא ולזרז (דרך הממשל וה"גבעה") יישום התחיקה להרחבת מתקני נמל חיפה (15 מיליון דולרים). משהב"ט יפעל - באמצעות השגרירות - לקידום ה-STUDY העוסק בהרחבת נמל אשדוד, כדי לתרגם הממצאים ללשון חקיקה תקציבית. (מחייב "חריש" עמוק לפני...).
- מימוש חקיקת ה-ENERGY ALLIANCE FUEL RESERVE (הצבתם בישראל של 4.5 מיליון חביות נפט מזוקק), וזרז תהליך המו"מ על נוהלי העברת הדלק, איכסוננו והשימוש בו. (מחייב "חריש" עמוק לפני...).
- קשר שוטף עם גורמי ממשל ו"גבעה" הקשורים לקידום ה"חץ" (42 מיליון דולרים) וגיוס תמיכת ה"גבעה" בהשארת ה-MOA הקיים על כנו (הממשל שואף לשנות בסיס ההשתתפות בהוצאות ולהחמיר במגבלות על השימוש בטכנולוגיה).
- סיוע לתעשיות הבטחוניות לקידום חוזים כגון: TALD (תעש) - 25 מיליון דולרים, POPYE (רפא"ל) - 25 מיליון דולרים, CLNAS (תע"א ורפא"ל) - 53 מיליון דולרים, UAV (תע"א) - 19 מיליון דולרים, PIONEER (תע"א) - 17 מיליון דולרים.



- יישום "תיקון ביל שניידר" המקשה על הסלת מגבלות שרירותיות על השתתפות חברות מ ישראל במכרזים בשחונניים בארה"ב. (מחייב "חריש" עמוק לפני...).
- מימוש יעיל של פוטנציאל ה- FOREIGN WEAPON EVALUATION והמו"פ המשותף ("תיקון נאן - ווארנר") ע"י הקמת צוות מיוחד לנושא במשהב"ט. (מחייב "חריש" עמוק...).
- ב. חוק סיוע החוץ 1991:
  - שמירה על ה- 1.8 וה- 1.2, חוך ניסיון להגדלת ה- FMS (האם ישנה החלטה ממשלה לגבי שמירת או שינוי היחס 1.8:1.2?).
  - שמירה על הישג ההפקדה מראש (EARLY DISPERSAL) של כספי ה- FMS (תוספת של כ-70 ליון דולרים).
  - מגעי מימשל ו"גבעה" למימוש רשימת ה- DRAWDOWN AUTHORITY בפרק זמן סביר. (מחייב "חריש" עמוק לפני...).
  - לוודא (במימשל ובקונגרס) מימוש התחיקה המקדמת את ישראל לרמת הזכאות העליונה לעודפי ציוד צבאי מאירופה, והקוראת לזרז העברת ציוד חיוני (מחייב "חריש" עמוק כדי שתתורגם לשפת מעשה).
  - עיבוי ההצבה מראש (PREPOSITIONING), ואולי אף העלאתה על פס רב-שנתי, קביעת פרטי ההצבה ומו"מ על ייצורה (כולה או חלקה) בישראל. (מחייב "חריש" עמוק לפני...).
  - בדיקת הפוטנציאל של סעיף 527 לחוק סיוע החוץ המאפשר החזרה הדדית של ציוד צבאי, וללא חשלוים.
  - ממוש סעיף ה- REOBLIGATION, DEOBLIGATION של ה- FMS הבלתי מנוצל (ההסתייגויות ידועות, אך ייתכן וכדאי לחזור לנושא דרך מומחים שונים).
  - ויצול יעיל של כספי ה- SPECIAL DEFENSE ACQUISITION FUND (SDAF), והגשת רשימת כש בתנאי חשלוים נוחים (העלאת ה- OBLIGATION AUTHORITY ל- 350 מיליון דולרים; חשלוים ב-3 שנים וללא ריבית). (מחייב "חריש" עמוק לפני שיתורגם לשפת מעשה).
  - ניטרול מגמות נוסח "תיקון אובי" (הזוממות לצמצם את מרחב התימרון של השימוש בכספי ה- FMS) אשר עלולות לחזור על עצמן בצורות שונות.
  - שמירה על רמת ה- OSP (475 מיליון דולרים).
  - שמירה על 45 מיליון דולר לשוב "פליטים" מברה"מ ומוא"ר בישראל.
  - שמירה על שני "תיקוני ברמן" (7.5 מיליון דולרים), ואפשרות לתוספת של 2.5 מיליון דולרים ל- CDR הזוכה לתשבוחות מכיוון AID ומוסדות אקדמאים בארה"ב.



- שמירה על "תיקון וואקסמן" (7 מיליון דולרים).

- הפקת לקחים (מדיניים ופיננסיים) מפרשת 400 מיליון דולרים ערביות להלוואות דיור.

(4) תחיקות פוטנציאליות כהצמדה ל"טרמפים" (נא ראה סעיף 5) ו/או כחלק מחוקי סיוע החוץ והפנסגון 1992 (נירות עבודה נמצאים ביחידת הקונגרס):

א. סעיפים בשחונניים:

- הגדלת הסיוע הצבאי באופן יחסי להגדלת נתח סיוע החוץ (מכוח הפיצוי על האינפלציה) וגם התקציב הפדרלי.

- הגדלת הסיוע הצבאי כחלק מן התקציב המיוחד ל- DESERT STORM.

- הגדלת הסיוע הצבאי על ידי בקשה להלוואה או לערביות להלוואה למטרות בשחונניות.

- העתקת דפוס ה- DRAWDOWN AUTHORITY לשנת התקציב הבאה.

- חכירת ציוד צבאי חיוני ללא תשלום או בתנאי תשלום מינימליים.

- מימוש ושיפור ההצבה מראש (רב-שנתי? רשימת פריטים מקובלת על ארה"ב וישראל; ייצור חלק/כל הרשימה בישראל?).

- חירגום ה- STUDIES הנ"ל (נא ראה סעיפי חוק הפנסגון בנושא לוחמה בסמים) לתחיקה מחייבת.

- עבוי פרוייקט נמל חיפה - חוץ הפקת לקחים מ"סערת המדבר" והטסת מוקד הסכסוכים מאירופה למזה"ת - ע"י הקצאת משאבים מתקציב ה- MILITARY CONSTRUCTION.

- ת"פ בנושא רפואה צבאית (מו"פ, הכשרה, מבצעים ובינוי), לאור סעיפים רלבנטיים בתקציב הפנסגון, על רקע צרכים פריטיקולרים העלולים לנבוע מהעמות במפרץ ומעמותים עתידיים, מתוך הנחה שצפויה שהות ארוכה של צבא ארה"ב במפרץ גם לאחר סיום המלחמה ולאור נסיונה של ישראל בתחום הספול והשקום בפצועי ונכי מלחמות ופח"ע.

- שת"פ בנושא מו"פ צבאי העוסק בהגנה ומיגון בפני לוחמה כימית וביולוגית.

- שת"פ בינמשטרתי ללוחמה בטרור וטמים לפי קטע (D) 660 ולפי פרק 8 ב- FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT 1961, ובאחריות הפנסגון ומחמ"ד (נא ראה ניר CRS בנדון).

- מימוש זכאותנו לציוד צבאי עודף במערב אירופה (באחריות תת-הועדה לסיוע חוץ).





שחרור טכנולוגיות אסורות לישראל (לדוגמה, טילי א.א.).

הרחבת השת"פ בתחום ה"חץ", לאור הלשון החיובית בחק הפנטגון, לתחומי ה-  
BATTLE MNG, HYPER VELOCITY GUN ו-RADAR. לבדוק קיצור אפשרי של תקופת פיתוח  
ויצור ה"חץ", תוך הגדלה יחסית של ההקצבות השנתיות. שמירה על יחס ממון של 80:20.  
מניעת הרחבת היקף המגבלות המוטלות על השימוש בטכנולוגיה ה"חץ". השארת ה-MOA  
הקיים על כנו, ודחיית נסיון הממשל לשנותו.

שנוי סעיפי תחיקת ה-MTCR המאיימים בסנקציות על ישראל והמונעים השתתפות התעשיות  
הבטחוניות במכרזים בארה"ב.

חידוק תחיקת ה-OWB, הרחבת יישומה מעבר לתעשייה האווירית, ומוש ה-STUDY בנדרן.

תמיכה בסעיפי תחיקה הנוגעים (התעשייה האווירית) לפיתוח, יצור ואספקה של מל"טים.  
דוגמא: הפרשת ה-CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTION על אספקה נוספת של ה-PIONEER  
ליל הים ולמרינס (ב-1998 תושלם הכנסתו לסד"כ של ה-UAV SHORT RANGE). מעקב  
אחר הקצבת הכספים לפיתוח המל"ט קצר הטווח, עליו מתמודדות התעשייה האווירית יחד עם  
TRW. מעקב אחר הקצבת כספים (40 מיליון דולר בתקציב 1992) לייצור ה-SYSTEM  
NIGHT TARGETING עבור המרינס. מעקב אחר הקצבת כספים (25 מיליון דולר בתקציב  
1992) לייצור ה-NORTH FINDING SYSTEM עבור הצבא, כחלק משיפור ה"פטריוט" ע"י  
התעשייה האווירית ו-"רייטאון". בירור האפשרות להחזרת ה-HARPY לסדר היום, לאור  
האפשרות של ביטול פרויקט ה-TACIT RAINBOW, ע"י הנחיה קונגרסיונאלית לפנטגון  
לבחון את ה-HARPY במסגרת ה-FOREIGN COMPARATIVE TESTING (הפרויקט נידחה  
בנוב' 90 ע"י בדיקה תיאורטית בלבד).

הסרת מגבלות נוספות מדרכן של חברות ישראליות לתחרות על חוזים בטחוניים (וגם  
מסחריים), תוך מימוש הסכמים קיימים (MNNA, FTA, MOUs), וחקיקה בתת-ועדת ההקצבות  
בתחום ה-MOBILIZATION BASE, DEFENSE TRADE, DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COOP. (לפי  
תקדים קנדה), ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY, קבלת נתח מעוגת ה-SMALL BUSINESS,  
וכו'. (אפשר לשקול זיון בנושא במסגרת ה-JOINT SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM -  
הקרוב והקמת תת-ועדת JSAP למעקב ולקידום הנושאים).

גיוס תמיכת הקונגרס להסרת המכשולים להשתתפות התעשיות הישראליות (IAI) במכרזים  
טכנולוגיות חלל.

מימון רכש צבאי ע"י בנק EXIM.

קבלת ערבויות בנק EXIM למימון רכש צבאי.

התאמת "המודל הסורקי", הדרום קוריאני ו/או זה של נאט"ו לצרכי הרכש והשת"פ  
האסטרטגי (עם ארה"ב) של ישראל.

עיקרון ה-SURCHARGE כעיבוי ה-FMS.

FAIR LOADING, או בשמו המוחן יותר COMPETITIVE PRICING (ערך הסעיף כ-20 מליון



- תחיקת שת"פ משולש (TRILATERAL COOPERATION) בין ארה"ב, ישראל וטורקיה/זרם קוריה/מדינות באפריקה, בתחומים שונים.
- מימוש ושיפור תחיקת מאגרי הנפט.
- תחיקה להקמת ועדה משותפת קונגרט-כנסת לקידום השת"פ, בצורה של גוף קבוע המעוגן בתחיקה, "קוקוס" לשיפור יחסי ארה"ב-ישראל הפועל בצורה שוטפת ו/או צוות משקיפים מטעם בתי המחוקקים ברמות שונות של דיונים ביחסי שתי המדינות.
- בדיקה עם סיב"ט לגבי ממוש טעיפי חק הפנסגון לפי נר 0270 מה- 15/11/90.
- ב. טעיפים אזרחיים:
  - גיוס ערבויות לתשתית קליטה וכלכלה (לסווח אורך) בסך 10 מיליארד דולרים לשנה למשך 5 שנים (במסגרת תקציב 1991), לדיור, לרכישת אמצעי ייצור, חמרי גלם ושימוש חפשי בישראל וליצירת מקומות עבודה. למידת לקחי חקיקת ערבויות הדיור: הנחיית הממשל להעניק אור ירוק לגיוס ההלוואות תוך 30 יום מאישור התחיקה.
  - שמיטת חובות, שיפור תנאי התשלום (DEBT REFINANCING) או צמצום החובות.
  - הגדלת הסיוע האזרחי באופן יחסי להגדלת נתח סיוע החוץ (מכוח הפיצוי השנתי על האינפלציה) בעוגת התקציב הפדרלי.
  - שמוש אפשרי בנתח המוגדל של סיוע החוץ לממון גיוס הערבויות הנוספות להלוואות לקליטה ותשתית כלכלית.
  - עודד השקעות וסחר בישראל באמצעות הקלות מס וחנאי אשראי מועדפים (אולי באמצעות ה"טרמפ" של FTA).
  - הגדלת קרנות הפיתוח.
  - ין לצמיחה כלכלית.
  - שחרור מחשבי העל באמצעות פניות מן ה"גבעה" או אף תחיקה (כמוצא אחרון).
  - בדיקת פוטנציאל SEED-2 ואולי SEED-3 (יש לדרוש ההיזון החוזר מנציגויותינו במזא"ר, והעברתו ל"גבעה" באמצעות שגרירויות מזא"ר בושינגטון).
  - עיבוי התקצוב של פעולות מש"ב והמחקר המשותף (CDR, CDP).
- ג. טעיפים מדיניים לחוק סיוע החוץ:
  - "תיקון דה-קונסינ" המתנה ממון פעילות הממשל באי-ניהול מגעים רשמיים ובלתי



רשמיים עם אש"ף ועם גופים המסונפים אליהם, וקורא TO TERMINATE ולא רק  
TO SUSPEND את הדו-שיח עם אש"ף.

- החלת תיקון מק-ליברמן על מדינות ערב בכל הקשור לדווח תקופתי (וגש על גילויי אנטישמיות, תוך התייחסות לדו"ח השנתי - על זכויות האדם - של מחמ"ד).
- הוספת תופעת גילויי האנטישמיות למנדט הקונגרסיונלי העומד מאחורי דו"ח זכויות האדם של מחמ"ד.
- הידוק החישובים של תיקון מק-ליברמן, תוך חיוב הממשל לדווח תקופתית על היצמדות אש"ף להתחייבותיו כלפי ארה"ב בין אם הדו-שיח מושעה אם לאו.
- מניעת השמטתה של סוריה מרשימת מדינות הטרור, כל עוד אין היא משנה מדיניותה ופעילותה בנידון.
- יום חקיקת חובת דיווח על פיתוח מערכות נשק בלתי קונבנציונאליות, או רכישתן, על ידי מדינות ערביות שאינן חתומות על הסכם שלום עם ישראל.
- החלפת קונגרס לביטול גנוי ישראל ע"י האו"ם עקב הדס הכור הגרעיני בעיראק.

(5) לו"ז:

לו"ז קשיח לגבי עיבוי סיוע 1991 מוכתב ע"י "טרמפים" תחיקתיים אשר יזדמנו לנו ב-1991: שלב 2 של עיסוק הנשק הטעונית (כ-14 מיליארד דולר לפי הצהרות הממשל), תחיקת ה-DESERT STORM SUPPLEMENTAL ל-1991 (כנראה בפברואר) ולפחות עוד SUPPLEMENTAL אחד לצרכי בטחון וכמו כן גם לצרכים אזרחיים פנימיים וחיצוניים. לכל התהליך התחיקתי הנ"ל אפשר יהיה לנסות ולהצמיד פריטים המעבים את הקשר האסטרטגי/פיננסי ארה"ב-ישראל (הן בתחום הבטחון והן בתחום הקליטה והכלכלה). הנסיון לעיבוי סיוע חוץ 1992 יוכתב ע"י לו"ז הקונגרסיונלי הגמיש של ועדות התקציב, החוץ ותת-ועדות ההקצבות לפעולות זרות ולתקציב הפנסגון (הצעת התקציב של הנשיא הוגשה לקונגרס ב-4/2/91; הצעת התקציב של הקונגרס תוגש - לפי הספר - ב-15/4; דיון המליאה בחוקי ההקצבות אמור להתחיל - לפי הספר - ב-15/5). כדי להימנע מהשלכות תקציביות, חובה להגיש את סיוע החרום שמבקשת ישראל, לבטחון לקליטה, במסגרת תקציב 1991, ויהיה להשיג הסכמת הממשל והקונגרס להגדרת הסיוע הבטחוני כ-NATIONAL EMERGENCY.

(6) מגבלות:

א. ארוכות טווח:

- עמדת הממשל כלפי ישראל - כפי שמשקפת מהתייחסותו לערבויות הדיור, לבקשות סיוע החרום הבטחוני ולרשימה ארוכה של תחיקות ישראליות בלתי ממומשות - עלולה לאפיין גם את 1991, ולהוות את המשוכה הגבוהה ביותר בדרך לעיבוי סיוע החוץ.





- חרב הגרעון הפדרלי תמשיך להתנופף מעל התקציב, ותצמצם יכולת הממשל והקונגרס להענות לבקשות סיוע כספי.

- המצב הכלכלי עלול להחמיר, מה גם שהוצאות "סופת המדבר" וההשלכות הכלכליות של המלחמה מחמירות עוד יותר את יחסו החמור ממילא של הציבור והנבחר האמריקאי כלפי חוק סיוע החוץ.

ב. קצרות טווח:

- המשך המשבר במפרץ, ונוכחות אפשרית של הכוח האמריקאי גם עם סיום המשבר, יצמצמו עוד יותר את יכולת ארה"ב להענות לבקשות סיוע כספי ואף לסיוע ציודי.

- מתיחות מזדמנות בין ארה"ב (ממשל ו/או קונגרס) לישראל.

(7) הגדרת ציבורי היעד:

א. לחקיקה והוצאה לפועל:

- "גבעה" (הנהגות הבתים, ועדות התקציב, החוץ, כוחות מזוינים ומודיעין, תת ועדות ההקצבות לפעולות זרות ולהגנה, סנטורים וצירי ביה"נ שאינם שייכים לוועדות הנ"ל, אך משחקים תפקיד בתחום סיוע החוץ לישראל, וראשי צוותות ועוזרים מקצועיים הנוגעים לנדון).

- ממשל (הבית הלבן על זרועותיו המדיניות-בטחוניות-תקציביות, מחמ"ד והפנטגון). ככל שגישת הממשל שלילית יותר, עולה חשיבות הקשר עם ה"גבעה".

- מפלגות (הנהגות ופעילים ברושינגטון ובערים המרכזיות כמקור השפעה - מוגבלת על ה"גבעה" והממשל כאחד).

- מיסד פוליטי מדינתי ("מושכי חוטים", מושלים וכו').

ב. איפא"ק: מן הראוי להנות מן הניסיון העשיר, החושים המדיניים הבריאים, הרעיונות היצירתיים והקשרים המעולים ברמות ה"גבעה" והממשל כאחד. במקביל, יש להימנע מהיסחפות אחר הילת האירגון וראייתו כאורים וחומים, או מיצירת הרושם כאילו איפא"ק מוביל את עגלת סיוע החוץ. לעיתים אף קיים פער רעיוני-מדיני בין הכוון והקצב של איפא"ק לבין אלו של ממשלת ישראל.

ג. ציבורי יעד לתיגבור מאמץ החקיקה וההוצאה לפועל:

- הנהגה ואירגונים יהודים (רתימתם למשימה - לפי יעדי סעיף 2 - מרמת הדיאלוג עם הבית הלבן ועד לגיוס הקהילה לכתיבת מכתבים, לשיחות שלפון ולמפגשים עם סנטורים



- PACs פרו-ישראלים.
- תקשורת (ראיית היעדים - לפי סעיף 2 - כקווים מנחים בתדרכי התקשורת).
- איגודים מקצועיים (זיהוי קשריהם עם אוכלוסיית ה"גבעה" והמימשל כאחד וטיפול הקשר ההיסטורי בינם לבין ישראל והקהילה היהודית).
- ארגונים נוצרים המעורים בזירה הפוליטית בווינגטון וברחבי ארה"ב (כגון ה- CMC, CIPAC, PRAYER BREAKFAST וכו').
- מרכזי חשיבה ומוסדות מחקר (יזום פעולות מחקרים - לפי יעדי סעיף 2 - במסגרת ה- FOREIGN POLICY CENTER, CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, HERITAGE, CENTER FOR ETHICS AND POLI וכו').

#### 8) צוותי פעולה:

##### א. שגרירות:

- צוות תכנון, תאום וביצוע (תת"ב): שגריר, ציר מדיני, נספח צבאי, ציר כלכלי וציר קונגרס (יש להמריץ משרדי החוץ, הבסחון והאוצר להחיש תכנית העבודה לשנת התקציב 1992, אך הניסיון מלמד כי אין להמתין, אלא להוין אותם בתכנית עבודה מגובשת).
- רמשי"ן וטיב"ט.
- צוות סיוע בשגרירות: ציר הסברה, יועצים מדיניים, נספחת תקשורת, נספח עבודה.
- צוות סיוע בשטח: קונכ"לים (יש לשאוף שתכנית עבודתם - החל מכנס קונכ"לים, דרך התדוך השבועי וכלה בפעילותם השוטפת - תנווט לפי סעיפים 2,3,4 ו-5).
- ב. צוותי סיוע חוץ-שגרירותיים (מעורבים בכל שלבי תכנית העבודה):
  - צוות התת"ב ייזום עימם התייעצויות מקדימות ומגעים שוטפים לקידום היעדים אשר יגובשו על בסיס סעיף 2, למימוש הפריטים בסעיף 3 וליציקת תוכן לסעיף 4.

##### איפא"ק.

- תעשיות בשחוניות (רפא"ל, תעשיה צבאית, תעשיה אירית וכו').
- מומחים חיצוניים (ביל שניידר, מל רישי, פול ברגר, סטיוארט אייזנשטאט, דב זקהים, סטיב ברייאן, ריצ'רד פרל, דאג פיית' וכו').
- מומחי "גבעה" המעורים בתהליך התחיקתי הנוגע ליחסי ארה"ב-ישראל (ג'ים בונד,



9) דרכי פעולה (כהשלמה להמלצות לפעולה בסעיפים 2,3 ו-4):

א. סעיפים 2,3,4 ינחו את סדר העדיפויות של יחידות השגרירות, החל מקביעת יעדי העבודה השוטפת, דרך קביעת מפתשים (עבור השגריר או אח"מים מישראל) ב"גבעה" ובמימשל, או עבור הקשר השוטף של ראשי יחידות ועוזריהם עם ציבורי יעד שיגרתיים. הם אף ינחו את הפצת חומר ההסברה ודימון מומחים מישראל.

ב. לו"ז של צוות תת"ב: שלב ההתייעצויות (נובמבר); שלב גיבוש תכנית עבודה ועדכון צוותי הסיוע השגרירתיים והחוץ-שגרירתיים (דצמבר); הרצת תכנית העבודה (מתחילת ינואר).

ג. צוות התת"ב ירכז את שלב ההתייעצויות (עם כל אחד מגורמי סעיף 7 בנפרד), יגבש את התכנית ויתדרך את צוותי הסיוע, יקבע את הרכב הצוותים היחידתיים והבינ-יחידתיים אשר יקדמו את התכנית ב"גבעה", במימשל, במוקדי המפלגות, בקהילה היהודית, בתקשורת ובאיגודים המקצועיים (לדוגמא: קונגרס-צבאי, קונגרס-כלכלי, קונגרס-רמש"ן, קונגרס-חץ", קונגרס-רפא"ל, למשימות ב"גבעה"). התת"ב ינחה את מימוש התכנית מינואר ועד להשלמת תהליך החקיקה ומימוש הישגיה.

ד. לאור מגבלת התקציב החמורה והמחמירה של ארה"ב, מומלץ לאתר יעדי פעולה שאינם כרוכים ב-BUDGET AUTHORITY, או שהשפעתם על הגרעון התקציבי היא מצומצמת. מומלץ להתמקד בהצעות לפעולה אשר במרכזן העברת ציוד עודף, שת"פ מו"פי, מימוש ממצאי ה-STUDIES (נא ראה סעיף 3א'), צמצום המגבלות המוטלות על השתתפות חברות ישראליות במכרזים בטחוניים ומסחריים, הגברת קשרי המסחר, קבלת ערבויות להלוואות בחנאים מועדפים, וכו'.

ה. למרות סעיף ד', ובמקביל לו, מוצע להציג תכנית רב-שנתית (מנומקת ומפורטת לפרטי פרטים, אשר תעמוד במבחן עין וושינגטונית בקורתית) לסיוע ושת"פ בטחוניים, לטיפול תשתית המו"פ הבטחוני בישראל, לשמירה על היתרון האיכותי של צה"ל ולמתן חשובה לצרכים אזרחיים ייחודיים. במקרה הרע ביותר תתרום התכנית לעמדת המיקוח של ישראל, במקרה הטוב יותר, היא תהווה ביטוי נאמן לצרכים הצבאיים והאזרחיים של המדינה.

ו. לאור עמדת המימשל כלפי ישראל, ומתוך הנחה שלא צפוי שינוי בעמדה ב-1991, יש להעמיק ולהרחיב היקף המגעים עם ה"גבעה".

ז. לקידום יעדי ה"גבעה", יש להאיץ קצב הביקורים בישראל של עוזרים מקצועיים בוועדות קריטיות (כוחות מזוינים, תת-ועדות לתקציבי סיוע חוץ ופנסגון, חוץ, מודיעין ותקציב). יש להפנות ל"גבעה" - באופן שוטף - מומחים ישראלים (בתחומי התעשייה הבטחונית, אקדמיה וצה"ל) בנושאי האיום המזו"תי (על ארה"ב ועל ישראל), האנשתו של צה"ל וישראל (בסיוע המומחים ודודו יהב, שלום הררי, סד טולצ'ינסקי, יצחק טבר, יצחק פטרבורג), השת"פ האסטרטגי והתעשיות הבטחוניות בישראל (לפי ה-STUDIES) ויכולתן של התעשיות להשתלב בפרויקטים בארה"ב, וכו'. מומלץ לשלב חברי ועדת חו"ב





ח. מומלץ כי יוכנו עזרים למפגשים עם ולהפריך קו אמריקאי): תרחישי איום גרפים, טבלאות וקלטות וידאו, לא והתחיקות המופיעות בסעיפים 3, 4.

ט. ייזום שימועים הרלבנטיים ל- STUDIES.

#### 10. סיכום:

א. כובד המשימה והלו"ז (נא ראה סעיף 5) ממחיש כי מן הראוי לשקול גיבוש מידי של חכנית פעולה אשר תשתרע ע"פ כל שנת העבודה.

ב. הגדרת היעדים והפעולות המתבקשות מן התחיקות הקיימות והפוטנציאליות, מבהירים עד כמה מורכבת המשימה.

ג. כדי לענות על אתגר כבד זה, מוצע למסד עבודת צוות (ברמות תכנון, תאום וביצוע) ביניחידתיות בתוך השגרירות, בין השגרירות לבין הקונסוליות, בין השגרירות לבין משרדי הממשלה בישראל ובין השגרירות לבין גופים ובודדים מקומיים.

ד. כדי לממש את היעדים מוצע להעמידם במוקד הפעילות השנתית השוטפת של יחידות השגרירות ושל הקונסוליות.

11) יעדים שהוצבו לקראת הדיון הקונגרסיונלי על חוקי סיוע החוץ והפנסגון (1991):

א. חוק סיוע החוץ:

- שמירה על 1.8 ו- 1.2 (הושג).

- גדלת הסיוע הבטחוני הכספי במליארד דולר כמענק מיוחד ו-700 מיליון דולר כתוספת שנתית ל-FMS (לא הושג על רקע המצוקה התקציבית החמורה בארה"ב, השוללת כמעט כל סכוי לעבוי הסיוע הכספי).

- קבלת ציוד צבאי בשווי של כ-700 מיליון דולר (הושג ברמת הקונגרס, אך המימוש נתון בידי הממשל...).

- העלאת ישראל לרמה הגבוהה ביותר במסגרת הזכאות לעודפי ציוד צבאי באירופה (הושג ברמת הקונגרס).

- הפקדה מוקדמת של ה-FMS (הושג).



- הגדלת ה-FMS ע"י DEOBLIGATION, REOBLIGATION (לא הושג עקב משוכות חוקיות ופוליטיות במישור הקונגרסיונלי והבינ"ל).

- הגדלת ה-OSP (הושג).

- ביטול "חיקון אובי" שעלול היה להגביל את יכולת התמרון הפיננסי של הרכש הבטחוני בארה"ב (הושג).

- חיעול כספי ה-EXIM BANK לצורכי רכש בטחוני (לא הושג עקב התנגדות בממשל וב"גבעה", אך גם עקב חוסר זמן).

- שיפור תנאי והיקף SDAF (הושג בצורה חלקית ביותר - כאשר הקונגרס ביטל את שיפור תנאי התשלום אשר אושר ע"י הסנאט, אך הגדלת הסכום העומד לרשות המדינות המעונינות נשארה על כנה).

- הגדלת היקף ההצבה מראש (הושג מעבר למצופה, עקב תוספת אשר ניתנה כתחליף לניטרול טעיף ה-SDAF).

- שמירה על סעיפי סיוע קטנים אך משמעותיים כגון חיקוני ברמן וואקסמן (הושג).

- מחיקת חוב (לא הושג עקב איתותים בלתי ברורים מירושלים, ועקב התנגדות והסתיגות משמעותיים ב"גבעה" ובממשל).

#### ב. חוק תקציב הפנטגון:

- הגדלת נתח ה-FMS מעוגת ה-GIFT FUND (לא הושג עקב התנגדות מוחלטת ב"גבעה" ובממשל).

- המשך מימון ה"חץ", ובחנאי המימון הקיימים (הושג).

- עידוד הפנטגון, ע"י הקונגרס, לעבות את היקף השת"פ האסטרטגי והתעשייתי-בטחוני (הושג).

- יחבת מתקני נמל חיפה והרחבה אפשרית של נמל אשדוד (הושג).

- הגברת קצב ביקורי הצי השישי בחיפה (לא הושג עקב העדר פעילות קונגרסיונלית בנידון).

- פתיחת ה-EUROPEAN WORKLOAD בפני התעשייה האווירית (הושג ברמת הקונגרס).

- זריז מימוש חוזי בטחון ושחרור טכנולוגיות (הושג ברמת הקונגרס).

- סיוע לתעשיות הבטחוניות לקידום חוזהן (הושג).

- הקמת מאגרי נפט בישראל (הושג).

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.




שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

— צמצום המגבלות המוטלות על השתתפות חברות ישראליות במכרזים בטחוניים בארה"ב  
(הושג בצורה חלקית ביותר בדמת הקונגרס).

יורם אטינגר



# הצעה לתכנית עבודה שנתית



אאא, חוזם: 25356

אל: רהמש/2125

מ-: ווש, נר: 2126, תא: 140291, זח: 1400, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר / בהול - ח.ר.ב ח.ר.ב

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

דע: מנכ'ל רוה'מ

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

דניס רוס הודיע לי הבוקר טלפנית, שעל סמך ההבהרות הנוספות שקיבלו מאיתנו, המזכיר אומנם התכוון להודיע היום על אישור סופי לערבויות הדיור, ואולם בעקבות מאמרו של ג'קסון דיל היום ב'ושינגטון פוסט' שהסתמך על איזשהו דו"ח של חברי הכנסת אורון וצוקר - 'המזכיר נמנע מעשות כנ''. השבתי לו בצורה חריפה שחשוב שיהיה ברור לו ולמזכיר שאני אישית לא אעסוק בכך יותר, שכל הטיפול שלהם בנושא, שהוא הומניטרי בעיקרו משאיר טעם מר ושאני ורבים אחרים בארץ חשים כאילו כל פעם מחפשים תירוץ חדש כדי לא לעשות דבר. הודעתי לו שלפי מיטב הבנתי לא תוסיף הממשלה אף לא מילה אחת מלבד למה שכבר פירטה - ושזו גם תהיה המלצתי.

זאת ועוד, תמוה בעיני כיצד מקבלים החלטות מעין אלה על סמך כתבות בעיתון ובפרט כשהמידע כביכול איננו מנותק ממניעים פוליטיים אופוזיציוניים. 'אני קורא יום יום עשרות ידיעות בעיתונות האמריקאית המנגחות את עמדות הממשל בעניינים שונים, כלום גם לידיעות אלה מתייחס הממשל כל כך ברצינות?'

בעקבות דברי, רוס הודיע לי שישוב ויעלה הנושא עם המזכיר מחר.

לידיעתכם.

שובל.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

סססס

(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

IN JERUSALEM: ISRAEL SAID TO PLAN SETTLEMENT BUILDUP  
(02/14 WPost article by Jackson Diehl) (770)

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE WASHINGTON POST ON PAGE A-16 ON  
FEBRUARY 14 UNDER THE ABOVE HEADLINE.

(BEGIN TEXT)

JERUSALEM, Feb. 13 -- The Israeli government is planning to build 12,000 homes for Jewish settlers in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip in a three year program that would increase the Jewish population of the territories by more than 50 percent, two opposition members of parliament said today.

The legislators, who said they had obtained internal plans of the Construction and Housing Ministry, charged that the building program

violated guarantees given by the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to the Bush administration in exchange for 400 million dollars in loan guarantees for housing construction.

Shamir's government, which is now seeking 10 billion dollars more in loan guarantees from Washington, promised last fall that it would not build housing in the territories for the hundreds of thousands of Soviet immigrants now coming here. It also pledged not to direct the immigrants to settlements and said it would provide the State Department with information about any settlement construction.

However, leftist deputies Dedi Zucker of the Citizen's Rights Movement and Chaim Oron of the Mapam Party said in a three-page report that about 2,500 Soviet immigrants are already living in the occupied territories outside of Jerusalem. They suggested that more Soviets would surely move to such areas if the new housing were built. The immigration wave has caused a severe housing shortage in Israel, and Soviet arrivals already are virtually forced to settle wherever apartments are available.

Zucker and Oron charged that the government building program, which they said would cost 750 million dollars over three years, "has the aim of creating facts on the ground that will make it difficult for Israel to enter the political process that is expected after the Persian Gulf War."

They said the building program is already underway, and that the government is putting 1,000 mobile homes in Jewish settlements in the Arab territories.

At least 90,000 Jewish settlers are now estimated to live in about 140 communities scattered through the West Bank and Gaza, which are home to 1.7 million Palestinians. The Bush administration, which says Israel should trade captured land for peace with its neighbors, strongly opposes further Jewish settlement of the territories. The issue contributed to a sharp deterioration in U.S.-Israeli relations over the two years before the gulf crisis.

A spokesman for the Housing Ministry, which is headed by Ariel Sharon, a hard-line leader of the Likud Party, did not respond today to several inquiries about the opposition report. A senior adviser to Shamir, Avi Pazner, said the report "sounds far-fetched," but added that he did not know whether it was correct.

Since the formation last June of Shamir's present cabinet, which includes far-right nationalist and religious parties, the government has refused to make its plans for settlements public, although it has said settlement of the territories would continue.

In recent weeks, sources here said, officials in Jerusalem have been



at odds with the State Department over U.S. attempts to obtain the promised information about settlements. U.S. officials recently complained that Israel's answers to questions about its settlement policy were inadequate, officials here said.

Aides to Shamir say the government responded that, in its view, it had provided the State Department with all the information it requested. However, officials said, the 400 million dollars in loan guarantees linked to the information request has still not been released by Washington, a delay that Secretary of State James A. Baker III recently attributed to "technical problems."

Israeli commentators say the continuing problems with the housing money -- which is only a fraction of what Israel hopes to obtain from the United States -- reflect the deep tensions that still underlie the wartime patina of cooperation between the United States and Israel.

The legislators' report said that the Housing Ministry plan for settlement construction extended from the present budget year, which ends in March, to 1993. In this year, it said, the government has allocated 2,149 new homes to settlements, of which some will be built directly by the government and some will be financed through purchase guarantees to private builders.

According to the report, the overall plan places priority on adding homes to existing settlements, "to assure that the present claim made to the Americans can be perpetuated: that no new settlements are being constructed."

(END TEXT)

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

NNNN

אאא, חוזם: 25605

אל: רהמש/2155

מ-: ווש, נר: 2130, תא: 140291, זח: 2030, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי-ביותר/מיידי.

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופרנ'

דע: שהח, רהמ'.

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון.

הנדון: ערבויות לדיוור.

1. מזכיר המדינה הזמין אותי היום אחצ' (1700, 14) לפגישה דחופה עמו הפגישה ארכה כ-20 דקות והשתתף בנוסף גם דניס רוס.

2. המזכיר פתח בהעלותו טענות קשות בשני נושאים: האחד, המשך ההדלפות בארץ ובעיקר, התייחס לתוכן שיחתו האחרונה עימי.

השבתי שגם אותי מרתיחה תופעת ההדלפות. המזכיר ענה שיודע שההדלפות לא באות מהשגרירות בושינגטון. מיידי אחר כך עבר לנושא לשמו זומנתי בדחיפות, התבטאותי בראיון לרויטרס. דברי בייקר בשיחה נאמרו בטון חריף למדי כשהוא מדגיש שני דברים: האחד, נפגע מכך שדברי נאמרו פומבית. השני, לגופו של ענין, הוא מנסה להוביל מאמץ סיוע לטובת ישראל בהוסיפו שמבחינת ישראל אין טעם לפעול באמצעות המחוקקים.

הוסיף שהוא גם תמה איך אנו יכולים לטעון, כפי שהתבטאתי בראיון, שלמרות שישראל מדינת חזית לא קבלנו עד-כה שום סיוע למרות הנזקים החמורים שנגרמו לה כאשר ארה"ב ספקה לישראל סוללות וטילי פטריוט והצבא האמריקאי נלחם לחיסול איום פוטנציאלי על ישראל. המשיך והעלה בנימה חריפה עוד כמה טענות לפיהן אין עושים כך למדינה ידידותית.

3. השבתי, שכמובן לא היתה שום כוונה לפגוע בו או במימשל, אותם אנו מעריכים ומוקירים על מעשיהם ויחסם לישראל אולם אני חייב להודות שבישראל קיימת תרעומת ומבוכה, להם אני שותף, בגין השתלשלות הענינים בקשר לערבויות לדיוור.

הרי רק לפני יומיים ספקנו כל התשובות לשאלותיהם האחרונות שלפי לארי איגלברגר בשיחתו עמי היו אמורות להביא סוף פסוק מוחלט לנושא - ואילו על סמך איזה מאמר עיתונאי בושינגטון פוסט, המתבסס על מידע ממקורות לא בדוקים חל עכוב נוסף במתן אשורם. הוספתי שבוודאי נוכחו לדעת בחודשים האחרונים, שרק החלטות מוסמכות של מדינת ישראל מחייבות את המדינה ולא הצהרה או התבטאות של זה או אחר.

המשכתי וציינתי שראינו בצער ידיעות בנוסח כמעט זהה שהופיעו ברוב העיתונים האמריקאים לפיהם ביקורו האחרון של שהבט נעשה כדי להשיג סיוע נוסף מארה"ב והרי המזכיר עצמו יודע שלא כך פני הדברים וקו זה יצר אצלנו תחושה לא נוחה.

4. עם חזרתי לשגרירות התקשר פעמיים דניס רוס. חזרתי בפניו על התחושה בארץ ותחושותי שלי בעקבות הטיפול בנושא הערבויות והעכוב הנוסף.

שובל.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס



Headline #11

Copyright REUTER NEWS REPORTS [RN01W] via NewsNet

Thursday February 14, 1991

Update #: 16 Item #: 430

## ISRAELI AMBASSADOR DEMANDS MORE AID, COMPLAINS OF U.S. STANCE

By Alan Elsner

WASHINGTON, Feb 14, Reuter - Israel's Washington ambassador, Zalman Shoval, on Thursday accused the United States of giving his country the ``run-around'' on its request for loan guarantees to help build housing for Soviet Jewish immigrants.

In an interview with Reuters, Shoval also complained that Israel had so far received no compensation for huge losses incurred as a result of the Gulf War and demanded that its needs be met.

He said he was disappointed at lengthy delays in providing Israel with housing loan guarantees worth 400 million dollars, approved in principle last October but still not released by the Bush administration.

``We sometimes feel we are being given the run around, although to the best of my understanding Israel has fully complied with the requests that were raised in this connection by the United States government,'' Shoval said.

Secretary of State James Baker told Congress last week he was holding up the loans until Israel fulfilled a promise to provide the United States with detailed information about its settlement programmes in the occupied territories.

Shoval said every time Israel provided information, Washington demanded more.

Israel, which received 200,000 Soviet immigrants last year and expects a further 800,000 in the next four years, estimates the cost of resettling them at 30 billion to 40 billion dollars. The bulk of the burden, its leaders say, will be borne by Israeli taxpayers and contributions from world Jewry but have spoken of the need of several billion dollars in U.S. loans, credits and loan guarantees.

``I am disappointed by the way the American administration has been dealing with it. After all, it is a drop in the bucket and basically a humanitarian effort,'' Shoval said.

Turning to the costs of the Gulf War, he said Israel was still not treated as a frontline state although its economy had suffering since August 2, when Iraq invaded Kuwait.

``Not being part of the coalition ... we have not received one cent of aid in spite of the fact that we have had immense direct military costs ... not to mention even the indirect economic costs such as the loss of tourism,'' Shoval said.

``We demand that these needs and necessities will be addressed as swiftly as possible,'' he said.

Baker said last week Washington did regard Israel as a frontline state and had asked European countries to help it as they had helped other countries affected by the crisis like Egypt, Jordan and Turkey.

REUTER

Headline #12

Copyright REUTER NEWS REPORTS [RN01W] via NewsNet

Thursday February 14, 1991

Update #: 16 Item #: 425

# ISRAELI AMBASSADOR DEMANDS MORE AID, COMPLAINS OF U.S. STANCE

By Alan Elsner

WASHINGTON, Feb 14, Reuter - Israel's Washington ambassador, Zalman Shoval, on Thursday accused the United States of giving his country the ``run-around'' on its request for loan guarantees to help build housing for Soviet Jewish immigrants.

In an interview with Reuters, Shoval also complained that Israel had so far received no compensation for huge losses incurred as a result of the Gulf War and demanded that its needs be met.

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Secretary of State James Baker told Congress last week he was holding up the loans until Israel fulfilled a promise to provide the United States with detailed information about its settlement programmes in the occupied territories.

Shoval said every time Israel provided information, Washington demanded more.

``Always something new arises. We have a saying in Hebrew that the wages of a good deed is the good deed itself and this should have been the approach of the United States government,'' he said.

Israel, which received 200,000 Soviet immigrants last year and expects a further 800,000 in the next four years, estimates the cost of resettling them at 30 billion to 40 billion dollars.

Its leaders say the bulk of the burden will be borne by Israeli taxpayers and contributions from world Jewry but have spoken of the need for several billion dollars in U.S. loans, credits and loan guarantees.

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``We demand that these needs and necessities will be addressed as swiftly as possible,'' he said.

Baker said last week Washington did regard Israel as a frontline state and had asked European countries to help it as they had helped other countries affected by the crisis like Egypt, Jordan and Turkey.

Shoval said he was not optimistic about prospects for an Israel-Syrian peace dialogue after the war and played down the importance of a statement from Damascus that it would be prepared to recognise Israel's right to exist as part of a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement.

``After all it is not Israel's right to exist which is in question but Syria's willingness to conclude peace with us and stop the state of belligerency,'' he said.

The ambassador said hopes of peace with the Palestinians depended on excluding the Palestine Liberation Organisation from the process and hinted at possible unilateral Israeli steps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

``Once this war is over Israel in my view will reiterate its peace proposal May 1989 with regard to the Palestinians and may even look beyond that for other avenues if that proposal should again prove to be impracticable,'' he said.

The May 1989 proposal envisaged granting Palestinians in the territories local autonomy under Israeli rule and Shoval said one possibility was that Israel would unilaterally implement its proposal.

``Israel could perhaps again consider the possibility of implementing some of the autonomy aspects unilaterally provided this will at the same time be agreed upon with some of the Arab states which by then will have entered peace negotiations with Israel,'' he said.

REUTER

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אאא, חוזם: 24828

אל: רהמש/2094

מ-: המשרד, תא: 140291, זח: 1611, דח: ר, סג: שמ,

בבב

42272

שמור/רגיל

אל: וושינגטון/ורנאי-דרנגר - קישור לקונגרס

דע: לש' רוה'מ, לש' שה'ח, לש' שהב'ט, מנהל מצפ'א

הנדון: ביקור קונגרסמן טום לנטוס בארץ (7-10.2.91)

להלן דו'ח ביקור הנ'ל בארץ:

הפגישות המדיניות

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עם שה'ח דוד לוי (7/2)

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השר פתח בסקירה קצרה על המצב בעולם במזה'ת ובארץ. הדגיש שישראל לא תיפול לתוך המלכודת של סדאם חוסיין, ולא תתן עילה לפגיעה באחדות הקואליציה. הזהיר מפני המניעים של סוריה להצטרף לקואליציה ולקבל 'שיקום מחדש', במיוחד באספקת נשק התקפי מול הנשק ההגנתי שמקבלת ישראל.

קונגרסמן לנטוס סיפר אודות נאומו בקונגרס לאחר הפצצת הכור האטומי העירקי ב-1981 וכמה שהוא גאה מהנאום שנשא אז - אמר שישלח לשה'ח העתק של הנאום. הוא הדגיש את חשיבות ההצבעה בקונגרס, לאשר לנשיא להפעיל כח נגד עיראק. אמר שללא ההצבעה החיובית היה קשה לנשיא בוש לפעול כפי שפעל.

לנטוס סיפר על פגישה בינו וכמה אנשי קונגרס וסנאט אחרים לבין הנשיא בוש, לפני בואו לישראל, כדי להודות להם על תמיכתם בהצבעה. הדגיש שהיתה זו הפעם הראשונה שהוזמן לאיזור הפרטי של הבית הלבן. במשך הסיור שעשה להם הנשיא בבית הלבן (ליתר דיוק בחדר השינה של לינקולן) ביקש לנטוס לדבר 'תכלס' עם הנשיא בנושא הישראלי.

הנשיא בוש הודה לממשלת ישראל ובמיוחד לשה'ח ('בהיותך בעל השפעה חשובה בנקיטת עמדה של מדינאי - במדיניות ההבלגה') על עמדת ההבלגה. לנטוס אמר לנשיא, שישראל צריכה עכשיו 2.5 מיליארד דולר (את הסכום הוא הדגיש, אמר ללא בדיקה לצרכי ישראל). בוש אמר: 'אני שומע אותך' ואמר גם 'אנו מבינים את הבעיות של ישראל ואנו עובדים על הבעיה הזאת'.

לנטוס הדגיש שישראל חייבת להמשיך עם ההבלגה ללא קשר למה שקורה, אך שהתקפה כימית תשנה את המצב. אמר שסדאם חוסיין יחוסל בסופו של דבר והיתרונות הצבאיים קצרי-הטווח מתגמדים מול תוצאה לא ברורה של התקפה ישראלית. הוא חילק שבחים לפעילותה של ממשלת ישראל, למעט שתי נקודות 'צורמות'. האחת: מסיבת העיתונאים של מודעי (לאחר ביקור איגלברגר) אודות ה-13 מיליארד, והשניה: הכנסת 'מולדת' בראשות רחבעם זאבי לקואליציה ולממשלה.

שה'ח הביע את תקוותו שנושא ערבות ה-400 מיליון דולר תסתיים בקרוב ושלא ימשיכו לגרור את הנושא. לנטוס אמר שיעשה את מירב המאמצים לעזור בנושא זה.

בסוף הפגישה העלה לנטוס רעיון אישי/פרטי אודות הסכם הגנה ישראלי-אמריקאי. הוא טען שנוכחות חיילים אמריקאים על אדמת ישראל (עם ה'פטריוט'), מהווה מעין 'חציית הרוביקון' של שתי המדינות ולכן הצורך לחשוב לטווח הארוך על מערכת יחסים צבאית שתגן על ישראל לאחר תום מלחמת המפרץ.

עם רה"מ יצחק שמיר (8/2)

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בפגישה עם רה"מ חזר לנטוס על מרבית הנקודות שהעלה בפגישתו עם שה"ח לוי. סיפר אודות האירוע בבית הלבן, ביקש שישראל תמשיך לשמור על מדיניות ההבלגה, שהחלטת הקונגרס היתה החלטה 'דה-פקטו' של מלחמה, ועל הרעיון שלו אודות ISRAELI-AMERICAN DEFENCE AGREEMENT. הוא הדגיש שהרעיון הוא פרטי שלו, כיוון שהוא דואג שלכשתסתיים המלחמה, תבקש ערב-הסעודית לרכוש נשק בשווי של 50 מיליארד דולר, אשר ודאי יאושר, ושעל ישראל לקבל משהו בתמורה - כיוון שלא יאשרו 'חבילה דומה' לישראל - כדאי ללכת על הסכם הגנה שיהיה בשווי 300 מיליארד דולר.

בתשובותיו הדגיש רה"מ שארה"ב עושה מאמצים לעזור לישראל אך הם לא מספיקים. גרמניה עושה דברים אך יפן היא קשוחה במיוחד ולכן הצורך בעזרה אמריקאית. ציין שהאמריקאים עושים יותר מידי בעיות בנוגע לערבות ה-400 מיליון דולר, והזכיר שקרט הבטיח לא לקשור תכתיבים וסייגים לסיוע הישראלי.

בנוגע למדיניות ההבלגה אמר רה"מ שהמדיניות היא קשה ושישראל איננה רגילה להיות מוגנת ע"י אחרים ושאחובתנו להגן על עצמנו. לא רוצים לגרום לבעיות אבל אנו חייבים להגן על עצמנו.

בתשובה לרעיון הסכם ההגנה עם ארה"ב, אמר רה"מ, שאין לו התנגדות ושכבר הסכמנו להבנה אסטרטגית, ושאוכלי יכולה להיות הרחבה של השת"פ האסטרטגי.

בהתייחסו להצטרפות רחבעם זאבי לממשלה, אמר רה"מ: 'מה שחשוב זה מי שמחליט. לגנדי לא תהיה אפילו השפעה קטנה ביותר. אמרתי בצורה רשמית, שאנו מתנגדים לדעותיו של השר זאבי ועל רעיונותיו לא נדון בממשלה'. לנטוס סיים באומרו שיעביר את דברי רה"מ לידיעת בוש, ושיפעל בקשר למדיניות יפן כלפי ישראל בוועדה שלו.

עם שר הביטחון משה ארנס (10/2)

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לנטוס העלה שוב את הרעיון של הסכם הגנה עם ארה"ב כפיצוי לבקשות אספקה סעודיות - עתידיות, וכן את הדברים של בוש מהפגישה הפרטית בבית הלבן. לנטוס הדגיש שהוא לא רואה סיכוי להשגת כספים נוספים דרך REGULAR BUDGET אלא, שהסיכוי היחיד למימון הוא דרך ה-SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET ושלא תקבלו מימון נוסף, זה לא יהיה מחוסר מאמץ מצידנו (IT WON'T BE FROM LACK OF TRYING).

השגריר בראון אמר, שהאמריקאים לוחצים על האירופאים כדי שיעשו יותר, ובתגובה לדברי המלך חוסיין אמר, 'הירדנים יקבלו אולי פחות' סיוע בשנה הבאה.

ארנס הדגיש שהמניע להבאת ה'פטריוטים' לארץ, היה הצלחתם בערב הסעודית ושהם לא עושים את העבודה שציפו מהם. בנוגע למימון המאמץ המלחמתי הישראלי אמר, שעד עכשיו עלות הכוננות היא של כמיליארד דולר. ארנס ציין, שישראל יכולה לתרום בצורה רצינית למאמץ המלחמתי האמריקאי ע"י התקפת האויור שממנו משוגרים הטילים לעבר ישראל.

לנטוס סיים את הפגישה באומרו, שהוא מקווה שישראל לא תגיב: 'אני חושב, שלטווח הארוך לא צריכים לעשות דבר'.

פגישות נוספות

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\* ארוחת ערב עם מר עודד ערן (7.2)

\* פגישה עם שלמה להט, ראש עיריית תל-אביב (8.2)  
בפגישה הציע להפגיש בין להט לבין המזכיר קמפ, לכשיגיע להט לארה"ב באפריל, ושישדל את קמפ לסייע בשיפוץ אחד האזורים שנפגעו בת"א.

\* פגישה עם שגריר הונגריה בישראל בביתו ברמת גן (8.2).

\* ארוחת ערב עם מר יוסף למדן, מנהל מצפ"א (8.2).

\* פגישה עם מר שמחה דיניץ בביתו (9.2).

\* ארוחת ערב עם סגן שה"ח מר בנימין נתניהו (9.2).

\* ארוחת בוקר עם מר איתן בנצור, סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"ן (10.2).  
לארוחת הבוקר הצטרף חבר הפרלמנט הבריטי גרוויל ג'נר. הוסכם שיעזרו לו במאמץ לצרף חברי פרלמנט מזרח אירופאיים לאגודה שהוא הקים נגד אנטישמיות. ג'נר גם ביקש עזרה בארה"ב אבל, ההיענות לבקשה היתה מעטה.

\* תידרוך דו'צ עם אל"מ ג'ק נריה (אמ'ן) בקריה ת"א (10.2).

\* פגישה עם ח"כ שמעון פרס (10.2).  
לנטוס שאל אודות הקמת 'ממשלת אחדות'. ח"כ פרס אמר שהוא לא רואה סיכוי לממשלה כזאת. נשאלו שאלות רבות בקשר למצב המדיני בישראל, הסכם עם ירדן, הסכם עם הפלסטינאים ואיך רואה פרס את האזור לאחר המלחמה. פרס ציין, שלאחר המלחמה יקח כשנה לעיצוב העתיד במזה"ת, צריך מו"מ מיידי עם הפלסטינאים - במתכונת שבייקר הציע (אולי כדאי לפסוח על תקופת הבחירות) ושלא צריכים לנטוש את ירדן. כשנשאל בקשר לרעיון לנטוס בנוגע להסכם הגנה, אמר פרס, שהוא לא רואה את ארה"ב חותמת על הסכם הגנה עם ישראל בגבולות הנוכחיים, ושהסכם כזה יבוא רק אחרי נסיגה ישראלית ולא לפני.

# אירועים נוספים =====

\* ארוחת צהרים עם איש המחלקה הכלכלית בשגרירות האמריקאית - ת"א (8.2).

\* סיור במקומות שנפגעו ע"י טילי סקאד בת"א (8.2).  
לסיור נלוו כתבי CNN ועיתונאים וכן גם ד"ר רות וסטהיימר (הסקסולוגית). לנטוס וד"ר רות סיכמו שעם שובם לארה"ב יארגנו ביחד ערב התרמות לאזורים שנפגעו.

\* ראיון טלביזיוני ברשות השידור - ראיון בשידור חי לחדשות באנגלית.  
בראיון הזכיר שוב את רעיונו להסכם הגנה ישראלי-אמריקאי (8.2).

\* ביקור במצדה ובמערות קומרן - היה זה ביקורם הראשון של לנטוס ואשתו באתר (9.2).

\* לנטוס אמר שיפעל אצל אליזבט דול (יו"ר הצל"א האמריקאי), כדי להזיז את העניין של ההכרה בסמל מד"א.

\* ארוחת צהרים אצל משפחת קלוגמן/ראובן - עין כרם (9.2).

\* ביקור במרכז הירושלמי ללימודי המזרח הקרוב בהר-הצופים (אוניברסיטת BRIGHAM YOUNG המורמונית) (9.2).

\* סיור במרכז קליטה מבשרת ציון (10.2).

\* ביקור בבסיס טילי 'פטריוט' (היה גם ביקור עיתונאי וטלביזיוני). בבסיס הבטיח לחיילים האמריקאים, שידאג ששר ההגנה צ'ייני יתן להם תנאי שכר דומים לאלה של הלוחמים בערב-הסעודית (10.2).



\* סיור נוסף, בלווית השגריר בראון, באזורים שנפגעו ברמת גן. מהריסות אחד הבתים הרים בובה שבורה וביקש לקחת אותה איתו, כדי להראות אותה בארה"ב (10.2).

לסיכום, הסיור היה מוצלח ומרגש. הקונגרסמן ואשתו רק חיזקו את הקשר ההדוק שכבר יש להם עם מדינת ישראל.

מירון ראובן - הסברה/מידע

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור, מצפא, רביב, הסברה, ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רס), אמן

סססס