<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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  <title>FDA Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/2451/25922" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>http://hdl.handle.net/2451/25922</id>
  <updated>2026-04-10T05:15:13Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-10T05:15:13Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>US and Canada Public Pension System Data 2008-2018</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/2451/61490" />
    <author>
      <name>Walter, Ingo</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Lipshitz, Clive</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/2451/61490</id>
    <updated>2020-09-22T04:39:44Z</updated>
    <published>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: US and Canada Public Pension System Data 2008-2018
Authors: Walter, Ingo; Lipshitz, Clive
Description: This dataset comprises eleven years of historical data (2008 through 2018) for the 25 largest U.S. public pension plans and the ten largest Canadian public pension plans.</summary>
    <dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Leverage, Default, and Mortality: Evidence from Cancer Diagnoses</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/2451/40067" />
    <author>
      <name>Gupta, Arpit</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/2451/40067</id>
    <updated>2017-09-18T17:58:42Z</updated>
    <published>2017-09-12T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Leverage, Default, and Mortality: Evidence from Cancer Diagnoses
Authors: Gupta, Arpit</summary>
    <dc:date>2017-09-12T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Skin or Skim? Inside Investment and Hedge Fund Performance</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/2451/38717" />
    <author>
      <name>Gupta, Arpit</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Kunal, Sachdeva</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/2451/38717</id>
    <updated>2017-06-08T02:38:38Z</updated>
    <published>2017-06-07T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Skin or Skim? Inside Investment and Hedge Fund Performance
Authors: Gupta, Arpit; Kunal, Sachdeva
Abstract: Using a comprehensive and survivor-bias free dataset of U.S. hedge funds, we document the role that inside investment plays in managerial compensation and fund performance. We find that funds with greater investment by insiders outperform funds with less "skin in the game" on a factor-adjusted basis; exhibit greater return persistence; and feature lower fund flow-performance sensitivities. These results suggest that managers earn outsize rents by operating trading strategies further from their capacity constraints when managing their own money. Our findings have implications for optimal portfolio allocations of institutional investors and models of delegated asset management.</summary>
    <dc:date>2017-06-07T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Trading Cost and Informational Efficiency</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/2451/38631" />
    <author>
      <name>Davila, Eduardo</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Parlatore, Cecilia</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/2451/38631</id>
    <updated>2017-05-12T14:59:21Z</updated>
    <published>2017-04-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Trading Cost and Informational Efficiency
Authors: Davila, Eduardo; Parlatore, Cecilia
Abstract: ​We study the effect of trading costs on information aggregation and acquisition in financial markets. For a given precision of investors' private information, an irrelevance result emerges when investors are ex-ante identical: price informativeness is independent of the level of trading costs. This result holds for quadratic, linear, and fixed trading costs in competitive and strategic environments. When investors are ex-ante heterogeneous, trading costs reduce (increase) price informativeness if and only if investors who disproportionately trade on information are more (less) elastic than investors who mostly trade on hedging. Through a reduction in information acquisition, trading costs reduce price informativeness.</summary>
    <dc:date>2017-04-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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