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
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January 18, 1989

BAKER SEES FIVE SIGNIFICANT WORLD CHANGES UNDERWAY

Secretary of State-designate James Baker says the world is undergoing five significant transformations -- a democratic revolution, a spread of free enterprise, a communist world experiment with economic ideas, technological progress in the area of information and communications, and new military trends.

"The only sure guide for such change is the compass of American ideals and values -- freedom, democracy, equal rights, respect for human dignity, fair play -- the principles to which I adhere," Baker told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee January 17.

Asking the panel to confirm his nomination as secretary, Baker said America must be resolved on two issues -- the necessity for leadership to adjust in a world that has outgrown the post World War Two era, and a bipartisanship between the executive branch of government and the Congress in the realm of foreign policy.

Following is the text of Baker's statement of January 17, 1989 to the Foreign Relations Committee. Following the text is a summary of Mr. Baker's answers to questions posed by the Committee"

(begin text)

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee"

It is an honor to appear before you as President-elect Bush's nominee to be secretary of state. I also appreciate your willingness to hold these hearings while we are still in the transition period. Every administration aspires to hit the ground running, instead of just hitting the ground.

This Friday (January 20) a new president will take office. He will govern an America vastly different from the country we knew even as recently as the beginning of this decade. When George Bush first campaigned for the presidency, American institutions and values were being questioned. Over the last eight years, we have reaffirmed them.

As a result, our nation has emerged much stronger both at home and abroad. For this, we owe thanks to Secretary Shultz and above all to



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President Reagan.

The legacy of the Reagan era is a more vibrant America. We have proven that our president can lead, that our government works, that progress can be made. The creativity of the individual and respect for his or her rights -- the touchstones of democracy -- have become once more ideas in the ascendancy.

Some of that vibrancy is reflected in the international developments of our time. Our most powerful foe, the Soviet Union, so aggressive a decade ago, is undergoing an ideological soul-searching of historic proportions. Regional conflicts long thought to be intractable -- in Southwest Asia and Southern Africa, for example -- have begun moving toward resolution with the help of creative American diplomacy. And the international economy, driven by the longest American peacetime economic expansion on record, has provided new hope for progress.

A World in Transition

These developments are symptomatic of the great changes and challenges we face in the decade ahead. Our world is undergoing five significant transformations:

First, the democratic revolution* Many nations in Latin America have recently achieved democracy or are struggling toward it, while in Asia, the Philippines and South Korea have joined the democratic ranks. But many of these new democracies are fragile. Their institutions need time to take root and success is not assured. And, while millions of people elsewhere are demanding free political institutions, we know that the demands for freedom are not always granted peacefully, if at all.

Second, the spread of free enterprise* Free markets and private initiative are the new watchwords of economic development -- because these concepts work in practice. Classic socialism and variants of government-controlled economies have been discredited. The nations of the Pacific Rim in particular have shown that the free enterprise model works astonishingly well for developing countries, not just mature economies. But in many regions, the problems of debt, large trade imbalances, and protectionist pressures overshadow this progress and threaten the future.

Third, change in the communist world* Virtually every communist government is now experimenting with economic ideas once denounced as heretical, including a role for a market economy. But the crisis of the communist systems, even by their own admission, is much broader. Political change, especially the demand for freer institutions, is high on the agenda. Yet it is not clear that reforms will be successful, or that democracy will be the outcome.

Fourth, technological progress* Rapid advances in the technology of information and communications have helped to bring about a global economy, shrinking time and space and transcending the traditional boundaries of the nation-state. It is already clear that in today's global economy, domestic economic policies can no longer be considered independently of their international consequences. But it is not yet certain that we will have the cooperation we need. And trade advantages unfairly pursued could lead to more economic strife and, eventually, to growing protectionism.

Fifth, new military trends* The same technological change affecting the international economy is altering strategic military relationships. Precision guidance enables the conventional weapons of today to destroy targets that, in years past, were assigned primarily to nuclear weapons. Research on the Strategic Defense Initiative is

exploring the potential for altering the future mix of offense and defense. We must continue to assess the impact of these changes on deterrence and arms control.

There is another, more worrisome aspect of the new military trends. A dangerous proliferation of high-technology has begun. Just as we are controlling or eliminating some nuclear weapons, chemical warheads and ballistic missiles have fallen into the hands of governments and groups with proven records of aggression and terrorism.

The Contraries of Our Times and How to Approach Them

These five transformations present us with a series of contraries and paradoxes. We could advance toward an increasingly democratic world, or, if fragile democracies fail, the cause of freedom could be thrown back. The international economy could continue to grow, or the stresses of competition could lead to protectionism and rival trading blocs -- ultimately to the disadvantage of all. A properly conceived approach by the Atlantic Alliance could extend the progress we have made with the Soviet Union. Or through mistakes on either side of the Iron Curtain, this opportunity could be lost. Finally, new military technologies could provide a greater stability at lower levels of forces. Or we could encounter a new and darker age if we cannot halt the spread of weapons that put nations on a hair-trigger, particularly in politically unstable regions.

I am asking you to vote to confirm me as secretary of state. So it is right and proper that I tell you as best I can of my approach to this challenging world, this world of contraries.

During my legal training, I became aware of a set of lectures by Justice Benjamin Cardozo called "The Nature of the Judicial Process." And I recall being struck by his observation that, "There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or not, which gives coherency and direction to thought and action." Some have described my philosophy as "pragmatic." I'd like to say that labels can be misleading -- I am actually a Texas Republican, all of whom are conservative. I will admit to pragmatism, however, if by that you mean being realistic about the world and appreciating the importance of getting things done.

My purpose is not to understand this world in order to accept it, but to understand it in order to change it where necessary -- sometimes by large steps, often of necessity by small steps, yet always pressing forward. And the only sure guide for such change is the compass of American ideals and values -- freedom, democracy, equal rights, respect for human dignity, fair play -- the principles to which I adhere.

I believe in freedom for the individual because it's a God-given right and the source of human creativity. The Founders of our country recognized that such freedom was preserved best by limited government -- the checks and balances system that still provides the framework for our success. Part of that system is a decentralized government, a government close to the people, a government of the people. I would argue, too, that economic freedom, the free market system, is an essential part of the framework. Finally and above all I believe, like Lincoln, that the United States has a special role in this world, a special contribution to make -- as he put it, "the last, best hope of earth."

Leadership and Bipartisanship

My sense of realism, my stream of tendency, tells me that we can

advance toward these ideals, if we are resolved on two issues.

The first is the necessity for American leadership. Some years ago, as secretary of the treasury, I spoke of the leadership "choice" -- but in fact it is no choice at all. As the most powerful democracy, the largest economy, the wealthiest society and the greatest concentration of scientific talents, we are going to substantially affect the future whether we do so consciously or not. We can be a force for freedom and peaceful change unlike any other in this world. But if we fail to do so, we will not be able to run or to hide from the consequences.

U.S. leadership must adjust for a world that has outgrown the post-war era. The United States is simultaneously a tribune for democracy, a catalyst for international cooperation, and a guardian of our national interests. We live in a world of powerful adversaries. We cannot take the survival of democracy for granted or assume that if we do not protect our own interests, someone else or some international organization will act on our behalf. We also live in a world of increasingly influential allies whose cooperation is essential if we are to surmount common problems. There are new, global dangers, such as terrorism, the international narcotics trade and the degradation of the world's environment that cannot be managed by one nation alone, no matter how powerful.

These realities will not permit a blind isolationism or a reckless unilateralism. Only through a realistic approach can we write a new chapter of American leadership for a rapidly changing world.

There is a second issue we must resolve. It concerns the relationship between the executive and the Congress in the realm of foreign policy. Simply put, we must have bipartisanship to succeed. That's the verdict of history and of recent experience.

Bipartisanship does not mean that we must always agree. There are and will always be differences in approach and on substance. Airing those differences in a manner that respects the other person's right to disagree is a strong affirmation of the democratic process. But eventually we must proceed, and when we do it is best that we do so together if we are to achieve the national interest.

On this subject, let me quote Dean Acheson. He was evidently acquainted with some of our Texas customs because he said that there was a rule in the saloons of the Old West "Never shoot the piano player." And he wrote that in foreign policy, the president was the piano player.

Yes, this is an appeal for a kinder, gentler Congress. But bipartisanship is also more than Acheson's "holy water sprinkled on political necessity." It's the lubricant that enables the branches of government to overcome their natural, constitutionally designed friction, a friction that arises from our differing perspectives and our different responsibilities.

As a realist, I know we need bipartisanship to succeed. While the executive is responsible for proposing and executing foreign policy, the legislature supports, modifies, and sometimes vetoes a course of action. Thus, bipartisanship is decided in practice.

So let our recent experience be our teacher. When we held the line together, on Afghanistan, or throughout the INF negotiations, we succeeded. When we did not -- in Central America -- the outcome was unsatisfactory to everyone.

The conclusion is inescapable. In order to succeed, we must work together. And a bipartisan foreign policy is sustained by three

principles"

-- First, trust that we each have the public interest in mind, that we are doing our best to carry out our responsibilities.

-- Second, consultation, that we are trying to communicate, that we are taking off and landing together.

-- Third, consistency, that our decisions and agreements, once arrived at, are in fact decisions and agreements that will be kept.

Senators Danforth and Boren have suggested a new means of consultation -- including periodic meetings of members of Congress with the secretary of State and sometimes the president -- to discuss the larger and longer term issues. As President-elect Bush wrote to Senator Danforth on November 18, 1988, "As soon as my National Security team is in place, I will ask them to meet with you to discuss your excellent suggestions." I look forward to that meeting.

Armed then with the conviction of American leadership and the practice of bipartisanship, let us together -- the executive and the Congress -- tackle the formidable agenda before us.

The International Agenda" The Americas

First on that agenda is our neighborhood -- the countries that border us, the countries of our continent and our hemisphere. The United States is both a continental and a maritime power, which gives us a unique geopolitical perspective. But we are not exempt from the old rule that foreign policy begins at home. It is rooted and must be rooted in our values. And it gathers both strength and vitality from our immediate neighborhood -- how well we do with our friends and neighbors to the North and South.

Recently, working with Canada, we achieved a Free Trade Agreement -- something both nations had sought for a hundred years without success. A lot of ink and some anguish has been spilled over the economic implications of this agreement with respect to certain industries. In my view, the Free Trade Agreement is in our mutual interest. And there are geopolitical implications that go far beyond the economic significance of this achievement.

The U.S.-Canada Agreement represents a signal success in a strategy designed to move all nations toward a more open trading system. It proves that the two largest trading partners in the world can not only eliminate tariff barriers but can also negotiate solutions in such areas as services and investment -- both increasingly transnational in scope -- while still respecting national sovereignty. It shows that an active, internationalist free trade policy can catalyze a bipartisan domestic coalition and turn back the forces of protectionism. So it can be done. And we look forward to working with Canada on other important issues, including international environmental problems, as we extend the range of our new cooperation.

To the South, we have an equally significant set of issues to consider. Our neighbor Mexico is deeply in debt and faces some serious challenges to its social fabric. But Mexico also has many assets -- the capabilities of its people and its significant natural resources. The Mexican government, led by President Salinas, is taking the road of economic and political reform. It is a difficult road and we are determined to help.

It is in our interest to do so. It is time we regarded Mexico with the respect and seriousness it warrants. Whatever the past, we must all be aware that America's relationship with Mexico means a great deal -- it is as important as our relationship with any other country in the world. I am convinced that we can make progress together, working on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

I know President-elect Bush looks forward to early consultations with President Salinas and Prime Minister Mulroney to chart the course ahead.

Another matter on our continental agenda is Central America. We have now had nearly ten years of frustrating and sometimes contradictory American policies toward that region. Some successes have been achieved. Most Central American nations are more democratic and more respectful of human rights than they were. And we must help to defend those achievements from threats against human rights, whether the threats are from the left or the right.

Still, the overwhelming blemish remains* the terrible draining conflict between Nicaragua and her neighbors and between the Nicaraguan Marxists and their own people, some of whom have taken up arms and merited American support.

Starting in 1987, all of the governments of the area stepped back from the brink long enough to agree on a set of principles for peace. The Esquipulas agreement, known as Esquipulas II and authored by President Arias of Costa Rica, expresses well everyone's objectives. It's a good platform for peace. What it lacks is a mechanism for enforcement. That problem emerged clearly in the record of negotiations following the Sapoia Accords between the Sandinistas and the Democratic Resistance. To date, neither democracy, as specified by Esquipulas II, nor the reintegration of the resistance, as pledged in the Sapoia Accords, has materialized.

Clearly, we need a different approach, an approach that must be bipartisan here in Washington if it is to succeed there in the region.

Events have shown that only such bipartisan action influences the Sandinistas.

That is why we must unite on clear goals for Central America -- democratization, development, and security for every state in the region. All of them must be free of the fear of subversive neighbors.

All of them must be able to share in an economic development plan, perhaps assisted by our European and Japanese allies. But none of this can occur unless the promises of democracy and security become reality. We must insist on protection for human rights in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and their neighbors -- applying equal standards fairly to all.

These objectives of American diplomacy carry a great national responsibility. We cannot and we must not abandon the Democratic Resistance. We must stand by them until our mutual goals are achieved.

Finally, I'd like to make a suggestion. In 1992, we will celebrate the 500th anniversary of Columbus's voyage of discovery. I'd like to suggest that today we embark on a voyage of rediscovery -- of the Caribbean and of South America. Our neighbors in this hemisphere are engaged in a quest for greater freedom and economic progress. We share many of their interests. And together we also face the scourge of drugs.

Now is the time to take a fresh look at these problems and to make more of our opportunities to overcome them.

Transformation of our Allies and Friends

Let me move now from our neighborhood to the broader world of our friends and allies. Through commerce, political alliance and defense agreements, the United States links together two highly dynamic, advanced regions -- Western Europe and the nations of the Pacific. We are at once an Atlantic power and a Pacific power and there should not be any thought to expand one relationship at the

expense of the other.

Realism compels us to understand the great changes taking place among our allies and friends in both regions. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the founding of NATO, the most successful alliance in history. But today's Western Europe is not the exhausted Europe recovering from its own devastation, nor is it the single Europe of the political visionaries. A new appreciation is needed on our side and theirs of how we can adapt to changing circumstances as a force for peace.

Certainly, in the first instance, it requires, as President-elect Bush has suggested, a meeting of our minds on how to proceed with a changing Soviet Union. In an era of constrained defense budgets, we require a common approach to the new military facts created by the INF Treaty -- the need to modernize our nuclear and conventional weapons. We need a set of both realistic and prudent standards for conventional arms control. We also need a common approach to the issues of loans and credits -- and trade and technology transfer -- to Moscow and Eastern Europe. Finally, we need to establish a more equitable and creative basis on which to share responsibilities. Our discourse and consultations should be free and frank as befits allies of long standing.

The stakes have not changed. Our commitment to NATO is stronger because we as nations are stronger. As long as Europe remains the most heavily armed continent, where American and Soviet troops face each other on the front lines, the Atlantic Alliance will be our first line of defense.

1989 also marks 32 years since the signing of the Treaty of Rome that gave official birth to the Common Market. And in only three more years, the enlarged Common Market will have achieved the objective of that treaty -- a single market. But will this new Europe -- a rising economic superpower -- be outward looking or inward? Will it be another building bloc in the new edifice of a more open, global trading system or a massive bloc protected against external competition? Will it be a healthy, dynamic economy that produces an abundance of jobs, or a cautious, stagnant region content with persistent unemployment? The correct answers to these contraries will be found, I believe, in a Europe that looks outward, not inward, that promotes structural reform, that breaks down barriers, that offers economic opportunities for all nations, not only for Europe. As an ally and as a major trading partner, the United States will take a keen interest in this transformation.

Turning to the Pacific Rim, we find a striking success already in the making. No area offers comparable achievements in creating advanced economies in record time. This economic progress is anchored in the remarkable partnership, now four decades old, between the United States and Japan. I expect that partnership to strengthen further and expand in scope.

Many have spoken of the Pacific Century and the Pacific Rim as the world of the future. One thing is certain. The world's economic promise to the end of this century depends on how well the United States and its Pacific partners manage their affairs. Our relations with the Pacific -- as our relations with Europe and indeed our own continent -- must emphasize outward-looking economic policies that promote trade and growth. I do not underestimate the challenge in Asia, or in other regions, of achieving free and fair trade, of avoiding all forms of protectionism, including the manipulation of exchange rates. After nearly a decade when the American economy has

driven international growth, we are all facing a changing world. The rule that success brings responsibility will find a fuller expression as the Pacific nations assume more important economic and political roles.

We have vital political and strategic interests in the Pacific as well. These interests are well-served by military capabilities based in Japan, the Philippines and Korea -- and by our close cooperation with these nations. We must enhance that cooperation while shouldering common defense and development responsibilities.

The U.S. relationship with the People's Republic of China, important in its own right, also contributes strongly to the overall stability of the international political order. President-elect Bush's extensive, personal experience in China will facilitate the expansion of our important and multifaceted ties.

Our policy toward the Pacific as a whole must tie together all strands* to assure the region's economic growth, with its global implications, in the context of a secure regional deterrence. I think we are going to see in Asia the necessity for closer coordination with ASEAN and other regional groups -- and perhaps even new institutional arrangements.

As we enter a new era characterized especially by the greater strength of our friends, the challenge of our agenda can be put this way* our mutual success should pave the road toward closer association, not a detour to the dead end of counterproductive rivalry. That's a road we must pave together.

Transnational Issues

The future of our civilization also demands that we act in concert to deal with a new class of problems, transnational in nature.

Terrorism has become a means for small groups, sometimes supported by nations, to attack innocent civilians around the world. The narcotics traffickers have become powerful enough to undermine governments, even as their drugs poison societies. Fanatics spread their messages of intolerance and hate, using mass communications that cut across borders. Every nation also knows now that we face major ecological challenges. The tides and winds can spread environmental damage to continents and hemispheres far removed from the immediate disaster. Scientists have warned us against the possible consequences of a long-term warming trend, the so-called greenhouse effect.

President-elect Bush has called for an international conference on global environmental issues. I believe the United States must lead this effort. We need to help foster a change of attitude, a reconciliation of the transcendent requirements for both economic development and a secure environment. As Treasury secretary, I pressed the multilateral development banks toward consideration of conservationally-sound, sustained development, and helped develop debt-for-charity swaps to aid conservation in developing nations. As secretary of State, I hope to build on this record.

No one has yet perfected the policies of collective action we need to deal with this special range of global problems. But the stakes are too high for us to desist. We will begin with our allies, include our friends, and challenge our adversaries to make common cause in treating these issues.

Realism in U.S.-Soviet Relations

Beyond the Americas, beyond greater partnership with our allies, beyond facing global problems, lies the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Thanks to the policy of peace through strength pursued over the last eight years, our dealings with Moscow have become noticeably less

tense. There has been progress in arms control -- notably the INF Treaty -- human rights, bilateral ties, and regional conflicts. We look forward to the day, coming soon, when all Soviet troops will have left Afghanistan.

Some have suggested that this progress deserves a radically different U.S. policy. Others fear that Mikhail Gorbachev has stolen a march on the democracies through such actions as the unilateral reduction in troops and tanks in Europe. The meaning and permanence of the new Soviet policies are being debated intensely, here and abroad.

There are good reasons for both optimistic and pessimistic views of today's Soviet Union. No one can doubt that there are very real changes. Many were unthinkable just a few years ago. The SS-20s are being destroyed. Soviet troops are leaving Afghanistan. Some political prisoners have been released. American doctors will soon visit psychiatric hospitals where prisoners of conscience have been sent. Soviet history itself is sometimes subject to harsh scrutiny. In other words, the slogans of glasnost and perestroika are being given content.

These are reasons to be hopeful. But realism requires us to be prudent. However fascinating the twists and turns of perestroika may be, and however riveting the details of Soviet decline as reported in Soviet newspapers, the Soviet Union remains a heavily armed superpower. The talk is different but the force structure and policies that support far-reaching interests and clients have not changed commensurately. Many of those policies and those clients are hostile to American values and threaten our interests and our allies. That's a reality.

Still, I would not underestimate the impact of Moscow's domestic troubles on Soviet foreign policy. Marxism-Leninism as a philosophy for a society must be in doubt when the system, after 70 years, produces declining health, shortages of food and consumer goods, and an obsolete industrial base. The political changes now being made are themselves reflective of a continuing paradox. While the purpose of reform is ostensibly to prevent a recurrence of dictatorial abuse, the reform itself depends on the concentration of power in one man's hands.

Meanwhile, the Eastern European countries are in ferment as the ground rules of their own governments and their relations to the USSR are rewritten. And the Baltic States and Armenia have reminded the world of ethnic dilemmas long suppressed by Stalinist methods. These situations too cannot be ignored.

In light of both the change and continuity in the Soviet Union, realistic American policy should be guided by these principles:

First, we should continue to welcome reform and changes in the Soviet Union that promise more freedom at home, in the workplace, or in public institutions. But we should never measure the progress of Mr. Gorbachev's reforms by how many credits, concessions or accommodations we might make ostensibly to help him succeed with his domestic plans. Ultimately, as the Soviets themselves acknowledge, perestroika depends not on help from outside, but on political, bureaucratic, and sociological changes in the Soviet Union.

Second, while recognizing that Moscow's policies are informed by a new sense of realism, we should also understand that our policies have contributed to that sense of realism. Our willingness to support the mujahidin -- not only economic dilemmas in the Soviet Union -- helped bring about the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Our

willingness, with NATO, to deploy the Pershing and cruise missiles -- not only food shortages -- helped bring about the INF Treaty. Where we have not raised the cost of adventure or aggression, we see little evidence of change. Can it be a coincidence that the only regional conflict where we failed to bring consistent, effective pressure -- in Central America -- we see little trace of new thinking in Soviet foreign policy?

Third, we must continue to probe Moscow along every aspect of our agenda -- arms control, human rights, regional conflicts, bilateral relations. We are interested in cooperating and negotiating to make progress wherever it can be made. Arms control should encompass conventional weapons and chemical and ballistic missile proliferation, going beyond expressions of general principles to practical details. And human rights means full compliance with the Helsinki Accords. There can be no relaxation of our standards on this issue.

Fourth, we need additional focus on the regional conflicts, whether in Central America, South Asia, Southern Africa, the Persian Gulf or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Does the Soviet Union truly see a lowering of tension, and negotiations to be in its own interests? We should not allow the rhetoric of restraint to become a substitute for restraint itself nor should we permit interest in diplomatic processes to be sufficient in the absence of a commitment to making actual progress.

Fifth, we may need a new category in our relations, to deal with global problems such as terrorism, drugs and the environment. We ought to find out whether Moscow can be helpful on these issues and if not, why not.

I am convinced that Western strength and Soviet domestic weakness have set the stage for the remarkable realism that has distinguished Mr. Gorbachev's tenure so far. Our task is to arrange affairs so that whatever the outcome of perestroika, a more responsible, constructive Soviet foreign policy will remain in Moscow's interest. We look forward to such a policy not only in dealing with old issues but the newer dangers and flashpoints that concern us. Much of the world's hope for a more peaceful international order rests on the outcome.

Resolving Regional Conflicts

I want to turn now to those very regional conflicts that have denied peace and freedom to the peoples of Southern Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. We have made encouraging progress in the recent agreement, mediated by the United States, that provides for Namibian independence and a withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola. And we will be watching carefully to be sure that Cuba does carry out its obligations. But more is needed. Angola desperately requires national reconciliation. And until that occurs we shall continue to support UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi, as President-elect Bush has indicated. Namibia will be a new and fragile state. In South Africa itself, the stresses and strains that accompany the inevitable end of apartheid will provide a severe test for all involved. We must think long and hard in this country about our role and about the effects of our actions -- not on our own self-esteem but on the people we want to help. Finally, we must also not forget the very real human and developmental needs of the people throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.

In South Asia, we look forward to final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and that country's achievement of independent neutrality with a government fully acceptable to the Afghan people. And as tensions decrease in Afghanistan, we also hope to build on the

more constructive relationship being forged now by the leaders of India and Pakistan. It is essential to improve ties with both Pakistan and India if we are to encourage this process.

All nations in Southeast Asia and the international community as a whole should look forward to the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. There, too, a difficult national reconciliation must be undertaken. The United States will continue to work for a new Cambodia, free of both Vietnamese occupation and the Khmer Rouge.

Turning to the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict has long engaged America's attention, resources, and good will. Our mediation has borne partial fruit in the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, part of the Camp David Accords for a comprehensive settlement. And our policy in the Middle East has been truly bipartisan. Every administration has made its contribution. I was proud to be part of the Reagan team that expanded our relationship with Israel into a true strategic alliance and that also met our responsibilities in the Persian Gulf.

Now, President Reagan has authorized a dialogue with the PLO after Yassir Arafat declared his organization's recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace, supported U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced terrorism. Dialogues bring messages. And we are bringing a message to the PLO about terrorism and about the need for even more realism -- realism that makes practical progress on the ground possible. But the existence of the dialogue should not lead anyone to misunderstand our overall policy, or question our enduring support for the State of Israel.

As President-elect Bush has described it, we have a solid consensus on the objectives and means of making peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. These include the purpose of the negotiations, which is above all a just, enduring peace that ensures Israeli security and satisfies the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. We advocate direct negotiations based on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, which include the exchange of territory for peace. Realistically, Jordan must play a part in any agreement. The Palestinians must participate in the determination of their own future. We continue to believe, however, that an independent Palestinian state will not be a source of stability or contribute to a just and enduring peace. These are sound principles and they should guide us.

Today, the rocks are flying and the blood is flowing -- bad blood -- between the Palestinians and the Israelis in the areas under Israeli military administration. We are determined to build upon the achievements of our predecessors in changing that situation, which must be the foundation of a secure peace. And we look forward to working with all the parties in the area to achieve it.

A Middle East policy focused exclusively on the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, would be too limited. Libya continues to be a destabilizing factor in North Africa and elsewhere in the region. Lebanon remains a rebuke to everyone's hopes for a restoration of stability and independence for that tragic country. A lasting peace remains to be established between Iran and Iraq. Meanwhile, the issues of chemical warfare and ballistic missile proliferation compel our attention.

We are going to be working with other nations to take the initiative on these issues. Surely the tragic experiences, the casualties, the victims of the Iran-Iraq war demand from the world and the region a more civilized order.

We are also going to be working with the United Nations on some

of these regional conflicts. The United Nations should be seen for what it is, an expression of the world's desire for peace but also too often the scene of those passions that prevent peace. Experience indicates that when nations need channels, when nations agree upon procedures, when they agree on much of the substance, the United Nations offers a valuable forum for making progress. We support that and we support the United Nations. Yet in the final analysis, the United Nations can be neither a substitute for American leadership nor an excuse for a failure to try.

Chemical Warfare and Technological Proliferation

The final point I want to discuss today is the proliferation of new and dangerous weapons, often to states with a history of terrorism and aggression. Perhaps the most frightening is the combination of the ballistic missile, against which there is currently no defense, and chemical weapons, outlawed as a crime against civilization. Yet the fact remains that these weapons have been used. The international reaction to such use has not been strong enough or timely enough. Nations are now stockpiling these weapons. And too often those few countries with the technical capacity to make these deadly chemicals have not been careful enough to prevent their proliferation.

Weapons, of course, do not start wars. Conflicts, hatreds, ambitions and sometimes accidents do start wars. Nonetheless, we must take special measures to prevent the accumulation of weapons, which, by their very nature, would create fear and hair-trigger responses. I know this concern to be very much on the mind of President-elect Bush, and we are determined to build on the recently concluded Paris conference and to make progress soon.

Conclusion

Clearly, we face a formidable agenda as we attempt to deal with the contraries of our age. Yet we start with the strong hand of a strong America. And we shall persist because we know that the stakes are very high.

In a few years, we could know whether a lasting constructive relationship with the Soviet Union is possible. Whether the world economy will progress. Whether our allies in Europe and Asia will look outward. Whether we can extend arms control and deterrence. Whether we can deal successfully with global problems like the environment, terrorism, and drugs. Whether we can create the new frameworks for the developing countries to move forward free of the curse of regional conflicts.

For me and for my generation, these are great prospects, but they are even greater for the next generation of Americans. President-elect Bush spoke for us all when he said to a group of students at Westminster College, "We have lived our lives partly in the sunlight but always in the shadow of struggle.... That struggle is not yet over." And then he told these young Americans, "Your generation has an opportunity to emerge from that shadow and finally enjoy the sunlight without fear."

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. I am certain that a realistic American leadership can seize that opportunity and usher in a more peaceful and prosperous era. It is the chance to lift the shadow of struggle and to leave a better world for America that motivates me. That is why I am here today to seek your support. Together, and under the leadership of our president, we can do it."

(end text)

In the afternoon session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Baker answered three hours of questioning on a variety of subjects. Among the points made by Baker were"

-- On Afghanistan, he emphasized that "we fully expect and believe" that Soviet troops will be withdrawn from that nation by February 15. He said that the Bush administration's goals for Afghanistan will be the same as Reagan's. On Afghan self-determination, he said the freedom fighters would not be pressured by the United States to include communists in the new government.

And, he added that "we see no reason to change the (U.S.) policy of continuing to aid the Afghan freedom fighters so long as the Soviets continue to aid the Kabul regime.

-- He could see a role for the Soviet Union in an international conference on peace in the Middle East if Moscow show signs of playing a "responsible role." Such a conference, Baker emphasized, must be "properly structured" and lead to "direct negotiations" among the parties.

He said that signs of a responsible Soviet role could include restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, continued Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union (which has been "doing pretty well") and ending support for countries such as Libya who opposes Middle East peace efforts.

-- In the continuing agricultural export dispute with the Common Market, Baker would like to see a free market with no agriculture subsidies on either side. For political reasons, both sides must end agricultural subsidies at the same time. He would support sanctions against unfair trade practices in "appropriate cases," stressing that he believes not only in "free trade," but also in "fair trade."

-- He said the Bush policy towards Yugoslavia would be "pretty much as it has been." On alleged human rights abuses against the Albanian minority in that country, "we would do what we can diplomatically to change that."

-- On settling the Cyprus issue, Baker said the United States supports the efforts of the United Nations to resolve this dispute. The new administration would like to see it resolved through direct negotiations between the two sides -- Greece and Turkey.

-- While noting the contributions of allies to the NATO effort in such areas as host country support, conscription and use of land for exercises, Baker said that he would "press for greater burden sharing" by the NATO allies.

-- He emphasized that the new administration still recognizes Devalle as the president of Panama. "There will be no lessening or removal of (U.S.) sanctions unless there is movement on the other side" and "no movement towards normalization while General Noriega" is still in power.

-- The United Nations "can be a force for resolving disputes," and he noted the organization is "making progress" in its budget reforms.

-- It is "difficult now to normalize relations" with Cuba, given Castro's continued support to subversion, the human rights abuses in Cuba, and that country's close ties with the Soviet Union, he said.

Responding to a series of questions from Senator Jesse Helms, the committee's ranking Republican, at the end of the afternoon, Baker said to the best of his knowledge, the United States has never asked the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for compensation for the deaths of Americans at the hands of terrorists affiliated with the PLO.

But he pointed out there has been only one meeting between U.S. and PLO representatives since a dialogue was opened in mid-December.

Baker assured Helms the PLO would have to demonstrate by both word and deed that it has renounced terrorism -- a key condition for the U.S. agreeing to open a dialogue with the organization.

"It's going to have to be done in both," he said adding that one of the subjects the United States considers appropriate to discuss with the PLO is that organization's "abstinence from terrorism."

However, Baker stopped short of accepting Helm's contention that the next instance of any act or threat of terrorism by any PLO faction would be reason for terminating talks with the PLO.

"I think we'd have to look at the circumstances, senator," Baker said. "I'm not sure the PLO can, or pretends to be able to, control everything that goes on over there, and for that matter even perhaps some of the dissident factions. I think it's a case of judging their compliance with their renunciation of terrorism in looking at the whole picture and judging it in good faith," he said. "But we certainly expect to see actions and not words."

Responding to questions from Senator Alan Cranston, Baker voiced strong opposition to providing subsidized credits to the Soviet Union.

He noted that the Western allies, at the Toronto economic summit and in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have adopted a policy of permitting and encouraging normal commercial relations. "I don't think that we should engage in a headlong rush to provide subsidized financing, trade credits and the like," Baker added.

Questioned about Panama, Baker said "it's going to be very difficult for us to see any progress toward normalizing relations as long as General Noriega retains power there." But he said the issue of a Panamanian administrator for the Panama Canal should be dealt with when it arises. Under the Panama Canal treaties, Panama is required to submit to the United States this year the name of the Panamanian citizen who will take over as canal administrator in 1990.

"I'm not sure that we can predict today with any degree of certainty what the situation will be there when that nomination comes forward," Baker told Senator Nancy Kassebaum. "I'm not sure that it's in the best interests of the United States to see us move forward down there under the current situation. A fully functioning democracy in Panama is clearly in our best interests as well as in the best interests of Panama. And we do not have a fully functioning democracy in Panama today," he said.

Senator Helms voiced strong support for Jonas Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and sharply questioned Baker about future U.S. support for that organization. President-elect Bush sent Savimbi a letter recently, pledging to continue "effective and appropriate" U.S. assistance.

Baker said the incoming administration has not yet "firmed up the details" of an international conference to deal with environmental problems, which had been a campaign commitment of Vice President Bush.

He said he did not yet know when or where the conference would be held or what would be on its agenda.

On other issues, the secretary-designate

-- said he would "press very diligently" to win Congressional approval of a 481 million dollar aid package for the Philippines the United States has pledged in return for the use of the Subic Bay and Clark Air Base facilities. He said Philippine officials would "find it exceedingly difficult to understand if we're not able to fulfill that kind of a commitment after using our best efforts when our level of assistance to the Philippines in recent years has been running at

about 415 million dollars, so it's not that much of an increase."


-- characterized the Latin American debt crisis as "a very important geopolitical problem in addition to being a very important economic and financial problem." He said finding a way to alleviate the problem must be based on the principle of economic growth, which in turn depends on the countries involved adopting free market economic policies and being able to find capital to fund their growth enhancing efforts. He emphasized that dealing with the debt problems of the developing world must not be put "on the backs of the taxpayers." He also warned Congress "cannot legislate a cure."

-- noted that the debt of many African nations is an "entirely different situation" because up to 70 percent of African debt is owed to official and multilateral creditors, which "opens itself up to a magic bullet cure." He noted that last year's economic summit in Toronto favored extending debt maturities well into the future, which provides a cash flow benefit to the countries involved but does not write the debt off the books. Baker said he anticipates further moves in that direction at the Paris summit in July and said he supports U.S. participation in it "recognizing the serious budget constraints that are involved."

-- said he does not anticipate any change in U.S. support for the so-called Front Line states in southern Africa. Baker said while the insurgency in Mozambique is not as active and effective as it once was, that country remains in "rather sad shape." But he said what ultimately happens there is going to "depend on the resolve of the Mozambican people and their government. I think what's happened recently is encouraging."

-- declared that "the core problem of apartheid persists" in South Africa, and added, "I really don't see the possibility for the United States normalizing relations with South Africa without there being real progress toward dismantling that system." He said U.S. sanctions have "amplified that message," but he pointed out that "the sanctions we've imposed haven't produced the desired result. And by themselves, they probably cannot produce the desired result." Indeed, repression has intensified, and the United States needs to review its policy toward South Africa, he said, adding "it's an extraordinarily difficult problem and it's one that's going to clearly occupy our time and attention."

-- emphasized the incoming administration's fundamental objectives in El Salvador will be to support the democratic political process and to promote the observance of human rights. While there has been a recent increase in politically motivated violence, he pointed out that Vice President Bush clearly expressed his firm opposition to right-wing death squads during a 1983 visit to San Salvador and said Bush may warn that a resurgence of death squad activity could imperil U.S. assistance. Baker also noted that despite guerrilla efforts, the democratic political process has become established in El Salvador, with five "free, honest elections" having been held since 1982 and with another election scheduled in March. "You should not worry about the new administration going soft on human rights in El Salvador, because that is simply not going to happen," he added.



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official text

January 18, 1989

BAKER SEES FIVE SIGNIFICANT WORLD CHANGES UNDERWAY

Secretary of State-designate James Baker says the world is undergoing five significant transformations: a democratic revolution, a spread of free enterprise, a communist world experiment with economic ideas, technological progress in the area of information and communications, and new military trends.

"The only sure guide for such change is the compass of American ideals and values -- freedom, democracy, equal rights, respect for human dignity, fair play -- the principles to which I adhere," Baker told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee January 17.

Asking the panel to confirm his nomination as secretary, Baker said America must be resolved on two issues -- the necessity for leadership to adjust in a world that has outgrown the post World War Two era, and a bipartisanship between the executive branch of government and the Congress in the realm of foreign policy.

Following is the text of Baker's statement of January 17, 1989 to the Foreign Relations Committee. Following the text is a summary of Mr. Baker's answers to questions posed by the Committee"

(begin text)

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee"

It is an honor to appear before you as President-elect Bush's nominee to be secretary of state. I also appreciate your willingness to hold these hearings while we are still in the transition period. Every administration aspires to hit the ground running, instead of just hitting the ground.

This Friday (January 20) a new president will take office. He will govern an America vastly different from the country we knew even as recently as the beginning of this decade. When George Bush first campaigned for the presidency, American institutions and values were being questioned. Over the last eight years, we have reaffirmed them.

As a result, our nation has emerged much stronger both at home and abroad. For this, we owe thanks to Secretary Shultz and above all to



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President Reagan.

The legacy of the Reagan era is a more vibrant America. We have proven that our president can lead, that our government works, that progress can be made. The creativity of the individual and respect for his or her rights -- the touchstones of democracy -- have become once more ideas in the ascendancy.

Some of that vibrancy is reflected in the international developments of our time. Our most powerful foe, the Soviet Union, so aggressive a decade ago, is undergoing an ideological soul-searching of historic proportions. Regional conflicts long thought to be intractable -- in Southwest Asia and Southern Africa, for example -- have begun moving toward resolution with the help of creative American diplomacy. And the international economy, driven by the longest American peacetime economic expansion on record, has provided new hope for progress.

A World in Transition

These developments are symptomatic of the great changes and challenges we face in the decade ahead. Our world is undergoing five significant transformations*

First, the democratic revolution* Many nations in Latin America have recently achieved democracy or are struggling toward it, while in Asia, the Philippines and South Korea have joined the democratic ranks. But many of these new democracies are fragile. Their institutions need time to take root and success is not assured. And, while millions of people elsewhere are demanding free political institutions, we know that the demands for freedom are not always granted peacefully, if at all.

Second, the spread of free enterprise* Free markets and private initiative are the new watchwords of economic development -- because these concepts work in practice. Classic socialism and variants of government-controlled economies have been discredited. The nations of the Pacific Rim in particular have shown that the free enterprise model works astonishingly well for developing countries, not just mature economies. But in many regions, the problems of debt, large trade imbalances, and protectionist pressures overshadow this progress and threaten the future.

Third, change in the communist world* Virtually every communist government is now experimenting with economic ideas once denounced as heretical, including a role for a market economy. But the crisis of the communist systems, even by their own admission, is much broader. Political change, especially the demand for freer institutions, is high on the agenda. Yet it is not clear that reforms will be successful, or that democracy will be the outcome.

Fourth, technological progress* Rapid advances in the technology of information and communications have helped to bring about a global economy, shrinking time and space and transcending the traditional boundaries of the nation-state. It is already clear that in today's global economy, domestic economic policies can no longer be considered independently of their international consequences. But it is not yet certain that we will have the cooperation we need. And trade advantages unfairly pursued could lead to more economic strife and, eventually, to growing protectionism.

Fifth, new military trends* The same technological change affecting the international economy is altering strategic military relationships. Precision guidance enables the conventional weapons of today to destroy targets that, in years past, were assigned primarily to nuclear weapons. Research on the Strategic Defense Initiative is

exploring the potential for altering the future mix of offense and defense. We must continue to assess the impact of these changes on deterrence and arms control.

There is another, more worrisome aspect of the new military trends. A dangerous proliferation of high-technology has begun. Just as we are controlling or eliminating some nuclear weapons, chemical warheads and ballistic missiles have fallen into the hands of governments and groups with proven records of aggression and terrorism.

The Contraries of Our Times and How to Approach Them

These five transformations present us with a series of contraries and paradoxes. We could advance toward an increasingly democratic world, or, if fragile democracies fail, the cause of freedom could be thrown back. The international economy could continue to grow, or the stresses of competition could lead to protectionism and rival trading blocs -- ultimately to the disadvantage of all. A properly conceived approach by the Atlantic Alliance could extend the progress we have made with the Soviet Union.

Or through mistakes on either side of the Iron Curtain, this opportunity could be lost. Finally, new military technologies could provide a greater stability at lower levels of forces. Or we could encounter a new and darker age if we cannot halt the spread of weapons that put nations on a hair-trigger, particularly in politically unstable regions.

I am asking you to vote to confirm me as secretary of state. So it is right and proper that I tell you as best I can of my approach to this challenging world, this world of contraries.

During my legal training, I became aware of a set of lectures by Justice Benjamin Cardozo called "The Nature of the Judicial Process." And I recall being struck by his observation that, "There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or not, which gives coherency and direction to thought and action." Some have described my philosophy as "pragmatic." I'd like to say that labels can be misleading -- I am actually a Texas Republican, all of whom are conservative. I will admit to pragmatism, however, if by that you mean being realistic about the world and appreciating the importance of getting things done.

My purpose is not to understand this world in order to accept it, but to understand it in order to change it where necessary -- sometimes by large steps, often of necessity by small steps, yet always pressing forward. And the only sure guide for such change is the compass of American ideals and values -- freedom, democracy, equal rights, respect for human dignity, fair play -- the principles to which I adhere.

I believe in freedom for the individual because it's a God-given right and the source of human creativity. The Founders of our country recognized that such freedom was preserved best by limited government -- the checks and balances system that still provides the framework for our success. Part of that system is a decentralized government, a government close to the people, a government of the people. I would argue, too, that economic freedom, the free market system, is an essential part of the framework. Finally and above all I believe, like Lincoln, that the United States has a special role in this world, a special contribution to make -- as he put it, "the last, best hope of earth."

Leadership and Bipartisanship

My sense of realism, my stream of tendency, tells me that we can

advance toward these ideals, if we are resolved on two issues.

The first is the necessity for American leadership. Some years ago, as secretary of the treasury, I spoke of the leadership "choice" -- but in fact it is no choice at all. As the most powerful democracy, the largest economy, the wealthiest society and the greatest concentration of scientific talents, we are going to substantially affect the future whether we do so consciously or not. We can be a force for freedom and peaceful change unlike any other in this world. But if we fail to do so, we will not be able to run or to hide from the consequences.

U.S. leadership must adjust for a world that has outgrown the post-war era. The United States is simultaneously a tribune for democracy, a catalyst for international cooperation, and a guardian of our national interests. We live in a world of powerful adversaries. We cannot take the survival of democracy for granted or assume that if we do not protect our own interests, someone else or some international organization will act on our behalf. We also live in a world of increasingly influential allies whose cooperation is essential if we are to surmount common problems. There are new, global dangers, such as terrorism, the international narcotics trade and the degradation of the world's environment that cannot be managed by one nation alone, no matter how powerful.

These realities will not permit a blind isolationism or a reckless unilateralism. Only through a realistic approach can we write a new chapter of American leadership for a rapidly changing world.

There is a second issue we must resolve. It concerns the relationship between the executive and the Congress in the realm of foreign policy. Simply put, we must have bipartisanship to succeed. That's the verdict of history and of recent experience.

Bipartisanship does not mean that we must always agree. There are and will always be differences in approach and on substance. Airing those differences in a manner that respects the other person's right to disagree is a strong affirmation of the democratic process. But eventually we must proceed, and when we do it is best that we do so together if we are to achieve the national interest.

On this subject, let me quote Dean Acheson. He was evidently acquainted with some of our Texas customs because he said that there was a rule in the saloons of the Old West "Never shoot the piano player." And he wrote that in foreign policy, the president was the piano player.

Yes, this is an appeal for a kinder, gentler Congress. But bipartisanship is also more than Acheson's "holy water sprinkled on political necessity." It's the lubricant that enables the branches of government to overcome their natural, constitutionally designed friction, a friction that arises from our differing perspectives and our different responsibilities.

As a realist, I know we need bipartisanship to succeed. While the executive is responsible for proposing and executing foreign policy, the legislature supports, modifies, and sometimes vetoes a course of action. Thus, bipartisanship is decided in practice.

So let our recent experience be our teacher. When we held the line together, on Afghanistan, or throughout the INF negotiations, we succeeded. When we did not -- in Central America -- the outcome was unsatisfactory to everyone.

The conclusion is inescapable. In order to succeed, we must work together. And a bipartisan foreign policy is sustained by three

principles"

-- First, trust that we each have the public interest in mind, that we are doing our best to carry out our responsibilities.

-- Second, consultation, that we are trying to communicate, that we are taking off and landing together.

-- Third, consistency, that our decisions and agreements, once arrived at, are in fact decisions and agreements that will be kept.

Senators Danforth and Boren have suggested a new means of consultation -- including periodic meetings of members of Congress with the secretary of State and sometimes the president -- to discuss the larger and longer term issues. As President-elect Bush wrote to Senator Danforth on November 18, 1988, "As soon as my National Security team is in place, I will ask them to meet with you to discuss your excellent suggestions." I look forward to that meeting.

Armed then with the conviction of American leadership and the practice of bipartisanship, let us together -- the executive and the Congress -- tackle the formidable agenda before us.

The International Agenda" The Americas

First on that agenda is our neighborhood -- the countries that border us, the countries of our continent and our hemisphere. The United States is both a continental and a maritime power, which gives us a unique geopolitical perspective. But we are not exempt from the old rule that foreign policy begins at home. It is rooted and must be rooted in our values. And it gathers both strength and vitality from our immediate neighborhood -- how well we do with our friends and neighbors to the North and South.

Recently, working with Canada, we achieved a Free Trade Agreement -- something both nations had sought for a hundred years without success. A lot of ink and some anguish has been spilled over the economic implications of this agreement with respect to certain industries. In my view, the Free Trade Agreement is in our mutual interest. And there are geopolitical implications that go far beyond the economic significance of this achievement.

The U.S.-Canada Agreement represents a signal success in a strategy designed to move all nations toward a more open trading system. It proves that the two largest trading partners in the world can not only eliminate tariff barriers but can also negotiate solutions in such areas as services and investment -- both increasingly transnational in scope -- while still respecting national sovereignty. It shows that an active, internationalist free trade policy can catalyze a bipartisan domestic coalition and turn back the forces of protectionism. So it can be done. And we look forward to working with Canada on other important issues, including international environmental problems, as we extend the range of our new cooperation.

To the South, we have an equally significant set of issues to consider. Our neighbor Mexico is deeply in debt and faces some serious challenges to its social fabric. But Mexico also has many assets -- the capabilities of its people and its significant natural resources. The Mexican government, led by President Salinas, is taking the road of economic and political reform. It is a difficult road and we are determined to help.

It is in our interest to do so. It is time we regarded Mexico with the respect and seriousness it warrants. Whatever the past, we must all be aware that America's relationship with Mexico means a great deal. It is as important as our relationship with any other country in the world. I am convinced that we can make progress together, working on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

I know President-elect Bush looks forward to early consultations with President Salinas and Prime Minister Mulroney to chart the course ahead.

Another matter on our continental agenda is Central America. We have now had nearly ten years of frustrating and sometimes contradictory American policies toward that region. Some successes have been achieved. Most Central American nations are more democratic and more respectful of human rights than they were. And we must help to defend those achievements from threats against human rights, whether the threats are from the left or the right.

Still, the overwhelming blemish remains* the terrible draining conflict between Nicaragua and her neighbors and between the Nicaraguan Marxists and their own people, some of whom have taken up arms and merited American support.

Starting in 1987, all of the governments of the area stepped back from the brink long enough to agree on a set of principles for peace. The Esquipulas agreement, known as Esquipulas II and authored by President Arias of Costa Rica, expresses well everyone's objectives. It's a good platform for peace. What it lacks is a mechanism for enforcement. That problem emerged clearly in the record of negotiations following the Sapoa Accords between the Sandinistas and the Democratic Resistance. To date, neither democracy, as specified by Esquipulas II, nor the reintegration of the resistance, as pledged in the Sapoa Accords, has materialized.

Clearly, we need a different approach, an approach that must be bipartisan here in Washington if it is to succeed there in the region.

Events have shown that only such bipartisan action influences the Sandinistas.

That is why we must unite on clear goals for Central America -- democratization, development, and security for every state in the region. All of them must be free of the fear of subversive neighbors.

All of them must be able to share in an economic development plan, perhaps assisted by our European and Japanese allies. But none of this can occur unless the promises of democracy and security become reality. We must insist on protection for human rights in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and their neighbors -- applying equal standards fairly to all.

These objectives of American diplomacy carry a great national responsibility. We cannot and we must not abandon the Democratic Resistance. We must stand by them until our mutual goals are achieved.

Finally, I'd like to make a suggestion. In 1992, we will celebrate the 500th anniversary of Columbus's voyage of discovery. I'd like to suggest that today we embark on a voyage of rediscovery -- of the Caribbean and of South America. Our neighbors in this hemisphere are engaged in a quest for greater freedom and economic progress. We share many of their interests. And together we also face the scourge of drugs.

Now is the time to take a fresh look at these problems and to make more of our opportunities to overcome them.

Transformation of our Allies and Friends

Let me move now from our neighborhood to the broader world of our friends and allies. Through commerce, political alliance and defense agreements, the United States links together two highly dynamic, advanced regions -- Western Europe and the nations of the Pacific. We are at once an Atlantic power and a Pacific power and there should not be any thought to expand one relationship at the

expense of the other.

Realism compels us to understand the great changes taking place among our allies and friends in both regions. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the founding of NATO, the most successful alliance in history. But today's Western Europe is not the exhausted Europe recovering from its own devastation, nor is it the single Europe of the political visionaries. A new appreciation is needed on our side and theirs of how we can adapt to changing circumstances as a force for peace.

Certainly, in the first instance, it requires, as President-elect Bush has suggested, a meeting of our minds on how to proceed with a changing Soviet Union. In an era of constrained defense budgets, we require a common approach to the new military facts created by the INF Treaty -- the need to modernize our nuclear and conventional weapons. We need a set of both realistic and prudent standards for conventional arms control. We also need a common approach to the issues of loans and credits -- and trade and technology transfer -- to Moscow and Eastern Europe. Finally, we need to establish a more equitable and creative basis on which to share responsibilities. Our discourse and consultations should be free and frank as befits allies of long standing.

The stakes have not changed. Our commitment to NATO is stronger because we as nations are stronger. As long as Europe remains the most heavily armed continent, where American and Soviet troops face each other on the front lines, the Atlantic Alliance will be our first line of defense.

1989 also marks 32 years since the signing of the Treaty of Rome that gave official birth to the Common Market. And in only three more years, the enlarged Common Market will have achieved the objective of that treaty -- a single market. But will this new Europe -- a rising economic superpower -- be outward looking or inward? Will it be another building bloc in the new edifice of a more open, global trading system or a massive bloc protected against external competition? Will it be a healthy, dynamic economy that produces an abundance of jobs, or a cautious, stagnant region content with persistent unemployment? The correct answers to these contraries will be found, I believe, in a Europe that looks outward, not inward, that promotes structural reform, that breaks down barriers, that offers economic opportunities for all nations, not only for Europe. As an ally and as a major trading partner, the United States will take a keen interest in this transformation.

Turning to the Pacific Rim, we find a striking success already in the making. No area offers comparable achievements in creating advanced economies in record time. This economic progress is anchored in the remarkable partnership, now four decades old, between the United States and Japan. I expect that partnership to strengthen further and expand in scope.

Many have spoken of the Pacific Century and the Pacific Rim as the world of the future. One thing is certain. The world's economic promise to the end of this century depends on how well the United States and its Pacific partners manage their affairs. Our relations with the Pacific -- as our relations with Europe and indeed our own continent -- must emphasize outward-looking economic policies that promote trade and growth. I do not underestimate the challenge in Asia, or in other regions, of achieving free and fair trade, of avoiding all forms of protectionism, including the manipulation of exchange rates. After nearly a decade when the American economy has

driven international growth, we are all facing a changing world. The rule that success brings responsibility will find a fuller expression as the Pacific nations assume more important economic and political roles.

We have vital political and strategic interests in the Pacific as well. These interests are well-served by military capabilities based in Japan, the Philippines and Korea -- and by our close cooperation with these nations. We must enhance that cooperation while shouldering common defense and development responsibilities.

The U.S. relationship with the People's Republic of China, important in its own right, also contributes strongly to the overall stability of the international political order. President-elect Bush's extensive, personal experience in China will facilitate the expansion of our important and multifaceted ties.

Our policy toward the Pacific as a whole must tie together all strands* to assure the region's economic growth, with its global implications, in the context of a secure regional deterrence. I think we are going to see in Asia the necessity for closer coordination with ASEAN and other regional groups -- and perhaps even new institutional arrangements.

As we enter a new era characterized especially by the greater strength of our friends, the challenge of our agenda can be put this way* our mutual success should pave the road toward closer association, not a detour to the dead end of counterproductive rivalry. That's a road we must pave together.

Transnational Issues

The future of our civilization also demands that we act in concert to deal with a new class of problems, transnational in nature.

Terrorism has become a means for small groups, sometimes supported by nations, to attack innocent civilians around the world. The narcotics traffickers have become powerful enough to undermine governments, even as their drugs poison societies. Fanatics spread their messages of intolerance and hate, using mass communications that cut across borders. Every nation also knows now that we face major ecological challenges. The tides and winds can spread environmental damage to continents and hemispheres far removed from the immediate disaster. Scientists have warned us against the possible consequences of a long-term warming trend, the so-called greenhouse effect.

President-elect Bush has called for an international conference on global environmental issues. I believe the United States must lead this effort. We need to help foster a change of attitude, a reconciliation of the transcendent requirements for both economic development and a secure environment. As Treasury secretary, I pressed the multilateral development banks toward consideration of conservationally-sound, sustained development, and helped develop debt-for-charity swaps to aid conservation in developing nations. As secretary of State, I hope to build on this record.

No one has yet perfected the policies of collective action we need to deal with this special range of global problems. But the stakes are too high for us to desist. We will begin with our allies, include our friends, and challenge our adversaries to make common cause in treating these issues.

Realism in U.S.-Soviet Relations

Beyond the Americas, beyond greater partnership with our allies, beyond facing global problems, lies the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Thanks to the policy of peace through strength pursued over the last eight years, our dealings with Moscow have become noticeably less

tense. There has been progress in arms control -- notably the INF Treaty -- human rights, bilateral ties, and regional conflicts. We look forward to the day, coming soon, when all Soviet troops will have left Afghanistan.

Some have suggested that this progress deserves a radically different U.S. policy. Others fear that Mikhail Gorbachev has stolen a march on the democracies through such actions as the unilateral reduction in troops and tanks in Europe. The meaning and permanence of the new Soviet policies are being debated intensely, here and abroad.

There are good reasons for both optimistic and pessimistic views of today's Soviet Union. No one can doubt that there are very real changes. Many were unthinkable just a few years ago. The SS-20s are being destroyed. Soviet troops are leaving Afghanistan. Some political prisoners have been released. American doctors will soon visit psychiatric hospitals where prisoners of conscience have been sent. Soviet history itself is sometimes subject to harsh scrutiny. In other words, the slogans of glasnost and perestroika are being given content.

These are reasons to be hopeful. But realism requires us to be prudent. However fascinating the twists and turns of perestroika may be, and however riveting the details of Soviet decline as reported in Soviet newspapers, the Soviet Union remains a heavily armed superpower. The talk is different but the force structure and policies that support far-reaching interests and clients have not changed commensurately. Many of those policies and those clients are hostile to American values and threaten our interests and our allies. That's a reality.

Still, I would not underestimate the impact of Moscow's domestic troubles on Soviet foreign policy. Marxism-Leninism as a philosophy for a society must be in doubt when the system, after 70 years, produces declining health, shortages of food and consumer goods, and an obsolete industrial base. The political changes now being made are themselves reflective of a continuing paradox. While the purpose of reform is ostensibly to prevent a recurrence of dictatorial abuse, the reform itself depends on the concentration of power in one man's hands.

Meanwhile, the Eastern European countries are in ferment as the ground rules of their own governments and their relations to the USSR are rewritten. And the Baltic States and Armenia have reminded the world of ethnic dilemmas long suppressed by Stalinist methods. These situations too cannot be ignored.

In light of both the change and continuity in the Soviet Union, realistic American policy should be guided by these principles:

First, we should continue to welcome reform and changes in the Soviet Union that promise more freedom at home, in the workplace, or in public institutions. But we should never measure the progress of Mr. Gorbachev's reforms by how many credits, concessions or accommodations we might make ostensibly to help him succeed with his domestic plans. Ultimately, as the Soviets themselves acknowledge, perestroika depends not on help from outside, but on political, bureaucratic, and sociological changes in the Soviet Union.

Second, while recognizing that Moscow's policies are informed by a new sense of realism, we should also understand that our policies have contributed to that sense of realism. Our willingness to support the mujahidin -- not only economic dilemmas in the Soviet Union -- helped bring about the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Our

willingness, with NATO, to deploy the Pershing and cruise missiles -- not only food shortages -- helped bring about the INF Treaty. Where we have not raised the cost of adventure or aggression, we see little evidence of change. Can it be a coincidence that the only regional conflict where we failed to bring consistent, effective pressure -- in Central America -- we see little trace of new thinking in Soviet foreign policy?

Third, we must continue to probe Moscow along every aspect of our agenda -- arms control, human rights, regional conflicts, bilateral relations. We are interested in cooperating and negotiating to make progress wherever it can be made. Arms control should encompass conventional weapons and chemical and ballistic missile proliferation, going beyond expressions of general principles to practical details. And human rights means full compliance with the Helsinki Accords. There can be no relaxation of our standards on this issue.

Fourth, we need additional focus on the regional conflicts, whether in Central America, South Asia, Southern Africa, the Persian Gulf or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Does the Soviet Union truly see a lowering of tension, and negotiations to be in its own interests? We should not allow the rhetoric of restraint to become a substitute for restraint itself nor should we permit interest in diplomatic processes to be sufficient in the absence of a commitment to making actual progress.

Fifth, we may need a new category in our relations, to deal with global problems such as terrorism, drugs and the environment. We ought to find out whether Moscow can be helpful on these issues and if not, why not.

I am convinced that Western strength and Soviet domestic weakness have set the stage for the remarkable realism that has distinguished Mr. Gorbachev's tenure so far. Our task is to arrange affairs so that whatever the outcome of perestroika, a more responsible, constructive Soviet foreign policy will remain in Moscow's interest. We look forward to such a policy not only in dealing with old issues but the newer dangers and flashpoints that concern us. Much of the world's hope for a more peaceful international order rests on the outcome.

Resolving Regional Conflicts

I want to turn now to those very regional conflicts that have denied peace and freedom to the peoples of Southern Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. We have made encouraging progress in the recent agreement, mediated by the United States, that provides for Namibian independence and a withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola. And we will be watching carefully to be sure that Cuba does carry out its obligations. But more is needed. Angola desperately requires national reconciliation. And until that occurs we shall continue to support UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi, as President-elect Bush has indicated. Namibia will be a new and fragile state. In South Africa itself, the stresses and strains that accompany the inevitable end of apartheid will provide a severe test for all involved. We must think long and hard in this country about our role and about the effects of our actions -- not on our own self-esteem but on the people we want to help. Finally, we must also not forget the very real human and developmental needs of the people throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.

In South Asia, we look forward to final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and that country's achievement of independent neutrality with a government fully acceptable to the Afghan people. And as tensions decrease in Afghanistan, we also hope to build on the

more constructive relationship being forged now by the leaders of India and Pakistan. It is essential to improve ties with both Pakistan and India if we are to encourage this process.

All nations in Southeast Asia and the international community as a whole should look forward to the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. There, too, a difficult national reconciliation must be undertaken. The United States will continue to work for a new Cambodia, free of both Vietnamese occupation and the Khmer Rouge.

Turning to the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict has long engaged America's attention, resources, and good will. Our mediation has borne partial fruit in the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, part of the Camp David Accords for a comprehensive settlement. And our policy in the Middle East has been truly bipartisan. Every administration has made its contribution. I was proud to be part of the Reagan team that expanded our relationship with Israel into a true strategic alliance and that also met our responsibilities in the Persian Gulf.

Now, President Reagan has authorized a dialogue with the PLO after Yassir Arafat declared his organization's recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace, supported U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced terrorism. Dialogues bring messages. And we are bringing a message to the PLO about terrorism and about the need for even more realism -- realism that makes practical progress on the ground possible. But the existence of the dialogue should not lead anyone to misunderstand our overall policy, or question our enduring support for the State of Israel.

As President-elect Bush has described it, we have a solid consensus on the objectives and means of making peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. These include the purpose of the negotiations, which is above all a just, enduring peace that ensures Israeli security and satisfies the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. We advocate direct negotiations based on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, which include the exchange of territory for peace. Realistically, Jordan must play a part in any agreement. The Palestinians must participate in the determination of their own future. We continue to believe, however, that an independent Palestinian state will not be a source of stability or contribute to a just and enduring peace. These are sound principles and they should guide us.

Today, the rocks are flying and the blood is flowing -- bad blood -- between the Palestinians and the Israelis in the areas under Israeli military administration. We are determined to build upon the achievements of our predecessors in changing that situation, which must be the foundation of a secure peace. And we look forward to working with all the parties in the area to achieve it.

A Middle East policy focused exclusively on the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, would be too limited. Libya continues to be a destabilizing factor in North Africa and elsewhere in the region. Lebanon remains a rebuke to everyone's hopes for a restoration of stability and independence for that tragic country. A lasting peace remains to be established between Iran and Iraq. Meanwhile, the issues of chemical warfare and ballistic missile proliferation compel our attention.

We are going to be working with other nations to take the initiative on these issues. Surely the tragic experiences, the casualties, the victims of the Iran-Iraq war demand from the world and the region a more civilized order.

We are also going to be working with the United Nations on some

of these regional conflicts. The United Nations should be seen for what it is, an expression of the world's desire for peace but also too often the scene of those passions that prevent peace. Experience indicates that when nations need channels, when nations agree upon procedures, when they agree on much of the substance, the United Nations offers a valuable forum for making progress. We support that and we support the United Nations. Yet in the final analysis, the United Nations can be neither a substitute for American leadership nor an excuse for a failure to try.

Chemical Warfare and Technological Proliferation

The final point I want to discuss today is the proliferation of new and dangerous weapons, often to states with a history of terrorism and aggression. Perhaps the most frightening is the combination of the ballistic missile, against which there is currently no defense, and chemical weapons, outlawed as a crime against civilization. Yet the fact remains that these weapons have been used. The international reaction to such use has not been strong enough or timely enough. Nations are now stockpiling these weapons. And too often those few countries with the technical capacity to make these deadly chemicals have not been careful enough to prevent their proliferation.

Weapons, of course, do not start wars. Conflicts, hatreds, ambitions and sometimes accidents do start wars. Nonetheless, we must take special measures to prevent the accumulation of weapons, which, by their very nature, would create fear and hair-trigger responses. I know this concern to be very much on the mind of President-elect Bush, and we are determined to build on the recently concluded Paris conference and to make progress soon.

Conclusion

Clearly, we face a formidable agenda as we attempt to deal with the contraries of our age. Yet we start with the strong hand of a strong America. And we shall persist because we know that the stakes are very high.

In a few years, we could know whether a lasting constructive relationship with the Soviet Union is possible. Whether the world economy will progress. Whether our allies in Europe and Asia will look outward. Whether we can extend arms control and deterrence. Whether we can deal successfully with global problems like the environment, terrorism, and drugs. Whether we can create the new frameworks for the developing countries to move forward free of the curse of regional conflicts.

For me and for my generation, these are great prospects, but they are even greater for the next generation of Americans.

President-elect Bush spoke for us all when he said to a group of students at Westminster College, "We have lived our lives partly in the sunlight but always in the shadow of struggle.... That struggle is not yet over." And then he told these young Americans, "Your generation has an opportunity to emerge from that shadow and finally enjoy the sunlight without fear."

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. I am certain that a realistic American leadership can seize that opportunity and usher in a more peaceful and prosperous era. It is the chance to lift the shadow of struggle and to leave a better world for America that motivates me. That is why I am here today to seek your support. Together, and under the leadership of our president, we can do it."

(end text)

In the afternoon session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Baker answered three hours of questioning on a variety of subjects. Among the points made by Baker were"

-- On Afghanistan, he emphasized that "we fully expect and believe" that Soviet troops will be withdrawn from that nation by February 15. He said that the Bush administration's goals for Afghanistan will be the same as Reagan's. On Afghan self-determination, he said the freedom fighters would not be pressured by the United States to include communists in the new government.

And, he added that "we see no reason to change the (U.S.) policy of continuing to aid the Afghan freedom fighters so long as the Soviets continue to aid the Kabul regime.

-- He could see a role for the Soviet Union in an international conference on peace in the Middle East if Moscow show signs of playing a "responsible role." Such a conference, Baker emphasized, must be "properly structured" and lead to "direct negotiations" among the parties.

He said that signs of a responsible Soviet role could include restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, continued Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union (which has been "doing pretty well") and ending support for countries such as Libya who opposes Middle East peace efforts.

-- In the continuing agricultural export dispute with the Common Market, Baker would like to see a free market with no agriculture subsidies on either side. For political reasons, both sides must end agricultural subsidies at the same time. He would support sanctions against unfair trade practices in "appropriate cases," stressing that he believes not only in "free trade," but also in "fair trade."

-- He said the Bush policy towards Yugoslavia would be "pretty much as it has been." On alleged human rights abuses against the Albanian minority in that country, "we would do what we can diplomatically to change that."

-- On settling the Cyprus issue, Baker said the United States supports the efforts of the United Nations to resolve this dispute. The new administration would like to see it resolved through direct negotiations between the two sides -- Greece and Turkey.

-- While noting the contributions of allies to the NATO effort in such areas as host country support, conscription and use of land for exercises, Baker said that he would "press for greater burden sharing" by the NATO allies.

-- He emphasized that the new administration still recognizes Devalle as the president of Panama. "There will be no lessening or removal of (U.S.) sanctions unless there is movement on the other side" and "no movement towards normalization while General Noriega" is still in power.

-- The United Nations "can be a force for resolving disputes," and he noted the organization is "making progress" in its budget reforms.

-- It is "difficult now to normalize relations" with Cuba, given Castro's continued support to subversion, the human rights abuses in Cuba, and that country's close ties with the Soviet Union, he said.

Responding to a series of questions from Senator Jesse Helms, the committee's ranking Republican, at the end of the afternoon, Baker said to the best of his knowledge, the United States has never asked the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for compensation for the deaths of Americans at the hands of terrorists affiliated with the PLO.

But he pointed out there has been only one meeting between U.S. and PLO representatives since a dialogue was opened in mid-December.

Baker assured Helms the PLO would have to demonstrate by both word and deed that it has renounced terrorism -- a key condition for the U.S. agreeing to open a dialogue with the organization.

"It's going to have to be done in both," he said adding that one of the subjects the United States considers appropriate to discuss with the PLO is that organization's "abstinence from terrorism."

However, Baker stopped short of accepting Helm's contention that the next instance of any act or threat of terrorism by any PLO faction would be reason for terminating talks with the PLO.

"I think we'd have to look at the circumstances, senator," Baker said. "I'm not sure the PLO can, or pretends to be able to, control everything that goes on over there, and for that matter even perhaps some of the dissident factions. I think it's a case of judging their compliance with their renunciation of terrorism in looking at the whole picture and judging it in good faith," he said. "But we certainly expect to see actions and not words."

Responding to questions from Senator Alan Cranston, Baker voiced strong opposition to providing subsidized credits to the Soviet Union.

He noted that the Western allies, at the Toronto economic summit and in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have adopted a policy of permitting and encouraging normal commercial relations. "I don't think that we should engage in a headlong rush to provide subsidized financing, trade credits and the like," Baker added.

Questioned about Panama, Baker said "it's going to be very difficult for us to see any progress toward normalizing relations as long as General Noriega retains power there." But he said the issue of a Panamanian administrator for the Panama Canal should be dealt with when it arises. Under the Panama Canal treaties, Panama is required to submit to the United States this year the name of the Panamanian citizen who will take over as canal administrator in 1990.

"I'm not sure that we can predict today with any degree of certainty what the situation will be there when that nomination comes forward," Baker told Senator Nancy Kassebaum. "I'm not sure that it's in the best interests of the United States to see us move forward down there under the current situation. A fully functioning democracy in Panama is clearly in our best interests as well as in the best interests of Panama. And we do not have a fully functioning democracy in Panama today," he said.

Senator Helms voiced strong support for Jonas Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and sharply questioned Baker about future U.S. support for that organization. President-elect Bush sent Savimbi a letter recently, pledging to continue "effective and appropriate" U.S. assistance.

Baker said the incoming administration has not yet "firmed up the details" of an international conference to deal with environmental problems, which had been a campaign commitment of Vice President Bush.

He said he did not yet know when or where the conference would be held or what would be on its agenda.

On other issues, the secretary-designate

-- said he would "press very diligently" to win Congressional approval of a 481 million dollar aid package for the Philippines the United States has pledged in return for the use of the Subic Bay and Clark Air Base facilities. He said Philippine officials would "find it exceedingly difficult to understand if we're not able to fulfill that kind of a commitment after using our best efforts when our level of assistance to the Philippines in recent years has been running at

about 415 million dollars, so it's not that much of an increase."

-- characterized the Latin American debt crisis as "a very important geopolitical problem in addition to being a very important economic and financial problem." He said finding a way to alleviate the problem must be based on the principle of economic growth, which in turn depends on the countries involved adopting free market economic policies and being able to find capital to fund their growth enhancing efforts. He emphasized that dealing with the debt problems of the developing world must not be put "on the backs of the taxpayers." He also warned Congress "cannot legislate a cure."

-- noted that the debt of many African nations is an "entirely different situation" because up to 70 percent of African debt is owed to official and multilateral creditors, which "opens itself up to a magic bullet cure." He noted that last year's economic summit in Toronto favored extending debt maturities well into the future, which provides a cash flow benefit to the countries involved but does not write the debt off the books. Baker said he anticipates further moves in that direction at the Paris summit in July and said he supports U.S. participation in it "recognizing the serious budget constraints that are involved."

-- said he does not anticipate any change in U.S. support for the so-called Front Line states in southern Africa. Baker said while the insurgency in Mozambique is not as active and effective as it once was, that country remains in "rather sad shape." But he said what ultimately happens there is going to "depend on the resolve of the Mozambican people and their government. I think what's happened recently is encouraging."

-- declared that "the core problem of apartheid persists" in South Africa, and added, "I really don't see the possibility for the United States normalizing relations with South Africa without there being real progress toward dismantling that system." He said U.S. sanctions have "amplified that message," but he pointed out that "the sanctions we've imposed haven't produced the desired result. And by themselves, they probably cannot produce the desired result." Indeed, repression has intensified, and the United States needs to review its policy toward South Africa, he said, adding "it's an extraordinarily difficult problem and it's one that's going to clearly occupy our time and attention."

-- emphasized the incoming administration's fundamental objectives in El Salvador will be to support the democratic political process and to promote the observance of human rights. While there has been a recent increase in politically motivated violence, he pointed out that Vice President Bush clearly expressed his firm opposition to right-wing death squads during a 1983 visit to San Salvador and said Bush may warn that a resurgence of death squad activity could imperil U.S. assistance. Baker also noted that despite guerrilla efforts, the democratic political process has become established in El Salvador, with five "free, honest elections" having been held since 1982 and with another election scheduled in March. "You should not worry about the new administration going soft on human rights in El Salvador, because that is simply not going to happen," he added.

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נשק לערב הסעודית

משני מקורות גפרדים: ב-11 לינואר נפגש הנסיר בנדר עם לון פארל ומסר כי ערב הסעודית מבקשת להחליף את מטוסי ה-F-5 במטוסים חדשים F-16 או F-18. (נציגי חברת מקדונלה דגלס כבר מדברים על 110 מטוסי F-18 שיסופקו החל מ-1993 בקצב של שנים לחודש כאשר היקף העסקה הוא 6 מיליארד דולר). בנדר ביקש שהבקשה תכלול "ברשימת יעבין" שאלתה מגיש הממשל מדי שנה לקונגרס וחמצינית את רעיונותיו, בעקרון, למכירת נשק.

השגריר האמריקאי בריאד נפגש עם סולטאן אחרי פגישת בנדר ושאל האם היא משקפת את החלטת המלך. השגריר גענה בשלילה כך שלא תהיה כנראה בקשה בעתיד הקרוב. מאידך כן תוגש לקונגרס בקשה למכירה של כ-350 טנקים מסוג M-1 לערב הסעודית.

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January 18, 1989
Issue 84

PLO-ARAB POLITICS

LEBANON

Shams al-Din, the Deputy Chairman of the Shi'ite Higher Council, has cautioned the Council and Arab foreign ministers that Palestinian expansion in Southeastern Lebanon maybe at the expense of the Shi'ite community. It may reflect a conspiracy to settle the Palestinians permanently in the South. He called upon the Shi'ites in the South to refrain from selling land to the Palestinians. Some Council members claim that the Palestinian moves in the South reveal the cause behind the killing of the three Shi'ite leaders (including Daoud Daoud and Mahmoud Faqih) who resisted the attempt to settle Palestinians in the South (al-Anwar, Beirut, January 1, 1989).

FINANCE

Abdullah Khorani, a member of the PLO Executive:
"...Since very little has materialized from the allocations budgeted at the recent Arab summit in Algiers... there is a need to remind Arab states how vital that support is. It is especially important in view of the evaporation of other sources of support... The financial situation is particularly difficult in light of the requirements arising from the uprising... The vast majority of Arab countries have not complied with their commitments" (Akhar Sa'ah, Egypt, January 4, 1989).

Abu Iyyad, Arafat's deputy:

The PLO has not received the aid decided upon during the Algiers Arab summit. Even the refugees in the camps have not received it (through UNRWA). We hope to receive one percent of the assistance extended by the Arabs to the rebels in Afghanistan. It is not logical to expect the PLO to issue a Palestinian passport when there are many Arab countries that reject the idea (al-Anba'a, Kuwait, December 6, 1988).

PLO-U.S.

Abu Iyyad:

U.S. anti-Libyan belligerency (the downing of two Libyan fighters) reflects an act of belligerency against the Palestinian people and the Arab nation (PLO Radio, broadcasting from Sana'a, January 6, 1989). A similar view was expressed by Abu-Iyyad at a press conference in Kuwait (al-Siyassa, Kuwait, December 27, 1988), and by Abdullah Khorani (AFP, January 5, 1989).

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

SAUDI TARGETS

The Islamic Jihad of Hijaz (a pro-Iranian group) has claimed responsibility for the January 4 killing of a Saudi

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diplomat in Bangkok. According to a press release issued in Beirut, the action was carried out in order to avenge the execution of four Shi'ites in Damam who were accused of membership in a subversive pro-Iranian organization (AFP, January 1, 1989).

THE PLO -- A TURNING POINT? pro-Iranian organization (AFP, January 1, 1989).

ON THE COVENANT

THE Arafat: A TURNING POINT? (AFP, January 7, 1989).

"...When Israel abandons the notion of borders extending from the Euphrates to the Nile, the PLO will remove the destruction of Israel from its Covenant..." (al-Mustaqbal, a Lebanese weekly published in Paris, January 7, 1989).

Rafiq al-Natsheh, a close supporter of Arafat and head of the PLO's office in Riyadh:

"...The PLO Covenant is the basis of the political and military activity of the PLO. The phased plan lies at the root of our present political approach... Internal discussions must aim at harmonizing the various political decisions with the Covenant and the phased plan..." (al-Wattan, Kuwait, January 8, 1989).

ON 242 Rafiq Natsheh: (al-Wattan, Kuwait, January 8, 1989).

"...All members of the PLO's Executive Committee reject 242 and 338 if the declared rights of the Palestinians are not understood to be included: self-determination, a Palestinian state, the PLO as the sole representative and the return of the refugees to their birthplace..." (al-Wattan, Kuwait, January 8). The Palestinian revolution erupted in order to liberate Palestine and to attain all the aims of our people: liberation, return of all the refugees to their land and a Palestinian state in Palestine. Any peace arrangement failing to take these into account is an illusory peace (al-Jezirah, Saudi Arabia, January 1, 1989).

ON HAMAS (THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT)

Nabil Sha'ath, Arafat's advisor on political affairs: Hamas's declaration of Jihad until the occupied lands are totally liberated is fully supported by the PLO (al-Nur, Egypt, December 7, 1988).

ARAB ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAEL Hamas's declaration of Jihad until the occupied lands are totally liberated is fully supported by the PLO (al-Nur, Egypt, December 7, 1988).

A JORDANIAN VIEW

ARAB "Is this the beginning of the end of this fabricated state, which is built on robbery and oppression, or is this the countdown to Zionist defeatism, or disgraceful Zionist blackmail...? The preparation of an independent Palestinian state in the original homeland is the beginning of the end of the Israeli enemy" (al-Ra'i, Jordan, December 14, 1988).

MILITARY BALANCE original homeland is the beginning of the end of the Israeli enemy" (al-Ra'i, Jordan, December 14, 1988).

IRAQ-USSR

MILITARY BALANCE "Iraq has signed an agreement with the USSR for the purchase of an unspecified number of Sukhoi-24 warplanes. The purchase turns Iraq into the number-two buyer of the planes, after Syria... The Iraqi regime soon will receive MiG-29 aircraft... They have conducted negotiations with France on assembling French Mirage-2000 aircraft in Iraq... With the assistance of Egyptian experts... Iraq has conducted negotiations for the purchase of weapons from other European countries and from Latin American states" (India News Agency, December 22, 1988).

דחיות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 2
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בושביץ - האם ניתנה כבר חקעה על ועידה בינ"ל.

ביקר - כרגע אינני רואה מדוע ישתנה אלמנט זה במדיניות האמריקנית. מכל מקום, ועידה בינ"ל תתכן רק אם תהיה PROPERLY STRUCTURED ותוליד לאח ישר.

ב. סנטור לארי פחסלר - האם קונפדרציה תחת המלך חוסיין ביר"ש עם רצועה מחברת לעזה הינה תוצאה מתקבלת על הדעת בהנחה שכל מדינות ערב מכירות בישראל. (אנ')
שלא לא ממשלא ממשלא ממשלא (אנ') (אנ') (אנ') (אנ')
ביקר - it would be premature לקבוע תוצאות סופיות כשלב זה. אר"ב לא תמכה בקונספט של מדינה פלסטינית עצמאית ודנה רק באפשרות של צעדי ביניים וקונפדרציה עם ירדן.
A SATISFACTORY FINAL OUTCOME IS GOING TO BE DETERMINED ONLY BY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
חזר והדגיש כי מוקדם מידי לדבר על תוצאות סופיות וכי יש תנאים פוזיטים בשטח המשפיעים אף הם.

ג. סנטור קרני מק - בהתייחס לעדותו של ביקר, אמר כי נראה לו שחצוץ הבא צריך להיות ועידה בגללומית, אלא מו"מ ישיר בין ישראל למדינות ערב. שלום כולל לא יושג ללא הכרה ערבית בישראל, לפיכך על אר"ב ללחוץ באמצעים דיפלומטיים על מדינות ערב להכיר בישראל.

ביקר - אינו רואה כל בעיה מצד אר"ב להשתמש בדיפלומטיה כדי להביא להכרה ערבית בישראל. מסכים עם הסנטור כי זה מה שיש לעשות. אולי יש מדינות ערביות שתטענה שעשו כך בהכירן ב-242 ואחרות תאמרנה כי זהו דבר נפרד לחלוטין.
חזר לחצוץ של מק ואמר שיבדוק האם וכיצד הצעה זו יכולה להפוך חלק ממדיניותה של אר"ב.

ד. סנטור צ'אק רוב - מה צריך להיות תפקיד ברה"מ בתהליך שלום.

ביקר - אם תינתן מתקיימת ועידה בינ"ל, תינתן משתתפת. איננו מתנגדים לתפקיד סובייטי אולם עלינו להיות קונסטרוקטיבי ולא רק בבחינת סיסמאות.

תפוצה:

דחיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 3
סוג:		מתוך: 4
תאריך וזמן חשור:		אל:
פס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		
346		פאת:

הסימנים לגישת סובייטית חיובית יכולים להיות:-

א. חידוש יחסים עם ישראל.

ב. הגברת חגילות היהודים מברח"מ.

ג. עידוד מדינות ערביות לחכיר בישראל ולחצטרף לתהליך השלום.

ד. ביקוש מביקור תגובתו על חקשר בין תהליך השלום ומכירות נשק.

ביקור - NO COMMENT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO.

בתהליך מכירות הנשק יש מקום לשיפורים בין אגף הממשל לאגף הליג'יסלטיבי. עליכם

לקבל PROPER NOTICE ומכאן אנו מצפים לא לבלום או למנוע כל מכירה, למשל ע"י

חתימת 70 סנטורים או קונגרסמנים על מכתבי התנגדות.

ניתן לפעול באופן משותף.

5. הסנטור פול סימון - היה היחיד שהתייחס לנושא סיוע החוץ בהקשר לסיוע לאפריקה.

במיוחד לאור ביקורו ביבשת לפני כשבוע.

סימון - סח"ק חסיוע לאפריקה מסך סיוע חוץ מסתכם ב-7.2%. אם מוציאים את מצרים

מכלל זה, המספר נמוך בהרבה.

האם נעשת חשיבה בנושא של ALLOCATION חדש של סיוע החוץ?

ביקור - היה טוב, לו הקונגרס היה מתעניין בעובדה שכוח התמרון והגמישות של

הממשל התבטל. ציין במיוחד עובדה של חסיוע הגבוה של ה- FMS וה- ESF.

מצד שני קונגרס יבדוק כל שנה וקונגרס.

מכיר בבעיה שעלל סנטור סימון. העדר מוחלט של גמישות ושריון שיגרתו שנתו ברמה

גבוהה אינו באינטרס של מדינות חוץ. בכך אין בכוחו להציע הורדה או העלאת רמת

חסיוע למדינות זו או אחרת. אנו זקוקים לגמישות וגם אתם וכרמל אין לנו גמישות זו.

אולם, הוסיף ביקור, WE JOINTLY HAVE NO FLEXIBILITY

סימון - מניח שיתכנו ש"פ ועבודה משותפת לקראת השגת גמישות כלשהי.

תפוצה:



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תאריך וזמן חבירה:		אל:
פס' פרוק:		דע:
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346		כאח:

6. סה"כ הנושאים שהועלו היום היו, בראש וראשונה יחסי ארה"ב - ברה"מ; נשק כימי (הודגש במיוחד ע"י של וולמס, אן גט אולייט, וולמס ציטט ובווי שה"וו בעידן בנוגע לשמרון החברות שסחרו עם עראק ולוב. הפיק חומר בדיון); יחסי ארה"ב ואירופה (ככנות ברית- חלוקת נטל שורה, ומבחינה כלכלית); קובה, דרא"פ; אמרכ"ז; דרא"פ; פיליפינים; בעיות אקולוגיות עולמיות; טרור; אפגניסטן ויחסי ארה"ב והאו"ם.

7. מחר כאמור ימשכו השימועים וצפויות שאלות נוספות בנושא המזה"תי.

אח"כ וקא' פרוק
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה:



official text

January 18, 1989

BAKER SEES FIVE SIGNIFICANT WORLD CHANGES UNDERWAY

Secretary of State-designate James Baker says the world is undergoing five significant transformations: a democratic revolution, a spread of free enterprise, a communist world experiment with economic ideas, technological progress in the area of information and communications, and new military trends.

"The only sure guide for such change is the compass of American ideals and values -- freedom, democracy, equal rights, respect for human dignity, fair play -- the principles to which I adhere," Baker told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee January 17.

Asking the panel to confirm his nomination as secretary, Baker said America must be resolved on two issues -- the necessity for leadership to adjust in a world that has outgrown the post World War Two era, and a bipartisanship between the executive branch of government and the Congress in the realm of foreign policy.

Following is the text of Baker's statement of January 17, 1989 to the Foreign Relations Committee. Following the text is a summary of Mr. Baker's answers to questions posed by the Committee.

(begin text)

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:

It is an honor to appear before you as President-elect Bush's nominee to be secretary of state. I also appreciate your willingness to hold these hearings while we are still in the transition period. Every administration aspires to hit the ground running, instead of just hitting the ground.

This Friday (January 20) a new president will take office. He will govern an America vastly different from the country we knew even as recently as the beginning of this decade. When George Bush first campaigned for the presidency, American institutions and values were being questioned. Over the last eight years, we have reaffirmed them.

As a result, our nation has emerged much stronger both at home and abroad. For this, we owe thanks to Secretary Shultz and above all to



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President Reagan.

The legacy of the Reagan era is a more vibrant America. We have proven that our president can lead, that our government works, that progress can be made. The creativity of the individual and respect for his or her rights -- the touchstones of democracy -- have become once more ideas in the ascendancy.

Some of that vibrancy is reflected in the international developments of our time. Our most powerful foe, the Soviet Union, so aggressive a decade ago, is undergoing an ideological soul-searching of historic proportions. Regional conflicts long thought to be intractable -- in Southwest Asia and Southern Africa, for example -- have begun moving toward resolution with the help of creative American diplomacy. And the international economy, driven by the longest American peacetime economic expansion on record, has provided new hope for progress.

A World in Transition

These developments are symptomatic of the great changes and challenges we face in the decade ahead. Our world is undergoing five significant transformations:

First, the democratic revolution* Many nations in Latin America have recently achieved democracy or are struggling toward it, while in Asia, the Philippines and South Korea have joined the democratic ranks. But many of these new democracies are fragile. Their institutions need time to take root and success is not assured. And, while millions of people elsewhere are demanding free political institutions, we know that the demands for freedom are not always granted peacefully, if at all.

Second, the spread of free enterprise* Free markets and private initiative are the new watchwords of economic development -- because these concepts work in practice. Classic socialism and variants of government-controlled economies have been discredited. The nations of the Pacific Rim in particular have shown that the free enterprise model works astonishingly well for developing countries, not just mature economies. But in many regions, the problems of debt, large trade imbalances, and protectionist pressures overshadow this progress and threaten the future.

Third, change in the communist world* Virtually every communist government is now experimenting with economic ideas once denounced as heretical, including a role for a market economy. But the crisis of the communist systems, even by their own admission, is much broader. Political change, especially the demand for freer institutions, is high on the agenda. Yet it is not clear that reforms will be successful, or that democracy will be the outcome.

Fourth, technological progress* Rapid advances in the technology of information and communications have helped to bring about a global economy, shrinking time and space and transcending the traditional boundaries of the nation-state. It is already clear that in today's global economy, domestic economic policies can no longer be considered independently of their international consequences. But it is not yet certain that we will have the cooperation we need. And trade advantages unfairly pursued could lead to more economic strife and, eventually, to growing protectionism.

Fifth, new military trends* The same technological change affecting the international economy is altering strategic military relationships. Precision guidance enables the conventional weapons of today to destroy targets that, in years past, were assigned primarily to nuclear weapons. Research on the Strategic Defense Initiative is

exploring the potential for altering the future mix of offense and defense. We must continue to assess the impact of these changes on deterrence and arms control.

There is another, more worrisome aspect of the new military trends. A dangerous proliferation of high-technology has begun. Just as we are controlling or eliminating some nuclear weapons, chemical warheads and ballistic missiles have fallen into the hands of governments and groups with proven records of aggression and terrorism.

The Contraries of Our Times and How to Approach Them

These five transformations present us with a series of contraries and paradoxes. We could advance toward an increasingly democratic world, or, if fragile democracies fail, the cause of freedom could be thrown back. The international economy could continue to grow, or the stresses of competition could lead to protectionism and rival trading blocs -- ultimately to the disadvantage of all. A properly conceived approach by the Atlantic Alliance could extend the progress we have made with the Soviet Union.

Or through mistakes on either side of the Iron Curtain, this opportunity could be lost. Finally, new military technologies could provide a greater stability at lower levels of forces. Or we could encounter a new and darker age if we cannot halt the spread of weapons that put nations on a hair-trigger, particularly in politically unstable regions.

I am asking you to vote to confirm me as secretary of state. So it is right and proper that I tell you as best I can of my approach to this challenging world, this world of contraries.

During my legal training, I became aware of a set of lectures by Justice Benjamin Cardozo called "The Nature of the Judicial Process." And I recall being struck by his observation that, "There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or not, which gives coherency and direction to thought and action." Some have described my philosophy as "pragmatic." I'd like to say that labels can be misleading -- I am actually a Texas Republican, all of whom are conservative. I will admit to pragmatism, however, if by that you mean being realistic about the world and appreciating the importance of getting things done.

My purpose is not to understand this world in order to accept it, but to understand it in order to change it where necessary -- sometimes by large steps, often of necessity by small steps, yet always pressing forward. And the only sure guide for such change is the compass of American ideals and values -- freedom, democracy, equal rights, respect for human dignity, fair play -- the principles to which I adhere.

I believe in freedom for the individual because it's a God-given right and the source of human creativity. The Founders of our country recognized that such freedom was preserved best by limited government -- the checks and balances system that still provides the framework for our success. Part of that system is a decentralized government, a government close to the people, a government of the people. I would argue, too, that economic freedom, the free market system, is an essential part of the framework. Finally and above all I believe, like Lincoln, that the United States has a special role in this world, a special contribution to make -- as he put it, "the last, best hope of earth."

Leadership and Bipartisanship

My sense of realism, my stream of tendency, tells me that we can

advance toward these ideals, if we are resolved on two issues.

The first is the necessity for American leadership. Some years ago, as secretary of the treasury, I spoke of the leadership "choice" -- but in fact it is no choice at all. As the most powerful democracy, the largest economy, the wealthiest society and the greatest concentration of scientific talents, we are going to substantially affect the future whether we do so consciously or not. We can be a force for freedom and peaceful change unlike any other in this world. But if we fail to do so, we will not be able to run or to hide from the consequences.

U.S. leadership must adjust for a world that has outgrown the post-war era. The United States is simultaneously a tribune for democracy, a catalyst for international cooperation, and a guardian of our national interests. We live in a world of powerful adversaries. We cannot take the survival of democracy for granted or assume that if we do not protect our own interests, someone else or some international organization will act on our behalf. We also live in a world of increasingly influential allies whose cooperation is essential if we are to surmount common problems. There are new, global dangers, such as terrorism, the international narcotics trade and the degradation of the world's environment that cannot be managed by one nation alone, no matter how powerful.

These realities will not permit a blind isolationism or a reckless unilateralism. Only through a realistic approach can we write a new chapter of American leadership for a rapidly changing world.

There is a second issue we must resolve. It concerns the relationship between the executive and the Congress in the realm of foreign policy. Simply put, we must have bipartisanship to succeed. That's the verdict of history and of recent experience.

Bipartisanship does not mean that we must always agree. There are and will always be differences in approach and on substance. Airing those differences in a manner that respects the other person's right to disagree is a strong affirmation of the democratic process. But eventually we must proceed, and when we do it is best that we do so together if we are to achieve the national interest.

On this subject, let me quote Dean Acheson. He was evidently acquainted with some of our Texas customs because he said that there was a rule in the saloons of the Old West "Never shoot the piano player." And he wrote that in foreign policy, the president was the piano player.

Yes, this is an appeal for a kinder, gentler Congress. But bipartisanship is also more than Acheson's "holy water sprinkled on political necessity." It's the lubricant that enables the branches of government to overcome their natural, constitutionally designed friction, a friction that arises from our differing perspectives and our different responsibilities.

As a realist, I know we need bipartisanship to succeed. While the executive is responsible for proposing and executing foreign policy, the legislature supports, modifies, and sometimes vetoes a course of action. Thus, bipartisanship is decided in practice.

So let our recent experience be our teacher. When we held the line together, on Afghanistan, or throughout the INF negotiations, we succeeded. When we did not -- in Central America -- the outcome was unsatisfactory to everyone.

The conclusion is inescapable. In order to succeed, we must work together. And a bipartisan foreign policy is sustained by three

principles:

-- First, trust that we each have the public interest in mind, that we are doing our best to carry out our responsibilities.

-- Second, consultation, that we are trying to communicate, that we are taking off and landing together.

-- Third, consistency, that our decisions and agreements, once arrived at, are in fact decisions and agreements that will be kept.

Senators Danforth and Boren have suggested a new means of consultation -- including periodic meetings of members of Congress with the secretary of State and sometimes the president -- to discuss the larger and longer term issues. As President-elect Bush wrote to Senator Danforth on November 18, 1988, "As soon as my National Security team is in place, I will ask them to meet with you to discuss your excellent suggestions." I look forward to that meeting.

Armed then with the conviction of American leadership and the practice of bipartisanship, let us together -- the executive and the Congress -- tackle the formidable agenda before us.

The International Agenda: The Americas

First on that agenda is our neighborhood -- the countries that border us, the countries of our continent and our hemisphere. The United States is both a continental and a maritime power, which gives us a unique geopolitical perspective. But we are not exempt from the old rule that foreign policy begins at home. It is rooted and must be rooted in our values. And it gathers both strength and vitality from our immediate neighborhood -- how well we do with our friends and neighbors to the North and South.

Recently, working with Canada, we achieved a Free Trade Agreement -- something both nations had sought for a hundred years without success. A lot of ink and some anguish has been spilled over the economic implications of this agreement with respect to certain industries. In my view, the Free Trade Agreement is in our mutual interest. And there are geopolitical implications that go far beyond the economic significance of this achievement.

The U.S.-Canada Agreement represents a signal success in a strategy designed to move all nations toward a more open trading system. It proves that the two largest trading partners in the world can not only eliminate tariff barriers but can also negotiate solutions in such areas as services and investment -- both increasingly transnational in scope -- while still respecting national sovereignty. It shows that an active, internationalist free trade policy can catalyze a bipartisan domestic coalition and turn back the forces of protectionism. So it can be done. And we look forward to working with Canada on other important issues, including international environmental problems, as we extend the range of our new cooperation.

To the South, we have an equally significant set of issues to consider. Our neighbor Mexico is deeply in debt and faces some serious challenges to its social fabric. But Mexico also has many assets -- the capabilities of its people and its significant natural resources. The Mexican government, led by President Salinas, is taking the road of economic and political reform. It is a difficult road and we are determined to help.

It is in our interest to do so. It is time we regarded Mexico with the respect and seriousness it warrants. Whatever the past, we must all be aware that America's relationship with Mexico means a great deal: it is as important as our relationship with any other country in the world. I am convinced that we can make progress together, working on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

I know President-elect Bush looks forward to early consultations with President Salinas and Prime Minister Mulroney to chart the course ahead.

Another matter on our continental agenda is Central America. We have now had nearly ten years of frustrating and sometimes contradictory American policies toward that region. Some successes have been achieved. Most Central American nations are more democratic and more respectful of human rights than they were. And we must help to defend those achievements from threats against human rights, whether the threats are from the left or the right.

Still, the overwhelming blemish remains* the terrible draining conflict between Nicaragua and her neighbors and between the Nicaraguan Marxists and their own people, some of whom have taken up arms and merited American support.

Starting in 1987, all of the governments of the area stepped back from the brink long enough to agree on a set of principles for peace. The Esquipulas agreement, known as Esquipulas II and authored by President Arias of Costa Rica, expresses well everyone's objectives. It's a good platform for peace. What it lacks is a mechanism for enforcement. That problem emerged clearly in the record of negotiations following the Sapoa Accords between the Sandinistas and the Democratic Resistance. To date, neither democracy, as specified by Esquipulas II, nor the reintegration of the resistance, as pledged in the Sapoa Accords, has materialized.

Clearly, we need a different approach, an approach that must be bipartisan here in Washington if it is to succeed there in the region.

Events have shown that only such bipartisan action influences the Sandinistas.

That is why we must unite on clear goals for Central America -- democratization, development, and security for every state in the region. All of them must be free of the fear of subversive neighbors.

All of them must be able to share in an economic development plan, perhaps assisted by our European and Japanese allies. But none of this can occur unless the promises of democracy and security become reality. We must insist on protection for human rights in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and their neighbors -- applying equal standards fairly to all.

These objectives of American diplomacy carry a great national responsibility. We cannot and we must not abandon the Democratic Resistance. We must stand by them until our mutual goals are achieved.

Finally, I'd like to make a suggestion. In 1992, we will celebrate the 500th anniversary of Columbus's voyage of discovery. I'd like to suggest that today we embark on a voyage of rediscovery -- of the Caribbean and of South America. Our neighbors in this hemisphere are engaged in a quest for greater freedom and economic progress. We share many of their interests. And together we also face the scourge of drugs.

Now is the time to take a fresh look at these problems and to make more of our opportunities to overcome them.

Transformation of our Allies and Friends

Let me move now from our neighborhood to the broader world of our friends and allies. Through commerce, political alliance and defense agreements, the United States links together two highly dynamic, advanced regions -- Western Europe and the nations of the Pacific. We are at once an Atlantic power and a Pacific power and there should not be any thought to expand one relationship at the

expense of the other.

Realism compels us to understand the great changes taking place among our allies and friends in both regions. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the founding of NATO, the most successful alliance in history. But today's Western Europe is not the exhausted Europe recovering from its own devastation, nor is it the single Europe of the political visionaries. A new appreciation is needed on our side and theirs of how we can adapt to changing circumstances as a force for peace.

Certainly, in the first instance, it requires, as President-elect Bush has suggested, a meeting of our minds on how to proceed with a changing Soviet Union. In an era of constrained defense budgets, we require a common approach to the new military facts created by the INF Treaty -- the need to modernize our nuclear and conventional weapons. We need a set of both realistic and prudent standards for conventional arms control. We also need a common approach to the issues of loans and credits -- and trade and technology transfer -- to Moscow and Eastern Europe. Finally, we need to establish a more equitable and creative basis on which to share responsibilities. Our discourse and consultations should be free and frank as befits allies of long standing.

The stakes have not changed. Our commitment to NATO is stronger because we as nations are stronger. As long as Europe remains the most heavily armed continent, where American and Soviet troops face each other on the front lines, the Atlantic Alliance will be our first line of defense.

1989 also marks 32 years since the signing of the Treaty of Rome that gave official birth to the Common Market. And in only three more years, the enlarged Common Market will have achieved the objective of that treaty -- a single market. But will this new Europe -- a rising economic superpower -- be outward looking or inward? Will it be another building bloc in the new edifice of a more open, global trading system or a massive bloc protected against external competition? Will it be a healthy, dynamic economy that produces an abundance of jobs, or a cautious, stagnant region content with persistent unemployment? The correct answers to these contraries will be found, I believe, in a Europe that looks outward, not inward, that promotes structural reform, that breaks down barriers, that offers economic opportunities for all nations, not only for Europe. As an ally and as a major trading partner, the United States will take a keen interest in this transformation.

Turning to the Pacific Rim, we find a striking success already in the making. No area offers comparable achievements in creating advanced economies in record time. This economic progress is anchored in the remarkable partnership, now four decades old, between the United States and Japan. I expect that partnership to strengthen further and expand in scope.

Many have spoken of the Pacific Century and the Pacific Rim as the world of the future. One thing is certain. The world's economic promise to the end of this century depends on how well the United States and its Pacific partners manage their affairs. Our relations with the Pacific -- as our relations with Europe and indeed our own continent -- must emphasize outward-looking economic policies that promote trade and growth. I do not underestimate the challenge in Asia, or in other regions, of achieving free and fair trade, of avoiding all forms of protectionism, including the manipulation of exchange rates. After nearly a decade when the American economy has

driven international growth, we are all facing a changing world. The rule that success brings responsibility will find a fuller expression as the Pacific nations assume more important economic and political roles.

We have vital political and strategic interests in the Pacific as well. These interests are well-served by military capabilities based in Japan, the Philippines and Korea -- and by our close cooperation with these nations. We must enhance that cooperation while shouldering common defense and development responsibilities.

The U.S. relationship with the People's Republic of China, important in its own right, also contributes strongly to the overall stability of the international political order. President-elect Bush's extensive, personal experience in China will facilitate the expansion of our important and multifaceted ties.

Our policy toward the Pacific as a whole must tie together all strands* to assure the region's economic growth, with its global implications, in the context of a secure regional deterrence. I think we are going to see in Asia the necessity for closer coordination with ASEAN and other regional groups -- and perhaps even new institutional arrangements.

As we enter a new era characterized especially by the greater strength of our friends, the challenge of our agenda can be put this way* our mutual success should pave the road toward closer association, not a detour to the dead end of counterproductive rivalry. That's a road we must pave together.

Transnational Issues

The future of our civilization also demands that we act in concert to deal with a new class of problems, transnational in nature.

Terrorism has become a means for small groups, sometimes supported by nations, to attack innocent civilians around the world. The narcotics traffickers have become powerful enough to undermine governments, even as their drugs poison societies. Fanatics spread their messages of intolerance and hate, using mass communications that cut across borders. Every nation also knows now that we face major ecological challenges. The tides and winds can spread environmental damage to continents and hemispheres far removed from the immediate disaster. Scientists have warned us against the possible consequences of a long-term warming trend, the so-called greenhouse effect.

President-elect Bush has called for an international conference on global environmental issues. I believe the United States must lead this effort. We need to help foster a change of attitude, a reconciliation of the transcendent requirements for both economic development and a secure environment. As Treasury secretary, I pressed the multilateral development banks toward consideration of conservationally-sound, sustained development, and helped develop debt-for-charity swaps to aid conservation in developing nations. As secretary of State, I hope to build on this record.

No one has yet perfected the policies of collective action we need to deal with this special range of global problems. But the stakes are too high for us to desist. We will begin with our allies, include our friends, and challenge our adversaries to make common cause in treating these issues.

Realism in U.S.-Soviet Relations

Beyond the Americas, beyond greater partnership with our allies, beyond facing global problems, lies the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Thanks to the policy of peace through strength pursued over the last eight years, our dealings with Moscow have become noticeably less

tense. There has been progress in arms control -- notably the INF Treaty -- human rights, bilateral ties, and regional conflicts. We look forward to the day, coming soon, when all Soviet troops will have left Afghanistan.

Some have suggested that this progress deserves a radically different U.S. policy. Others fear that Mikhail Gorbachev has stolen a march on the democracies through such actions as the unilateral reduction in troops and tanks in Europe. The meaning and permanence of the new Soviet policies are being debated intensely, here and abroad.

There are good reasons for both optimistic and pessimistic views of today's Soviet Union. No one can doubt that there are very real changes. Many were unthinkable just a few years ago. The SS-20s are being destroyed. Soviet troops are leaving Afghanistan. Some political prisoners have been released. American doctors will soon visit psychiatric hospitals where prisoners of conscience have been sent. Soviet history itself is sometimes subject to harsh scrutiny. In other words, the slogans of glasnost and perestroika are being given content.

These are reasons to be hopeful. But realism requires us to be prudent. However fascinating the twists and turns of perestroika may be, and however riveting the details of Soviet decline as reported in Soviet newspapers, the Soviet Union remains a heavily armed superpower. The talk is different but the force structure and policies that support far-reaching interests and clients have not changed commensurately. Many of those policies and those clients are hostile to American values and threaten our interests and our allies. That's a reality.

Still, I would not underestimate the impact of Moscow's domestic troubles on Soviet foreign policy. Marxism-Leninism as a philosophy for a society must be in doubt when the system, after 70 years, produces declining health, shortages of food and consumer goods, and an obsolete industrial base. The political changes now being made are themselves reflective of a continuing paradox. While the purpose of reform is ostensibly to prevent a recurrence of dictatorial abuse, the reform itself depends on the concentration of power in one man's hands.

Meanwhile, the Eastern European countries are in ferment as the ground rules of their own governments and their relations to the USSR are rewritten. And the Baltic States and Armenia have reminded the world of ethnic dilemmas long suppressed by Stalinist methods. These situations too cannot be ignored.

In light of both the change and continuity in the Soviet Union, realistic American policy should be guided by these principles.

First, we should continue to welcome reform and changes in the Soviet Union that promise more freedom at home, in the workplace, or in public institutions. But we should never measure the progress of Mr. Gorbachev's reforms by how many credits, concessions or accommodations we might make ostensibly to help him succeed with his domestic plans. Ultimately, as the Soviets themselves acknowledge, perestroika depends not on help from outside, but on political, bureaucratic, and sociological changes in the Soviet Union.

Second, while recognizing that Moscow's policies are informed by a new sense of realism, we should also understand that our policies have contributed to that sense of realism. Our willingness to support the mujahidin -- not only economic dilemmas in the Soviet Union -- helped bring about the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Our

willingness, with NATO, to deploy the Pershing and cruise missiles -- not only food shortages -- helped bring about the INF Treaty. Where we have not raised the cost of adventure or aggression, we see little evidence of change. Can it be a coincidence that the only regional conflict where we failed to bring consistent, effective pressure -- in Central America -- we see little trace of new thinking in Soviet foreign policy?

Third, we must continue to probe Moscow along every aspect of our agenda -- arms control, human rights, regional conflicts, bilateral relations. We are interested in cooperating and negotiating to make progress wherever it can be made. Arms control should encompass conventional weapons and chemical and ballistic missile proliferation, going beyond expressions of general principles to practical details. And human rights means full compliance with the Helsinki Accords. There can be no relaxation of our standards on this issue.

Fourth, we need additional focus on the regional conflicts, whether in Central America, South Asia, Southern Africa, the Persian Gulf or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Does the Soviet Union truly see a lowering of tension, and negotiations to be in its own interests? We should not allow the rhetoric of restraint to become a substitute for restraint itself; nor should we permit interest in diplomatic processes to be sufficient in the absence of a commitment to making actual progress.

Fifth, we may need a new category in our relations, to deal with global problems such as terrorism, drugs and the environment. We ought to find out whether Moscow can be helpful on these issues and if not, why not.

I am convinced that Western strength and Soviet domestic weakness have set the stage for the remarkable realism that has distinguished Mr. Gorbachev's tenure so far. Our task is to arrange affairs so that whatever the outcome of perestroika, a more responsible, constructive Soviet foreign policy will remain in Moscow's interest. We look forward to such a policy not only in dealing with old issues but the newer dangers and flashpoints that concern us. Much of the world's hope for a more peaceful international order rests on the outcome.

Resolving Regional Conflicts

I want to turn now to those very regional conflicts that have denied peace and freedom to the peoples of Southern Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. We have made encouraging progress in the recent agreement, mediated by the United States, that provides for Namibian independence and a withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola. And we will be watching carefully to be sure that Cuba does carry out its obligations. But more is needed. Angola desperately requires national reconciliation. And until that occurs we shall continue to support UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi, as President-elect Bush has indicated. Namibia will be a new and fragile state. In South Africa itself, the stresses and strains that accompany the inevitable end of apartheid will provide a severe test for all involved. We must think long and hard in this country about our role and about the effects of our actions -- not on our own self-esteem but on the people we want to help. Finally, we must also not forget the very real human and developmental needs of the people throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.

In South Asia, we look forward to final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and that country's achievement of independent neutrality with a government fully acceptable to the Afghan people. And as tensions decrease in Afghanistan, we also hope to build on the

more constructive relationship being forged now by the leaders of India and Pakistan. It is essential to improve ties with both Pakistan and India if we are to encourage this process.

All nations in Southeast Asia and the international community as a whole should look forward to the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. There, too, a difficult national reconciliation must be undertaken. The United States will continue to work for a new Cambodia, free of both Vietnamese occupation and the Khmer Rouge.

Turning to the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict has long engaged America's attention, resources, and good will. Our mediation has borne partial fruit in the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, part of the Camp David Accords for a comprehensive settlement. And our policy in the Middle East has been truly bipartisan. Every administration has made its contribution. I was proud to be part of the Reagan team that expanded our relationship with Israel into a true strategic alliance and that also met our responsibilities in the Persian Gulf.

Now, President Reagan has authorized a dialogue with the PLO after Yassir Arafat declared his organization's recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace, supported U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced terrorism. Dialogues bring messages. And we are bringing a message to the PLO about terrorism and about the need for even more realism -- realism that makes practical progress on the ground possible. But the existence of the dialogue should not lead anyone to misunderstand our overall policy, or question our enduring support for the State of Israel.

As President-elect Bush has described it, we have a solid consensus on the objectives and means of making peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. These include the purpose of the negotiations, which is above all a just, enduring peace that ensures Israeli security and satisfies the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. We advocate direct negotiations based on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, which include the exchange of territory for peace. Realistically, Jordan must play a part in any agreement. The Palestinians must participate in the determination of their own future. We continue to believe, however, that an independent Palestinian state will not be a source of stability or contribute to a just and enduring peace. These are sound principles and they should guide us.

Today, the rocks are flying and the blood is flowing -- bad blood -- between the Palestinians and the Israelis in the areas under Israeli military administration. We are determined to build upon the achievements of our predecessors in changing that situation, which must be the foundation of a secure peace. And we look forward to working with all the parties in the area to achieve it.

A Middle East policy focused exclusively on the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, would be too limited. Libya continues to be a destabilizing factor in North Africa and elsewhere in the region. Lebanon remains a rebuke to everyone's hopes for a restoration of stability and independence for that tragic country. A lasting peace remains to be established between Iran and Iraq. Meanwhile, the issues of chemical warfare and ballistic missile proliferation compel our attention.

We are going to be working with other nations to take the initiative on these issues. Surely the tragic experiences, the casualties, the victims of the Iran-Iraq war demand from the world and the region a more civilized order.

We are also going to be working with the United Nations on some

of these regional conflicts. The United Nations should be seen for what it is, an expression of the world's desire for peace but also too often the scene of those passions that prevent peace. Experience indicates that when nations need channels, when nations agree upon procedures, when they agree on much of the substance, the United Nations offers a valuable forum for making progress. We support that and we support the United Nations. Yet in the final analysis, the United Nations can be neither a substitute for American leadership nor an excuse for a failure to try.

Chemical Warfare and Technological Proliferation

The final point I want to discuss today is the proliferation of new and dangerous weapons, often to states with a history of terrorism and aggression. Perhaps the most frightening is the combination of the ballistic missile, against which there is currently no defense, and chemical weapons, outlawed as a crime against civilization. Yet the fact remains that these weapons have been used. The international reaction to such use has not been strong enough or timely enough. Nations are now stockpiling these weapons. And too often those few countries with the technical capacity to make these deadly chemicals have not been careful enough to prevent their proliferation.

Weapons, of course, do not start wars. Conflicts, hatreds, ambitions and sometimes accidents do start wars. Nonetheless, we must take special measures to prevent the accumulation of weapons, which, by their very nature, would create fear and hair-trigger responses. I know this concern to be very much on the mind of President-elect Bush, and we are determined to build on the recently concluded Paris conference and to make progress soon.

Conclusion

Clearly, we face a formidable agenda as we attempt to deal with the contraries of our age. Yet we start with the strong hand of a strong America. And we shall persist because we know that the stakes are very high.

In a few years, we could know whether a lasting constructive relationship with the Soviet Union is possible. Whether the world economy will progress. Whether our allies in Europe and Asia will look outward. Whether we can extend arms control and deterrence. Whether we can deal successfully with global problems like the environment, terrorism, and drugs. Whether we can create the new frameworks for the developing countries to move forward free of the curse of regional conflicts.

For me and for my generation, these are great prospects, but they are even greater for the next generation of Americans. President-elect Bush spoke for us all when he said to a group of students at Westminster College, "We have lived our lives partly in the sunlight but always in the shadow of struggle.... That struggle is not yet over." And then he told these young Americans, "Your generation has an opportunity to emerge from that shadow and finally enjoy the sunlight without fear."

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. I am certain that a realistic American leadership can seize that opportunity and usher in a more peaceful and prosperous era. It is the chance to lift the shadow of struggle and to leave a better world for America that motivates me. That is why I am here today to seek your support. Together, and under the leadership of our president, we can do it."

(end text)

In the afternoon session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Baker answered three hours of questioning on a variety of subjects. Among the points made by Baker were"

-- On Afghanistan, he emphasized that "we fully expect and believe" that Soviet troops will be withdrawn from that nation by February 15. He said that the Bush administration's goals for Afghanistan will be the same as Reagan's. On Afghan self-determination, he said the freedom fighters would not be pressured by the United States to include communists in the new government.

And, he added that "we see no reason to change the (U.S.) policy of continuing to aid the Afghan freedom fighters so long as the Soviets continue to aid the Kabul regime.

-- He could see a role for the Soviet Union in an international conference on peace in the Middle East if Moscow show signs of playing a "responsible role." Such a conference, Baker emphasized, must be "properly structured" and lead to "direct negotiations" among the parties.

He said that signs of a responsible Soviet role could include restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, continued Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union (which has been "doing pretty well") and ending support for countries such as Libya who opposes Middle East peace efforts.

-- In the continuing agricultural export dispute with the Common Market, Baker would like to see a free market with no agriculture subsidies on either side. For political reasons, both sides must end agricultural subsidies at the same time. He would support sanctions against unfair trade practices in "appropriate cases," stressing that he believes not only in "free trade," but also in "fair trade."

-- He said the Bush policy towards Yugoslavia would be "pretty much as it has been." On alleged human rights abuses against the Albanian minority in that country, "we would do what we can diplomatically to change that."

-- On settling the Cyprus issue, Baker said the United States supports the efforts of the United Nations to resolve this dispute. The new administration would like to see it resolved through direct negotiations between the two sides -- Greece and Turkey.

-- While noting the contributions of allies to the NATO effort in such areas as host country support, conscription and use of land for exercises, Baker said that he would "press for greater burden sharing" by the NATO allies.

-- He emphasized that the new administration still recognizes Devalle as the president of Panama. "There will be no lessening or removal of (U.S.) sanctions unless there is movement on the other side" and "no movement towards normalization while General Noriega" is still in power.

-- The United Nations "can be a force for resolving disputes," and he noted the organization is "making progress" in its budget reforms.

-- It is "difficult now to normalize relations" with Cuba, given Castro's continued support to subversion, the human rights abuses in Cuba, and that country's close ties with the Soviet Union, he said.

Responding to a series of questions from Senator Jesse Helms, the committee's ranking Republican, at the end of the afternoon, Baker said to the best of his knowledge, the United States has never asked the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for compensation for the deaths of Americans at the hands of terrorists affiliated with the PLO.

But he pointed out there has been only one meeting between U.S. and PLO representatives since a dialogue was opened in mid-December.

Baker assured Helms the PLO would have to demonstrate by both word and deed that it has renounced terrorism -- a key condition for the U.S. agreeing to open a dialogue with the organization.

"It's going to have to be done in both," he said adding that one of the subjects the United States considers appropriate to discuss with the PLO is that organization's "abstinence from terrorism."

However, Baker stopped short of accepting Helm's contention that the next instance of any act or threat of terrorism by any PLO faction would be reason for terminating talks with the PLO.

"I think we'd have to look at the circumstances, senator," Baker said. "I'm not sure the PLO can, or pretends to be able to, control everything that goes on over there, and for that matter even perhaps some of the dissident factions. I think it's a case of judging their compliance with their renunciation of terrorism in looking at the whole picture and judging it in good faith," he said. "But we certainly expect to see actions and not words."

Responding to questions from Senator Alan Cranston, Baker voiced strong opposition to providing subsidized credits to the Soviet Union.

He noted that the Western allies, at the Toronto economic summit and in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have adopted a policy of permitting and encouraging normal commercial relations. "I don't think that we should engage in a headlong rush to provide subsidized financing, trade credits and the like," Baker added.

Questioned about Panama, Baker said "it's going to be very difficult for us to see any progress toward normalizing relations as long as General Noriega retains power there." But he said the issue of a Panamanian administrator for the Panama Canal should be dealt with when it arises. Under the Panama Canal treaties, Panama is required to submit to the United States this year the name of the Panamanian citizen who will take over as canal administrator in 1990.

"I'm not sure that we can predict today with any degree of certainty what the situation will be there when that nomination comes forward," Baker told Senator Nancy Kassebaum. "I'm not sure that it's in the best interests of the United States to see us move forward down there under the current situation. A fully functioning democracy in Panama is clearly in our best interests as well as in the best interests of Panama. And we do not have a fully functioning democracy in Panama today," he said.

Senator Helms voiced strong support for Jonas Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and sharply questioned Baker about future U.S. support for that organization. President-elect Bush sent Savimbi a letter recently, pledging to continue "effective and appropriate" U.S. assistance.

Baker said the incoming administration has not yet "firmed up the details" of an international conference to deal with environmental problems, which had been a campaign commitment of Vice President Bush.

He said he did not yet know when or where the conference would be held or what would be on its agenda.

On other issues, the secretary-designate

-- said he would "press very diligently" to win Congressional approval of a 481 million dollar aid package for the Philippines the United States has pledged in return for the use of the Subic Bay and Clark Air Base facilities. He said Philippine officials would "find it exceedingly difficult to understand if we're not able to fulfill that kind of a commitment after using our best efforts when our level of assistance to the Philippines in recent years has been running at

about 415 million dollars, so it's not that much of an increase."

-- characterized the Latin American debt crisis as "a very important geopolitical problem in addition to being a very important economic and financial problem." He said finding a way to alleviate the problem must be based on the principle of economic growth, which in turn depends on the countries involved adopting free market economic policies and being able to find capital to fund their growth enhancing efforts. He emphasized that dealing with the debt problems of the developing world must not be put "on the backs of the taxpayers." He also warned Congress "cannot legislate a cure."

-- noted that the debt of many African nations is an "entirely different situation" because up to 70 percent of African debt is owed to official and multilateral creditors, which "opens itself up to a magic bullet cure." He noted that last year's economic summit in Toronto favored extending debt maturities well into the future, which provides a cash flow benefit to the countries involved but does not write the debt off the books. Baker said he anticipates further moves in that direction at the Paris summit in July and said he supports U.S. participation in it "recognizing the serious budget constraints that are involved."

-- said he does not anticipate any change in U.S. support for the so-called Front Line states in southern Africa. Baker said while the insurgency in Mozambique is not as active and effective as it once was, that country remains in "rather sad shape." But he said what ultimately happens there is going to "depend on the resolve of the Mozambican people and their government. I think what's happened recently is encouraging."

-- declared that "the core problem of apartheid persists" in South Africa, and added, "I really don't see the possibility for the United States normalizing relations with South Africa without there being real progress toward dismantling that system." He said U.S. sanctions have "amplified that message," but he pointed out that "the sanctions we've imposed haven't produced the desired result. And by themselves, they probably cannot produce the desired result." Indeed, repression has intensified, and the United States needs to review its policy toward South Africa, he said, adding "it's an extraordinarily difficult problem and it's one that's going to clearly occupy our time and attention."

-- emphasized the incoming administration's fundamental objectives in El Salvador will be to support the democratic political process and to promote the observance of human rights. While there has been a recent increase in politically motivated violence, he pointed out that Vice President Bush clearly expressed his firm opposition to right-wing death squads during a 1983 visit to San Salvador and said Bush may warn that a resurgence of death squad activity could imperil U.S. assistance. Baker also noted that despite guerrilla efforts, the democratic political process has become established in El Salvador, with five "free, honest elections" having been held since 1982 and with another election scheduled in March. "You should not worry about the new administration going soft on human rights in El Salvador, because that is simply not going to happen," he added.

american cultural center

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January 18, 1989

Dear Friend:

February has been designated **Black History Month** by the U.S. Congress, honoring the history and achievement of Black Americans. To commemorate this occasion, the American Cultural Center, Jerusalem, is pleased to present three special programs featuring videotapes depicting aspects of the Black American experience.

Sunday, February 19, 8:00 p.m.

A History of the Negro in America details the history of Black people in the United States using old prints, documents, photographs and footage. We are especially pleased to have Professor Richard Polenber, Fulbright Professor of American Studies at The Hebrew University, introduce this program.

Tuesday, February 21, 8:00 p.m.

An evening devoted to Black achievement in the arts:

Black Artists in the U.S.A. a video survey of the work of Black artists from the 18th century to the present.

Achievements in American Black Literature and Poetry

Abbey Lincoln and Roscoe Lee Browne read from the works of such authors as Langston Hughes, Richard Wright, Nikki Giovanni and Fredrick Douglas.

Black Shadows on a Silver Screen - a History of the Blacks in the Cinema

Thursday, February 23, 8.00 p.m.

King - Montgomery to Memphis a detailed history of the Martin Luther King, Jr. years -- his achievements, his assassination, and his legacy.

To reserve a place for any or all of these programs, please call 225755 or 222376.

Sincerely,



Philippe duChateau
Director



United States Information Service

ISRAEL'S ABSOLUTE, and suicidal, dependence on Western consumer society, and especially on the U.S., is considered by many the only viable policy. This is a radical mistake. The future will probably provide Israel with another political alternative as a result of major changes in international affairs.

So far the U.S. has shown itself to be a completely unreliable ally, undermined by the weaknesses inherent in its political and economic system.

The American political system is crumbling. It is not the majority that rules the country, but different minorities whose role may be decisive in the shaky political balance. Now nobody cares about the majority, but only about the minorities. (Let us recall Natorei Karta.) A few extremists impose their will on a nation. It is tragic to see how such a really great country like the U.S. is swiftly crumbling into a chaotic conglomerate of pressure groups.

The U.S. is still the economic leader of the world since the colossus of American industry, which devours a major part of the world's resources, is able to supply the world with cars, arms, thrillers, etc., and is able to supply credit and food. But since the American economy is built on the principle of permanent growth, the U.S. is extremely sensitive to the problem of natural resources (now it is oil) and can easily be blackmailed by every resource-holder. Being unable to control politically the resource-holders, the U.S. uses the only other policy possible, that of appeasement.

One of the most important reasons for the political weakness of the U.S. abroad is the Vietnam syndrome, which has developed to the level of psychosis. One can see this in the popular American movie "Coming Home," which went so far as to attempt to explain marital infidelity vis-a-vis the Vietnam war. Any intervention abroad on the part of the U.S., especially in a distant part of the world, is now likely to be subject to an immediate condemnation by the traumatized American public, whose will to play the role of the superpower was thoroughly broken in Vietnam.

The power of the president has deteriorated since Watergate, and Carter is not the man to restore it. It is impossible to expect a president completely dependent on Congress and on different pressure groups to make a quick political decision on matters of war and peace.

CURRENT AMERICAN foreign policy, and certainly Middle East policy, is that of an ailing sybarite, whose only aim is to supply himself with sufficient natural resources to maintain his wasteful way of life. This sybarite theoretically has enough power to destroy any enemy by a nuclear strike (with the risk of being destroyed himself). But such a nuclear strike is considered only as a deterrent, and nobody seriously thinks it would be applied in a local conflict.

The old American tiger dares to show his claws only to the West's "bad boys," like South Africa or

Chile. Simultaneously, he appeases almost every aggressor, as it did when praising the Cubans for their "constructive" role in Africa.

The enormous discrepancy between economic strength and actual military power, between the possibility of a huge arms supply and the possibility of a military operation, is characteristic of American foreign policy. Another distressing feature is the systematic betrayal of allies and friends, as if they were America's worst enemies.

It is a sad paradox, but now it is preferable to be in opposition to the U.S. than to be among its friends. The U.S. easily betrayed its allies in Vietnam, Cambodia, Taiwan, Iran, Nicaragua, and elsewhere it is continually appeasing its enemies. This has been the general rule of American foreign policy. To get American assistance, to ensure that America will come courting, one has to be among its enemies, or at least among its critics.

One can understand those African leaders who, shocked by the thoughtlessness of the U.S. in Africa, realized that it would be crazy to rely on Americans for help, and, having no alternative, submitted to Soviet pressure.

The U.S. freely chose the role of superpower with global ambitions. But while the U.S. pretends to be a superpower, it doesn't take the concomitant responsibility for its actions. This puts its friends in a very difficult position.

Every ally of America suffers for being one in proportion to the strength of the alliance. Friendship with the U.S. is interpreted as a choice made in a world polarized into two camps. Any country making this choice is not only left without real support, but also invites hostility from the opposite camp. Any American move anywhere is immediately challenged by a Soviet action.

In these conditions of push-pull American-Soviet rivalry, to have the unfaithful and politically weak U.S. as one's exclusive ally is simply foolish. The U.S., ambitious to push the USSR out of the Middle East, has greatly endangered the position of Israel, and possibly made it the target for a new military attack and merely demonstrated America's weakness. For while the U.S. may provoke a new conflict, it cannot intervene in one directly. The cost, one must assume, will be paid by Israel.

THE U.S. gave up on John Kennedy's call for that nation to be a guardian of world freedom. Instead, it decided to be a guardian of the world's natural resources, but even that it can't manage. The U.S., it

A dangerous policy

MIKHAIL AGURSKY warns against Israel relying on the U.S. as its sole ally since America is a seriously weakened superpower.

16 Sept. 1979 Jerusalem Post

turns out, has become the main international "resource beggar." What a miserable change!

The period of American grandeur is ending. One can now observe a selfish, short-sighted, faint-hearted policy, that of an ailing strongman obsessed by consumption, hiding his head like an ostrich in the sand, losing friends voluntarily.

Who can rely on American guarantees? Any intention of fulfilling obligations may be dropped. Who

can entrust his destiny to an unyielding political machine when his life may be decided in hours?

How can the U.S. be independent if in the year 2000 it will have to import (aside from oil) 80 per cent of its ferrous metals and 70 per cent of its non-ferrous metals? Syria, Nigeria, Mexico, Iraq, Saudia Arabia and others are incomparably more independent than the U.S. The U.S. may cut a heroic figure, but has feet of clay.

If it is dangerous to rely on the U.S., who else in this crazy world could be a natural ally for Israeli? Western Europe has the same ailments the U.S. has. It is swiftly losing its independence, being too old and too sybaritic to use force to guarantee its needs. Western Europe is ready to endure every humiliation to guarantee its supply of raw materials.

An historical irony may make Israel's arch-enemy, the USSR, its reliable, natural ally in the foreseeable future, though the way is painful and thorny. And it will not be the USSR we know today. It will be the post-Brezhnev and post-Tchernenko Russia, which will eventually perceive the inevitability of confrontation with Islam, giving it a common denominator with Israel.

The author works at the Hebrew University's Russian Research Centre and is a former leading Soviet Jewish dissident.

1979 221600

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JANUARY 17, 1989 תדרוך דובר כחפ"ד ליום

Q Do you have anything on the reports that some of the sanctions against Libya might be eased?

MR. HARTER: The White House addressed that subject at their briefing just about an hour ago, and I have nothing beyond what they said at that time.

Q Do you have anything, Dennis, on the reports that an Arab-American group has invited Yassir Arafat to come to the US in April?

MR. HARTER: We have seen those reports but have no record of his having applied for a visa. As we've indicated before, we can't speculate, obviously, if we don't have an application.

Q I believe it was ABC reporting today that up to 12 PLO members were assisting with the investigation of the Lockerbie crash. Do you have anything on that?

MR. HARTER: As Chuck mentioned several times last week, we would welcome assistance from any legitimate source in this investigation

with regard to the tragedy of the Pan Am Flight 103. To our knowledge, however, the PLO has not provided such assistance. Yes?

Q There are members of the Israeli Cabinet who are, apparently, concerned about the continued violence in the Occupied Territories and the army's apparent aggressiveness. Any response to that?

תפוצה:

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MR. HARTER: We are deeply concerned over the rise in violent confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis, which have resulted in increased injuries and deaths. We especially regret the loss of life. Restraint is called for now. There is an urgent need for Palestinians and Israelis alike to pull back from confrontation and reflect seriously on what each side can do to promote calm and create an atmosphere conducive to dialogue, understanding and negotiations.

Q Over the months, there has been this thing about the Israeli forces using -- not using rubber bullets. Have you all addressed this question again? Over the weeks at this podium, Chuck has said that you all made these concerns [known] to the Israeli government, but has this been brought up again in recent days?

MR. HARTER: Well, I won't get into the specifics of our dialogue with the Israeli government, but you can rest assure that that matter continues to be one of discussion. Yes?

Q Dennis, Senator Helms, during the Baker hearings this morning, said that chemical weapons had been brought in and stored by the Cubans in Namibia and, further, that on three separate occasions, the Cubans had used chemical weapons on UNITA forces in Angola. Are you aware of this?

MR. HARTER: I don't have anything to help you with that story. At this point, the questions regarding Secretary Baker's testimony and the things that he is providing in that testimony will have to go to Secretary Baker and the new team.

X

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	נאו"ם ג'רמי יששכרופ

ביקור איימה ופיקו

1. איימה היוצא הערב (17/1) לביקור קצר בירדן וקהיר, התקשר, לפי בקשת המזכ"ל, בעניין הבא.
2. המזכ"ל מבקש לשגר את איימה ופיקו לביקור קצר בירושלים על מנת שיפגשו ויחליפו דעות עם גורמים מדיניים בעניין תהליך השלום. הביקור, לדברי איימה, יהיה "LOW-KEY", ומבקשים לבוא לישראל ב-30/1 בערב, לשעות יומיים בירושלים, ולעזוב ב-1/2 בערב לדמשק. ניתן יהיה לקבוע, איפוא, פגישות עבודה ב-31/1 וב-1/2 (במשך חיום) תחילה איימה לא ביקש פגישה עם אישיות ספציפית, אך כאשר שאלתיו אם יש לו בקשה מיוחדת העלה האפשרות של פגישות עם סגן שה"ח נתניהו וכן מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ כו-אהרן. הסביר שעבר זמן רב מאז ביקורו האחרון בישראל וישמח לעשות היכרות עם בעלי תפקיד חדשים כמשח"ץ כגון המנכ"ל ראובן מרחב.
4. הבטחתי להעביר הבקשה לירושלים. איימה ביקש אם נוכל להודיע על פרטים לליזה בטנהיים כאן. איימה יחזור לנ"י אחרי רבת עמון וקהיר בטרם יציאתו לישראל.
5. מניחים שתשקלו פגישות נוספות לפי ראות עיניכם.
6. הביאונא הנ"ל לידועת ביון.

נאו"ם

נאו"ם

סה"ח 3 3 1 1 1 2 2
מחלקת 3 3 1 1 1 2 2
מחלקת 3 3 1 1 1 2 2

3

חאיר: 17.1.89 ספ השולח: לוי יליה אישור:

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

11550

תאריך 17.01.89

יוצא **

שמור

**

**

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506

חוזם: 1,11550

אל: פרנציסקו/103

מ-: המשרד, תא: 170189, זח: 1526, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: @ גס: מקצב

נד: @

שמור מיידי

שני טל

ועידת רהמ.

הרשימה שצויינה בסעיף ו בשלך 28 טרם הגיעתנו. נודה על
העברתה בחוזר.

הלל

לש

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מקצב,
פאולמרט/מזכירות הממשלה

January 17, 1989
Issue 83


AN ARAB INTERPRETATION OF RECENT PLO PROCLAMATIONS

Cartoonists have played a major role in expressing political trends in Arab politics. Unlike Western cartoonists they have been perceived to represent the regime itself by serving as its mouthpiece, or represent a major threat to the survival of the regime by supporting dissident elements and insurgencies.

A most outstanding cartoonist, Naji al-Ali, was murdered in London in July 1987 by Arafat's own Special Operations Unit, headed by Col Hawari. Naji al-Ali was known for his anti-Arafat cartoon-editorializing.

Reprinted here are three recent cartoon-editorials:

KUWAIT'S INTERPRETATION OF ARAFAT'S GENEVA SPEECH



(al-Anba'a, Kuwait, December 14, 1988; note that the number "9" is drawn so as to resemble the shape of the whole of Palestine from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River)


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
.../2

JORDAN'S INTERPRETATION

PALESTINE



(Saut al-Sha'ab, Amman, December 26, 1988; this newspaper is regarded as King Hussein's mouthpiece)



(al-Ra'i, Amman, January 1, 1989; the sword carries the date "1989" in Arabic script, and the severed head represents that of Prime Minister Shamir)

נכנס

בלמס

א"ת

חוזם: 1,11041

אל: המשרד

מ-: טורונטו, נר: 26, תא: 130189, זח: 1500, דח: ר, סג: בל

תח: @ גס: מקצב

נד: @

בלמס/רגיל

אל: לשכת המנכל

דע: מצפא-בני אבילאה

מאת: הקונסול, טורונטו

הנדון: הועידה לסולידאריות יהודית

לשלכם נר 79 מ-12 דנא

להלן רשימת המנהיגים והאישים היהודיים מהשורה הראשונה
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הקונסוליה בטורונטו.

1. RABBI GUNTHER PLAUT

רב רפורמי. אישיות דתית רוחנית בקנה מידה לאומי קנדי.

2. MR. PHIL GRANOVSKY

חבר הנהלת הסוכנות. יור ועידת פורום הינני (מגדולי
התורמים).

3. RAY AND ROSE WOLFE

מגדולי התורמים והפעילים בקהיליה. גב' רוז היתה נשיאת
הקונגרס היהודי בטורונטו.

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(UNITED JEWISH APPEAL - UJA)

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הליגה נגד השמצה
של בני ברית

המלך דוד 30
ירושלים 94101

02-224844

02-221171

הרי וואל



HARRY WALL

Director, Israel Office

לידיעתך

F.Y.I.

LYNNE IANNIELLO
Director, Communications Division

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

New York, NY, December 27....The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith has urged the U.S. State Department "to adopt strict criteria" to determine the Palestine Liberation Organization's commitment to Israel's right to peace and security.

In a letter (dated December 23) to Secretary of State George P. Shultz in Washington, Burton S. Levinson, ADL's national chairman, and Abraham H. Foxman, the agency's national director, said that while the U.S. has indicated that the PLO has met the basic conditions to open a dialogue, "it remains clear that fundamental changes necessary to peace in the Middle East are still a long way off."

The ADL leaders made the following recommendations to Mr. Shultz:

- The U.S. should insist that for the PLO to qualify as a party to negotiations, it must renounce its Covenant, which calls for Israel's dissolution.
- The PLO should be encouraged "in the strongest terms" to order an end to the violence that it has sanctioned and abetted in the West Bank and Gaza..
- The U.S. must make clear to Yasir Arafat and to all representatives of factions under the PLO umbrella that they will be held accountable for any violations of the "renunciation of terrorism" in word or deed. The U.S. should state for the record that such violations will result in an immediate halt to any discussion with Washington.

ADL pointed out that several PLO officials have already vowed to break with Arafat's December 14 statement in Geneva, in which he renounced terrorism in all its forms. The League noted that Salah Khalaf, Arafat's second-in-command, declared: "Neither military

(more)

JAN 1 1980



attacks nor our heroic intifada will stop. We will carry on our struggle until the Palestinian flag is hoisted over Jerusalem."

Those remarks came just three days after the State Department announced it would open a dialogue with the PLO.

Mr. Levinson and Mr. Foxman said that Khalaf's remarks "should be understood...in the context of the PLO's history of regarding all actions against Israel as military operations." They added that "once the PLO realized the repugnance of terrorism to a majority of the world community, it began to routinely justify its acts by portraying civilian targets as military, and its cowardly atrocities as acts of heroism."

The League asked Mr. Shultz for his reaction to the recommendations and also asked how the U.S. plans to address these difficult issues.

#

AJ,C-A,DC-A,IP-A,LAJ,MPC,MP,BHFOR-A,BHN-A-Sp-FAX-88

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13510

תאריך : 19.01.89

יוצא

בלמס

חוזם: 1,13510
אל: נ/י, 673/ווש/649
מ-: המשרד, תא: 190189, זח: 1516, דח: ב, סג: בל
תח: א גס: הסברה
נד: א

בלמ'ס/בהול

אל: ניו יורק - קונכ'ל
דע: וושינגטון

פגישת מועדון הנשיאים על רקע אפשרות ביקור ערפאת. שלך 359
מ-18.1, ולשיחתן הטלפונית עם מנה'ס.

להלן התבטאויות המבוקשות ופרטים רלוונטיים:

1. דברי הרמטכ'ל בועדת החוץ והבטחון (המקור מעריב 11.1):

לגבי אל-פתח הגדול בארגוני אש'פ וכן ארגונים קטנים ממנו
הכפופים ליאסר ערפאת אמר רב-אלוף דן שומרון כי 'אלה 'אינם
פעילים' מחודש נובמבר. עם זאת הבהיר: 'אין יודעים על שום
פקודה שניתנה בפועל לחדול מלבצע פיגועים נגד ישראל'.
(מעריב 17.1).

2. ראו בעניין זה הערכת מקורות צבאיים כפי שהופיעו בכתבה
ב'הארץ' 13.1:

'למרות שארגון הפת'ח והארגונים האחרים באש'פ נמנעו מאז חודש
נובמבר מלבצע פיגועים נגד ישובי הצפון, הערכת מקורות צבאיים
בצפון היא שבתקופה הקרובה, הפעילות של הארגונים המתנגדים
ליוזמת ערפאת תימשך ואף תיגבר ובמקביל לה עלולים גורמים
העומדים באופוזיציה לערפאת ליזום פעולות בתוך אזור הבטחון
ואף נגד ישראל. גורם צבאי בכיר אמר כי לדעתו בפרספקטיבות
זמן של חודש ימים, אין כל משמעות בשטח להימנעות תומכי ערפאת
מפיגועים נגד ישראל וכן יש להמתיך לפחות 6 חודשים לפני שניתן

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מסקנות כלשהן'.

3. דברי שהב'ט רבין: מלשכת שהב'ט שהב'ט אין מידע מעבר לציטוטים שהופיעו באמצעי התקשורת.
עיקרי דבריו הועברו אליכם באמצעות הרדיו. ראו מברק פלמי 404 מה-18.1.

תהליך מדיני

4. דברי רה"מ שמיר בענין מו"מ בחסות המעצמות (10.1):

THE ONLY NORMAL AND ACCEPTABLE WAY TO A PEACE AGREEMENTS THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. FORTUNATELY, WE ARE ALL WITNESS, TODAY, TO A PROGRESS IN SOLVING SEVERAL CONFLICTS IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD BY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED. SUCH NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE LAUNCHED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE GREAT POWERS, OR THE U.N., PROVIDING THEY REFRAIN FROM ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TALKS. IN THIS REGARD WE HAVE HAS A POSITIVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE U.S. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT PLAYED A USEFUL ROLE AT CAMP DAVID WHICH WAS FOUNDED ON THE TRUST AND CREDIBILITY THAT THE U.S. UNJOYED ON THE PART OF THE TWO PARTNERS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. דברי שמיר בשכם כפי שדווחו בעיתוני הצהריים היום 18.1:

'אל יחשוב מישהו, שאיננו יודעים מה נעשה כאן. אני מרוצה מביקורי בשכם, גם אם לא נעמו לאוזני כמה מהדברים ששמעתי'.
בבסיס צבאי, שהוקם בשכם בעקבות ארועי האינתיפאדה, פנה רה"מ, מלווה ברמטכ"ל, אלוף הפיקוד ומפקד איזור שכם, ביחידת צנחנים במילואים, שחייליה לא חששו לומר לו את אשר על ליבם.
'מה שנאמר והושמע כאן היום, מסמל את המצב המיוחד של מדינת ישראל במזה"ת', אמר שמיר בדבריו לחיילי הגדוד.
'הרי לא יתואר שדברים כמו שהושמעו כאן, ייאמרו בצבא של אחת המדינות המקיפות אותנו. 'המציאות שלנו היא שאנו חיים בחלק זה של העולם, מדינה דמוקרטית יחידה, המונחית ע"י יחסי אנוש, כבוד עצמי וערך עליון של חיי אדם. זו הסיבה העיקרית לכך שאנו צריכים ללחום על קיומנו. אני מאמין שבסופו של דבר נגיע לשלום'
שאנו חולמים עליו, וכפי שהמציאות מחייבת. אך אסור לנו להגיע

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לאותו שלום, ע'י כניעה למשהו הנוגד את הדמוקרטיה ואת כבוד האדם. מי שזורק בקבוקי תבערה, אינו זורק אותם מפני שאנו יושבים בשכם, אלא מפני שאנו יושבים בארץ'.

'עלינו לשכנע את שכנינו שניתן לדבר איתנו על שלום, אך אי אפשר להכניע אותנו בכוח, או להשמידנו. את הערבים יוותרו על הדרך של אלימות, נוכל לחיות בשלום. אנחנו שונאים את הטרוריסטים ואת אנשי אש'ף, כי הם מאלצים אותנו לאחוז בנשק ולהרוג ילדים ערבים'. אנחנו חייבים לעשות זאת אם אנו חפצי חיים. עצם זה, שאתם כואבים את המצב מעיד על כך, שאתם נאמנים לכבוד האדם. אי אפשר להגיע לפתרון ללא סבלנות ואורך רוח. השלום המיוחל יגיע. אינני יודע מתי, אך אין ספק כי הוא יבוא. זה יקרה אך ורק כאשר אותם מסיתים ישתכנעו שהאינתיפאדה אינה מועילה להם, ואינה משיגה את מטרתם לבד מהרג ומקורבנות'. בהמשך אמר: 'שכחנו כבר את התקפות הטרור באולימפיאדת מינכן, את שריפת נשים באוטובוסים ויידוי אבנים על תינוקות. אפשר לחשוב מה אנו עושים פה'?

במסיבת עיתונאים שנערכה אח'כ התייחס רה"מ לאמצעים החדשים הננקטים בשטחים ולריבוי הנפגעים החודש האחרון. 'אלימות אפשר לדכא באלימות', אמר, 'צה'ל מחפש אמצעים חדשים כדי להשתלט על האלימות. האמצעים שצה'ל משכלל יצמצמו את תופעת זריקת האבנים במידה רבה ואני מקווה, שבאמצעים אלה, נגיע לקץ האינתיפאדה'.

6. בהופעתו בפני ועדת החוץ והבטחון ב-17 דנא אמר שה'ח ארנס: 'יש מקום ליוזמה ישראלית. במצב שנוצר נחוצה יוזמה שמרכיביה:

1. מו"מ ישיר.
2. הסדר ביניים בדרך להסדר כולל.
3. התייחסות לשאיפות של עם ישראל ודרישות הבטחון של מדינת ישראל וכן התייחסות לשאיפות של האוכלוסיה הערבית ביו"ש וחבל עזה'.

7. נקודות התייחסות נוספות ביחס לתהליך המדיני

עם מי ינוהל מו"מ? קשה להפריד בין אוכלוסיות מערב ומזרח הירדן. בירדן יותר פלשתינים מאשר בגדמ'ע. לכן גם אם חוסיין מהסס בינתיים - הוא בר שיח פוטנציאלי. הקטגוריה האפשרית השניה אוכלוסיית השטחים.

על מה יסוב המו"מ? עם ירדן על גבולות - עם אוכלוסי הגדמ'ע על הסטאטוס של התושבים.

הבעייתיות של אש'ף - אמון על הטרור ודוגל בזכות השיבה ולפיכך אין להדבר עמו.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

8. להלן מספר התבטאויות של ראשי אש"פ:

- אליאס פרייג' חזר בו מהצעתו להפסקת האינתיפאדה בשטחים לצורך נסיונות קידום תהליך מדיני בשל איום של ערפאת ש'כל מי שינסה לעצור ולהפסיק את האינתיפאדה חושף עצמו לכדורי בני עמו ומסתכן באובדן חייו ואש"פ כבר ידע איך לטפל בו'.
על כן הברקנו לכם בפרוטרוט.

- בראיון אבו מאזן (חבר הועד הפועל של אש"פ וראש הועדה הירדנית פלשתינית המשותפת מטעם אש"פ) 'לא נוותר על זכויותנו, ככל שיאריך הזמן, ואנו נשתמש בכל צורות המאבק המדיני והצבאי נגד האויב הציוני. לפני הועדה הלאומית הפלשתינית כינינו את המאבק הזה בשם הג'יהאד הקטן ועתה נכנסנו לתקופת הג'יהאד הגדול אשר יחזור.

- ערפאת ל'מסתקבל' הלבנוני (7.1) בתשובה לשאלה 'מתי תשנו את נוסח האמנה הלאומית הפלשתינית הקוראת לחיסול ישראל' - כשישראל תוריד את מפת ישראל. וישראל התלויה בכנסת, בה מסומנים גבולותיה מן הנילוס עם הפרת'.
הערת מדור מידע: אין ולא היתה מפה כזו בכנסת.

ערפאת לטלויזיה האוסטרית (ב-19.12) ענה על שאלת השדרן 'האם אש"פ הניח את נשקו?' ואמר 'איך נוכל לעשות זאת כאשר אנו חשופים מידי יום לתוקפנות בדרום לבנון...'

9. חדירות מחבלים מאז המל"פ:

- בעת המל"פ ב-13.11.88 השתלטו 5 מחבלים חברי פת"ח על עמדת יוניפ"יל בה היה גם אזרח לבנוני - אותו הרגו לאחר מכן. בחקירתם לאחר שהוסגרו לחיילי יוניפ"יל - אמרו שבכוונתם היתה לבצע פיגוע ראווה גדול בגליל. בתחנת השידור בביירות נאמר שזה 'לכבוד דיוני המל"פ'.

- סיכול פיגוע - פלג טלעאת יעקוב 28.12.88 ליד גדר גבול הצפון שם נהרגו 3 מחבלים מהארגון שמטרתם היתה פיגוע מיקוח בשטח ישראל (ולא ביוש"ע) לאחר המל"פ. כבר במל"פ ה-18 (אפריל 87) היו נסיונות איחוד בין פלג טלעאת יעקוב ופלג אבו אל עבאס ושניהם שבו לחיק אש"פ. במל"פ האחרון השתתף נציג טלעאת יעקוב (שמת בינתיים) כחבר מלא.

- ב-26.12 יצאו 4 מחבלים מארגון 'חזית המאבק העממית' של סמיר רושא לבצע פיגוע בישראל. בשל מזג האוויר ומנוע שהתקלקל נסחפה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

הסירה צפונה ו-3 מהם טבעו בים והרביעי שהיה איתם הצליח להגיע לחוף. סמיר רושא השתתף בכנס המל'פ באלג'יר וחתום על ההודעה המדינית של אש'פ. (מעריב וידיעות 27.12).

10. פגיעות טרור של אש'פ באזרחים אמריקנים

מאי '72: הצבא האדום היפני בהוראת אבו אל-עבאס ביצע פיגוע בשדה התעופה בן גוריון. 14 מבין ההרוגים צליינים מפורטו-ריקו.

מרץ '73: 8 טרוריסטים מפתח משתלטים על שגרירות ערב-הסעודית בחרטום (סודן) בין הנרצחים שגריר ארה"ב בסודאן. (AMBASSADOR CLEO A. NOEL).

יוני '76: שגריר ארה"ב בלבנון נרצח בביירות (AMBASSADOR FRANCIS MELOY JR.) מייחסים את הפיגוע ל'חזית העממית לשחרור פלשתי'.

נוב' '76: יועץ איש קונגרס נרצח בשדה תעופה באיסטנבול כשהוא ממתין לעלות על מטוס אל-על.

פברואר '78: תייר אמריקני נרצח בירושלים כשהתפוצצה פצצה באוטובוס בו נסע.

מרץ '78: בפיגוע מהים (פיגוע כביש החוף) נרצחו 33 איש ביניהם אזרחית אמריקנית GAIL RUBIN בחוף מעגן מיכאל.

מאי '85: כוח 17, תת קבוצה של פת"ח, מקבלים אחריות להטמנת פצצה קרוב למלונן של שולץ בירושלים.

יוני '85: מחבלים בהנהגת אבו אל עבאס חוטפים ספינה (אקילה לאורו) ורוצחים אזרח אמריקני (LEON KLINGHOFFER).

אוק' '86: אמריקני נפצע מזריקת רימון ליד הכותל המערבי.

מאי '88: היוונים עוצרים ומשחררים את מחמד רשיד מקבוצת הווארי שהיה קשור לפיצוץ מטוס פאן-אם מעל הונולולו (הרוג 1 ו-60 פצועים) וכנראה קשור גם בפיגוע ב-1986 במטוס TWA (4 הרוגים אמריקנים ביניהם תינוק).
אש'פ סיפק לרשיד מתרגם ועו"ד בזמן המשפט.

מרץ '88: בהודעה ל-A.P. קיבל ערפאת אחריות לנסיון התנגשות

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בג'ורג' שולץ בירושלים.

11. ראה נא גם מברקיננו היומיים 'אש'פ - התבטאויות,
ידיעות והדגשי הסברה מספרי 1-13.

הסברה/מידע

מג

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה,
ר/מרכז, ממד

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13428

תאריך : 19.01.89

** יוצא

שמו

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חוזם: 1,13428

אל: ני/669, וו/ש/647

מ-: המשרד, תא: 190189, זח: 1450, דח: ב, סג: שמ

תח: פ גס: הסברה

נד: פ

שמו/בהול להזעיק

אל: ניו יורק/הקונכ'ל

דע: וושינגטון/השגריר

ישיבת מועדון הנשיאים.

בנפרד תקבל תדרוך הסברה לקראת שיחתך עם הונלין. אוסיף
הנקודות הבאות:

א. במכתבו לרה"מ מה-22 בדצמבר 1988 כותב הנשיא ריגן בין
היתר:

I AM UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE PLO. THEIR WORDS
WILL HAVE TO BE SUPPORTED BY ACTIONS, NAMELY A
CONTINUING RENUNCIATION OF TERRORISM EVERYWHERE AND
DISASSOCIATION FROM THOSE WHO PERPETRATE IT.

ב. בהופיעו בטלוויזיה האוסטרית ב-19 בדצמבר 1988 בראיון
עם ROBERT HOCHNER אמר ערפאת:

(HOCHNER): MR ARAFAT, LAST WEEK AT THIS FAMOUS PRESS
CONFERENCE YOU RENOUNCED TERRORISM. HAVE YOU DONE THIS
NOT ONLY UNDER MASSIVE U.S. PRESSURE?

(ARAFAT): I DID NOT MEAN TO RENOUNCE (AS HEARD). OUR

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

RESOLUTION CONDEMNEND ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM -
INDIVIDUAL TERRORISM AND STATE TERRORISM. ACTUALLY, I
ONLY REPEATED WHAT OUR PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL
HAD ACCEPTED.

ג. לפי סימז'ת מה-5 בינואר הכחיש ערפאת כי אש'פ עשה
ויתורים כלשהם בכך שהכריז על הסכמתו להחלטת מועב'יט 242
וציין כי הסכמת המל'פ להחלטה זו הותנתה ב-3 עקרונות והם:
- המדינה הפלשתינית
- ההגדרה העצמית
- וזכות השיבה.

מה נשאר אם כן מהחלטה 242 אם היא קשורה וכרוכה בשלוש
התניות אלה.

ד. הכרה בישראל.

יו'ר המל'פ, עבד על חמיד אלסאאחי, בעתון אלסיאסה (כווית)
21.12 אומר:

'התנועה הזאת (חמאס) פרסמה הצהרה האומרת במפורש כי מטרתה
היא פלשתיין. גם אנו שואפים לאותו יעד. אנו פועלים בגדר
האפשרויות המצויות, ולאחר מכן נוכל לדבר על הנושאים
האחרים.. אנו נמשיך, עד אשר נשיג את יעדנו הבסיסי
והעליון.. אם אש'פ יצליח בהקמת מדינה בגדה המערבית
וברצועת עזה, אין זה מונע את המשך המאבק המזוין של כל
פלשתיין. אני אומר שזה צריך להיות היעד של כולנו.. אנו
חייבים לקחת ולהמשיך לבקש אולם מבלי להציע ויתורים..
אנו פועלים להשיג את האפשרי בשלב הנוכחי ונבקש עוד
בהמשך.

בעניין דומה אמר רפיק אל נתשה, נציג אש'פ בסעודיה
(אלווטן),

8.1.89: 'אמנת אש'פ הינה עדיין היסוד של הפעולה הצבאית
והמדינית של אש'פ. תוכנית השלבים היא הבסיס למהלך המדיני
הנוכחי.'

מה שמצטייר מכל הנ'ל הוא שבשלושת הנושאים העיקריים עליהם
הסתמכה ארה'ב כשהחליטה על הדו-שיח עם אש'פ נמשכות
ההסתייגויות של דוברים שונים של הארגון כולל ערפאת, שהכל

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מותנה CONDITIONAL ושה-AMBIGUITY שכל כך מאפיינת ארגון
זה נמשכת. מבחינת האנטרים החיוניים של ישראל עמידת אש'פ
על מדינה פלשתינית, על תורת השלבים ועל זכות השיבה הרבה
יותר משמעותיים מאשר ניסוח זה או אחר.

סמנכ'ל הסברה

פא

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה,
ר/מרכז, ממד

יוצא

בלמס

חוזם: 1,11450

אל: 335/מנמת, 559/ווש

מ-: המשרד, תא: 170189, זח: 1435, דח: ר, סג: בל

תח: א גס: ממד

נד: א

בלמ'ס/רגיל

ארה'ב מכינה מפגש בין מבארכ לרה'מ שמיר.

'אלופד' (16.1) מוסר, כי הממשל האמר' החדש מנסה להכין פסגה בין מבארכ לרה'מ שמיר בווש'ינגטון, במהלך חודש מרץ 1989.

לטענת העתון, מקיים ג'ורג' בוש מגעים עם ישראל בנסיון לדחות את בקור שמיר בארה'ב מפברואר למרץ.

מבארכ אמור לערוך סיור באירופה במהלך חודש מרץ ואף לבקר בווש'ינגטון.

בינ'ל 1 / ערב 1 / ממ'ד

טד

אק

תפ: שהוז, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, ליאור, מצרים, בנצור, מצפא, ממד, סייבל, רביב, מעת, הסברה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

11360

תאריך : 17.01.89

נכנס

בלמס

חוזם: 1,11360

אל: המשרד

מ-: וינה, נר: 113, תא: 170189, זח: 1000, דח: ר, סג: בל

תח: פ גס: אירופה

נד: פ

מחלקת
הקשר

בלמס/רגיל

אל: אירופה 1

דע: מצפ' א'

מאת: וינה

שיחת מוק-שולץ בנושא המזהת

בעתונות דווח שמוק אמר לשולץ שיש לברך על היוזמה של אשפ ושחייבים לקיים את הדינמיקה בנדון. מוק הציע להקים ועדה שתכין ועדה ב'ל בחסות האום.

שולץ הגיב שהוא סבור ששיחות ישירות בין הצדדים לסכסוך
הן המכריעות.

ירדן

פא

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, ממד, איר, 1,
בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13507

תאריך : 19.01.89

יוצא **

שמור

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חוזם: 1,13507

אל: ווש/648, ני/672

מ-: המשרד, תא: 190189, זח: 1530, דח: ב, סג: שמ

תח: גס: ארבל

נד: @

שמור/בהול

ערן ווש

דע: מתני, יששכרוף ני'

מועבי'ט - הודעה נשיאותית.

א. קיבלת העתקי הדיווחים של נאו'ם בנושא.

ב. אנו מודאגים במיוחד מהנסיגה המסתמנת בעמדה האמריקנית בין השיחה עם אוקון (נר 64 לווש') לבין השיחה עם הום (נר 68).

ג. נבקשך לשוחח דחופות בדרג מתאים במחמ'ד ולדרוש:
1. שמחמ'ד לא ינסה להתעלם מהעובדה שהיזמה להודעה הנשיאותית באה ישירות מאש'פ לנשיא. עובדה היא שיש נוסח שהוצע ע'י אש'פ וגם אם הנשיא שינה אותו זה נשאר במהותו מהלך אשפ'י של הפעלה ישירה של המועצה. הזכות להפעיל המועצה שמורה אך ורק למדינות.

2. הנוסח שהוצע ע'י הנשיא, איננו חוזר איננו מאוזן. אנו מבקשים שארה'ב לא חוזר לא תסכים לכל נוסח שמטיל האשמה על האירועים בשטחים על ישראל אין בו קריאה להפסקת האלימות שנגדה נלחמת ישראל.

ד. קיימת אפשרות שאם לא תהיה הסכמה על נוסח 'הודעה נשיאותית' תכונס מועבי'ט ותוגש הצעת החלטה. אם אנשי שיחך יעוררו נקודה זו, עליך לציין שבמקרה כזה תהיה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

זו הזכחה לכוונת אש'פ לעשות הון פוליטי ולהשתמש
ב'אינתיפדה' לקידום מטרותיו. אנו מקוים שבמקרה כזה
ארה'ב לא תאפשר שימוש נוסף לרעה במועבי'ט ותטיל וטו.

ברנע

פא

תפ: שהו, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור, מצפא, ברנע, ארבבל,
ליאור, מזתים, ר/מרכז, ממד

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13553

תאריך : 19.01.89

יוצא **

שמו

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חוזם: 1,13553

אל: 659/וש

מ-: המשורד, תא: 190189, זח: 1606, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: פ גס: מצפא

נד: נ

שמו/מיד

אמש 18/1 בפגישה עם השגריר בראון לרגל חתימת ההסכם
על הקמת הנציגויות שלהם בירושלים ותל-אביב, הביא עמו
את נוסח תדריך דובר מחמ'ד מאותו בוקר ואמר שהוא מוסר
לנו את הדברים המיצגים את עמדת הממשל ואת הבקורת של
ושינגטון על החמרת פעילות צה'ל בשטחים.

מנהל מצפ'א

רש

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

הליגה נגד השמצה

של בני ברית

המלך דוד 30

ירושלים 94101

02—224844

02—221171

הרי וואל



HARRY WALL

Director, Israel Office

לידיעתך

Anti-Defamation League

823 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017

ADL of B'nai B'rith
212-490-2525 Telex 649278

LYNNE IANNIELLO
Director, Communications Division

NEWS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

New York, NY, December 30...Secretary of State George P. Shultz has told the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith that he "will be pleased" to receive the agency's Klinghoffer Award to be presented in June 1989. The award is given by ADL's Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer Memorial Foundation in recognition of significant contributions in combatting terrorism.

In their letter advising Mr. Shultz that he had been selected as a recipient of the award, Ilsa and Lisa Klinghoffer -- whose parents, Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer, were among the hostages seized by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorists aboard the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1985 -- paid tribute to the Secretary of State for his leadership in the struggle against terrorism. The Klinghoffers specifically cited his "courageous decision" earlier this month to deny Yasir Arafat a U.S. visa, which would have allowed the PLO leader to address the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

The Klinghoffer Award will be presented at a session of the League's National Commission meeting here in June. It was previously presented to the British Government in 1987 for its action in breaking diplomatic relations with Syria in response to that country's attempt to blow up an Israeli El Al airplane. No presentation was made in 1988.

The Klinghoffer Foundation was organized in the aftermath of the Achille Lauro tragedy in which Mr. Klinghoffer -- who was wheelchair-bound -- was shot to death by PLO terrorists and thrown overboard. The Foundation, affiliated with the League since 1986, seeks to educate the public on the threat of international terrorism and has sponsored numerous conferences and publications toward that end.

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AJ, D.C., IP, LAJ, MPC, MP, BHN, BHP-88

Our 75th Year



Founded in 1913 "to stop the defamation of the Jewish people . . . to secure justice and fair treatment to all citizens alike." 1913 - 1988

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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תאריך : 14.01.89

נכנס **

סודי

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חוזם: 1,9789

אל: המשרד

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סודי/מידי

אל: ראובן הלל מקצב

דע: סמנכל צפ'א

מנהל מצפא

ציר הסברה וושינגטון

ועידת רה"מ לסולידריות יהודית

א. ברצוני לברך על היוזמה הנ'ל. מציע כי על מכתב ההזמנה יהיה חתום רה"מ עצמו כדי להבליט את חשיבות הענין כולו.

ב. על סמך שיחות רבות בתחום השיפוט שלי קיימת ציפיה בקרב תומכינו היהודים כי ממשלת ישראל תצא ביוזמה מדינית בהקדם האפשרי, יוזמה שתנוסח במונחים פוזיטיביים. יוזמה כזו תזכה כנראה לתמיכת כל יהודי ארה"ב. לשון אחר, היוזמה צריכה להיות מנוסחת במונחים של 'בעד' ולא דווקא במונחים של 'נגד'.

ג. גורמים יהודים רבים מצביעים על כך שיש להקנות תחושה של כיוון ברור. הדימוי של אי עשייה וקפיאה על השמרים יוצר ואקום בקרב תומכינו ומשמש כר פעולה מתאים לגורמים המבקשים לצאת ביוזמות פרטיזניות למען קידום התהליך המדיני.

ד. פרשת 'מיהו יהודי' הייתה סימפטומטית לאבחן האמון המוחלט של יהודי ברה"ב בישראל. רבים שואלים עתה שאלות קשות כיצד ניתן לסמוך על ישראל בנושאים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אחרים. חלק מראשי הקהילה בסן פרנציסקו מדברים על מעין
'משבר אימון' בין ישראל לבין יהודי ארה"ב.

הלאור האמור לעיל, רצוי לאפשר לבאי הכינוס לשחרר הלחצים
אשר הצטברו לאחרונה באמצעות דו שיח גלוי לב.

ו. בנפרד רשימות האישים מתחום השיפוט שלי המסומנים בכוכב
הינם החשובים ביותר.

שני טל

פא

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, רביב, מקצב, בנצור, מצפא,
אולמרט/מזכירותהממשלה

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נבליק פאלק

מצב: -

1) מאמר פרנקל ד- פ.א.א. על באון רופא "ג'ראלד פוסט"

2) מאמר בורסי ד- W.Z. על דיקור סאן שפה.

3) מאמר ויליאמס ד- LAT כולל באון על מנא אסד רופא

פא

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תפוצה: 2-

Shamir Shifts Stance on

Internationally Sponsored Talks

By Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Foreign Service

TEL AVIV, Jan. 13—After two years of unyielding opposition, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir this week quietly but dramatically shifted ground and endorsed holding direct talks with Israel's Arab foes under international auspices—a plan previously championed by his main political rival, Vice Premier Shimon Peres.

Shamir's aides insist that the prime minister still opposes Peres's proposal for an international Middle East peace conference. But Shamir's language and the mechanism he described in statements and interviews sound virtually identical to the plan that Peres promoted and Shamir vetoed in 1987.

It also mirrors the Middle East peace plan proposed last year by Secretary of State George P. Shultz, a proposal that died after Shamir expressed firm opposition.

"I don't believe in conferences and things like that," Shamir told the Jerusalem Post in an interview published today. "But if it can help someone that these negotiations be held under some formal auspices of the superpowers or the U.N., I don't mind—as long as the negotiations themselves are direct and on condition that the external bodies do not intervene in the content of the negotiations. Maybe it can help."

Asked about a formal role for the United Nations, with which Israel has long been locked into a hostile stance, Shamir replied: "I don't mind, I don't mind. It just shows

how far we are willing to go, even to take certain risks . . . I'm willing to try it."

The prime minister mentioned Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar's intermediary role in the Iran-Iraq war as one example of the kind of help the world body could provide. "This is being conducted under the auspices of the U.N. secretary general who invites the negotiating sides . . . but does not intervene in the negotiations themselves," he said.

"The main thing is to get to negotiations," Shamir said. "I know very well that the road from negotiations to a settlement is a long one, but if we don't start down this road we will never reach an agreement."


Shamir's aides denied that his new statements marked an abrupt change of stance

for the prime minister, who portrayed Peres's international conference proposal as a potential betrayal of Israel during last fall's bitter election campaign.

"His opposition to an international conference is as strong as ever, but he is looking for mechanisms or formulas to get direct negotiations going, and he will leave no stone unturned to find them," said Shamir's media adviser, Avi Pazner.

But senior officials acknowledged that Shamir's remarks this week were a significant departure from the past. They attributed the change to several factors, especially the recent U.S. decision to open a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization and mounting international pressure

See SHAMIR, A18, Col. 4



YITZHAK SHAMIR
... "Maybe it can help."

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Shamir Quietly Shifts Stance on Peace Talks

SHAMIR, From A14

on Israel to offer concessions to get peace talks started. They said Shamir also hopes to mobilize renewed support from American Jewish leaders, who have stunned Israel by generally reacting passively to the U.S. move.

Political scientist Eytan Gilboa of Hebrew University said Shamir's main concern at the moment is to ease pressure on Israel to enter talks with the PLO and also to counter the image that the PLO is ready to talk peace while Israel is intransigent. By showing flexibility on the venue and ground rules for talks, Gilboa said, Shamir hopes to maintain his insistence that any negotiations be with King Hussein of Jordan and unaffiliated Palestinians from the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, rather than with the PLO.

A senior Israeli official said domestic politics also played a major role in the shift. Before November, he said, Shamir was trapped in an equal governing partnership with the more dovish Peres that limited the prime minister's options.

In the last two years of the old government, Peres served as foreign minister and conducted a virtually independent foreign policy

that left the two leaders at bitter odds. But after the inconclusive November election, in which Shamir's rightist Likud outpolled Peres's Labor party by one Knesset seat, the Labor leader agreed to become finance minister and at least temporarily take a back seat in the peace process, giving Shamir a freer hand.

"Shamir was in the position of always having to look over his shoulder to see what Peres was up to," said the official. "And he knew that anything he offered in concessions, Peres would then come and offer twice as much. He doesn't have that problem anymore."

The prime minister also has consolidated his position within his own Likud party and among the Israeli right, outmaneuvering party rivals and placing some of his key supporters in Cabinet posts, the official noted. "It's been three days since Shamir first mentioned the U.N. idea and so far there has not been one voice of criticism from the right," said the official. "He feels a lot stronger politically than before."

It was Peres who first proposed conducting an international peace conference under U.N. Security Council auspices after holding a secret meeting with Jordan's King Hussein in London in April 1987

Peres insisted the conference would serve only as a framework for direct negotiations between Israel and a joint delegation representing Jordan and Palestinians from the occupied territories. But Shamir contended that such a conference ultimately would serve to coerce Israel into withdrawing from the territories and allowing the establishment of a Palestinian state there. The Inner Cabinet split 5 to 5 along party lines in a vote in May 1987, effectively killing the proposal and plunging Israel into 18 months of diplomatic paralysis.

Shamir made clear in today's published interview that he still has no intention of holding talks with the PLO. He also charged that the U.S. decision to talk to the PLO had added fuel to the 13-month-old Palestinian uprising in which about 350 Arabs and 15 Israelis have been killed.

"I think they prolonged the *intifada*," Shamir said. "I don't know for how long, but it gave a great push and great encouragement to people who perhaps had reached the point where they were considering desisting from this way. But here they saw that there are rewards, that there is compensation for their sacrifices, and I am surprised that the Americans did not think about this in advance."

Israel is confident it can repair sagging image

By James M. Dorsey
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Israel is concerned about its eroding image in the United States, but feels it can still change increasingly pro-Palestinian public opinion, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said yesterday.

Speaking to Israeli journalists, Mr. Netanyahu said he had come to Washington to listen to officials of the outgoing and incoming administrations so that he could report back to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Foreign Minister Moshe Arens.

Mr. Netanyahu said elements of an Israeli peace proposal had been discussed in his meetings during the past three days in both Washington and New York.

The official said the proposal which is still being drafted in Jerusalem would be completed by March, in time for Mr. Shamir's planned visit to Washington.

Besides Mr. Shultz, Mr. Netanyahu met with President-elect George Bush's incoming national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and Dennis Ross, designated to be assistant secretary of state for policy

planning in the incoming administration.

The Israeli official also met Jewish groups and boards of major news organizations in New York.

Mr. Netanyahu said the issue of elections in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip had been raised in a number of his meetings, but that concern had focused on Israel's eroding image.

Asked as he left his meeting with Mr. Shultz whether Israel's peace proposals had been raised, Mr. Netanyahu said: "We had a very good conversation, but it was private. . . .

There will be some good suggestions."

U.S. officials said Mr. Netanyahu had not presented any new ideas.

Other sources said the official had raised the possibility of an Israeli withdrawal from population centers on the West Bank and Gaza as part of the its proposal.

These sources quoted Mr. Netanyahu as saying Israel had three options in opening a dialogue with Palestinians: It could talk to Palestinians living in Israel, Palestinians living in the occupied territories or Palestinians living in Jor-

dan. Mr. Netanyahu did not indicate which option Israel would prefer.

U.S. and Israeli sources said earlier that the Israeli ideas include proposals to grant Palestinians limited self-rule in the territory for a period of three years, during which Israel would negotiate the final status of the West Bank and Gaza with locally elected representatives.

Mr. Netanyahu said the erosion of Israel's image was the result of a successful strategy by the Palestine Liberation Organization to influence public opinion without changing its

own position.

The official said he had shown his interlocutors in New York and on Capitol Hill a long list of statements from senior PLO officials, dating from the period after PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat's Geneva statements, which prove that the guerrilla movement still calls for Israel's destruction.

The Reagan administration decided to open a dialogue with the PLO after Mr. Arafat in early December in Geneva recognized Israel and key U.N. Security Council resolutions and renounced terrorism.

Mr. Netanyahu said the United States remained "inherently skeptical" of the PLO and, unlike Western Europe, did not romanticize the guerrilla movement.

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Israel Floating Mideast Peace Ideas

By DANIEL WILLIAMS, Times Staff Writer

LAT

JERUSALEM—Israel has begun to float proposals on the form and substance of eventual Middle East peace talks in the hope of countering efforts by the Palestine Liberation Organization to begin negotiations aimed at creating a Palestinian state.

Sources in the office of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and in the Foreign Ministry say the proposed initiatives center on the 1978 Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel, which provided for a period of "autonomy" for Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.

They say that presentation of a plan will eventually coincide with a publicity campaign to win the support of the American public and, specifically, influential Jewish groups in the United States.

Once an Immovable Object

Independent observers have noted that the outlines of the ideas being floated are little different from proposals as much as a decade old. They point out, however, that because the plans are being weighed by Shamir, who has long been considered an immovable object on peace talks, they reflect an effort by the government to give a fresh face to Israeli policy.

"What is new is that these ideas come from Shamir," said Yaron Ezrahi, a political theorist at Hebrew University. "It seems that at last he recognizes that the situation is changing, so Israel must change to keep its head above water."

A Foreign Ministry official said: "Shamir has some plans in mind. This is clearly movement. But he hasn't reached any final decisions."

Shamir told government radio Tuesday that he had not yet worked out a "formal" peace plan. Avi Pazner, his spokesman, would say only that the government is "studying now certain ideas based on our principles."

The two comments were part of a denial of a report here in the Nation

newspaper that said Foreign Minister Moshe Arens gave U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz a draft peace plan at a meeting on chemical warfare this week in Paris.

The report and the denials notwithstanding, a mosaic of proposals has appeared here this week, both in conversations with government officials and in published articles. Generally, the ideas center on two main issues: to whom Israel would talk and what would be talked about.

First, the government remains opposed to talking with the PLO, which it views as a terrorist organization committed to destroying Israel. However, Shamir is toying with the idea of permitting elections in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip aimed at letting Palestinians choose their own delegates to peace talks. Previously, Shamir opposed such elections on the grounds that the PLO would intimidate voters into voting for its candidates.

While conceding PLO victory in any such vote, the government views an election as the lesser of two evils, the alternative being direct PLO representatives chosen outside the occupied territories.

Only a Symbolic Role

Talks with the elected Palestinian delegates, plus officials from Egypt and Jordan, could be held under the auspices of the United States and Soviet Union or of the United Nations. But according to a report on Israel Radio, quoting Shamir, the United Nations would play only a symbolic role and not "intervene" in any way.

From Israel's point of view, the goal of such talks would be to grant limited autonomy, rather than statehood, to Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza. Autonomy is defined as local self-rule by Palestinians until a longer-term resolution is worked out.

In an interview with The Times, a top Shamir assistant, Yosef Ben-Aharon, said that under autonomy, Arabs would be able to select their own local leaders and, if Jordan would permit it, legislators in the Jordanian Parliament. Ben-Aharon called this a plan for "maximum autonomy."

Ben-Aharon outlined an eventual economic union of Israel and Jordan plus the West Bank and Gaza Strip that would permit a free flow of goods and travel across the borders of each "entity."

He said that Israel would maintain security within the West Bank and Gaza in order to prohibit the "thrust of Arab power" from settling on Israel's doorstep.

Ben-Aharon blamed an apparent delay in coming up with a new peace policy on the coalition of Shamir's rightist Likud Party and the center-left Labor Party.

"New ideas have to be approved by a lot of people," he said, "and that is a slow process."

The pressing interest here in producing a peace plan stems from Washington's decision last month to talk with the PLO. The spectacle of Israel's foremost ally talking with a group that sees peace coming in the form of a new independent Arab state on Israel's borders stunned Israeli officials.

"We are against any independent state west of the Jordan River," Ben-Aharon said. "Talks with the PLO would inevitably turn on the creation of a Palestinian state."

Egypt and Jordan have both recognized the Palestinian state, as has the Soviet Union. The Israeli concept of autonomy for the Palestinians is rejected by the PLO and its international supporters as a means of creeping annexation of the occupied territories by Israel.

Israel has embarked on a renewed diplomatic campaign to get its point across, but the way does not look easy.

דחיפות: מיידית	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: _____
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306		כאח: ציר - עודד ערו

מצרים - ביקורים בווינגטון

מג'ון חירש שאל באז-ביטל ביקורו מתוך כעס על שאנשי הממשל החדש סרבו לראותו לפני ה-20.1, אך עתה נדונה אפשרות של ביקור בימים הראשונים לכניסת הממשל החדש. כמו כן ביקשו המצרים אישור לביקור מובדאק במהלך פברואר.

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תפוצה: 36

מלך המלכות ה'תשנ"ח
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שיש בהם אינם רציני לבטחון ישראל, אך להערכתם פחתו הסיכויים להצלחה, בעיקר בגלל החסדים למשק האמריקאי נוכח כוונות האירופאים למכור כלים חלופיים לערבים (למשל, מטוסי טורנדו לסעודיים ועוד).
(3) לדעתם, אייפא"ק ינקוט בעמדה ביטולית לגבי כלים לא פרובלמטיים ושנליים מבחינת בטחון ישראל, אך עקב חבירות שגמחה על אייפא"ק בזמן האחרון (התקרבות לממשל הרפובליקאי) יצאו בתקיפות נגד פריטים כגון מטוסי קרב מתקדמים למדינות ערב.

(ג) הרכב וועדת החוץ

(1) כמדרון בשלנו 242, יעטרף לוועדה הסנטור הדמוקרטי החדש מוירג'יניה, צ'אק רוב (במקום ברוק אדאמס, העובד לוועדת ההקצבות), והסנטורים הרפובליקאים גורדון האמפרי מניו-המפשייר (ותיק) וקוני מאק (מפלורידה) (חדש, חבר בוועדת החוץ בבית הנבחרים בקונגרס האחרון) להערכת ורבורג. הדמוקרטים בוועדה מחזיקים עתה גוש הומוגני לליברלי ובעל תמימות דעים ברוב הנושאים שעל הוועדה לטפל בהם. רק בנושא ניקרגואה ייתכנו חילוקי דעות כי הרי שני "דרומיזם" (טנענו'ד מצפון קרולינה ורוב מוירג'יניה) זהו חובבים להמור בסיוע לקונטרס, בקרב הדמוקרטים הומוגניזם וטנענו'ד מצפון קרולינה, דבר שמבשר טובות בנושא הסיוע. לעומתם הרפובליקאים יהיו מפרלגים לשני מחנות (חמחנה חשמרני של בכיר המיעוט חלמס, אליה מצטרפים האמפרי ומאק וחמחנה הפרגמטס של לוגר, יריבר של חלמס ווועדה). בקיעים אלה מקרב הרפובליקאים יהיו לטובת הדמוקרטים.

(2) הרכב וועדות המשנה של וועדת החוץ טרם סוכס. לבקשת פל, הסכים קרנטון לעבור מתת-וועדה למזה"ת לתת-וועדה לאפריקה למשך שנתיים (עד-1991) - וזאת בשל בעיות איש תת הוועדה לאפריקה (חוסר עניין מצד חברי וועדת החוץ).

דמיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	זר: 3
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(ד) פעילות הוועדה

- (1) מסתמנת מתיחות גוברת בין הגישה הפסגבית של יו"ר הוועדה פל (ראו-נא מברקנו 242) לבין הגישה האקטיבית יותר של מספר חברי הוועדה (קרנסטון, ווי סיימון, קרי דעוד), האחרונים ירצו לקיים שימועים רציניים במספר נושאים רגיונליים ואחרים ואם פל לא יסכים לשימועים נפרדים, אזי יביאו לכך במסגרת השימועים על חצעת חוק הסיוע (הרשאות).
- (2) לגבי החוק הנ"ל, מפקפק וורבורג (כמו אחרים) ביכולתו של פל להעבירו במליאת הסנט. אי-לכך הוא סבור שמנהיג הרוב מיטצ'ל יסכים לקיים דיון בהצעת החוק במליאה רק אם חברים בכירים בוועדה החוץ (ביידן, קרנסטון, סרבנס) יסכימו להיות BABY-SITTERS עבור פל ויעזרו לו בניהול הדיון.
- (3) באשר לנושאים ספציפיים, מסכים וורבורג עם הערכת קריסטיאנסון (מברקנו הנ"ל) שחוק להגברת הסנקציות נגד דרא"פ לא יתקבל חשנה - ולו רק בגלל התנגדות בייקר להטלת סנקציות בכל מצב (מלבד חוסר החתלפות בסנט להגברת הסנקציות במקרה זה). מאידך, הוועדה תצטרך ככל הנראה לטפל ברצינות בנושא אחר והוא המצב בסלבדור, כי קרוב לוודאי יתחווה שם משבר תוך חודשים בעקבות הבחירות הקרובות.

ב/חלפה
למדך

תפוצה:

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סיווג בטחוני:

דחיפות: בהול ביותר

תאריך וזמן רישום
מס. מברק: } לשימוש
מח' הקשר

אל: רושנינגטון, השגריר

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מצ"ב מכתב ברכה מראש הממשלה לנשיא ריגן לרגל סיום כהונתו כנשיא.

אנא העבירוה לתעודתה מיד ואשרו ביצוע.

המכתב המקורי יגיע בדי"פ הקרוב.

י.ח. בן-אהרן

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השולח: אישור מנהל המחלקה: אישור לשכת המנכ"ל: (לציין תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר)

תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח) 19.1.89

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ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem,

January 18, 1989.
322-7

Dear Ron,

I am most grateful to you for your warm words of congratulation to me and my colleagues on the formation of our new Government of National Unity. This Government faces the formidable challenges of external dangers, of economic hardship and the ongoing search for peace with our neighbours and co-existence with the Palestinian Arabs who live under our rule. We shall look for solutions with the utmost vigour and pray that we shall be successful.

Upon the completion of your eight years of outstanding leadership of the United States of America and of the free world, permit me to say that your great accomplishments have already placed you in history as one of the most successful Presidents your country has known. You started out with a vision which, to a large extent, has become a reality. The world is a better place because it bears the imprint of the meaningful steps of Ronald Reagan.

The people of Israel will be eternally grateful for your profound understanding of this small nation's history, its travails and triumphs. Your role in establishing with us the basis for strategic cooperation, for economic development and political understanding has inscribed you in the annals of our people as one of the greatest friends Israel has ever had. The relationship between our two countries has never been better than in the period of your leadership of the United States. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Memorandum of Agreement we signed on Israel's 40th. Anniversary is already known and spoken of as the Reagan Agreement.

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington DC

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
Your words about me personally have moved me deeply. It was a privilege to work with you. It was possible, occasionally, to differ without impairing the basic friendship. It was easy for Israel to be the country with the best voting record at the United Nations at the side of the United States.

I hope to continue working in the same spirit together with your successor and his Administration.

Dear Ron, our people have taken you to their hearts. I hope you will give us an opportunity of saluting you and thanking you for all you have done for freedom, for democracy, for your own great country and for our people. It would be an honour and a joy to welcome you here in our ancient-new land at an early date.

Shulamit and I send Nancy and you our affection and respect, and our prayers that you will be blessed with good health, strength and happiness for many years ahead.

Yours sincerely,



Yitzhak Shamir

דתימות: כידי	שגרירות ישראל/וויסינגטון	דף: 1
סוג: בלכ"ס	טופס פברק	מתוך: 3
תאריך וזמן חבירה:		אל: כצפ"א, כע"ת, הסברה
כס' פברק:		דע: ירה"כ לתקשורת, י. שהב"ט לתקשורת,
הפסד: בטחון ניו יורק		רמ"ח/קס"ח, ניו יורק
47 249 266		פאת: עתונות/וויסינגטון

סכום עתונות יומי

NEWS SUMMARY JANUARY 12, 1989

EDITORIALS:

ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC FRONT: CSM: More than the intifada, the mismanagement in Israel is to blame for its economic stagnation and inflation. Also more alarming than the cost of the intifada is the cost of emigration from Israel to the US. ...Shamir will respond to the Arafat initiative with a peace move of his own. ...Arafat will probably have to accept a demilitarized state if peace is to be remotely possible.

A PRETTY GOOD CONFERENCE: WP: Editors point out that the Paris conference went pretty well: Libya was ostracized, Iraq was forced to say it wouldn't pass chemical weapons on to others, the Arabs' argument that they needed to offset Israel's nuclear arms was seen as an evasion of the truth, Bonn is imposing new export controls, the suppliers are in an untenable position, and the Soviets have reported a reduction in their own stocks.

FIGHTING A CHEMICAL WAR: BS: Editors praise the results of the Paris conference - "It was the most sweeping expression of human revulsion against chemical warfare (CW) since the 1925 protocol. NOW, THE HARD PART ON POISON GAS: NYT: The Paris conf. succeeded in accelerating the effort to ban production and possession of chemical arms, but failed in establishing tighter export controls and sanctions against nations that use them. Editors call for a complete ban on chemical weapons with real risk of detection for violators. The conference also failed to condemn Iraq, Syria and Libya.

A BAD ODOR: PI: No country has the right to develop chemical weapons. The world community should create barriers to any more breaches of the taboo. Editors also fault Arab countries with trying to side-track the conference by linking a ban on chemical weapons to a total ban on nuclear weapons.

SOVIET GAS AND THE REAL WORLD: WT: The Soviets repeated the propaganda rewards on the Paris conference by announcing that Moscow would unilaterally destroy its chemical arsenal. Editorial describes Soviet use of chemical weapons and the irony of the Shevardnadze proposal.

תנ

147 + 1231 פיו 1231 - 1231

WRONG ON RIGHTS: CSM: The Soviet Union has not yet won the right to host the 1991 human rights conference and Reaga acted prematurely in consenting.

2/3

COLUMNS:

ISRAEL WANTS PEACE TOO: WP: Ambassador Moshe Arad (cabled) Response to Western appeasement of the PLO's recent moves. "There is nothing in the PLO's recent behavior that persuades us that it has changed its terrorist attitude." But Israel will continue to seek for peaceful solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

266

JEWISH EXODUS FROM ARAB LANDS: WSJ: David Harris (AJC): Critical of a Dec 19 column which ignored the issue of the mass exodus of Jews from Arab countries since 1948: specifying Libyan Jews. Harris' wife was forced to leave Libya because she is Jewish.

249

47

AMERICAN JEWS MUST SUPPORT PEACE: CT: Moshe Amirav (Israel Council for Peace and Security 1-11) Appeal for American supporters of Israel to remain involved in the ME peace initiatives. Israelis must accept the fact that Palestinians have the right to self-determination - the right to their own flag and Palestinians must accept Israel as a fait accompli.

PRESS REPORTS:

ISRAEL SEEKS REVIVAL OF MODIFIED CAMP DAVID ACCORD: WT: Dorsey (cabled) American and Israeli sources said that Israel is seeking US support for a refined version of the moribund Camp David peace process in a bid to regain the initiative in Middle East diplomacy. US officials said the Israeli ideas were aimed at refocusing the debate following Arafat's diplomatic triumph last month.

ISRAELI SUPREME COURT OVERRULES CENSOR'S BAN OF ARTICLE ON MOSSAD CHIEF: WP: Frankel: Israel's Supreme Court has overturned the chief military censor's ban of an article criticizing the competence of the head of the Mossad. Israeli officials confirmed press speculation that the Mossad chief will soon be replaced. The SC ruling was hailed by many as a victory for freedom of speech but security officials warned that it could damage the morale and operational effectiveness of the Mossad. Positive response of the decision by Dedi Zucker and apprehensive reply by Avi Pazner. ISRAEL REBUFFS ARMY CENSOR: NYT: Reuters: Ha'ir article has been banned since August and is highly critical of Mossad's role in the Iran-contra scandal and the Pollard affair. comments given by the the author of the article.

ISRAELI JETS RAID BASES IN LEBANON: NYT: story appeared in all morning shows.

GENERAL WORRIES UPRISING TAXES ISRAELI SOLDIERS' MORALS: WT: AP: Article taken from Maariv interview with Maj Gen. Menachem Eitan who said Israel's efforts to quell the uprising could damage the moral standards of its soldiers.

ISRAEL FLOATING MIDEAST PEACE IDEAS: LAT: Williams 1-11: Israel has begun to float proposals on the form and substance of eventual ME peace talks in the hope of countering efforts by the PLO. Sources at Shamir's office say that the initiatives center on the 1978 CDavid accords.

3 FROM KNESSET WILL ATTEND PLO TALKS: LAT: Reuters 1-11.

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PLEA TO PRESERVE LIFE COULDS NOT PIERCE ARAB-ISRAELI BITTERNESS:
LAT and PI: Williams: article appeared last week. The intense
anger and hatred surrounding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
exemplified by a heart transplant that never took place.

3/3

US RAISES QUOTA OF SOVIET REFUGEES BY CUTTING ASIANS': NYT: Pear:
p.1: Reagan decided to increase the number of Soviet refugees who
can come to the US this year by 39%, to a total of 25,000, and
will offset the change by reducing the number of places reserved
for Southeast Asian refugees. The State Dept. estimates that
50,000 people, mostly Jews and Armenians, will file applications
to come to the US in 1989 as refugees.

266

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149 NATIONS VOW TO SHUN POISON GAS: WP: p.1: 149 nations solemnly
reaffirmed commitments not to use chemical weapons and urged swift
completion of a treaty being negotiated in Geneva to ban their
production or possession.

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BONN LINKS 2 FIRMS TO UNAUTHORIZED EXPORTS TO LIBYA: WP: Germany
acknowledged for the first time that investigators have uncovered
"indications" that two West German firms may have made
unauthorized exports to Libya. (similar article in WSJ, also p.1
of PI, WT (reuters))

US, BRITIAN, FRANCE VETO RESOLUTION ATTACKING DOWNING OF LIBYAN
PLANES: WP: (also in NYT and PI) ...The triple veto of the
resolution followed a closely watched vote in which the Security
Council decided to let a PLO official address it under rules
reserved for member countries. Only the US voted against that
move, while France, Britian and Canada abstained.

US SHIPS TO AVOID 'BAITING' LIBYA: WP:AP: The US will rotate two
aircraft carrier battle groups well away from Libya and also has
cancelled plans for a missile-firing exercise in the nearby
central Mediterranean.

US CANCELS MISSILE-FIRING EXERCISES OFF LIBYAN COAST: WT: P.1.

CHEMICAL ARMS PARLEY PRODUCES PROMISES: WT: P.1.

PARIS CONFERENCE CONDEMNS THE USE OF CHEMICAL ARMS: NYT: P.1

CHEMICAL WARFARE OPPOSED: BS: P.1

BONN RELENT SOMEWHAT ON US CHARGES: NYT: p.1

AS TALKS END, SKEPTICS LOWER TONE: NYT.

SHARANSKY RECEIVES MEDAL, SCATHES SOVIETS: WT: Sharansky accepted
a gold medal from Reagan and used the White House platform to
castigate the Soviet Union and warn of a propaganda bonanza for
Moscow if it hosts the 1990 human rights conference.

SHIITES WAR SPLITS SYRIANS AND IRAN: NYT: Bitter fighting between
Shiite Muslims factions in Lebanon appears to have strained a
decade-old alliance between Syria and Iran as a Tehran newspaper
waged a scathing attack against Damascus.

CIA CHIEF HAS LEADS IN PAN AM BOMBING: USA TODAY:

USA TODAY: INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM WEBSTER: on terrorism...

UN FORCES: POPULAR BUT POOR: CSM: New unprecedented demands on UN
peacekeeping operations...but very expensive...

ASPIN URGES POOLING STRATEGIC WEAPON FUNDS: WP (similar articles
in NYT, WT, BS and PI): Revealing it would cost \$1 billion to fix
the B1 strategic bomber's flawed electronics, Les Aspin warned
that the strategic weapon programs in Reagan's farewell defense
plan cannot all be funded, and called for a new approach to
building nuclear forces.

Beth Silverman
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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

11539

תאריך : 17.01.89

יוצא **

שמור

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חוזם: 1,11539

אל:ני/553, אוסלו/157, שטוקהולם/197, הלסינקי/86, לונדון/303,

בטחון/630, מנמת/336

מ-:המשרד, תא:170189, זח:1514, דח:מ, סג:שמ

תח:פ גס:ארבל

נד:פ

שמור/מידי

שג, נאו'ם.

דע:איתן הבר/לשכת שהב'ט, לוברני/משהב'ט

יוניפיל.

פגישת גולדינג שהב'ט (16/1). מצדם נכחו גם הגנרל ואלגרן
ה' קרנפאס וקנוטסן והגב' שימורה. מצדנו - ראש אמ'נ,
תא'ל מור ואלקנה, דיבון, הבר, ביין והח'מ.
להלן עיקרי השיחה.

א. גולדינג תאר באותה נימה פסימית (שלנו ח/10737 מה-16)
המצב בלבנון. שתי הממשלות הלבנוניות אמנם רוצות בהארכת
מנדט יוניפיל אך אצל הממשלות התורמות ליוניפיל בכסף
ובכוחות מורגש תסכול ואכזבה בגלל חוסר התקדמות במצב
בלבנון, הפגיעות הרבות בחייליהן ובגלל גידול
התחייבויותיהן לכוחות או'ם נוספים המוקמים בעולם
(אנגולה, אירן-עיראק וכו').

ב. גולדינג ציטט עיקרי מדיניות ישראל בלבנון כפי שנמסרה
לאו'ם בזמנו. שהב'ט חזר ואישר עיקרים אלה.

ג. גולדינג טען שאיזור הבטחון יוצר שתי בעיות: - המשך
קיומו יוצר איבה כלפי ישראל כי נוכחותנו ונוכחות צד'ל
היא בלתי-נסבלת (INTOLERABLE) עבור אמל. האיבה עוד
מתחזקת בגלל מעשיו החריגים של צד'ל. מצד שני יוניפיל

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מצטייר בעיני אמל והאוכלוסיה המקומית, כאילו הגן על איזור הבטחון.

ד. שהב'ט השיב שנוכחותנו באיזור הבטחון דווקא מסייעת לאמל ומחזקת אותו כלפי אויבו העיקרי שהוא החזבללה, יתר על כן הפעילות הישראלית מגבירה תמיכת התושבים באמל כי ברור להם שהעברת השליטה באיזור לידי גורמים יותר קיצוניים תהיה בעוכרי התושבים המקומיים ותגרום להם סבל.

ה. גולדינג חידש הצעתו הישנה בדבר 'העמדת אמל במבחן' ע"י נסיגת צה'ל-צד'ל מאיזור קטן בגזרה המערבית, דוגמת הנסיגה מאל חוקבן ב-87 (שהיתה מוצלחת). שהב'ט הפנה תשומת לב גולדינג להסכם שהושג לאחרונה בין אמ'ל לאש'פ ושעל פיו מתקיימת תנועה של מאות מחבלים אל ובתוך איזור צור, בעיקר בסביבת ראשידיה. ציין שיש לחכות ולראות באיזו מידה יצליח אמל לדחוק חזבללה מזרחה. ציין שמפקדים מקומיים של אמל משתפים פעולה עם חזבללה ואש'פ בנסיונות החדירה שלהם.

ו. גולדינג טען שלדעתו אמל לא חוזר לא יאפשר למחבלים הפלשתינאים לפתח פעילות צבאית נגדנו מאיזור רשידיה או ממקום אחר בגזרה המערבית. הוא קיבל הבטחות מראשי אמל באיזור שהם לא ירשו פיגועים, במידה שצה'ל-צד'ל יוסגו מגיזרה באיזור.

ז. שהב'ט הציע להמתין להתפתחויות בחודשיים-שלושה הבאים כדי לבדוק יכולתו של אמל באיזור. ראש אמ'ן הפנה תשומת לב גולדינג שהמדובר בלבנון ושבו קני המידה להתנהגות שונים ואין ערך להבטחות.

ח. התפתח דיון קצר על הבעיות הצבאיות באיזור. שהב'ט הדגיש במיוחד העובדה שאין חוזר אין ישראל מצפה שיוניפיל יגן על גבולותיה ועל איזור הבטחון. התפרסות יוניפיל עד לגבול הבינ'ל תאלצו לבוא לידי עימות-אש עם המחבלים במקומנו.

ט. גולדינג העלה הבעיות שנוצרו בגזרת הגדוד הנורווגי עקב הגברת פעילות צה'ל בגזרה ויצירת עימותים בין שני הכוחות. שהב'ט השיב שבמרוצת 88 היו מרבית נסיונות החדירה בגזרה המזרחית וצה'ל נאלץ להגביר פעילותו בגזרה הנורווגית. אם יש בעיות של תיאום בין צה'ל לנורווגים,

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שהב'ט מציע שמפקד יוניפיל ידון בנושא עם אלוף פקוד הצפון במטרה לפתרון.

י. גולדינג העלה נושא ביקורי הצל'א במתקן המעצר של צד'ל באל-חיאם ובעית גירושם של 28 לבנונים מאיזור הבטחון לביירות ע'י צד'ל. שהב'ט השיב בעניין אל-חיאם שאנו עודדנו תמיד קיום קשר בין הצל'א לגנרל לאחד וקשר כזה אמנם התקיים בקביעות. הבעיה עכשיו היא שהצל'א נאלץ לפנות אנשיו מלבנון וכל פעילותו שם (כולל פעילות למען שבויינו ונעדרינו) הופסקה. באשר למגורשים - היתה זו פעולה של גנרל לאחר נגד אנשי המפלגה הקומוניסטית הלבנונית שהיו מעורבים בנסיון לרצחו (או היו חלק מהמערכת שהביאה לנסיון הרצח). מזלם של אנשים אלה הוא שגורשו ולא טופלו בדרך לבנונית. שהב'ט הדגיש שאנו אמנם מגבים צד'ל ומסייעים לו אך איננו מצפים מהם שלא יהיו לבנונים. הודות למאמצינו הם אמנם מתנהגים טוב מהסטנדרדים הלבנוניים המקובלים אך איננו מתימרים לשנותם.

יא. גולדינג סיפר שניסה לשוא גם הפעם להשיג בלבנון מידע על גורלו של קולונל היג'ינס האמריקני. שאל אם הגיע אלינו מידע חדש ונענה בשלילה.

יב. בתום השיחה ביקש גולדינג לשוחח עם שהב'ט בארבע עיניים.

מנהל ארב'ל 2

יל

לש

תפ: שהו, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, ממד, ברנע, ארב'ל 2, בנצור, מצפא, איר 1, איר 2, ליאור, מזתים, סייבל, משפט, מור/כוחות זרים

דף: 1	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דחיות: מידד
כתובת: 12		סוג: שמור
אל: מצפ"א	תאריך יוסף חבור: 12.01.89 17:20	
דע: מקש"ח	פס' פרוק: חפשי: 250	272
פאת: ק/ק לקונגרס		

סיוע חוץ

א. חלוקה לשנת 1989

המספרים לחלוקת הסיוע ("ALLOCATIONS") עבור כל מדינה וכל תכנית יצאו לאור
ב: 1. (10.1). כידוע, מירב הכספים לסיוע האזרחי והצבאי היו משוריינים מראש ולכן
אין בחלוקה הפתעות. הנחת עבור ישראל כמשוריינת בחוק (3 ביליון). המסמך המלא בדי"פ.

ב. הסיוע לשנת 1990

רצ"ב הבקשה לכל מדינה שהוכנה במחמ"ד בפנטגון ושהועברה לקונגרס עם המהדורה הראשונה
של ספר ה "CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION"
המפרט את בקשת הסיוע. כפי שתראו, הממשל מבקש (כמובטח) 3 ביליון עבור ישראל
(1.2 + 1.8).

למדו
אשר

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תפוצה: 36 + 1

09-Jan-89

FY 1990 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUEST (dollars in millions)

1

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

	DA	PL-I	PL-II	ESF	OTHER ECON.	TOTAL ECON.	IMET	FMS (G)	OTHER MILITARY	TOTAL MILITARY	GRAND TOTAL
NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA											
Afghan Humanitarian	35.000	--	35.566	35.000	--	105.566	--	--	--	0.000	105.566
Algeria	--	--	--	--	--	4.000	0.150	--	--	0.150	0.150
Bangladesh	55.000	60.000	18.968	--	--	133.968	0.300	--	--	0.300	134.268
Egypt	--	168.000	--	815.000	--	975.000	1.700	1,300.000	--	1,301.700	2,276.700
India	25.000	--	85.000	--	--	110.000	0.400	--	--	0.400	110.400
Israel	--	--	--	1,200.000	--	1,200.000	--	1,800.000	--	1,800.000	3,000.000
Jordan	--	--	--	35.000	--	35.000	2.200	48.000	--	50.200	85.200
Lebanon	--	--	12.744	2.000	--	14.744	0.550	--	--	0.550	15.294
Maldives	--	--	--	--	--	4.000	0.050	--	--	0.050	0.050
Morocco	12.500	35.000	15.694	15.000	--	78.194	1.400	40.000	--	41.400	119.594
Nepal	12.000	--	--	--	--	12.000	0.125	0.500	--	0.625	12.625
Oman	--	--	--	20.000	--	20.000	0.100	--	--	0.100	20.100
Pakistan	50.000	80.000	--	250.000	--	380.000	1.000	240.000	--	241.000	621.000
Sri Lanka	18.000	16.000	0.589	--	--	34.589	0.200	--	--	0.200	34.789
Tunisia	--	15.000	--	12.500	--	27.500	1.500	30.000	--	31.500	59.000
Yemen	21.150	5.000	--	--	--	26.150	1.100	2.000	--	3.100	29.250
Middle East Regional	21.423	--	--	17.500	--	38.923	--	--	--	0.000	38.923
Sub-total	250.073	371.000	168.566	2,402.000	0.000	3,191.639	10.775	3,460.500	0.000	3,471.275	6,662.914

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FY 1990 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUEST (dollars in millions)

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ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

	DA	PL-I	PL-II	ESF	OTHER ECON.	TOTAL ECON.	IMET	FMS (G)	OTHER MILITARY	TOTAL MILITARY	GRAND TOTAL
EUROPE											
Austria	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.030	--	--	0.030	0.030
Cyprus	--	--	--	7.000	--	7.000	--	--	--	0.000	7.000
Finland	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.035	--	--	0.035	0.035
Greece	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.700	350.000	--	350.700	350.700
Iceland	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.025	--	--	0.025	0.025
Ireland	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.030	--	--	0.030	0.030
Luxembourg	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.025	--	--	0.025	0.025
Malta	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.050	--	--	0.050	0.050
Poland	1.000	--	--	--	--	1.000	--	--	--	0.000	1.000
Portugal	--	--	--	50.000	--	50.000	2.600	125.000	--	127.600	177.600
Spain	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	2.100	--	--	2.100	2.100
Turkey	--	--	--	60.000	--	60.000	3.500	550.000	--	553.500	613.500
Yugoslavia	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.100	--	--	0.100	0.100
Sub-total	1.000	0.000	0.000	117.000	0.000	118.000	9.395	1,025.000	0.000	1,034.395	1,152.395

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ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

AMERICAN REPUBLICS

	DA	PL-I	PL-II	ESF	OTHER ECON.	TOTAL ECON.	INET	FMS (G)	OTHER MILITARY	TOTAL MILITARY	GRAND TOTAL
Argentina	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.150	2.000	--	2.150	2.150
Bahamas	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.040	--	--	0.040	0.040
Belize	7.175	--	--	2.000	--	9.175	0.115	0.500	--	0.615	9.790
Bolivia	21.725	20.000	13.172	30.000	--	84.897	0.500	7.000	--	7.500	92.397
Brazil	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.150	--	--	0.150	0.150
Chile	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.050	--	--	0.050	0.050
Colombia	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	1.500	20.000	--	21.500	21.500
Costa Rica	11.000	15.000	--	57.000	--	83.000	0.250	1.500	--	1.750	84.750
Dom. Rep.	16.355	20.000	4.305	70.000	--	60.740	0.750	2.000	--	2.750	63.490
Ecuador	15.528	--	0.622	9.000	--	25.150	0.700	3.000	--	3.700	28.850
El Salvador	67.000	35.000	4.763	180.000	--	287.563	1.600	17.000	--	18.600	386.163
Guatemala	35.275	18.000	8.843	87.000	--	149.118	0.500	9.000	--	9.500	158.618
Guyana	--	4.000	--	--	--	4.000	0.050	--	--	0.050	4.050
Haiti	28.000	--	13.433	--	--	41.433	0.400	--	--	0.400	41.833
Honduras	43.200	12.000	3.878	89.000	--	148.078	1.250	40.000	--	41.250	207.328
Jamaica	16.000	30.000	--	25.000	--	71.000	0.350	5.000	--	5.350	76.350
Mexico	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.250	--	--	0.250	0.250
Panama	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
Paraguay	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.150	--	--	0.150	0.150
Peru	14.155	10.000	18.190	5.000	--	47.345	0.525	5.000	--	5.525	52.870
Suriname	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.050	--	--	0.050	0.050
Trinidad/Tobago	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.040	--	--	0.040	0.040
Uruguay	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.200	0.500	--	0.700	0.700
Venezuela	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.125	--	--	0.125	0.125
PACAFS	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	2.300	--	--	2.300	2.300
ROCAF	24.500	--	--	--	--	24.500	--	--	--	0.000	24.500
C. America Regional	23.250	--	--	12.000	--	35.250	--	--	--	0.000	35.250
E. Caribbean Reg.	18.250	--	--	15.000	--	33.250	0.505	5.000	--	5.505	38.755
L. America Regional	28.700	--	--	15.600	--	44.300	--	--	--	0.000	44.300
Sub-total	370.913	164.000	67.286	544.600	0.000	1,146.799	12.500	217.500	0.000	230.000	1,376.799

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FY 1990 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUEST (dollars in millions)

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

AFRICA

	BA	PL-I	PL-II	ESF	OTHER ECON.	TOTAL ECON.	INET	FMS (G)	OTHER MILITARY	TOTAL MILITARY	GRAND TOTAL
Benin	--	--	1.375	--	--	1.375	0.100	--	--	0.100	1.475
Botswana	7.000	--	--	--	--	7.000	0.370	4.000	--	4.370	11.370
Burkina Faso	3.000	--	8.094	--	--	11.094	0.100	--	--	0.100	11.194
Burundi	6.000	--	--	--	--	6.000	0.140	--	--	0.140	6.140
Cameroon	20.000	--	--	--	--	20.000	0.275	--	--	0.275	20.275
Cape Verde	3.000	--	1.720	--	--	4.720	0.100	--	--	0.100	4.820
Cent. Afr. Rep.	2.000	--	--	--	--	2.000	0.100	0.500	--	0.600	2.600
Chad	6.000	--	2.764	10.000	--	18.764	0.400	10.000	--	10.400	29.164
Comoros	0.700	--	--	--	--	0.700	0.100	--	--	0.100	0.800
Congo	0.500	--	--	--	--	0.500	0.075	--	--	0.075	0.575
Djibouti	--	--	--	3.000	--	3.000	0.165	2.000	--	2.165	5.165
Equatorial Guinea	1.000	--	--	--	--	1.000	0.100	--	--	0.100	1.100
Ethiopia	--	--	7.437	--	--	7.437	--	--	--	0.000	7.437
Gabon	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.100	--	--	0.100	0.100
Gambia	5.000	--	2.632	--	--	7.632	0.100	--	--	0.100	7.732
Ghana	15.000	6.000	5.649	--	--	26.649	0.200	--	--	0.200	26.849
Guinea	15.000	10.000	--	--	--	25.000	0.150	--	--	0.150	25.150
Guinea Bissau	2.000	--	0.522	--	--	2.522	0.100	--	--	0.100	2.622
Ivory Coast	0.500	--	--	--	--	0.500	0.150	--	--	0.150	0.650
Kenya	30.000	10.000	2.353	9.000	--	51.353	1.100	15.000	--	16.100	67.453
Lesotho	8.000	--	2.160	--	--	10.160	0.100	--	--	0.100	10.260
Liberia	--	7.500	--	15.000	--	22.500	0.000	1.000	--	1.000	24.300
Madagascar	19.000	5.000	2.491	--	--	26.491	0.100	1.000	--	1.100	27.591
Malawi	20.000	--	--	--	--	20.000	0.300	1.200	--	1.500	21.500
Mali	19.000	--	3.541	--	--	22.541	0.175	--	--	0.175	22.716
Mauritania	3.000	--	4.959	--	--	7.959	0.125	--	--	0.125	8.084
Mauritius	1.500	--	--	--	--	1.500	0.050	--	--	0.050	1.550
Mozambique	20.000	--	13.028	--	--	33.028	--	--	--	0.000	33.028
Niger	18.000	--	--	--	--	18.000	0.275	2.000	--	2.275	20.275
Nigeria	11.500	--	--	--	--	11.500	0.100	--	--	0.100	11.600
Rwanda	8.000	--	0.304	--	--	8.304	0.100	--	--	0.100	8.404
Sao Tome	0.300	--	--	--	--	0.300	0.110	--	--	0.110	0.410
Senegal	22.000	5.000	--	10.000	--	37.000	0.525	2.000	--	2.525	39.525

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FY 1990 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUEST (dollars in millions)

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ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

	BA	PL-I	PL-II	ESF	OTHER ECON.	TOTAL ECON.	INET	FMS (G)	OTHER MILITARY	TOTAL MILITARY	GRAND TOTAL
Seychelles	--	--	--	3.000	--	3.000	0.100	--	--	0.100	3.100
Sierra Leone	0.500	4.000	0.976	--	--	5.476	0.100	--	--	0.100	5.576
Senalia	4.000	5.000	5.552	20.000	--	34.552	1.200	15.000	--	16.200	50.752
South Africa	21.000	--	--	3.300	--	24.300	--	--	--	0.000	24.300
Sudan	12.000	20.000	3.429	10.000	--	45.429	1.050	5.000	--	6.050	51.479
Swaziland	6.000	--	--	--	--	6.000	0.100	--	--	0.100	6.100
Tanzania	10.000	--	--	--	--	10.000	0.120	--	--	0.120	10.120
Togo	4.000	--	2.951	--	--	6.951	0.100	--	--	0.100	7.051
Uganda	18.000	6.000	--	--	--	24.000	0.200	--	--	0.200	24.200
Zaire	33.000	16.000	0.092	--	--	49.092	1.300	9.000	--	10.300	59.392
Zambia	5.000	5.000	--	--	--	10.000	--	--	--	0.000	10.000
Zimbabwe	5.000	--	--	--	--	5.000	0.240	--	--	0.240	5.240
NEPSP	55.000	--	--	--	--	55.000	--	--	--	0.000	55.000
African Regional	16.900	--	--	--	--	16.900	--	--	--	0.000	16.900
S. Af. Reg./SABCE	50.000	--	--	--	--	50.000	--	--	--	0.000	50.000
Civic Action/ACS	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	6.000	--	6.000	6.000
Sub-total	508.000	99.500	72.031	83.500	0.000	822.831	11.275	73.700	0.000	84.975	907.806

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FY 1990 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUEST (dollars in millions)

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	ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE										
	BA	PL-I	PL-II	ESF	OTHER ECON.	TOTAL ECON.	INET	FMS (G)	OTHER MILITARY	TOTAL MILITARY	GRAND TOTAL
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC											
Brunei	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
Burma	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.250	--	--	0.250	0.250
Cambodian Resistance	--	--	--	7.000	--	7.000	--	--	--	0.000	7.000
Fiji	--	--	--	1.000	--	1.000	0.100	0.300	--	0.400	1.400
Indonesia	43.000	10.000	4.918	--	--	57.918	2.000	5.000	--	7.000	64.918
Korea	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	1.650	--	--	1.650	1.650
Malaysia	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	1.000	--	--	1.000	1.000
Papua New Guinea	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.075	--	--	0.075	0.075
Philippines	55.000	15.000	16.471	160.000	200.000	446.471	2.900	200.000	--	202.900	649.371
Singapore	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.050	--	--	0.050	0.050
Solomon Islands	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.075	--	--	0.075	0.075
Thailand	14.500	--	--	5.000	--	19.500	2.400	45.000	--	47.400	66.900
Tonga	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.075	--	--	0.075	0.075
Vanuatu	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.030	--	--	0.030	0.030
S. Pacific Ocean	--	--	--	0.200	--	0.200	--	--	--	0.000	0.200
S. Pacific Regional	6.500	--	--	1.000	--	7.500	--	--	--	0.000	7.500
S. Pacific Tuna	--	--	--	10.000	--	10.000	--	--	--	0.000	10.000
Sub-total	119.000	25.000	21.389	184.200	200.000	549.589	10.605	250.300	0.000	260.905	810.494
WID NON-COUNTRY PROGRAMS											
Operating Expenses	447.684	--	--	--	--	447.684	--	--	--	0.000	447.684
Op. Exp. (IG)	31.194	--	--	--	--	31.194	--	--	--	0.000	31.194
Deob/Reob Reapprop.	39.000	--	--	18.000	--	57.000	--	--	--	0.000	57.000
ASNA	30.000	--	--	--	--	30.000	--	--	--	0.000	30.000
Disaster Assistance	25.000	--	--	--	--	25.000	--	--	--	0.000	25.000
HIG Borrowing Auth.	45.000	--	--	--	--	45.000	--	--	--	0.000	45.000
HIG Loan Guar.	[100.000]	--	--	--	--	[125.000]	--	--	--	0.000	[125.000]
TCIP	[200.000]	--	--	--	--	[200.000]	--	--	--	0.000	[200.000]
Trade & Development	--	--	--	--	25.000	25.000	--	--	--	0.000	25.000
S&T	282.253	--	--	--	--	282.253	--	--	--	0.000	282.253
FVA	55.902	--	--	--	--	55.902	--	--	--	0.000	55.902

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FY 1990 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUEST (dollars in millions)

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

	DA	PL-I	PL-II	ESF	OTHER ECON.	TOTAL ECON.	INEP	FMS (G)	OTHER MILITARY	TOTAL MILITARY	GRAND TOTAL
PPE	60.294	--	--	--	--	60.294	--	--	--	0.000	60.294
PPE	16.903	--	--	--	--	16.903	--	--	--	0.000	16.903
PPE Mining/Urban Dev.	5.000	--	--	--	--	5.000	--	--	--	0.000	5.000
Priv. Sec. Loan Guar. [50.000]	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
SCI	8.662	--	--	--	--	8.662	--	--	--	0.000	8.662
Intl. Training	2.000	--	--	--	--	2.000	--	--	--	0.000	2.000
Priv. Prov. Sec. Ser.	20.000	--	--	--	--	20.000	--	--	--	0.000	20.000
Sub-total	1,468.892	0.000	0.000	18.000	25.000	1,111.892	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1,111.892

PL 480 NON-COUNTRY PROGRAMS

Reserve	--	103.000	79.523	--	--	182.523	--	--	--	0.000	182.523
World Food Program	--	--	65.000	--	--	65.000	--	--	--	0.000	65.000
Ocean freight	--	70.000	217.000	--	--	287.000	--	--	--	0.000	287.000
Initial payment	--	(15.500)	--	--	--	(15.500)	--	--	--	0.000	(15.500)
Stock adjustment	--	--	(25.795)	--	--	(25.795)	--	--	--	0.000	(25.795)
Regular ref. (IEFR)	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
Receipts	--	(551.055)	--	--	--	(551.055)	--	--	--	0.000	(551.055)
Sub-total	0.000	(393.555)	335.728	0.000	0.000	(57.827)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	(57.827)

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FY 1990 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUEST (dollars in millions)

7

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

	DA	PL-I	PL-II	ESF	OTHER ECON.	TOTAL ECON.	INET	FMS (G)	OTHER MILITARY	TOTAL MILITARY	GRAND TOTAL
PPC	60.294	--	--	--	--	60.294	--	--	--	0.000	60.294
PPE	16.903	--	--	--	--	16.903	--	--	--	0.000	16.903
PPE Housing/Urban Dev.	5.000	--	--	--	--	5.000	--	--	--	0.000	5.000
Priv. Sec. Loan Guar. [50.000]	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
SCI	8.662	--	--	--	--	8.662	--	--	--	0.000	8.662
Intl. Training	2.000	--	--	--	--	2.000	--	--	--	0.000	2.000
Priv. Prov. Soc. Ser.	20.000	--	--	--	--	20.000	--	--	--	0.000	20.000
Sub-total	1,068.892	0.000	0.000	18.000	25.000	1,111.892	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1,111.892

PL 480 NON-COUNTRY PROGRAMS

Reserve	--	103.000	79.523	--	--	182.523	--	--	--	0.000	182.523
World Food Program	--	--	65.000	--	--	65.000	--	--	--	0.000	65.000
Ocean freight	--	70.000	217.000	--	--	287.000	--	--	--	0.000	287.000
Initial payment	--	(15.500)	--	--	--	(15.500)	--	--	--	0.000	(15.500)
Stock adjustment	--	--	(25.795)	--	--	(25.795)	--	--	--	0.000	(25.795)
Regular ref. (IEFR)	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
Receipts	--	(551.055)	--	--	--	(551.055)	--	--	--	0.000	(551.055)
Sub-total	0.000	(393.555)	335.728	0.000	0.000	(57.827)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	(57.827)

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FY 1990 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUEST (dollars in millions)

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ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

	BA	PL-I	PL-II	ESF	OTHER ECON.	TOTAL ECON.	INET	FMS (G)	OTHER MILITARY	TOTAL MILITARY	GRAND TOTAL
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS											
African Dev'l. Bank	--	--	--	--	10.641	10.641	--	--	--	0.000	10.641
African Dev'l. Fund	--	--	--	--	105.000	105.000	--	--	--	0.000	105.000
Asian Dev'l. Bank	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
Asian Dev. Fund IV-V	--	--	--	--	230.712	230.712	--	--	--	0.000	230.712
IBRD	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
IDA VIII	--	--	--	--	965.000	965.000	--	--	--	0.000	965.000
IBRD/FSB VII-VIII	--	--	--	--	90.252	90.252	--	--	--	0.000	90.252
Int. Finance Corp.	--	--	--	--	114.936	114.936	--	--	--	0.000	114.936
Inter-Am. Dev. Bank	--	--	--	--	120.843	120.843	--	--	--	0.000	120.843
Inter-Am. Inv. Corp.	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
WB Other	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
Sub-total	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1,637.384	1,637.384	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1,637.384

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FY 1990 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUEST (dollars in millions)

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ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

	DP	PL-I	PL-II	ESF	OTHER ECON.	TOTAL ECON.	INET	FMS (G)	OTHER MILITARY	TOTAL MILITARY	GRAND TOTAL
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS											
UNDP	--	--	--	--	107.834	107.834	--	--	--	0.000	107.834
UNICEF	--	--	--	--	33.900	33.900	--	--	--	0.000	33.900
IPCE	--	--	--	--	0.100	0.100	--	--	--	0.000	0.100
IAED	--	--	--	--	25.200	25.200	--	--	--	0.000	25.200
OAS	--	--	--	--	10.000	10.000	--	--	--	0.000	10.000
INEP	--	--	--	--	8.000	8.000	--	--	--	0.000	8.000
ICSOC	--	--	--	--	2.000	2.000	--	--	--	0.000	2.000
MMO	--	--	--	--	2.000	2.000	--	--	--	0.000	2.000
UNCDF	--	--	--	--	1.500	1.500	--	--	--	0.000	1.500
MFP	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
UNETPSA	--	--	--	--	0.800	0.800	--	--	--	0.000	0.800
CRS	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
UN Fellowships	--	--	--	--	0.200	0.200	--	--	--	0.000	0.200
UNTFSA	--	--	--	--	0.250	0.250	--	--	--	0.000	0.250
UNDEFW	--	--	--	--	0.220	0.220	--	--	--	0.000	0.220
World Heritage	--	--	--	--	0.200	0.200	--	--	--	0.000	0.200
CITES	--	--	--	--	0.200	0.200	--	--	--	0.000	0.200
UNIDO	--	--	--	--	0.500	0.500	--	--	--	0.000	0.500
UN Afgh. Emer. T.F.	--	--	--	--	16.000	16.000	--	--	--	0.000	16.000
UNUFEVT	--	--	--	--	0.100	0.100	--	--	--	0.000	0.100
Sub-total	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	209.000	209.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	209.000

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09-Jan-89

FY 1990 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUEST (dollars in millions)

10.

	ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE										
	DA	PL-I	PL-II	ESF	OTHER ECON.	TOTAL ECON.	INET	FMS (6)	OTHER MILITARY	TOTAL MILITARY	GRAND TOTAL
MISCELLANEOUS											
African Dev. Found.	--	--	--	--	9.000	9.000	--	--	--	0.000	9.000
Inter-Am. Found.	--	--	--	--	16.932	16.932	--	--	--	0.000	16.932
Peace Corps	--	--	--	--	163.614	163.614	--	--	--	0.000	163.614
Narcotics	--	--	--	--	115.000	115.000	--	--	--	0.000	115.000
Refugee Assistance	--	--	--	--	380.000	380.000	--	--	--	0.000	380.000
Exim Bank	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
INET Gen'l. Costs	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	0.150	--	--	0.150	0.150
MOP Gen'l. Costs	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	40.432	40.432	40.432
Anti-terrorism	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	10.017	10.017	10.017
Peacekeeping (PKO)	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	33.377	33.377	33.377
Gen As Econcl Ast	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	--	0.000
Sub-total	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	684.546	684.546	0.150	0.000	83.826	83.976	768.522
TOTAL DISCRETIONARY DA 2,377.878 265.945 665.000 3,349.100 2,755.930 9,413.853 54.500 5,027.000 83.826 5,165.326 14,579.179											
Offsetting receipts	(455.000)	--	--	--	(42.349)	1497.349	--	--	1150.000	1150.000	(647.349)
AID Misc. Trust Fund	5.000	--	--	--	--	5.000	--	--	--	0.000	5.000
AID T.F. rec.	(5.000)	--	--	--	--	(5.000)	--	--	--	0.000	(5.000)
P. Corps Misc. T.F.	--	--	--	--	0.300	0.300	--	--	--	0.000	0.300
Eximbank adjustment	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	--	0.000	0.000
DOT Misc. Trust Fund	--	--	--	--	3.737	3.737	--	--	--	0.000	3.737
DOT T.F. rec.	--	--	--	--	(2.892)	(2.892)	--	--	--	0.000	(2.892)
Guaranty Res. Fund	--	--	--	--	--	0.000	--	--	719.545	719.545	719.545
TOTAL DA (151+152)	1,922.878	265.945	665.000	3,349.100	2,714.726	8,917.649	54.500	5,027.000	653.371	5,734.871	14,652.520

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דמיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: _____
סוג: שמור		כתוב: _____
תאריך וזמן חבירה: 12 בינואר 1989 09:00	מצי"א	אל:
	מקשיח-משהבטי	
כס' פרוק:	רמשיח-ניו יורק	דע:
הפסד:	נספח צבאי-כאן	
$\frac{51}{52}$ $\frac{67}{242}$ 259		כאן: ק. לקונגרס

תוספות לתקציב שח"א 1989

בשיחה עם צוות עוזרי ועדת החקצבות בביתנ"ב סיפרו הללו על כוונת ^{הח"א} להגיש שתי בקשות לתוספות (supplemental) לשח"א 89 :-

1. Supplemental של 100 מיליון \$ למימון סיוע לחמש המדינות (ירדן, פורטוגל הונדורס, אלסלבדור ותיילנד) שבגינן ניהה הממשל לידום קיצוץ של 2%. (חכטן שהיה נחוץ להם למעשה ח"ח 88 מיליון \$).

2. Supplemental של 125 מיליון \$ (העברה מתקציב הפנטגון) למימון שני כוחות האו"ם החדשים במפרץ ובנמיביה.

ישראל / וושינגטון
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

ס.ח. 3 ר.ה. 3 א.ה.ה. 1 א.נ.ל. 1 א.נ.ל. 1 א.נ.ל. 1 א.נ.ל. 2

תפוצה: 36

דפי: <u>1</u>	שגרירות ישראל / ווסינגטון	דמיפות: כידי
כתוב: <u>7</u>	טופס פרוק	סוג: בלביס
אל: ⁴	מצביא, מעיית, ממיד	תאריך וזמן חבור:
דע:	יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שחביט לתקשורת, לע"מ אמ"ן/קטיח, דובר אח"ל, ניו-יורק	כס' פרוק:
		מפסד: בטחון ניו יורק
	פאת: עתוכות ווסינגטון	46 248 265

JANUARY 12, 1989

תדרוך דובר כחפ"ד ליום.

MR. REDMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. One brief announcement. At 3:00 today, a Consular Convention between the United States and Algeria will be signed in the Treaty Room by Deputy Secretary Whitehead and Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun. The Treaty, in preparation for nearly six years, sets forth the privileges and immunities of consular officers. The treaty delineates the functions of consuls, in particular, those of assisting citizens of one country who are traveling or living in the other country.

Q Have you seen the reports from West Germany that some companies may in fact have been implicated? These are new, within the last 24 hours or so.

MR. REDMAN: I don't know how to distinguish those reports from ones we talked about yesterday, which were already known at that time. But my reaction would still be the same.

Q And you haven't seen any details of the German technical export regulations?

MR. REDMAN: No. What I said yesterday remains the case on that score.

Q Chuck, on the Vienna Conference, do you have anything new to tell us about that lingering dispute?

MR. REDMAN: They're still hard at work. The issues are still those that I described yesterday.

Q Going back to the West Germans, are you encouraged by the amount of activity that appears to be underway? There's been an arrest in Belgium for apparently a false-end user certificate. The German government is now looking -- scrutinizing a lot harder than they apparently have been in previous days about some of the details of the companies that have been implicated. Is that encouraging to the United States?

תפוצה:

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MR. REDMAN: I would just say what I have said previously, that we believe this is an important issue. That's the reason we've been briefing people about it. We appreciate the efforts that are being undertaken by the Federal Republic and other countries. And, in terms of specifics and progress, I would leave that to each of the individual governments to comment on as they deem appropriate.

Q Has the West German team been briefed now by the United States government on those --

MR. REDMAN: I don't know whether or not they have been briefed, but that is occurring here in Washington.

MR. REDMAN: I believe they are here.

Q Chuck, the statements that were made in Germany yesterday by Chancellor Kohl and other officials, are fairly embarrassing to the West German government which had told the United States and said publicly that at least one company that had been thoroughly investigated was not involved. Is the US -- has the US done anything -- can it do anything to ease the embarrassment that West Germany must feel over this?

MR. REDMAN: It's your scenario that you've set up. I really have no way to get into that. All I can do is call attention to the meeting that we had with Foreign Minister Genscher in Paris just last Sunday for example, where the Secretary said that he had absolutely no doubt that the Foreign Minister, the Chancellor, the federal government were actively involved in pursuing this investigation. I would only say in the end that, again, we appreciate what these countries are doing. It's a worthwhile endeavor.

Q Chuck, did that meeting produce a go-ahead for a post-Vienna economic meeting now as some of the papers are reporting?

MR. REDMAN: Nothing has been produced yet. The -- that story comes from the fact that there are number of follow-on conferences to Vienna that are being looked at, follow-on conferences that there have been after previous CSCE meetings. There are 11 of those conferences on the table. The United States believes that that's too many conferences to handle. I'm not sure what the final number will come out to be. Some of those are human rights conferences, and you're aware of those. Another one is the East-West Economic Conference, as it's called; that's one, as with the human rights conferences and maybe a couple of others, that we've agreed to in principle. The -- (pauses) -- but finally, as I said in starting, that the number and the subject areas for these follow-on meetings is still under consideration, and the final decision on those follow-up meetings will reflect a balance between the various baskets of economic, environmental, scientific, human rights, security -- those kind of things.

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MR. REDMAN: Nothing is agreed to until the Vienna meeting wraps up. On that conference, since you're interested, let me just give you its purpose and also what is not its purpose. The purpose will be to enable officials of Eastern and Western governments, as well as representatives of the private sector, to exchange views on economic issues, and to learn more about their respective economies and methods of doing business. The conference will not be a forum for any negotiations among the participating governments. For example, East Bloc participation in international economic organizations is addressed within those organizations and will not be a subject for negotiation at this conference. Similarly, the OECD export credit arrangement on avoiding subsidized export credits is firmly in place and will not be affected by the Bonn meeting. The US and its allies have also made clear that the conference will not address

Q Mr. Redman, regarding the presidential raise in the quotas of Soviet refugees allowed to come to this country, that policy was fueled by the large numbers of applications, the increase in the numbers of applications. Is it necessary that this -- that a paper work matter would lead to the development where it would decrease the numbers of refugees allowed to enter this country from Indonesia?

MR. REDMAN: Indochina.

MR. REDMAN: Let me review where things are. First, those of you who have been here know that we put out a statement on December the 15th which addressed this particular problem. It went through a lot of the things that we were looking at as ways to meet that,

including this question of reallocating some numbers from Southeast Asia. At that point, we said we were consulting about reallocating some fully funded refugee numbers from the Vietnamese Orderly Departure Program. Since -- and that this -- what we said then, was since we have not been able to reach agreement with the Vietnamese about the processing of the re-education camp detainees, we believe it's possible to reallocate numbers at this point in the fiscal year, and that if our talks with the Vietnamese were to bear fruit in this fiscal year, then the necessary numbers could be sought for that program.

We talked about some other steps, including the generous use of the parole authority to accommodate Soviet applications who might not qualify as refugees. We talked about the drafting of legislation which will establish a new category of immigrant, which could provide some 20,000 to 30,000 numbers annually for persons other than refugees whose admission is deemed to be in the national interest of the United States. One element of the new legislation could be a provision which specifically authorizes the adjustment to permanent resident status for these parolees.

We have dispatched some additional INS personnel to Moscow to deal with the backlog there, and I can give you the current numbers in just a minute. We are also talking to organizations about the possibility of private funding for refugee admissions. All of that summarizes the kind of things we put out on December 15th.

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Now we have, in this process, been consulting with the Congress. A letter was sent on December 13th from Jonathan Moore to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee -- and you can have copies of that in the press room afterwards if you want -- and that sketched out what the administration was proposing to do; essentially that up to 5500 numbers would be allocated to the Soviet-Eastern European ceiling from the Vietnamese Orderly Departure Program. That includes the 3,000 fully funded that I just made reference to, in addition to some semi-funded, some 2500 semi-funded. So, 5500 would be allocated from the Vietnamese Orderly Departure Program, as well as 1,000 from the East Asia First Asylum program, and 500 from the ceiling for the Near East and South Asia.

Now, what does this mean for Vietnamese? First, there is no shortage of refugee or immigration numbers available to Vietnamese wishing to immigrate to the US. The only shortage are the exit permits issued by the Vietnamese authorities. There are nearly 40,000 such numbers available to Vietnamese in Vietnam. That's 19,500 refugee numbers which still remain -- 25,000 minus the 5,500 -- and 20,000 immigrant visa numbers.

The Vietnamese, in 1988, issued exit permits to only 2500 persons wishing to emigrate, leaving 17,500 numbers unused. We have urged the Vietnamese to issue more exit permits to emigrants in 1989, and they've agreed to that. In addition, there are 27,000 refugee numbers available for persons seeking admission to the US as refugees from refugee camps in Southeast Asia, as opposed to Vietnam.

So, what that means is that, out of a total worldwide program of 90,000, there are remaining 46,500 refugee numbers available for Indochinese refugees. So, all that has been done at this point is to take advantage of the fact that these 5500 from the political prisoner portion of the Vietnamese ODP program, which we have not been able to implement, are being made available for the Soviet Union-Eastern Europe program for the time being.

Q And you add 1500 Asians to that? 1500 Asian slots to that?

MR. REDMAN: Then you add -- you add 1,000 from the East Asia First Asylum. That means from -- numbers outside of Vietnam -- and you add 500 from the Near East and South Asia. And that gives you a total of 7,000 new numbers. Now, with those 7,000, you bring the Soviet total for this year to 25,000. The original number for fiscal year 1989 for the Soviets was 18,000, to which you now add 7000 for a total of 25,000. In addition, the Attorney General has indicated that the Justice Department would permit up to 2,000 parolees a month for Soviets rejected for refugee status and coming through Moscow, and unlimited parole for those rejected in Rome.

Now, finally, in terms of total flow, since that is probably necessary to complete this, we have two kinds of flow for Soviet emigration, the first through Vienna during the first quarter of fiscal year 1989, of approximately 10,000 Soviet emigrants came to Vienna with intentions of coming to the United States.

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Q '89 or '88?

MR. REDMAN: During the first quarter of FISCAL year 1989. Now, of the 10,000, just to show you how the flow moved, 4500 arrived in Vienna in December out of that 10,000.

Q I'm sorry, how many --

MR. REDMAN: Ten thousand in the first quarter, but 4,000 of that 10,000 in the one month of December alone. If the December rate were to continue, approximately 50,000 Soviets would arrive in Vienna with the intention of coming to the United States through Europe. The second flow is through Moscow. In Moscow, the Soviets continue to come to the embassy at the rate of approximately 100 per day, or 2,000 per month. And we have in the queue in Moscow, as of the end of December, 14,000. That's one of the reasons that we have dispatched additional INS officers now who are in place in Moscow to speed up that process.

Q I just -- in terms of the large amount of numbers standing outside the embassy trying to file applications, it seems that this is what's fueling the reevaluation of your refugee policy.

MR. REDMAN: No, not really. What's fueling it is the rate of applications that we are seeing. We are seeing 2,000 a month in Moscow, and we are seeing these flows coming into Vienna, people eventually coming to the United States through Europe. So what we are reacting to is this flow rate now which indicates much, much larger numbers than in previous years.

Q But in the context of reform in the Soviet Union, what kind of a message do you think this gives to Gorbachev? And don't you think that at this point, there's -- it's necessary to begin a reevaluation of the refugee status of a Soviet refugee?

MR. REDMAN: Well, we've been through all that before. I don't want to go through all that again, because others may not be interested. But we have described the approach we have been trying to take, the advice we have been giving to people thinking about applying. We have talked about how we have been screening, and the problems -- or interviewing, and all of those kind of things. So, that's on the record, and I've explained that, and I don't think I need to go through it again.

Q The 25,000 is not just Soviet, it's Soviet-Eastern Europe, correct? And if it is, there are people from Poland and other countries who've been waiting a lot longer than would-be refugees from the Soviet Union. Can any of this -- will any of this increase be used for other East Europeans who are also stacked up -- I think in Vienna, maybe Rome.

MR. REDMAN: I don't really have a specific answer to that, Barry. There are so many technicalities to that, that that's one I'm not -- my words say that the 25,000 is Soviet, but --

Q Chuck, just to make sure I understand you and follow all of this guidance. If I get it correctly, what you're saying is that what you've done is reallocated what amounts to about 7,000 spaces from various Asian programs that are unused to this.

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MR. REDMAN: And a few hundred from NEA --

Q -- their entry chances are being given up.

MR. REDMAN: That's right. First, I said we have a huge number of spots remaining. For example, in the Vietnamese refugee program, we have triple the number of allocations this year that we had last year, for example.

Q Is this the first time that the United States has reduced refugee admissions for Asians to accommodate the Soviet emigration?

MR. REDMAN: I don't know of any other cases, but I just don't know. But -- well, you know the genesis of all of this: as the refugee numbers -- or as the numbers from the Soviet Union in particular have picked up dramatically in just the last few months, you have a new issue that has to be dealt with. So all of these things are sort of predicted on the basis of past performance. And when it doesn't follow that pattern, then you have to adjust.

MR. REDMAN: What I said is that you have some very large numbers, which still remain; one category -- political prisoners -- which they have not allowed us to process any in this fiscal year. We are now moving over to the Soviet account. But, should that change, then it is always possible for the President to go back for additional numbers to take care of that. So we continue to try to operate within the numbers we have as long as we can, and if that

doesn't make it, then you have to look at other options. But, as I said, in addition to reallocating these numbers, there are any number of other things that we're working on that will also help with this refugee problem as I described at the very first part of the presentation.

Q Chuck, can you tell us when and with whom West German Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, will meet here at the State Department to discuss this issue?

MR. REDMAN: We can look up the full range of his appointments. I believe he's meeting with Deputy Secretary Whitehead.

Q Are you going to have any kind of readout on the Netanyahu meeting?

MR. REDMAN: I don't expect to have anything in particular. This is part of a regular series of bilateral consultations. He's

here on a private visit, for the most part, and he's going to New York later on. But he is meeting with the Secretary here in the building. We expect they're going to cover the normal range of regional bilateral issues, including the peace process and other things.

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Q There are reports that Israel is seeking American support for a new peace initiative. Have you got anything on that, and does the meeting between Shultz and Netanyahu have any relevance on that?

MR. REDMAN: I don't want to draw any more attention to it other than to say I assume the peace process is one of the things that they're going to be discussing. But in terms of what the Israeli government is planning to do or may be doing, I'd leave it to them to characterize that. Certainly, a lot of people in the region are looking for ways to move the peace process forward, and as a general reaction, we welcome and encourage all of them.

Q This time there were also formalized talks in Paris on the subject of the peace initiative between Arens and Shultz over the weekend. Any -- any --

MR. REDMAN: That conversation, which I was in on, was in the same vein as this, talking about the peace process in general terms.

Q Do you have any comment on the PLO being allowed to address the UN as a full member state?

MR. REDMAN: I would only repeat what Ambassador Okun said at the UN, which essentially was that the PLO's request was not made in accordance with established practice and procedures. We do not consider this a precedent for allowing observer organizations to speak. And beyond that, copies of the explanation of vote, which went into much more detail, are available if you want to see that.
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Embassy of the United States of America
Tel Aviv, Israel

January 13, 1989

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have been instructed by Secretary Shultz to convey to you the advance text of a letter dated January 12 which he is sending you. The original will be forwarded to you upon its receipt.

With highest regards,

Sincerely,

William A. Brown
Ambassador

Enclosure: A/S

His Excellency
Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister of Israel

January 13, 1989

ADVANCE TEXT OF LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR
FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN

Dear Yitzhak:

Congratulations on the successful formation of a new government and on the opportunity given to you to lead Israel into the 1990s. As I prepare to leave office, I want to review briefly both the accomplishments of my administration as well as its unfinished business.

Through our close and candid dialogue we have achieved much over the past few years, and I feel justifiably proud of our record. We have broken new ground in our relationship, and the security of the United States and of Israel has been enhanced by our mutual efforts. Through strategic cooperation we have learned to think, plan and practice in close harmony. Through our consultations on Israel's economic difficulties, we have begun to reverse destructive trends challenging Israel's economic well-being. The free trade agreement will serve as a solid base for expanding trade and as a symbol of our commitment to an abiding, mutually advantageous relationship. I was proud to have been able to institutionalize our dialogue in the Memorandum of Agreement we signed on the occasion of Israel's fortieth anniversary.

Despite the many challenges you and I have faced and the occasional differences that have arisen, I believe our friendship has emerged ever stronger. I attribute this to the goals and values that unite us: democracy, peace, and an unassailable posture of strength against our enemies.

Your new government and the next U.S. administration will open a new chapter in our relations, but I am confident that there will also be fundamental continuity. I hope that you will move quickly to address the central questions that face Israel -- how to restore momentum toward a comprehensive and peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and how Israel may best contribute to this goal. I know you will receive all the support and assistance you need from the United States.

Of the world leaders I have known, you are among the most courageous and most forthright in the defense of your national interests. It is my fervent hope and prayer for the new year that while fully preserving those interests you will be able to take constructive steps that will lead toward a comprehensive peace for Israel and its neighbors.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Ron

שגרירות ישראל בווינגטון
טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 2
דחיפות: מיידי
סוג: גלוי

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה
דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת
יועץ שהב"ס לתקשורת
מנהל לע"מ, ניו-יורק
מאת: עתונות

תאריך, זמן: 12.1.89
מספר המברק:

1/2

המשרד: 45 247 264

דו"ח תקשורת - 12.1.89

הצעת התקציב של הנשיא היוצא רייגן, ועידת פאריס בנושא הנשק הכימי, יחסי ארה"ב-לוב ומעורבות חברות גרמניות בבניית המפעל לנשק כימי בלוב, הדיונים באו"ם בדבר גינוי לארה"ב בעקבות הפלת המטוסים הלובים והליכוח בציבור האמריקאי בדבר אמינות שיקול דעתם של הטייסים, פתיחת משפטו של אוליבר נורט' ומות הקיסר היפני הירוהיטו הן את הנושאים המרכזיים בתקשורת האמריקאית בשבוע שחלף.

הקיצוצים בתקציב הממשלה והמדיניות הכלכלית החדשה בישראל עוררו עניין בעיקר בעתונות הכתובה. הדווחים שיבחו ברובם את המהלכים הכלכליים שננקטו ע"י הממשלה החדשה תוך שהם מדגישים כי עוד ארוכה הדרך להבראה כלכלית שלמה. בהקשר הוזכרו ההוצאות הכרוכות בהתקוממות בשטחים, המקבלת כיסוי מועט אך קבוע. בסוף השבוע הופיעו כמה ידיעות בדבר נכונותו של רוה"מ שמיר לפתוח את הדלת בפני מעורבות האו"ם בתהליך השלום במז"ת. כמה מאמרי אופ-אד עסקו בשאלת הסרוב הישראלי למו"מ ישיר עם עראפת (ביניהם א.מ. רוזנטל ב-NYT, ג'ון קירקפטריק ב-WP, והשגריר משה ארז ב-WP) וכולם הובעה הבנה לעמדה הישראלית תוך איזכור קולותיו השונים של עראפת לעולם הערבי מחד ולעולם המערבי מאידך. פסיקת בג"צ בנושא פרסום המאמרים על המוסד בעיתון העיר אוזכרה הבוקר בכמה מהעתונים המרכזיים.

מאמציו של אש"פ להכרה דיפלומטית כממשלה גולה הן הנציגויותיו באירופה והן באו"ם דווחו במרבית העתונים יחד עם התנגדותה של ארה"ב לשינוי מעמד משלחת אש"פ באו"ם.

לקראת סוף השבוע גבר העניין בקרבות בין פלגים שיעים יריבים בדרום לבנון, במבחן שמרכו אלו באלו ובקרע שנוצר כתוצאה מכך בין סוריה

12.1.89 10:10 AM

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לאיראן.

נשק כימי

הווה את הנושא התקשורתי המרכזי של השבוע בעתונות וברשתות האלקטרוניות. הדווחים מועידת פאריס הדגישו את הדרישה הערבית להצמיד את ההחלטות בנושא הנשק הכימי, 'כלי ההתגוננות של העניים' לדבריהם, לפירוק נשק גרעיני בטענה כי בידי ישראל אמצעים גרעיניים המאיימים על בטחונן. לכיסוי רב זכתה עמדת ארה"ב הטוענת כי יש לאסור גם אגירת הנשק הכימי ולא רק השימוש בו, כנדרש באמנת ג'נבה מסוף מלחמת העולם הראשונה, וההיסוס של בנות בריתה האירופאיות בנושא. בהקשר אוזכר הוויכוח בין ארה"ב לגרמניה בדבר מעורבות חברות גרמניות בפיתוח המפעל בלוב, הכחשת גרמניה ונסיגתה לאחר שהומצאו לה מסמכים מרשיעים ע"י ממשלת ארה"ב. נעילתה של ועידת פאריס בפשרה חסרת שיניים זכתה לכותרות ראשיות בעתונות ובתקשורת האלקטרונית.

הנשק הכימי וועידת פאריס הוו את הנושא המרכזי במאמרי המערכת והאופ-אד של השבוע. רבים תמכו בעמדה תקיפה של הממשל, בעיקר בנושא לוב עקב ראיות קדאפי כמרכז מבצעי וכלכלי לטרור העולמי, אולם אחרים הצביעו על צביעות מסוימת בהתקשות על ענישת לוב בעוד המפעלים הגדולים ליצור נשק כימי, בכמויות מאיימות ואמיתיות, נמצאים בסוריה ועיראק ומשום מה ממשל רייגן אינו מציג לצאת נגדם למתקפה צבאית. עוד הושמעה הטענה שהתמקדות הנשיא רייגן בלוב העבירה את משקל ועידת פאריס מדיון כללי בנושא לעיסוק פרטי בתאונות נקם (מאמר מערכת ב-WP) שאיפשר לאשמים להסתלק מאחריות.

אורית גובר.

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דחיות מידדי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: _____
סוג: שמר		כתוב: _____
תאריך וזמן חבור: 11.01.89 18:00	אל: מצפ"א, משח"ח, מקש"ח, משח"ב"ט	דע: _____
כס' פרוק:		דע: לשמנכ"ל אוצר, לשדח"מ (דועץ לענייני כלכלה), רמט"ן כיר-דורק
המסרד:	כאח: ק/ק לקונגרס	
239		5

קונגרס: תקציב ארצ"ב לשנת 1990

לשלנו 216

רצ"ב כידי שחוכן ע"י מקור יודע דבר בעל קשרים טובים בגבעה ובמנושל, כפי שתראה
חמבר מגיע למסקנות דומות מאד לאלה שבמברקנו ראף מחדד אותן.
לעיונכם.

וסח ארצ
למדן

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Reagan Budget for FY 90

Jan. 10, 1989

The most important fact to remember when analyzing the last Budget submitted by President Reagan is that, like all its predecessors, it is a political--more than a fiscal--document.

Reagan used the same approach that typified his past budgets; a combination of:
no new taxes,
higher military spending,
reductions in social programs, and
very optimistic economic assumptions that lead to the conclusion of actual deficit reductions.

Reagan's \$1.15 trillion budget has significant advantages for George Bush and places the Democrats in the position of opposing it by stressing that the only way to achieve the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) targets would be by raising taxes.

On the first point (making Bush look better when he submits his budget), by cutting 82 programs (almost all of which had been suggested to be cut in previous Reagan budgets--and all of which had been saved by Congress), Reagan will allow Bush to look like a "kinder, gentler" President when he restores any given program.

Similarly, by calling for cuts of over \$5 billion in Medicaid and Medicare, Reagan will allow Bush to look like both a budget cutter and an advocate of better health care for the poor and elderly when he calls for less drastic cuts. The same is true of Reagan's \$9.7 billion cut in farm programs.

Bush has promised to submit his budget, which will be based upon the Reagan budget--but have significant departures--no later than February 20. He is likely to have either smaller cuts or actual increases over Reagan's requests in programs like Medicaid, child care, environmental protection, etc.

Equally important, Bush has indicated that his defense request will be at a freeze plus inflation level--Reagan asked for slightly over 2% more than this. By reducing this amount, Bush will free up over \$6 billion for social programs or deficit reductions.

On the second point (taxes), the Democrats in Congress claim that it will be impossible to reduce the deficit to the required \$100 billion level required by GRH without increasing government revenues (ie. taxes). They claim that Reagan's approach of addition user fees and asset sales (ie. sale of the Naval Petroleum Reserve and two power generating complexes--these two concepts alone are anticipated to produce over \$6 billion) will not be sufficient.

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Reagan and Bush respond by telling the Democrats that if they truly feel this way, the Congress should raise taxes--thus putting the blame on the Democrats and letting the Administration off the hook.

The issue of taxes is likely to be the key political budget debate over the course of the next few months and it will probably take another budget summit in which both sides share the blame before the issue can be resolved.

The Democrats claim that, aside from taxes, the other major flaw of the Reagan budget is its overly optimistic economic assumptions.

They claim that Reagan is basing his predictions on both overstated figures for national economic growth and declining interest rates. It is possible that one or the other of these might take place--but, not both.

Thus, in a conversation I had with new Budget Chairman Jim Sasser and in the Senate Majority review of the budget proposal, the main concept is that Reagan has "failed the test. ... Relying on unrealistic economic assumptions and ignoring some of the most critical problems facing the country, the Reagan budget drastically understates the deficit crisis. By focusing exclusively on deep cuts in domestic programs, the outgoing administration resurrects a deficit reduction approach that has been rejected repeatedly by the Congress and the American people."

FUNCTION 150

<u>FY</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>
BA	18.1	18.9
O	16.1	17.3

Note: These totals are somewhat confusing and misleading. The FY 89 totals do not include the over \$5 billion in loan prepayments.

The foreign aid part of the function is scheduled to increase by \$0.8 in Budget Authority.

FMS for FY 90 is requested at \$5.0 billion, and Outlays of \$3.8 billion.

ESF for FY 90 is requested at \$3.3 billion and Outlays at \$3.5 billion.

ISRAEL REQUEST

In the country-by-country budget submission, the request for Israel was the same as last year--\$1.8 billion in FMS and \$1.2 billion in ESF.

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POLITICAL MINEFIELDS IN THE 150 REQUEST

First, it is unlikely that the overall Reagan Budget will survive very long, so the 150 request will go down with the rest of the budget.

Second, it is virtually impossible that a 6.6% (14% by some calculations---depending how the Ex-Im direct loan termination program is calculated) increase in Function 150 can survive during a year when drastic cuts in all other functions will be made to reach the GRH target. (Compared with a 4.5% increase in Defense--Function 050).

Third, the function has numerous controversial items in it that will affect the final functional totals.

Controversies likely to arise during the debate over 150 include:

* The President's request calls for the elimination of Export-Import Bank direct loan program. If this is restored, the functional totals will be even higher. The President's request cuts this program, thus saving \$695 million.

* State Department and USIA Operations: The President proposes an increase of \$686 in BA to fully fund the U.S. contribution to the U.N., new embassy construction, security programs and radio transmitters.

* Arrearages: The budget calls for an additional \$314 million in BA to cover part of the current U.S. arrearage to multilateral development banks and \$46 million to cover one-tenth of the U.S. arrearage to the United Nations (in addition to the approximately \$200 million for full funding of this years dues).

* Philippines: \$200 million in a special security fund for the Philippines.

* Moscow Embassy: \$300 million.

* Board for International Broadcasting: of the \$425 million requested for the Board, \$207 million are for the construction of a high priority shortwave radio relay station in Israel--to be used by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America.

*Cross-over--there might be an ultimate struggle between the State, Justice, Commerce and the Foreign Operations portions of the overall totals. This struggle may favor Sen. Hollings, who is on the Budget Committee, over Sen. Leahy, who is not.

LIKELY BUSH 150 PROPOSAL

In discussions with State Department, I got the indication that Jim Baker is likely to amend the Reagan budget totals for the function to approach a "freeze" or "freeze plus inflation" level

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rather than a 6.6% increase. This will place even greater pressure on the existing programs in the function---especially if they try and keep everything. This in turn, would place greatest pressure upon the Israel and Egypt accounts.

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END

דף: _____	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון סופס פרוק	דתיפות: מידד
כתוב: _____		סוג: שמר
אל: סמנ"ל צפ"א יועץ מדינה לשח"ח	תאריך וזמן חבור: 12.01.89 10:00	
דע:	פס' פרוק: המשרד: 248	
פאת: ציר - עודד ערן		

ארה"ב - תהליך

נשיא מועדון הנשיאים סימור רייך ומנכ"ל הארגון הוונליין נפגשו אתמול עם המזכיר. העלר בפניו את נושא מחויבותה של ארה"ב שלא לנהל מר"מ עם אש"פ בנושאים שונים. שולץ אמר שיענה למכתבו של קסטן שחברק אליהם אתמול ובתשובתו יאמר שארה"ב לא תדון עם אש"פ (או עם כל גורם אחר) על חזרה לגבולות 67, על ועידה בינלאומית ועל מדינת פלשתינאית, כמו כן תלחץ למר"מ ישיר בין ישראל ושכנותיה. בשיחה הועלה גם נושא יחודי ברה"מ. שולץ טען שלא היה שום במניעת חושידה לזכירות האדם מלהעריך במוסקבה שכן חקלף הזה היה מאבד מערכו. עתה נותרו עוד שנתיים עד לושידה ואפשר יהיה ללחוץ על הסובייטים באמצעות קיום או אי קיום הושידה אצלם. שולץ גם אמר לרייך והוונליין כי לדעתו החליטו הסובייטים לכונן מחדש יחסים דיפלומטיים עם ישראל ולדעתו לא ימתינו הסובייטים עד שיתמלאו התנאים הידועים שהם חציבו לעצמם.

בא"ס אבן
ערן

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תפוצה: 36

דחילות: מידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 1
סוג: שמור	טופס פרוק	מתוך: 5
תאריך וזמן חבירה:		אל: מצפ"א
11 בינואר 1989 16:30		דע:
כס' פרוק:		
הפסד:		
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הסנטור אינוה וקסטן ודו-שיח עם אשייפ

רציב הצעת מכתב ששני הסנטורים הנ"ל אמורים לשגר חיוס או מחר למזכיר שולץ.
המכתב מדבר בעד עצמו.

בשלב זה, לידיעתכם בלבד.

י.ל.
קונגרס.

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

Events have moved rapidly over the past few weeks in the development of U.S. Middle East policy, and we are concerned that, in the rush of these events, certain basic principles of U.S. policy may have seemed lost or forgotten.

We know how much you have personally contributed to the strengthening of the US/Israel relationship throughout your remarkably successful tenure as Secretary of State. However, one unfortunate result of the sudden U.S. decision to begin an official dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization has been to create a growing sense of isolation and unease within Israel.

We therefore urge that, in these last few weeks of your stewardship of U.S. foreign policy, you solidify and strengthen those basic principles that have served as the cornerstone of US Middle East policy. We urge you to reassure our close friend and ally Israel that those principles have not changed and will not change under a new Administration. In particular, we hope you will reinforce basic US policy that:

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1. The U.S. does not support the creation of an independent Palestinian state as it would be harmful to the security of both the United States and Israel.

2. The final borders between Israel and her neighbors must be the subject of direct negotiations. The U.S. does not support a return to the pre-1967 borders.

3. Jerusalem must remain a unified city.

4. Direct negotiations are the only avenue for peace. The United States will not support or attend an authoritative international conference with the power to impose its will on the parties concerned.

5. The United States recognizes that Israel must make its own decision as to the parties with whom it will negotiate and will not take a position as to whether Israel should negotiate with the PLO.

6. The United States will not deviate from these principles without advance consultation and approval of the government of Israel.

We also firmly believe that your decision to begin an official dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization has placed a direct burden upon the PLO to back up Yasir Arafat's

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words with concrete actions. The PLO must clearly demonstrate its commitment to peace through deeds, not just words and the United States must be prepared to walk away from the talks if those deeds are not forthcoming.

In particular, if the PLO-U.S. dialogue is to lead to constructive steps toward peace, the PLO must undertake the following steps:

1. Terrorist attacks against Israel and Israeli targets must stop entirely. It is not enough for Arafat alone to "renounce terrorism," particularly when PLO leaders like Khaled al-Hassan, chairman of the PLO Foreign Affairs Committee, announces that "We are in a state of war, not peace," and when other top PLO officials have declared their right to continue "armed struggle" within Israel and the territories.

2. Arafat must end all terrorist incidents committed by PLO factions under his control, condemn and expel from the organizations all groups and individuals who continue to commit such acts and agree to the extradition of individuals arrested for their involvement with terrorism. The United States must make it very clear that it will end its dialogue with the PLO if Arafat's pledge is violated.

3. Despite Arafat's carefully drafted statements, the PLO covenant is still in force which calls for the elimination of the

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State of Israel. The covenant should be amended to reflect a true willingness to live in peace with Israel, and all future statements by Arafat and his top officials should reflect this new policy. Unfortunately, recent statements by one top Arafat advisor reiterated the PLO's stated policy of the "step by step" liberation of Palestine.

The Bush Administration will build its Middle East policy upon the foundations you have established. Peace will only come when, as you have stated, Israel is secure in the knowledge that American support is firm and unalterable. You can do a great deal to help set the stage for further progress in the peace process at this critical moment by reiterating basic U.S. principles and support for Israel's security and well being.

We have enjoyed working with you over the past six years and wish you the best of luck as you return to Stanford.

דף: _____	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דחיפות: מידדי
מתוך: _____		סוג: שמור
אל: _____		תאריך וזמן חבירה: 11.01.89 20:15
דע: _____		פס' פרוק: הפסד: 243
פאת: ק. לקונגרס		

הבחירות לנשיאות ארצ"ב והלובי הערבי

ה- ADC חגישו תלונה ל- FEC (FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION) נגד כ-55 PAC'S פרו ישראלים על פעילותם הבלתי חוקית במהלך הבחירות. על המכתב חתומים אישים כמו פול פינדלי וג'ורג' בול.
(ה- FEC מוצף בד"כ בתלונות רבות ועליו לחליט לגבי דרך פעולה אם בכלל).
מחר יקוימו מסיבת עיתונאים בנדון ונבריק פרטים נוספים לאחר קיומה.

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תפוצה:

דמיפות: כיידו	שגרירות ישראל/ווינגטון	קד: 1
סוג: בלבים	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 7
תאריך וזמן חשור:		אל: מצטיא, מעיית, ממיד
פס' פרוק:	יועץ רוחיים לתקשורת, יועץ טכנייט לתקשורת, לעיית	דע: אמ"ן/קשיית, דובר צה"ל, ניו-יורק
מפסרד: בטחון ניו יורק		פאת: עתוכות ווינגטון
41 214 235 1/4		

תדרוך דובר כחפיד ליום January 11, 1989

REDMAN:

That remains the issue on that side of the discussions. And on the Vienna CSCE meeting, there are still some other issues there that are still being worked on. Those include some of the wording of the military security text having to do with the autonomy of the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. That's still under discussion. The United States is also continuing its efforts to strengthen human rights texts on rights of Helsinki monitors and limiting the use of prior national security employment as a bar to emigration. And finally, the number of post-Vienna follow-up experts meetings has still to be decided.

So, as you can see, there are still some discussions underway, but it may come to a point where I wouldn't have enough time to give you any advance notice if this trip gets laid on. So, please, if you're interested, sign up as soon as possible.

Q What --

Q Can you tell us what the parameters would be?

MR. REDMAN: You know that the conference has set aside the 17th as the day to try to conclude. So, if that were to be the case, I would think we would be talking about a Sunday departure and probably back in Washington by Tuesday night.

Q Do you have any comment on the new export regulations put in by the West Germans?

MR. REDMAN: (Pause.) I do, Jim, but let me find out where I'm going here. (Pause.) Concerning the export controls that have been announced, we warmly welcome the efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany to strengthen their export controls. We haven't seen the details of these government proposals. We'll want to study them carefully. In that connection, we look forward to the visit in early February of Economics Minister Hausmann (ph), who has stated that he will brief us fully on the German plan. Beyond that, we

תפוצה:

סהר רמא גדיה סהכט (ב/פוי) גלב גלב רליכר גלב רמ
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would hope that the German government will move quickly to implement the new policy.

Q Did the Secretary send a telegram to Chancellor Kohl, which one of the papers says he did, thanking him for the progress?

MR. REDMAN: That I couldn't confirm. We have been in continuing consultation with the German government. But I don't know that anything has occurred since these new export controls have been announced. Of course, this is something that the German government has said they are -- have been considering for some time now.

Q (Off-mike) -- were to leave today. Are they here? Will they see Americans tomorrow?

MR. REDMAN: Those talks haven't started yet. You know that our exchange of information is an ongoing process. We will have these meetings with West German officials and experts this week, but they have not occurred yet.

Q Are those talks going to be held in secret? I mean, are we ever going to see or know who or what this delegation is?

MR. REDMAN: I don't know exactly how that will work out. The talks obviously will be held on a classified basis because of the nature of the information.

Q One more on this before we do. My recollection is that this -- we've lived through this once before in the case of Iraq, and at that point too, the West Germans put in new regulations, I think, on precursor chemicals and some other technical items. Is my memory correct? Do you recall?

MR. REDMAN: I just don't remember that particular case, but I don't know that I could answer that. I think the German authorities are better placed to describe the evolution of their export control

laws. But, for all of us, there has been a continuing effort to address various aspects of this issue. In the case of the so-called Australian group, for example, we have identified a number of precursor chemicals that we have then tried to get into play. But, I just don't know the evolution in the German case in specific terms.

Q Sort of related to that: While I can understand that the Germans couldn't find the evidence somehow, they were groping there but couldn't come to the conclusion the Americans, the British, and the Dutch all came to, how could they impose export controls? If they claimed nothing got out that was wrong, what are they controlling? Are they controlling --

Q -- perfectly legitimate exports to please the United States, or the blind has fallen from their eyes?

MR. REDMAN: I can't speak for the German government, obviously. All I can say is that we have had a continuing exchange with them, as the Secretary made clear during his meeting with

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Foreign Minister Genscher last week. We appreciate the efforts that the German government has been making. As they have said, they have been working on this question of looking at our information, plus they have been looking at their export laws, something that's been underway for some time, so that I don't have anyway to make any further explanation. I would just say, in a more global sense, that we appreciate the cooperation and the efforts of the German government, as well as the other governments, investigating the possible involvement of their firms in this Libyan project.

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Q This is about the previous subject, as I said. One of the networks yesterday released a report that, while the Secretary was arguing in Paris to stop the production and use of chemical weapons, the US was actually increasing its production of it, and in the budget that the President submitted, there is actually quite a sizable sum of money to do just that. Do you have any comment on that?

MR. REDMAN: That's the same point that we have talked about publicly a number of times. The Secretary addressed it in his press conference in Paris -- that we are in the process, for the first time since 1969, contrary to what the Soviets have been doing, of modernizing our chemical weapons stock. We are going to produce binary weapons, but as we produce those, we are also destroying the old unitary stocks. So that the net result of our effort will continue to be a diminution in the quantities, but we will have a safer and more reliable deterrent. And then, as the Secretary also noted, we are committed to these negotiations in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament, which we hope will lead to an effective verifiable worldwide ban on these weapons. So, that's exactly what we have been saying. It's been

voted on in the Congress some time ago. It shouldn't have been news to anyone.

Q Do you have a status report on Libya's chemical weapons effort? As far as you're concerned, is it a stalemate situation now? That plant is not functioning in any way, shape or form? Do you see the precursor chemicals near? Where does that stand?

MR. REDMAN: I don't think that I can help you very much. Nothing has really changed. Our appreciation remains the same, that the plant is not yet in production, and that in order for it to make that step, outside expertise, equipment is going to be required. So our effort continues to be the same.

Q Are you aware that Qadhafi has surrounded that industrial park area with hundreds, if not thousands, of children and cripples and -- I mean, apparently there is this incredible display of -- it's now a tent city which has sprung up around the industrial park. It's an effort to deter any military action on the part of the United States. Are you aware of that?

MR. REDMAN: If the question is "am I aware of it?", certainly. For example, I saw reports from journalists who were down there a few days ago who reported that kind of activity. But as to its significance or rationale, you'll have to talk to the Libyans.

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Q If you're talking about the outside experience and equipment that's demanded, with the action of the West Germans and the reassurances of the Japanese and the Italians, is there a sense now that the pipeline has been cut off?

MR. REDMAN: I don't want to really take the appreciation any further than what I just did in answering the previous question. It remains true, as I said, that we need to stop that kind of flow of material and expertise if the plant is not to become operational. We have been working at that. We've seen a number of governments actively working at that, and I think we just have to keep at that effort. So I'd just leave it at that.

Q:

Has the issue of the US thinking that we could take out the plant militarily been resolved in any way by the chemical weapons conference in Paris? Or is it still a -- do we still have contingency plans, military contingency plans?

MR. REDMAN: A two-part answer. First, that I have never addressed the question of military contingency planning for this subject or for any other. It's not a subject that I will address here. So you make reference to some previous statement, and I have no knowledge of that; nor have I made any at this podium. And secondly, concerning the issue of the plant and the conference in Paris, we have made it very clear from the beginning that that was not the object of the conference in Paris; that that conference had specific objectives. We have said and resaid what those objectives are. So those would be only two points.

Q As a result of the conference, does it allay US concerns in any way?

MR. REDMAN: Again, the conference had objectives. Those objectives focused specifically on future use of chemical weapons, for example. So that's what this conference has been working on, not on the specifics of this particular plant.

Q Just to follow that, is it still -- maybe you can refine what you said a day or two ago about the American position on the plant being dismantled, destroyed, disappearing. What's the current position on that?

MR. REDMAN: No, I'm not going to refine anything.

Q Let me ask you one other question. You had mentioned previously that the State Department had talked to as many as 10 or 12 different countries about private companies that were doing business with Libya, selling chemicals. One of those companies apparently is a subsidiary of an American company, Phillips Petroleum, which operates out of Belgium, and has sold some chemicals to the Libyans. Do those talks include discussions with American companies? Or have those talks included discussions --

MR. REDMAN: I have never dealt with any of the specifics in terms of our own concerns, and I don't propose to do that. We are dealing with that on a confidential basis with the governments involved, and I'll just leave it at that.

[Handwritten marks: a large 'X' and a circled 'X']

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Q Chuck, is it possible to stop the flow of materiel and expertise to Libya, to prevent it from obtaining such capabilities?

MR. REDMAN: Yes.

MR. REDMAN: That's no obligation I have to rephrase my answer.

Q That's fine. In mid-December, the President said that the United States was examining the possibility of a military strike against the Libyan chemical weapons plant. I don't have his exact words, but I think that was his meaning. Is this still an operative idea? Is the United States still examining the possibility of a military strike against the plant?

MR. REDMAN: Then I won't rephrase my answer.

Q I was also about two minutes late. Did you react specifically to the conference resolution that was passed in the middle of the night?

MR. REDMAN: No.

Q Could you? Do you have --

MR. REDMAN: I'm sure there will be some reaction from our delegation in Paris. But we are pleased with what's been accomplished at the Paris Chemical Weapons Conference. The US objectives for the conference were to focus world-wide attention on the problems of chemical weapons use and chemical weapons proliferation and help put a stop to the use of these weapons in violation of international law. The US also wanted participants to reaffirm their commitment to comply with existing norms on the use of chemical weapons, and for nations which have not thus far done so to adhere to the 1925 Geneva protocol.

World-wide attention has been focused on the problem of chemical weapons. Conference participants have strongly reaffirmed their commitment to existing norms on the use of chemical weapons, in particular, the 1925 Geneva protocol. They have also reaffirmed their support for an enhanced role of the UN Secretary General in the chemical weapons field. Finally, eight nations have acceded to the 1925 protocol, and two others have announced their intent to do so.

As you know, the Paris conference was not intended to negotiate an agreement on chemical weapons. The US will continue to work toward such an agreement in the conference on disarmament

negotiations in Geneva. The principal objective of US policy with respect to chemical weapons remains that of negotiating a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global ban on chemical weapons in those negotiations at Geneva.

Q The Geneva '25 protocol really talks about -- or limits or puts some restrictions on states to use it, but not to produce it. Now, how does that fit into the US-Libya, quote, "controversy"? You didn't want to listen to him(?) here, but we all heard that the President actually did refer to some plans or some thinking about knocking off that plant.

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MR. REDMAN: Once again, I can only say what I've said before. We had some objectives in Paris, those are the ones I've just talked about. The other issue of the Libyan plant is one we have been addressing many times, you know what our concerns have been there. And I'll just leave those statements as they are.

Q Can you talk -- comment on the accuracy of reports that came out of Paris in the last few days that the United States had assured a number of nations that there would not be a military strike?

MR. REDMAN: I won't comment on any reports dealing with military contingencies. I just -- I can't be put in the position of dealing with that particular kind of question in this kind of setting.

Q Chuck, can you give us any information on what the specific problem is that is preventing the Libyans going ahead with chemical weapons production at their plant? Specifically, does it have to do with a spill at the site last summer? Is it an ongoing problem as a result of that spill?

MR. REDMAN: I don't know that there's any -- I just don't know what the length might be between that toxic spill and the current constraints about going ahead to production. I would only stay with a more generic response, which is to point to the desirability of keeping both equipment and expertise from moving.

Q How is the US going to vote in the Security Council on the resolution which is apparently about to emerge there?

MR. REDMAN: The Council is scheduled to meet again this afternoon to continue discussion. A draft resolution critical of the United States has been tabled and the vote is expected today. As I said several days ago, we would oppose any resolution that does not reflect that the US acted in self-defense in the face of unprovoked hostile acts by Libyan forces.

MR. REDMAN: There will be a vote. I have given you the principle which will guide our decision.

Q Prime Minister Shamir made a statement yesterday which seems to accept a UN role in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. How does the US view this statement, and do you see it moving the peace process?

MR. REDMAN: I don't want to reflect on those kind of statements. I think I would leave it to the Israeli government to formulate their positions, to talk about them as they would; but, no, I don't really have any reaction at this point.

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MR. REDMAN: It's a Pentagon report, but of course it was cleared around. I don't know of any disagreements or disputes over that report, no.

Q Chuck, can we go back to that report by DOD? It lists Fatah and other Palestinian groups as terrorist groups. And there have the name, and in fact the picture, of Yassir Alatrabou (ph), with whom Ambassador Pelletreau met in Tunis. Do you have anything on that? And will you take the question, take a look at it?

MR. REDMAN: No, I think there was a briefing yesterday at the Pentagon, and they explained the nature of that document that's been at the printer's since September, for example; our continuing concerns about terrorism. I think all those questions were addressed, and I thought perfectly adequately.

Q But don't you find it odd that a report like that would include the name and the picture of a man with whom the United States State Department --

MR. REDMAN: Not at all.

MR. REDMAN: Not at all. We have made it very clear that terrorism was the first issue on our agenda, because those organizations have engaged in terrorism. And they have made a pledge not to do so, a pledge which we expect them to live up to.

MR. REDMAN: This is a report -- this is a report on terrorist activities. Those activities have occurred, and they are documented in that report. If there are future reports, and if the track record has changed, then I'm sure you will see changes in the track record.

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דף: <u>1</u>	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דחילות: מדדי
פתוך: <u>3</u>	טופס פברק	סוג: שמר
אל: נצח"א		תאריך וזמן חבור: 11.01.89 20:00
דע:		כס' פברק:
		הפסד:
פאת: ק. לקונגרס		242 1/3

סג'אט: רעדט חזק

היום נפגשנו, למדן רח"מ עם הרב בריסטיאנסן, מנהל צוות העוזרים בועדת החוץ בסנאט.
להלן הנושאים העיקריים שעלו בשיחה:

לר"ז של חרעדה

17-18/1 HEARING של ביוקר לקראת אישור מינויו כמזכיר המדינה.
24/1 - דיווח של גנרל ברנס על ועידת פריז בנושא הנשק הכימי.
25/1 - הגשת החלטה (BY PARTISAN) בנושא נשק כימי שתקרא לענושת המדינות המשתמשות בנשק כימי ותחבירות המספקות חומרים כימיים.
7-8/2 - יתכן שחנשלא בוש יקרא ל- JOINT SESSION בנושא התקציב.
חדש פברואר כולו- יוקדש ל- HEARINGS לאישור מינויים לממשל החדש.

אישור מינויים

א. כאמור חדש פברואר כולו יוקדש לאישור מינויים. בדיקה וצוותו יקבעו סדר הקדימויות לקיום השימועים. הראשונה לאחר בדיקה תהיה ככל הנראה קצינת הקישור החדשה לקונגרס במחמ"ד, חג'ב ג'אנט מאלונס.

ב. אישור מינויו של פיקרלינג - חלק ניכר מחשימוע יוקדש לנושא הקונטרס, בהקשר זה ציין כריסטיאנסן כי פנו לגורמים קונגרסיונליים שעסקו בפרשת איראן-קונטרס וביקשו לקבל אוטומטית תיקיהם של כל חמועמדים לאישור מינוייהם שהיו מעורבים בפרצח או בתחליך העדויות בועדות חקירה של הקונגרס,

ג. לגבי המינויים שנעשו בעת פגרת הקונגרס, הם עדיין יצטרכו לעבור תהליך אישור, היו סנטורים שחזיעו לא לקיים שימועים ובתום שנה לתת למינויים לפוג מתוקפם. זאת במגמה לאותת לממשל התנגדות הסנאט לשיטת המינויים בפגרה.

כריסטיאנסן אמר שיציע לחמתין 9-6 חודשים כדי לראות כיצד מתפקדים למשל חשגרירים
החדשים שמונו בפגרה ולקיים שימועים רק לאחר מכן, היינו בסתיו.
לגבי חשגריר ביל בראון, ציין כי הוא זוכה להערכה והוקרה רבה בגבעה.

תפוצה: -36-

$\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{3}$ $\frac{1}{4}$ $\frac{1}{5}$ $\frac{1}{6}$ $\frac{1}{7}$ $\frac{1}{8}$ $\frac{1}{9}$ $\frac{1}{10}$ $\frac{1}{11}$ $\frac{1}{12}$ $\frac{1}{13}$ $\frac{1}{14}$ $\frac{1}{15}$ $\frac{1}{16}$ $\frac{1}{17}$ $\frac{1}{18}$ $\frac{1}{19}$ $\frac{1}{20}$ $\frac{1}{21}$ $\frac{1}{22}$ $\frac{1}{23}$ $\frac{1}{24}$ $\frac{1}{25}$ $\frac{1}{26}$ $\frac{1}{27}$ $\frac{1}{28}$ $\frac{1}{29}$ $\frac{1}{30}$ $\frac{1}{31}$ $\frac{1}{32}$ $\frac{1}{33}$ $\frac{1}{34}$ $\frac{1}{35}$ $\frac{1}{36}$ $\frac{1}{37}$ $\frac{1}{38}$ $\frac{1}{39}$ $\frac{1}{40}$ $\frac{1}{41}$ $\frac{1}{42}$ $\frac{1}{43}$ $\frac{1}{44}$ $\frac{1}{45}$ $\frac{1}{46}$ $\frac{1}{47}$ $\frac{1}{48}$ $\frac{1}{49}$ $\frac{1}{50}$ $\frac{1}{51}$ $\frac{1}{52}$ $\frac{1}{53}$ $\frac{1}{54}$ $\frac{1}{55}$ $\frac{1}{56}$ $\frac{1}{57}$ $\frac{1}{58}$ $\frac{1}{59}$ $\frac{1}{60}$ $\frac{1}{61}$ $\frac{1}{62}$ $\frac{1}{63}$ $\frac{1}{64}$ $\frac{1}{65}$ $\frac{1}{66}$ $\frac{1}{67}$ $\frac{1}{68}$ $\frac{1}{69}$ $\frac{1}{70}$ $\frac{1}{71}$ $\frac{1}{72}$ $\frac{1}{73}$ $\frac{1}{74}$ $\frac{1}{75}$ $\frac{1}{76}$ $\frac{1}{77}$ $\frac{1}{78}$ $\frac{1}{79}$ $\frac{1}{80}$ $\frac{1}{81}$ $\frac{1}{82}$ $\frac{1}{83}$ $\frac{1}{84}$ $\frac{1}{85}$ $\frac{1}{86}$ $\frac{1}{87}$ $\frac{1}{88}$ $\frac{1}{89}$ $\frac{1}{90}$ $\frac{1}{91}$ $\frac{1}{92}$ $\frac{1}{93}$ $\frac{1}{94}$ $\frac{1}{95}$ $\frac{1}{96}$ $\frac{1}{97}$ $\frac{1}{98}$ $\frac{1}{99}$ $\frac{1}{100}$

דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	דף: <u>2</u>
סוג:		פתוך: <u>3</u>
תאריך וזמן העבר:		אל:
כס' פבוק:		דע:
<u>הפשרד:</u>		
2/3 242		פאת:

תקציב פדרלי

כאמור לעיל, קיימת אפשרות שהנשיא בוש יקרא ל- ~~Joint Session~~ ^{Joint Session} (7-8/2-ב) וידון בנושא התקציב. להערכת כריסטיאנסן ~~כלל~~ הנראה להעמיד הקונגרס בדפנסיבה ולחעביר אליו את יוזמת ועול חטיפול בתקציב, בשלב הבא, לאחר שיוברלי לבוש שאין בכוונת הקונגרס ליטול יוזמה מצידו, יחל ככל הנראה. במר"מ ובשיחות עם המחוקקים אולם לא נראה שיש משחר בכתב - בבחינת תכנית כתובה ומלאה.

סדה"י של חרעדה

אינו צופה לנושאים מיוחדים להוציא נשק כימי, דיון ביחסי ארה"ב וברית"מ ואשרור מספר
אמנות.

פ"א 77

אמנם יתכן שהסנטורים קרנסטון קנדי וסיימוץ יחזרו ויגישו החלטה בנושא, כשתקד, ומסיבות פוליטיות ליו"ר הועד, הסנטור פל, לא תהיה ברכה אלא לדון בו, אולם נושא הסנקציות כדבריו של קריסטיאנסן

WILL LEAD TO NOWHERE

אל סלבדור

CERTIFICATION צומח לבעיות. חנושא יטופל בחוק החרשאות ויצטרכו להתנות הסיוע ולדרוש מהממשל בנוגע לזכויות אדם.

חוק הסיוע

- א. לא יחלו לטפל בנושא ללא הצעת חוק שתבוא מהממשל, דבר שעלול לקחת זמן רב.
ב. לא צופה לכל שינוי במבנה ולא לשבירת שיטת השריונים.
ג. הרויזיות בביחנ"ב ARE GOING NOWHERE
ד. הצעת התקציב של מטשל ריגן תבוצע ככל הנראה כמעט במלואה ללא שינויים משמעותיים
ובככל זה חסיוע לישראל.

תפ"ח :

דחיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון שופט פרוק	דף: 3
סוג:		כתוב: 3
תאריך וזמן חבירה:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
המסר:		כאח:
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הרכב הועדה

מצד הדמוקרטים יצטרף לוועדה הסנטור רוב ומצד הרפובליקנים יצטרפו הסנטורים המפרי גורדון וקרני מק.

לדברי כריסטיאנסן ההערכה היא שהלמס מנח לדול רביקש להכניס לוועדה סנטורים רפובליקנים שמרנים שיטמשו לו בנז ברית ואשר יתמכו ביוזמותיו 'NOT TO BE OUTVOTED ON EVERY INITIATIVE AMONG FELLOW REPUBLICANS' להערכת כריסטיאנסן השניים חלל יחיו רק לעובת הדמוקרטים בוועדה.

מנהיג הרוב

הסנטור מיטצ'ל מסר שלא יתערב בעניני חוץ, בניגוד לקודמו בירד, וכן לא ינסה "לגנוב להם את ההצגה". מאידך, בכוננתו להעביר יותר נושאים לטיפול הועדה.

FAIR PRICING

תדענה אותם בנושא, לכאורה, אינו רואה כל בעיות.

דו"ח יעבץ

דו"ח הממשל על כוונותיו למכור נשק למדינות זרות (בכללן מדינות ערב) צפוי להופיע רק בעוד כשישה שבועות, שכן הממשל החדש יחיה זה שיכין דו"ח.

י.ו. יוסף למדן
יחודית ורגאי דרגר

תפוצה:

דחיות: מ ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 2
סוג: ש מ ר		כתוב: 8
תאריך וזמן העבר:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסיד:		
29 - 190 - 216		כאח:

אין להסתמך על תחזיות הצמיחה המופיעות בתקציב; יש צורך למקד את העדיפויות על צרכי פנים. הקונגרסמן ליאון פנטה סבור שההצעה אינה אלא "צוואה האחרונה" של ממשל רייגן ו"השאלה העקרית היא באם הממשל החדש יחדש או ידחה את הקדימויות של הממשל היוצא", הביע תקווה שבוש יחתור, כפי שהבטיח, לקראת "A KINDER, GENTLER AMERICA."

(4) באשר ל"פונקציות" חשונות (הסעיפים הראשיים) בתקציב מקובלת הדעה שפונקציה 050 (הגנה) תשונה ותוקטן, אם לא ע"י בוש, אזי ע"י הקונגרס, תוך הפניית המשאבים המתפנים לתכניות פנים. לעומת זאת מעריכים שפונקציה 150 (עניני חוץ) תשתנה פחות בשל קשיחות המחויבויות והאינטרסים האמריקאיים וירושל ומוחדד של תזרזר המדינה המיועד, ג'ים בייקר.

(ב) פונקציה 150 (עניני חוץ)

(1) המספרים חלוצים

הבקשה להרשאות : 18.9 בליון, הווה אומר תוספת של 2.7 בליון לעומת השנה (שת"א 1989).

הוצאות בפועל : 17.3 בליון, סכום שמהווה תוספת של 6.6 בליון יותר לעומת השנה (הערה: השנה יוחזרו לממשל כ-5 בליון דולר בתשלומים מראש (DEBT PREPAYMENTS) של חובות הסיוע הצבאי (FMS DEBT RESTRUCTURING) וחכנסות אלה יחסרו בשת"א 1990, אך סידורים תקציביים כבר נעשו לא לפגוע בהוצאות יפונקציה 150 (TO HOLD THE FUNCTION HARMLESS)

תפוצה:

דחיות: מיד	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 3
סוג: ש מ ר		מתוך: 8
תאריך וזמן חבירה:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		
29 - 190 - 216		כאח:

(2) חלוקה פנימית (תת-סעיפים עיקריים)

ש"ת א 1989	ש"ת א 1990	סיוע צבאי
4.3 מיליון	5 בליון	הרשאה
3.2	3.8	הוצאות בפועל
		סיוע אזרחי
3.25	3.35	הרשאה
3.4	3.5	הוצאות בפועל
		סוכנות אי. אי. די.
2.3	2.6	הרשאה
2.1	2.3	הוצאות בפועל
		ארגונים בינלאומיים
521 מיליון	832 מליון	הרשאה
538	809	הוצאות בפועל
		קרן ה- GRF
594	720 מליון	הרשאה
599	720	הוצאות בפועל
		סיוע לפליטים
412	380 מליון	הרשאה
410	404	הוצאות בפועל
		תפוצה:

ד"ר: 4	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דחפיות: מ י ד י
מתוך: 8		סוג: ש מ ד י
אל:		תאריך וזמן חבירה:
דע:		כס' פרוק:
		הפסד:
פאת:		29 - 190 - 216

ש"ת א 1989

ש"ת א 1990

כספי מחמ"ד

הרשאה

הוצאות בפרעל

2

2,3 בליון

2,2

" 2,2

(3) הערות לגבי המספרים הנ"ל

א. ישראל-מצרים

מובן מדברי תת-המזכיר רוזיטהד (מברקו 168) ומדברים פחות מפורשים בהצעת הנשיא שבכונת הממשל לבקש המשך הסיוע הצבאי והאזרחי עבור ישראל ומצרים ברמת הנוכחית (3 בליון דולר ו-2.3 בליון). אנשי צוות העוזרים וועדת התקציב בסנט משערים שהוועדה תמליץ על המשך הסיוע לישראל, בעוד שיתעוררו שאלות לגבי הסיוע למצרים, בעיקר לגבי החלק בסיוע האזרחי המוקדש לפרויקטים לא מוצ'קייט ווהיקועיט נצגות ובבידורוקרטיה המצרית. לתשומת הלב, בהסבר לבקשה לסיוע אזרחי וצבאי מודגש חלקו של סיוע זה בקידום תהליך השלום במזה"ת ובהבטחת הדמוקרטיה באמריק"ז.

ב. הגדלה במימון תכניות קדימות

באופן כללי הסיוע חבילטרלי מוגדל ב-5% והתכניות המולטי-לטרליות בבנק לפיתוח בינלאומי ב-25%. חגידול הראשון משקף שיעורי האינפלציה, אך חגידול מעורר תמיהות.

ג. תכניות חדשות

בהצעה מספר תכניות חדשות שתגרומנה להוצאות חדשות כגון קרן פיתוח לאפריקה בסך של 565 מליון דולר; "יוזמה לסיוע מיוחד" (SPECIAL ASSISTANCE INITIATIVE) שתתחיל במתן סיוע מיוחד לפיליפינים בסך של 200 מליון דולר; השתתפות ארה"ב בכוחות חדשים מטעם האו"ם לשמירת השלום (50 מליון דולר לקבוצת המערב בכמביניה,

תפוצה:

דחיות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	זר: 5
סוג: ש מ ד י		סתיו: 8
תאריך וזמן חגור:		אל:
פס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		כאת:
29-190-216		

20-2 מליון לקבוצת המשקיפים העבאיים בסכסוך איראן-עיראק, ועוד.

ד. ארגונים בינלאומיים

בחצעה בקשה לאשר תשלום מלא של חוב ארה"ב לאו"ם, על כל גופיו וטכנולוגיותיו.

ה. פיוע לפליטים

לא זו בלבד שהבקשה למימון תכנית זו קטנה ב-32 מליון דולר מחבקשה השנה, אלא צויין שיש לכסות גם זרימה משמעותית של ארמנים ויהודי בריח"מ לתוך לארה"ב. יש הסבורים בבקשה המפורטת לתכנית סיוע יוצע לצמצם את הסיוע לקליטת פליטים בישראל ל-10 מליון (לעומת 28 מליון השנה) ולנצל חלק מהסיוע לקליטת פליטים סובייטים בארה"ב.

ו. כספי מחמ"ד

משרד VoA בערבה. כמקובל הכספים ל-USIS והטכנולוגיות הקשורות בו כלולים בתוך תקציב מחמ"ד. במסגרת התקציב ל-BIB ו-VoA בקשה ל-207 מליון \$ עבור התחנה בישראל, פירוש הדבר הרשאה ליתרת הפרוייקט כאשר ההוצאות בפועל יתפרסו על כחמש השנים הבאות.

כזכור, בשת"א 89 הבקשה היתה לשנה אחת בלבד, ושינוי הגישה לקראת שת"א 90 בוודאי תמשוך תשומת חלב-ראולי "אש".

ז. בנק EXIM (EXPORT-IMPORT BANK) - בבקשה, מציעים שלא יחזיר הלוואות חדשות מצד הבנק ולכן אין בקשה בכלל למימון פריט זה.

תפוצה:

זר: 6	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	זיכיונות: מ י ד י
מתוך: 8		סוג: ש מ ר ר
אל:		תאריך וזמן העבר:
דע:		כס' פרוק: הפסד:
כאח:		24- 190-216

ח. מטרות לקיצוץ או לשינויים מצד הקונגרס

מעיון ראשוני בחצעה לפונקציה 150 מסתמנת הערכה בקרב העוזרים בשני הבתים שהמחוקקים ימקדו תשומת ליבם על מספר נושאים/תכניות וביניהם:

"SAI" - יוזמת סיוע מיוחדת זו לפיליפינים בגודל של 200 מיליון \$ עלולה להתקל בביקורת קשה.

- תחנת VOA בערבה - יתכן שהמחוקקים לא יסכימו להרשאת הפרוייקט כולו ויעמדו על השיטה דאשתקד, היינו הרשאת הקצבה לכל שנה בנפרד.

- בנק EXIM - לבטח יהיו מחוקקים שיתנגדו לרעיון לפיר בנק זה יחדול ממתן הלוואות וידרשו תקצוב מחודש לחמשך פעילותו.

(ג) פונקציה 050 (הגנה)

(1) מטפרים גלובלים

ש"ת א 91	ש"ת א 90	ש"ת א 89	הרשאה
320.9	305.6	290.2	הוצאות בפועל
304.7	293.8	290.	

(2) מדובר בגידול בשיעור של 2% מעבר לאינפלציה המשוערת.

(3) התגובה הראשונית היא שגידול במימדים אלה אינו מציאותי ובסופו של דבר יסכים הקונגרס הדמוקרטי לפיצוי על האינפלציה בלבד ויפנה את המשאבים המתפנים, בשעור 2%, לטובת תכניות פנים.

תפוצה:

דחיפות: מ ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	זר: 7
סוג: ש מ ז ה		מתן: 8
תאריך וזמן חבירה:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
הפשרד:		פאת:
29-190-216		

(4) ברור גם שמספר תת-סעיפים לא נעמדו בפני ביקורת המחוקקים. הדוגמה הבולטת היא תוספת של 1.8 ביליון לתכנית ה- SDI מעבר לבקשה לשנת "א' 89. איש אינו מעלה על הדעת שהקונגרס הדמוקרטי יסכים לבקשה כזו.

(5) כפי שרודאו שאתם לב מבחוקר 164, העגת העניינים של פונקציה זו שונה מזו שבפונקציה 150 ובמקום להביא מספרים מפורטים יחסית, ההצגה מבליטה את המדיניות שתנחה את הפנטגון בשנה הבאה, בחקשר זה נציין מספר הערות שנוכל ללמוד מהן:

- פיתוח ורכש ציוד קונבנציונאלי לצורך מודרניזציה חכוחות הקונבנציונאליים האמריקנים.

- חיזוק בריתות וקואליציות להגן על אינטרסים אמריקנים בעולם, ובמיוחד להשיג מטרת NATO.

- המטרה העיקרית של הפנטגון לשנת "א' 90-91: פישוט ושיפור תהליך הרכש.

- לשנת "א' 1990 יוצעו 32 תכניות לרכש רב-שנתי כדי להפחית את היציבות המסורתית בגישת הרכש החד-שנתי. מטרת גישה זו להביא לחסכון של 8.6 ביליון \$ ל-8 שנים.

- התחרותיות תעודד כדי לשמור על מחירים נמוכים, איכות גבוהה ובסיס תעשייתי חזק.
- ייעשה שמוש במוצרים מסחריים קיימים במקום מוצרים "CUSTOM MADE" בכל מקרה שהדבר ניתן.

- תופעל מדיניות חדשה בדבר זכויות הקבלן בקשר למידע טכני שפותח במסגרת חוזים ממשלתיים.

תפוצה:

דחיות: מ י ד י סוג: ש מ ד י	שירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס מצוק	זק: 8 סתיו: 8
תאריך יזמן חצור:		אל:
פס' מצוק: הפשרד:		דע:
29-190-216		כאת:
<p style="text-align: right;">ד. ס י כ ר ס</p> <p>חמאפיונים העיקריים של בקשה תקציבית זו כפי שנתפסים בגבעה ובהקשרות הם:</p> <p>תקציב הגנה מוגדל, קיצוץ בתכניות פנים ואי-העלאת מיסים. כתוצאה מכך הרוחת תחושה של נסיון למניפולציה של חמספנים ע"י חממשל היוצא ואף גגיעה במספר "פרות קדושות" כמו קיצוץ בתכניות ביטוח רפואי ותכניות סיוע לחקלאים.</p> <p>עם זאת, סבורים כולם כי בקשה זו מהווה בבחינת <u>BLUE PRINT</u> התחלתי עבור חממשל הבא.</p> <p>חוזים איפוא, חגשת חצעה מתוקנת בפברואר ע"י הנשיא בוש ובעקבותיה כינוס אפשרי של פסגה תקציבית.</p> <p>ולבסוף, נכון לעכשיו, הדיעה הכללית היא שישראל תמשיך לקבל מלוא חסיוע, על אף המצוקות התקציביות והקשיים הפוליטיים שהתעוררו בשנה האחרונה.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">ד. למדן - י. ורנאי-דרנגר</p>		
		תפוצה:

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

7113

תאריך : 11.01.89

נכנס **

סודי

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חוזם: 1,7113

אל: המשרד

מ-: וווש, נר: 214, תא: 100189, חז: 1800, דח: ר, סג: סו

תח: ג: ס: מצפא

נד: ג

סודי / רגיל

אל: מצפ' א, פר' נ

דע: ממ' ד

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

ארה' ב- מז' ת

1. כללי

א) בשיחה עם ס/ראש אגף המחקר (INR) קלארק התייחס לבקשתי

להמלצותיו לממשל הנכנס ביחס לטיפולו בסוגיות התהליך המדיני והפצת הטילים והנשק הכימי.

ב) אקדים את המאוחר ואציין שהמלצותיו אינן תואמות את ההמלצות ועמדות אותן משמעים אנשי ה- NEA והאגף הפוליטי-צבאי. (נראה שקלארק כאיש מחקר יכול להרשות לעצמו 'הלוקסוס' שאותו אנשי הביצוע החייבים להראות פעלתנו אינם מרשים לעצמם).

2. סכום השיחה

א) תהליך מדיני.

1. שותף להנחה (המקובלת) שהתנאים כיום אינם בשלים להתקדמות בתהליך המדיני.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2. בניגוד לאלה הסבורים שעל ארה"ב לסייע ביצירת תנאים להדברות טוען קלארק שעל ארה"ב להמתין עד שהתנאים יבשילו .

3. עד אז, על ארה"ב לשמור על ערוצי תקשורת פתוחים לכל הגורמים המעורבים , כולל אש"פ .

(ב) הפצת טילים ונשק כימי .

1. סבור שהקונצפט ודרך הפעולה שהתווה האגף הפוליטי צבאי (הזמנת ישראל ומצרים לשיחות נפרדות וכו' נושא עליו דווח בשעתו) נדונה לכשלון . כנ"ל לגבי כוונת הנשיא להתמודד עם הנשק הכימי ע"י חתירה להשגת הסכם שיאפשר ייצור, אחסון ושמוש .

2. במקום זאת על ארה"ב לפעול עצמאית לאיתור הפצת הטילים והנשק הכימי במטרה למנוע סיכון בטחון ישראל. בעקבות מגעים שנוהלו עם סין נראה שאין בכוונת סין לספק טילים לטווח בינוני לסוריה . ברי"מ גם כן לא תספק טילים בעלי טווח דומה לסוריה . מצרים הוסיף ויתרה על רעיון ייצור טיל (כוונתו לתכנית קונדור. בתשובה לשאלתי הגדיר את המידע שבידיהם על כך שהפרוייקט לא יקודם כמשכנע) . עיראק בהקשר לעיל מהווה בעיה.

3. במקביל לצעדים להגבלת אספקת טילים לארצות ערב על ארה"ב לדאוג לבטחון ישראל . משוכנע שהשיחות שיקיימו עמנו בנושא הטילים יתנו תשובות שיסייעו להקטנת הסכנה (הוסיף כי כתוצר לוואי נזכה לתוספת סיוע לפיתוח אמצעי הגנה) .

שטיין

חו

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

7702

תאריך : 11.01.89

שמו

יוצא **

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חוזם: 1,7702

אל: 376/ני

מ-: המשרד, תא: 110189, זח: 1652, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: @ גס: מצפא

נד: @

מיד/שמו

ידיד.

להלן שלד תכנית ועידת הנשיאים:

יום א' - 5/2

15:45 - נחיתה

19:30 - ק'פ טדי קולק.

יום ב' - 6/2

8:00 - א'ב שר האוצר

9:30 - סיור במרכז קליטה מבשרת - בליווי

אורי גורדון.

11:00 - נטיעות,

12:30 - פגישה עם שה'ח

13:30 - מנוחה + ארוחה

15:30 - פתרונות לסכסוך במזה'ת-פאנל חוקרים ממכון יפה.

18:00 - יחסי ישראל-ארה'ב, פאנל בהשתתפות:

ס/שה'ח נתניהו, שלמה אבינרי, יוסי בן-אהרון, פרופ' שי פלדמן

20:00 - א'ע - הסופרים עמוס עוז וא.ב. יהושע/ק'פ בבית

השגריר בראון.

יום ג' - 7/2

8:00 - פגישה עם רה'מ

סיור בצה'ל עם הליקופטר.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

20:00 - א'ב עם השר פת בארוח אל-על

יום ד' - 8/2

9:00 - פגישה עם שילנסקי (בכנסת)
9:15 - ועדת חו'ב
11:30 - פגישה עם שהב'ט (במלון)
12:30 - פאנל בנושא: ISRAEL'S IMAGE ABROAD
בהשתתפות העיתונאים: -
עידו דיסנצ'יק(מעריב)
ישראל סגל (טלוויזיה ישראלית)
בוב סימון (CBS)
יואל ברינקלי NYT.
15:30 - פאנל בנושא: חוקה לישראל
בהשתתפות: - נשיא ביהמ'ש העליון שמגר, שר המשפטים,
פרופ' אוריאל ריכמן
18:00 - פגישה עם יו'ר הסוכנות, שמחה דיניץ ועם נתן
שצ'רנסקי.
20:00 - ק'פ בבית הנשיא

בנוסף, ננסה לשלב בתכנית פגישה עם סארי נוסייבה.

נא שאלו את מר הונליין:

א. מי מארגן את הארוח מטעם אל על לארוחה עם פת.

ב. אם אכן רוצים מפגש עם הרב לאו- במקום איזו מהפגישות
שפורטו?

מצפ'א

ל.כ.

אק

תפ: שהח,רהמ,ממרהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא,רביב,מאור

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

7431

תאריך : 11.01.89

יוצא

בלמס

חוזם: 1,7431
אל: ווש/368, מנמת/195
מ-: המשרד, תא: 110189, זח: 1358, דח: ר, סג: בל
תח: א גס: ממד
נד: א

בלמ'ס/רגיל

יוזמה מצרית לקיום פגישה בין שה'ח האמר' לערפאת.

'אלספיר' (עפ'י סיכ 10.1) טוען שלפי מקורות מהימנים בקהיר, מצרים הכינה תכנית לפיתוח הדיאלוג האמר'-פלס', אשר עיקרה- קיום פגישה ישירה בין ערפאת לשה'ח החדש ג'יימס ביקר, להגביר את הדיאלוג ולקיימו בקהיר, או בתוניס. המקורות ציינו, כי אסאמה אלבאז יגיע בימים הקרובים לארה'ב ויביא עימו את התכנית.

ערב1 / בין'ל 1 / ממ'ד

טד

אק

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ליאור,
מצרים, בנצור, מצפא, ממד, סייבל, רביב, הסברה

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2 1/2

11 January 1989

The Secretary-General said the following to journalists just before leaving Lund—

The Secretary-General said that he had heard about press reports about Mr. Shamir's statement and he told them that he had not read the official text but if the reports were true, of course, the United Nations would be ready to help to develop the peace process.

דח'בות: מידי	יד: 1 מח'ר: 2 טופס מברק קשר ניו-יורק
סיוג: שמור	אל: מנהל מצפ"א, סמנכ"ל צפ"א, לש' השר
תזח: 111530	
מל מדקי: 0 0265	דע: השגריר וושינגטון
44-711	מאת: סגן הקונס"ל

מועדון הנשיאים - ס/השר

בהודעתו בעלי מועדון הנשיאים, בראשות סימור רייך, בימי נתניהו התמקד על הנקודות הבאות: (המפגש עם המנהיגות היהודית היה סגור לתקשורת).

1. הפגישה עם שוורנדרה בפריס: פירט התפתחויות חיוביות ביחסי בריה"מ - ישראל, העלאת דרג שתי המשלחות בישראל ובמוסקבה, בריה"מ כממלא תפקיד בתהליך השלום, יהודי בריה"מ - טרם הגענו להיקף יציאת יהודים כבתקופת ברז'נייב. על סדר היום הגברת מספר היוצאים וכיוון העליה לישראל. יש לחזק החינוך היהודי בבריה"מ, להגדיל השליחים הישראליים ולהסדיר נושא הטיסות הישירות.

2. הנשק הכימי קיים כמיוחד במז"ת. כניגוד לממשלות מערביות המחזיקות נשק כימי, מדינות ערביות ישתמשו בנשק הכימי ללא כל הגבלה ובצורה שרירותית. העולם שוכח כי ישראל מוקפת בשלוש חזיתות ע"י מדינות המחזיקות נשק כימי, כיום עירק בעלת צבא חזק יותר, יש התעצמות החימוש בסוריה ונשק בשווי של 30 ביליון דולר אמור להישלח לערב הסעודית. העולם שוכח: הסכנות שישראל ניצבת בפניהם ושהסכסוך הפלסטינאי-ישראלי הוא רק מרכיב אחד.

3. החלטת ארה"ב לדיאלוג עם אש"ף מחזקת את הלחץ הארופאי להקמת מדינה פלסטינאית. ס/השר דיבר על תורת שני השלבים והשימוש במדינה פלסטינאית כבסיס להתקפת ישראל. אבו-איאד אמר שאי אפשר להשיג השמדת הציונות בלי מדינה פלסטינאית, דברי המנהיגים

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תאריך: 3/1/89
 שם השולח: אגף אגף
 שם היחיד: אגף אגף
 חתום: אגף אגף
 חתום: אגף אגף

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265/44

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הערביים לעמם עומדים בניגוד להצהרותיהם לעולם המערבי. המנהיגות האמריקאית נגד מדינה פלסטינאית. החלטת ארה"ב לדיאלוג גרמה למומנטים של הקמת מדינה פלסטינאית. ועל יהדות ארה"ב לפעול בקונגרס ובאדמיניסטרציה החדשה ולהזכיר שאש"ף למעשה לא הפסיק הטרור. ישראל תגן על חיי מנהיגים מקומיים. מתייחס לאיום ערפאת נגד פרייג', המכשול לשלום הוא אש"ף. ניתן להגיע להסדר עם מנהיגות פלסטינאית ואז ניתן להסיר את הממשל הצבאי, להעביר הניהול היום-יומי לפלסטינאים ולעודד ש"פ כלכלי עם ירדן. לאה"מ ושר החוץ אינם חוזר אינם רוצים בחמשן הסטטוס קוו. אנו רוצים לזוז בכיוון יותר פוזיטיבי מבלי לסכן בטחונינו.


4. בסיום דבריו אמר שאלת מי הוא יהודי ירדה מהפרק ופנה למנהיגים היהודים בשאלה "היכן אתם" אנוחנו חייבים לאחד את כוחותינו ועליכם לפעול בקרב הפוליטיקאים ובתקשורת שפתוחים לשמוע דעותיכם.

5. להלן מהשאלות שס/השר נשאל:

- התייחסות למאמרו של אבא אבן בניו-יורק טיימס (55% מהציבור הישראלי דוגל בדיאלוג עם אש"ף). ס/השר - רק 5% דוגל בהקמת מדינה פלסטינאית.

- ערפאת אמנם פעל בואקום אך הואקום עדיין נמשך ואנו זקוקים ליוזמת השלום הישראלית החדשה בהקדם. יש ציפיות לכך והן גוברות.

מרדכי ידיר



11.1.89

END

american cultural center

19, Keren Hayesod Street
P.O. Box 920
Jerusalem 94188
phone 02 222376

a|c|c

THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION

AMERICAN CULTURAL CENTER, JERUSALEM
SUNDAY, JANUARY 22


The American Cultural Center, Jerusalem invites you to view videotaped proceedings from the Friday, January 20 inauguration of President-Elect George Bush. On Sunday, January 22 from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., in the ACC auditorium, you are invited to watch the inaugural festivities:

- The arrival of President-Elect Bush at Capitol Hill
- Swearing-in ceremonies and the inaugural address
- Scenes from the inaugural parade

The ACC will also present video profiles of George Bush and Dan Quayle (18 minutes each), and other relevant information on the new U.S. administration.

We look forward to hosting you on January 22 for this review of the U.S. presidential inauguration ceremonies.

Sincerely,



Philippe duChateau
Director



United States Information Service

דחיות: כידי	שגרירות ישראל/וויינגטון	דף: 1
סוג: בל"ס	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 4
תאריך וזמן מעור:	אל: כצ"פ"א, כע"ת, הסברה	
כס' פרוק:	דע: ירה"פ לתקשורת, י. שהב"ט לתקשורת,	
הפסרד: בטחון ניו יורק	רמ"ח/קס"ח, ניו יורק	
39 184 209	כאת: עתונות/וויינגטון	

סכום עתונות יומי

NEWS SUMMARY JANUARY 10, 1989

CABLED INTERVIEW WITH GADHAFI IN USA TODAY:

**ON ISRAEL: Gadhafi: The Israelis will never give us a chance to do so [true peace in the ME]. The Israelis don't want peace. ...Of course, there can be no peace. [when asked whether there can be no peace as long as Israel exists.]

EDITORIALS:

THE OLD WORLD: WSJ: Editors satirically and pungently point out how Europe gets more excited and does more to condemn growth hormones in beef than poison gas in the hands of Gadhafi.

COLUMNS:

CABLED: ...AND THE GERMAN : WP: Richard Cohen.

CABLED: CHEMICAL WAR: THE LIBYAN DISTRACTION: WP: Gayelin.

TALKING TO THE ENEMY: BS: Stanley Sheinbaum - one of the five American Jews who went to Stockholm: re: meeting, need to talk with PLO, loss of morality, education, and intellect values in Israel.

CAMP DAVID: MIDEAST PEACE BUILDING BLOCK: CSM: Ned Temko: The Camp David Accords can be used as the first building block for a future peace between the PLO and Israel. Compromise will also be built on the changes by the PLO and Arafat's recent acceptance of diplomacy and solutions.

THE CONQUEST OF TERRORISM: NYT: A.M. Rosenthal: Hypocrisy and cowardice of the West in dealing with terrorism and refusing to face realities and condemn the leadership of terrorism and those at the heart of int'l terrorism: Hafez Assad, Khomeini, Qaddafi. Criticism of the West's refusal to take economic and political action that would hit terrorist states and their leaders hard enough to show them that terrorism doesn't pay.

LETTERS:

BG: Supportive of Israel and critical of piece by Yonit Yogev of Nov 13.

BS: Palestinians' history of abusing themselves and the PLO threat against Israel.

WP: Baker, Director of AJC: response to Henry Mitchell article in which Mitchell blames Israeli int'l terrorism for the downing of the Pan Am Flight 103.

תפוצה:

אשרף פארוק 103

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PRESS REPORTS:

ISRAEL, EGYPT, PAKISTAN TO GET LION'S SHARE IN AID PACKAGE: WT: As in the past, Israel, Egypt, and Pakistan will receive the lion's share of American aid under Reagan's proposed spending package. About a fifth of the total budget of foreign aid will go to Israel - \$3 billion.

ISRAEL'S PERES ACCUSED OF FEATHERING HIS NEST: USA TODAY: Re: Austerity budget and tucked-away funds for Peres' personal expenses.

ISRAELIS WOUND 23, ARABS REPORT: NYT:AP: Arab reports that Israeli troops shot and wounded 23 Palestinians during clashes.

PLO, DUTCH OFFICIALS HOLD INITIAL CONTACT: WT: First official contact between the Netherlands and the PLO in a meeting in Tunis.

US SHIFTS ON UN GAS WEAPONS ROLE: WP: Shultz's call for an "enhanced" role for the UN secretary general in chemical weapons investigations appear to mark a substantial change of position by the US, diplomats and UN officials said.

BONN NAMES 4 MORE FIRMS LINKED BY US TO LIBYA: WP: WGerman officials made public names of 4 WG-based firms that, together with a fifth, have been identified by the US as having helped Libya build the poison gas factory.

SOVIETS SAY US CASE ON LIBYA FALLS SHORT: WP: Shevardnadze said that the evidence shown by Shultz has not convinced him of US charges that a Libyan factory is producing chemical weapons. The Libyan FM, Talhi, said that his country understands perfectly the dangers posed by chemical weapons but that its commitment not to use them has been strained by a nuclear-armed Israel backed by an aggressive US. He also accused the US of waging an defamatory campaign against Tripoli and preparing a large-scale military attack against the factory.

LIBYA SAYS IT CAN MAKE CHEMICAL ARMS IF OTHERS DO: NYT: Libya asserted its right to make chemical weapons as long as other nations have similar devices. This assertion came in a day of stormy debate in which Israel appealed for new export controls to contain the spread of chemical weapons etc. The Libyan FM hurled epithets at the US and Israel. Moshe Arens said that nations should consider publishing the names of companies that have provided expertise to nations that have used chemical weapons or are likely to do so.

WAR AND FINGER POINTING: NYT: p.1: The conference in Paris as an exercise of moral ambiguity because none of the key participants can claim a spotless record. US seizing the high moral ground. The Soviet recapturing some of that ground...

IN SECURITY COUNCIL, ANTI-US RHETORIC COOLS: PI: softening of the language of a resolution critical of the US downing of the two Libyan jets.

GADHAFI TO US: LET'S 'KEEP COOL' USA TODAY: p.1: In interview with USA TODAY Gadhafi expects that the White House under Bush will be "very sane, very wise". At the same time, his govt. began the expulsion of Western journalists...

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US SAYS AN IRAQI HAD ROLE IN LIBYAN PLANT: NYT: Engelberg: Administrative officials said today that an Iraqi civil engineer who operates several companies in Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe played a central role in the construction of the Libyan chemical plant. engineer: Ihsan Barbouti The accounts of his role shed new light on how a host of Western companies were reportedly enlisted covertly in the construction of the Libyan plant.

US REBUFFS GADHAFI ON DIRECT TALKS: PI: p.1: US rebuffed Gadhafi suggestion that the two nations resume direct talks after Bush becomes president. Fitzwater said, "There is no need for direct discussions."

COMPROMISE SEEMS LIKELY AT CHEMICAL ARMS TALKS: BS: Henry: Less likelihood of a deadlock between Arab and Western states. ...Western diplomats had indicated that they would forgo a final declaration rather than agree to a communique tying chemical weapons to nuclear weapons. Noted is Arab delegates blame on Israel for nuclear weapons.

LIBYAN OFFICIALS CRITICIZE BOSSES OVER TRIP TO PLANT: BS: Reuters: Rare sign of dissent, Libyan Information Ministry officials criticized their bosses for turning a press trip to the factory into a public relations disaster.

SUDAN REBELS SAY THEY ARE VICTIMS OF POISON GAS: NYT: Pear: Spokesman for the Sudanese rebels said that Libyan forces used chemical weapons against them in Sudan in the last six months.

MOSLEM FUNDAMENTALISTS POSE DOMESTIC CHALLENGE TO GADHAFI: WP: Parmelee: Gadhafi faces a surge of activism by Moslem fundamentalists at home. ...outbreaks of fundamentalist-inspired turmoil at Tripoli's Al-Fatah University.

RIGID MOSLEM GROUP IRKING QADDAFI AGAIN: WT:AP: renewed demonstrations at Al-Fatah Univ.

GADHAFI INFUSES LIBYA WITH SUBTLE REFORMS: MH: Tamayo p.1 1-9: Gadhafi is pushing Libya toward subtle but significant reforms that are being compared to the Soviet Union's perestroika.

DECISION OF F14S TO FIRE IS QUESTIONED: WP: p.1:

LIBYA ASKS CONFERENCE TO 'PREVENT' US ATTACK: WT: p.1.

SOFTER TONE AT UN ON LIBYA INCIDENT: NYT: softening of proposed resolutions on the downing of two Libyan jets.

RIVAL SHIITES WAGE BLOODY BATTLE FOR LEBANESE VILLAGE: WT.

LEBANESE FLEE A BATTLE OF SHIITE RIVALS: NYT: Re: fierce fighting between rival Shiite Muslim militiamen in south Beirut.

POLICE CITE 'HORRIFIC MASSACRES' AS 80 DIE IN LEBANESE FIGHTING: BS: AP:

IRAQ AND IRAN USE TRUCE FOR MASSIVE ARMS BUILDUPS: CSM: Richey: Iran and Iraq are locked in a "no war, no peace" stalemate that is perpetuating regional animosities rather than preparing the way for peace and both sides have dug their heels at peace talks and launched massive efforts to rearm with conventional weaponry, long-range missiles, and new stockpiles of chemical weapons: a protracted cold war...

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ISLAMIC CRESCENT TO TEST STRATEGISTS: CSM: EA Wayne: Strategies for the Bush administration, areas of contention in the ME. background on Bush's ME priorities.

SYRIA, MOROCCO RESTORE RELATIONS: WT: AFP: Syria restored diplomatic relations with Morocco but is likely to take its time before resuming ties with Egypt and Iraq.

'SHULTZ ASSAILS 'PROPHETS OF DECLINE' WP: Oberdorfer: Re: Shultz's speech to the Citizens Network: Shultz sharply criticized "prophets of decline" who see a diminished US role in the world and said he will leave town bothered by "the chaotic ongress" and "a diminution of trust within our government."

SDI BUDGET BOOST FACES AXE IN CONGRESS: WT

DEFENSE PLAN SEEKS TO TAKE SOME 'STAR WARS' TECHNOLOGY TO SEA: WP

US JUDGE DECLINES TO DROP 2 CHARGES NOW IN NORTH CASE: NYT: p.1

NAZI-FILE THIEF SENTENCED: WP:

Beth Silverman

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✱

✱

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FUNCTION 050: NATIONAL DEFENSE

	(\$ in Billions)				
	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
<u>Current Services</u>					
Budget Authority.	298.8	310.4	320.1	328.6	335.7
Outlays.....	298.3	300.9	308.9	318.9	328.9
<u>President's Budget</u>					
Budget Authority.	298.8	315.2	330.8	346.1	361.4
Outlays.....	298.3	303.0	314.4	326.4	339.9
<u>President Under (-) or over (+) Current Services</u>					
Budget Authority.	0.0	+4.8	+10.7	+17.5	+25.7
Outlays.....	0.0	+2.1	+ 5.5	+ 7.5	+11.0

Analysis

- o The President's budget proposes \$315.2 billion in budget authority for the programs in the National Defense function, a level that represents 2 percent real growth over last year's funding total for this function. This President's funding request for the period 1990 to 1993 exceeds the current services baseline by nearly \$60 billion in budget authority and over \$26 billion in outlays.
- o From the beginning of the defense build-up, the Reagan Administration has appeared to deliberately underestimate defense outlays in order to underplay the size of the deficit. It appears that the Administration adopted this approach again in projecting defense outlays through 1993. When compared to the CBO baseline for this same period, the President's budget is \$23.4 billion higher in budget authority and yet \$10.5 billion lower in outlays.
- o Within the overall national defense topline, the President has requested \$305.6 billion in funding for the Department of Defense (DoD) and \$9.6 billion for defense-related activities of the Department of Energy and other non-DoD defense programs. This \$9.6 billion request represents real growth of over 7 percent over last year's funding level.
- o The President's Five Year Defense Plan for the period 1990 to 1994 is projected to call for \$100 billion in real program growth. Much of this growth would fund a new wave of weapon system modernization. This latest

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cycle of modernization comes fast on the heels of a recently completed military build-up in the early and mid-1980s that proved to be the longest and broadest peacetime modernization in the nation's history.

- o Major weapon systems that are just coming into production during this period and account for much of the \$100 billion increase in DoD funding include the Army's MH-60K helicopter, the Navy's Advanced Tactical Aircraft, the V-22 Roto-tilt aircraft, the Long-Range Air ASW Capable aircraft, the SSN-21 attack submarine, the Air Force's B-2 "Stealth" bomber, the C-17 transport aircraft, and the Short-Range Attack Missile. The B-2 bomber program alone is likely to receive well over \$30 billion during this period. It should be noted that the Air Force recently modernized its strategic bomber force by spending approximately \$25 billion to acquire 100 B-1B bombers and as much as an additional \$10 billion may be necessary to make the plane capable of performing the mission for which it was initially designed.
- o Strategic Defense Initiative: As in previous Presidential defense budget requests, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) continues to be one of the fastest growing programs. The President's budget requests nearly \$5.6 billion for the Strategic Defense Initiative, an increase of about \$2 billion or 54 percent over last year's funding level. The bulk of this increase is a result of growth in SDI's Kinetic Energy Weapons account (nearly \$600 million increase or 74 percent) and the initial funding for the study of the first deployment phase of a future strategic defense system (\$262 million increase).
- o Inter-Service Resource Allocation: Within the three major services, the Air Force topline grows at the fastest rate from 1989 to 1990 (6.2 percent) while Army funding grows at the slowest rate (2.9 percent). Increases in funding for the procurement of aircraft accounts for much of this growth within the Air Force budget.
- o Pay Raises: The President's budget request includes pay raises of 3.6 percent for military personnel and 2.0 percent for civilian employees.
- o Multi-Year Procurement: The President requests that multi-year purchases be approved for 32 weapon systems. This number represents a significant expansion over last year's number and is achieved by modifying congressional restrictions on the use of multi-year procurement.

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- o Navy Carrier Battle Groups: The Navy attains the goal of 15 deployable carrier battle groups in 1990 and its budget request supports 574 deployable battle force ships.
- o Nuclear Defense Waste Cleanup: The President's budget proposes \$1.5 billion for nuclear defense waste cleanup activities including environmental restoration, waste management and safety and health measures. A recent DOE report on environment, safety and health (ES&H) resource needs estimates that maintaining the current base ES&H program requirements will total \$1.8 billion per year for the next twenty years--\$300 million more than the President's request. The report also cites severe environmental cleanup problems that have gone unattended and estimates that an additional \$53 billion to \$92 billion above the base program will be needed to address these problems. A July, 1988 GAO report puts this figure at \$110 billion. The President's budget does not appear to address these potential additional costs. The DoD request also provides \$300 million for the procurement of a nuclear reactor.

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FUNCTION 150: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

	(\$ in billions)				
	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
<u>Current Services</u>					
Budget Authority.	16.2	18.0	18.7	19.4	20.2
Outlays.....	10.7	17.0	16.9	17.3	17.3
<u>President's Budget</u>					
Budget Authority.	16.2	18.9	18.2	18.6	19.4
Outlays.....	10.7	17.3	17.0	17.4	17.3
<u>President Under (-) or over (+) Current Services</u>					
Budget Authority.	0.0	+0.9	-0.5	-0.7	-0.8
Outlays.....	0.0	+0.3	+0.1	+0.1	-(*)

Analysis

- o The President's budget proposes \$18.9 billion in 1989 budget authority for the programs in the International Affairs function. Excluding the proposed termination of the Export-Import Bank direct loan program, the President is proposing a 14 percent increase over 1989 in funding for the discretionary programs in the function.
- o Export-Import Bank: The President reiterates his proposal to terminate the \$695 million Export-Import Bank direct loan program. A \$100 million "war chest" export subsidy program is retained.
- o Foreign Assistance: The President proposes to increase funding for discretionary foreign assistance by \$768 million (+6 percent) in budget authority over 1989. An outlay increase of \$4.8 billion is forecast mainly due to the large reduction in 1989 outlays resulting from prepayments of past military loans which will not recur in 1990.
- o Arrearages: The President proposes an additional \$314 million in budget authority to cover part of the current U.S. arrearage to multilateral development banks and \$46 million to cover one-tenth of the U.S. arrearage to the United Nations.
- o State Department and USIA Operations: The President's budget proposes an increase over current services of \$686 million in budget authority to fully fund the U.S. contribution to the U.N., and for new embassy construction, security programs and radio transmitters.

Arafat - offer to aid PAN AM investigation
US NEWS WR(16):Rosenblatt:Expresses incredulity at acceptance of help from master terrorist, emphasizing recent Freij threat.

Chemical weapons
Bonn to tighten controls on export of nuclear, chemical materials and technology due to U.S. pressure (NYT,Shmemann-p.1; WSJ) and as Conference worked on final statement officials said U.S. had fallen short of objectives. (NYT,Gordon) Also, (ND,Friedman) notes USSR put U.S. on spot by marshaling world pressure for U.S. to halt nerve gas production.

Other articles: US NEWS WR(16) on difficulty of curbing spread of chem weapons and in "Washington Whispers" notes U.S. almost sold anti-nerve gas to Iraq. (ND,Phelps) on Libya's transparent manipulations of journalists visiting chem plant.

U.S. - Libyan jet downings
Pentagon vigorously defends U.S. actions (NYT,Rosenthal) and U.N. resolution on incident softened further. (NYT)

Israel - uprising/querillas clash
WSJ mentions Palestinian casualties.
NYT:Israelis kill guerrillas in Lebanon.

Lebanon - More die in Shiite fighting (NYT,WSJ)

Iran - Khomeini urged people to sacrifice to revive economy. (ND)

LETTERS

US NEWS WR(16):2 letters support dialogue with PLO, 1 against; another says Israel and its lackeys in Congress are obstacles to peace.

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PRESS REPORTS:

SHAMIR OKS UN IN TALKS: WT and FI: AP: Shamir said for the first time he is willing to accept a UN role in the ME peace talks, but he again rejected the PLO as a negotiating partner. He did this before meeting members of the European Parliament, who urged him to negotiate with the PLO to test its newly professed moderation. ...also, strong criticism of Shamir by Pannella of Italy.

ISRAELIS SAY THEY KILLED 8 GUERRILLAS IN LEBANON: NYT: AP: The clash, north of the buffer strip in southern Lebanon, was the first reported battle between Israeli soldiers and guerrillas in southern Lebanon this year and followed at least three attempts by guerrillas to infiltrate Israel late last month. ...also in same article...12 more killed by rival Shiite Muslim fighting in Beirut. 92 have been killed in three days of battles between Amal and the Party of God.

LAND VS. MIDEAST PEACE: CSM: Moffatt p.1: Re: Jewish settlers' mulled response should they be forced to leave the WB and Gaza. Since the intifada began, leaders of 160 settlements "have tried to put steel in their government's will to break the rebellion and make the territories safe for Jews to live in. Instead, security remains precarious and a more subtle threat to the settlers, pressure to negotiate an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has surfaced.

HOMESTEADING ON GAZA A TOUGH SELL: BG: 1-10 Wilkie p.2: Efforts to promote Israeli tourism and revitalize the Katif (Jewish settlement on beach in Gaza)

US OPPOSES PLO EFFORT TO ADDRESS UN COUNCIL: WP: An attempt by the PLO to address the UN Security Council under rules reserved for member nations has sparked a major procedural battle among council members, with the US said to be the sole member opposed to the PLO move. An American diplomat said the PLO move, if successful, would break the 43 years of Security Council procedures and would give the Palestinian group more legitimacy at the UN than South Korea, which has observer status.

PENTAGON PUBLISHES PROFILES OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS: WP: The Defense Dept's guide to int'l terrorist organizations: profile of 52 of the world's most dangerous terrorist groups. Guide prominently details Libyan terrorist orgs and reports "signs that Libyan involvement in terrorism may be again on the rise." The Abu Nidal org. is identified as "the most dangerous terrorist organization in existence" and the report said it has one of the widest areas of operations of any such group. It is also one of the best financed terrorist org. The Pentagon guide did not associate the Hawari Group with the 1985 bombing of a TWA plane and the 1982 bombing of a Pan Am plane.

PENTAGON REPORT CALLS ABU NIDAL MOST LETHAL GROUP: WT: Abu Nidal is most lethal terrorist org... article also charts and profiles Abu Nidal Org., Hezbollah, the IRA, the FMLN, M-19, and the ANC.

US CALLS ABU NIDAL GROUP MOST DANGEROUS TERRORISTS: BS.

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SOVIETS OPPOSE ARABS ON LINKING CHEMICAL, A-ARMS: WP: The Soviet Union declared firm opposition to Arab demands for linking a call for abolishing chemical weapons with an appeal for parallel prohibition of nuclear weapons.

BONN ACTS TO TIGHTEN EXPORT CONTROL: WP: The West German govt. moved to tighten controls on alleged cases of exports of chemical and nuclear arms including widening monitoring of shipments and a doubling of fines for violators. Kohl told "Die Welt" that the package represented "measures for the future" and was not a confession of guilt. And, two West German companies implicated by the US in the Libyan project denied WGerman authorities' allegations that they may have helped build a chemical arms factory in Iraq.

BONN WILL TIGHTEN CURB ON EXPORTS OF DEADLY GOODS: NYT: p.1:

WGermany tightened controls because of American pressure.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS PARLEY LABORS ON: NYT: As the Paris conference nears an end, an American official said the US had fallen short of some of its objectives, notably that it failed to win broad support for an explicit call for export controls. Nor has the US obtained a conference endorsement of the use of economic sanctions, which would be approved by the UN SC, and applied to nations that use chemical weapons....

W. GERMANY TIGHTENS ITS EXPORT REGULATIONS: PI:UPI.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEFENSIVE, ARABS SAY: MH: 1-10:

F14 PILOTS' ACTIONS 'JUSTIFIED,' REAGAN SAYS: WP:AP.

PENTAGON DEFENDS TACTICS OF PILOTS OFF LIBYA: NYT: Carlucci told reporters that the Navy fliers may have waited too long before launching their missiles.

RADICALS THREATEN, ECONOMY REELS: CSM: Re: The Mubarak govt. is caught between the IMF and a restive population. Egypt is counting on foreign policy successes to shore up support for its government at home and abroad as it tackles difficult domestic challenges.

B. Silverman

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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תאריך : 10.01.89

יוצא

בלמס

חוזם: 1,6780

אל: ני/327, ווש/325, וינה/122, גנבה/118, טוקיו/176, ביירס/198,
קופנהגן/109, ברזיליה/92, לימה/112, ליסבון/81, אוסלו/97,
אוטבה/112, מכסיקו/125, קרקס/133, קנברה/87, אתונה/108, האג/127,
ניקוסיה/88, פריס/331, רומא/127, מילנו/89, אנקרה/104, בוקרשט/90,
ברן/107, מדריד/132, ריו/72, יאונדה/84, לונדון/180, בון/157,
בריסל/148, שטוקהולם/116, לוסאנגלס/95, מונטריאול/64,
טורונטו/68, אטלנטה/55, בוסטון/65, שיקגו/70, יוסטון/54,
מיאמי/71, פרנציסקו/60, פילדלפיה/51, מונטבידאו/84, בוגוטה/79,
הלסינקי/50, סידני/50

מ-: המשרד, תא: 100189, זח: 1714, דח: ב, סג: בל

תח: א גס: הסברה

נד: א

בלמס/בהול

בהול - ניו יורק, סגן שה'ח

אש'פ - התבטאויות, ידיעות והדגשי הסברה מס' 8

1. בסאם אבו-שריף בראיון בירדן לעיתון מקומי אמר:
'ההתקוממות באדמה הכבושה נגד הכובשים הישראליים לא רק
שתימשך אלא אף תוחרף. (צות - אל-שעב (ירדן) 9.1).

2. בדיילי-טלגרף האנגלי פורסם (7.1) מדמשק ראיון עם איש
החזית של ג'בריל ('החזית העממית - המפקדה הכללית')
אבו-פיראס הסביר כי ימיו של ערפאת ספורים וכי ערפאת
מוליך את הפלשתינים שולל ועולב בהם. אבו-פיראס ממשיך
ומסביר בראיון כי אין מספיק מקום בשטחים לכל הפלשתינים
ולכן הפתרון הוא מדינה פלשתינית על כל שטחי פלשתיין.

3. א. תושבת הכפר חבלה בשטחים, שגראת אבו-דיאב, מורה
במקצועה, נדקרה ביום א' בערב בביתה ע'י רעול פנים,
ואושפזה בביה'ח אל-איתיחאד אנסאי בשכם כאשר היא סובלת

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מפצעים קלים בראשה. זו הפעם הראשונה שידוע על פגיעה באשה בשטחים החשודה כמשתפת פעולה. (הארץ, ג'רוזלם פוסט 10.1).
ב. תושב הכפר עידנא שבדרום חברון נדקר היום (10.1) בחשד לשיתוף פעולה עם השלטונות. ('קול ישראל' 10.1).

הדגשי הסברה (הפעם בנושאי דרום לבנון)

קרבות אמ'ל-חיזבאללה בדרום לבנון

4. תנועת אמ'ל הודיעה אתמול שהיא שבה וכבשה את כל ששת הכפרים השיעים בחבל אל-תופאח שבדרום לבנון, שנכבשו קודם ע'י חיזבאללה. בקרבות נהרגו עד כה כ-160 איש. (פרטים נוספים בדו"ח אירועים יומי, 10.1). מדיווחי עתונות הבוקר (10.1) בארץ עולה כי שני הצדדים ביצעו מעשי טבח נוראים באוכלוסיה האזרחית בכפרים באזור אל-תופאח. עשרות אזרחים נטבחו בשנתם, במיטותיהם.

5. הארועים מפנים זרקור לשיתט יישוב חילוקי הדעות בין ארגונים וקבוצות במזה'ת ואת השמוש שעושות מדינות באזור בקבוצות אלו במסגרת המאבק ביניהן על הגמוניה.
לא ייפלא איפוא שארגונים אלו משתמשים בשיטות דומות ואף חריפות יותר (שגור מכוניות תופת, נסיונות חדירה וכו') כלפי מי שנתפס בעיניהן כאויב העיקרי, קרי: ישראל. מכאן מובנת דאגת ישראל לבטחון אוכלוסיתה האזרחית ביישובי וערי הצפון הגובלים באזור בו ארעו התקריות ולבטחון התושבים המוסלמים והנוצרים ברצועת הבטחון. ראוי לזכור ארועי הימים האחרונים כאשר נאלצת ישראל לנקוט באמצעי מנע פסיביים ואקטיביים ברצועת הבטחון ומצפונה לה ולראותם בהקשר זה.

6. למעקב - מהו היקף הכסוי בתקשורת הבינ'ל לאירועים אלה.

הסברה/מידע

פא

תפ: שהח, מנכל, רהמ, ממרהמ, רביב, הסברה, יועצרהמ/טרוור

דחילות: כידי	שגרירות ישראל/ווינגטון	קד: 1
סוג: בלפ"ס	טופס מברק	כתוב: 4
תאריך וזמן מעבר:	אל: כצפ"א, כע"ת, המברה	
כפ' מברק:	דצ: ירה"פ לתקשורת, י. שהב"ט לתקשורת,	
הפסיד: בטחון ניו יורק	רמ"ח/קס"ח, ניו יורק	
30 165 170	כאת: עתונות/ווינגטון	

סכום עתונות יומי

NEWS SUMMARY JANUARY 9, 1989

COLUMNS:

PEACE, PLO-STYLE: WP: Jeane Kirkpatrick (cabled): Arafat's peace initiative has been saturated with threats of violence - the latest being his threat against Elias Freij. He has softpedaled the extent of his change and has made it clear that peace will come on the PLO's terms, or not at all. His confidence rests in part on his expectation that the Bush administration will be more friendly to the PLO demands and pressure Israel. Israel has failed lately in its perception of Middle East politics.

PALESTINE ROCK ROLLS BACK ON JORDAN: CSM: Joyce Starr and Ralph Katroshi: Jordan is in trouble as King Hussein's position has been undermined by the recent initiatives and events and as the uprising has past him by and is a repudiation of his leadership. Jordan faces many pressures from Palestinians in Jordan and the West Bank, from the PLO and from Israel. But Jordan would be best off to recognize an independent Palestinian state on the WB and Gaza rather than risk "transfer" to the East Bank.

ON BEING HEARD: NYT: Safire: Re: being heard on three issues: the morality of pre-emption (Libya's poison gas plant), the "German problem" of seeing no evil in helping to build the new "Auschwitz-in-the sand" (German poison gas profiteers), and the US cave-in to Soviet demands for a human rights extravaganza in 1991.

THE MIDEAST, BUSH'S FIRST TEST: NYT: Reston: The Bush administration must be more precise on its policy toward Israel and the PLO. Bush and Baker must make clear their commitment to Israel in that America would be ready to back the security of Israel with force. Without this commitment, there can be no fundamental changes in this endless and intolerable state of semiwar.

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KHOMEINI' BATTLES ENEMY WITHIN: WP: Anderson and Van Atta: Women as a propaganda issue in Iran...Report from Khomeini's repressive security force, Komiteh, says "One of the People's Mojahedin's most dangerous and attractive propaganda methods [against Khomeini] is its adherence to the issue of equality between men and women."

PRESS REPORTS:

RADICAL PALESTINIANS DENY BOMB ROLE: WP: Boustany: Officials from radical Palestinian factions based in Syria strongly deny any role in last month's Pan Am bombing, contending that such an act of international terrorism would betray the uprising in the territories and would not be permitted by Syria, their patron and host. Denials made by the DFLP and the PFLP-GC by their spokesmen. Western diplomats and analysts in Syria said it would not make sense for Syria to back the Pan Am bombing and some rule out the involvement of guerrilla organizations enjoying Syrian support. ...Syrian efforts to establish better ties with the US and attempts to break out of isolation...Assad hopes to influence any int'l conference in order to regain the Golan Heights...

ARAFAT: BOMB AIMED AT PEACE EFFORTS: WP: Arafat said that the bombing of the Pan Am flight was aimed at sabotaging Middle East peace efforts, but he said he did not know who was to blame. He noted that during the Geneva conference, he warned that there would be a lot of efforts by the Mossad to abort the peace efforts in the ME.

PEAKS FOR PERES AGGRIEVE AUSTERITY-MINDED ISRAEL: NYT: Kifner: Political storm over reports that Peres' austerity budget is less austere than it first appeared. "Tucked away in the budget was a special account for Peres amounting to 2/3rds of a million dollars in perks. Nimrod Novick discounted the reports.

DESOCIALIZING AN ECONOMY: CSM: 1-5 Moffett: Peres' reform plans. ...review of report from IASPS - blueprint for economic growth in Israel.

MOSCOW WILL UPGRADE ISRAELI CONSULAR UNIT: WT: The Soviet Union will upgrade Israel's consular delegation in Moscow and allow Israeli diplomats to conduct political talks there, Moshe Arens said.

ISRAELI-APPOINTED PALESTINIAN IS WOUNDED: NYT: Re: second attack in two days; killed because collaborated with Israelis.

ARABS LINK CURBS ON GAS AND A-ARMS: NYT: Iraq and other Arab nations said today that a call for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons should be linked to a similar stand on nuclear weapons in light of Israel's reported possession of nuclear arms. Iraq's FM Tariq Aziz sought to deflect attention to Israel, arguing that Israel had introduced nuclear weapons to the Middle East and recalling its "direct aggression" in 1981 against a "peaceful Iraqi nuclear reactor." His comments prompted loud protests from the Israeli delegation. Both the Egyptian and Israeli FM's, Abdel Meguid and Moshe Arens met at the conference.

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ARABS WANT CHEMICAL BAN TIED TO MIDEAST NUCLEAR BAN: PI and LAT: Tuohy: Arab nations complicated the chemical warfare conference by demanding that any ban on poison gas be linked to outlawing nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Iraqi FM Aziz attacked Israel and a group of Arab states told the meeting that Israel had atomic weapons that endanger the ME and that such weapons should be banned.

JORDAN UPGRADES MISSION OF PLO TO EMBASSY STATUS: WSJ:AP.
...Jordan, China and Qatar announced they would upgrade PLO missions to Embassies.

'WHO IS A JEW' REMAINS A VOLATILE ISSUE IN US: NYT: In the US, the controversy over "who is a Jew" continues to alter the relations of Jews with Israel and each other fundamentally, many American Jews say.

TWO SHIITE MILITIAS BATTLE FIERCELY NEAR SIDON: NYT
similar short articles appeared in USA TODAY, WT.

MOSCOW ANNOUNCES CHEMICAL ARMS CUTS: WP: p.1: The Soviet Union announced it will begin destroying some of its stockpiled poison gas even before completion of a treaty being negotiated in Geneva to ban possession of chemical weapons. Shultz welcomed this announcement made by Shevardnadze. ...At the Paris conference, Arab countries swimming against the tide, arguing that any prohibition of chemical weapons should be linked to prohibition of nuclear weapons. This reflected a growing sentiment in the Arab world that chemical weapons could prove advantageous in balancing Israel's conventional military superiority as well as nuclear arsenal Israel is widely reported to possess.

SOVIETS TO START TRIMMING ARSENAL OF CHEMICAL ARMS: NYT: p.1
US CLAIMS PROGRESS AT GLOBAL MEETING DISCUSSING BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS: WSJ

US LAUDS BUT TRIES TO PLAY DOWN SOVIET MOVE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS: BS:
REAGAN WHITE HOUSE MUST SHARE BLAME FOR LUKEWARM RESPONSE TO COL. GADHAFI: WSJ: Greenberger: Showdown with Libya underscores the importance the Reagan Admin. attaches to promoting an int'l effort to ban chemical weapons. But the conflict also demonstrates just how difficult the goal will be to achieve. US failure to persuade allied govts. to force their companies to stop supplying material to the Libyan project. Some Blame should be placed on the US failure to confront Iraq on its use of chemical weapons. Also, the difficulty of confirming that adversaries are complying with a ban will pose future problems.

TRY NEGOTIATING FIRST ON LIBYAN PLANT, SENATE LEADERS URGE: WT:
Senate leaders urged the Reagan admin. to exhaust other options of persuading Libya to dismantle the plant before staging a preemptive military strike.

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TO SOME, A MELLOW QADDAFI IS ABOUT: NYT: Signs of Libyan change toward a more reconciliatory stand in ME politics, economics, and propaganda against the US and Israel.

AN ERA OF TENSION AND CHANGE FORCES LIBYANS TO ADAPT: WSJ: Brooks: Libya as an unpredictable country (i.e. foreign journalists were promised a tour of the Libyan plant but were ordered out of the country without setting foot in it.)

QADDAFI'S MEDIA COUP TURNS TO DUST: Qaddafi's bluff in inviting 200 journalists to view the Libyan chemical plant.

IN UNEASY WAIT, LIBYANS LACK FORMER ANGER: BS: Ruby: p.1: Feelings of nervousness and isolation in Libya. "The Libya of bellicose words has been partially replaced by one professing injured innocence and scrambling to find allies to take its side in Qaddafi's latest dispute with the US.

GORBACHEV: MAJOR BUDGET CUT NEEDED: WP: Gorbachev called for a major review of his country's military expenditures in order to protect the living standards of ordinary Soviet citizens at a time of severe economic strain.

NERVE GAS: PRESSURE ON FOR CUTS: USA TODAY: Soviets to begin destroying chemical weapons this year - and will press Libya about producing such weapons, Shevardnaze said.

Beth Silverman
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