http://hdl.handle.net/2451/42230 2026-04-12T10:29:29Z 2026-04-12T10:29:29Z Wrisley, David Joseph Guéville, Estelle http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75614 2026-03-12T16:25:30Z 2026-02-01T00:00:00Z

Title: Medieval Manuscripts and the Computational Humanities Big Data, Scribes, and the “Paris Bible” Authors: Wrisley, David Joseph; Guéville, Estelle Abstract: This book examines the transformations in medieval studies—and the humanities more broadly—enabled by decades of digitization and advances in computational methods. Centring on the Paris Bible, a widely copied thirteenth- and fourteenth-century manuscript genre, we demonstrate how automated transcription produces scribal data at a scale once inaccessible, and how automation can support new approaches to localizing, dating, and contextualizing manuscripts. We argue that bringing machine learning and artificial intelligence to medieval studies not only requires re-centring expert human intelligence within computational systems, but also raises the question of the infrastructures needed for equitable, collaborative scholarship across the field. The book models how medieval studies might rethink interpretation, highlighting both the promise and risks of computational methods in manuscript research.

2026-02-01T00:00:00Z Baranski, Andrzej Haas, Nicholas http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75583 2026-02-24T08:38:47Z 2022-09-01T00:00:00Z

Title: The timing of communication and retaliation in bargaining: An experimental study Authors: Baranski, Andrzej; Haas, Nicholas Abstract: Communication is central to multilateral negotiations in settings such as legislatures, committees, juries, and corporate boards. We conduct an experiment to investigate how the timingo f communication affects bargaining outcomes and dynamics in a multilateral, majoritarian bargaining game. We find t hat allowing for free-form written communication at the proposal making stage results in behavior closer to equilibrium predictions. However, when communication channels are also open during the voting stage, the proportion of equilibrium play is between the proposal stage and no communication treatments. Communication in general affects bargaining dynamics in that, following a disagreement, voters strongly retaliate against failed proposers by offering them a lower share in subsequent rounds. Our results underscore the importance of a detailed analysis of processes and dynamics to understand bargaining outcomes, because even if communication leads to outcomes closer to equilibrium, the strategies employed by subjects need not resemble equilibrium.

2022-09-01T00:00:00Z Baranski, Andrzej Lozano, Lina Nikiforakis, Nikos http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75516 2025-12-10T10:20:56Z 2025-12-08T00:00:00Z

Title: Coordination through bargaining in weakest-link games Authors: Baranski, Andrzej; Lozano, Lina; Nikiforakis, Nikos Abstract: Coordination problems are often modeled as weakest-link games, where the minimum-contributing agent determines their group’s surplus to be shared in equal parts. Yet in many settings, the sharing of a jointly-produced surplus occurs through bargaining, which acts as a double-edged sword: It can promote effort by disciplining low contributors or deter it through the added uncertainty of returns. We present experimental evidence that bargaining improves coordination by promoting equitable divisions that reward higher contributions, even in one-shot interactions. High contributors are more likely than low contributors to propose allocations that reward effort, creating a virtuous cycle that increases efficiency. Allowing groups to endogenously select who can act as proposers can backfire: Efficiency increases when high contributors are endorsed but falls otherwise. These results highlight the scope and limits of participatory surplus division mechanisms in providing incentives for efficient coordination.

2025-12-08T00:00:00Z Allen, Robert C. http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75507 2025-10-30T12:20:27Z 2025-10-01T00:00:00Z

Title: The third check: Surplus extraction, Malthus, and the origins of agrarian civilization Authors: Allen, Robert C. Abstract: The paper analyzes the economic basis of agrarian civilizations. These had an agricultural part that produced food and a non-agricultural part that was supported by food from the countryside. The agricultural surplus was necessary for these cities but not sufficient. The technology (domestic seed, the plough) that generated the surplus was created by foragers and hoe cultivators who held the land in common. Their technology is modeled with engineering production functions derived with linear programming. Had they exploited the advanced technology, the result would have been a large population of cultivators living at subsistence and consuming the entire ‘surplus.’ This Malthusian nightmare was avoided by landlords who privatized land and organized it to maximize their income. Taxation could have a similar effect but less precisely. The rent proceeds supported the city. Theoretical analysis and simulation show that the effect of private property was to reduce the total population (the third Malthusian check) and to reduce the agricultural population even more. The difference was the urban population. In equilibrium the urban and rural labourers were at subsistence, the landowners were rich, Gini coefficients were high, and GDP per capita was greater than subsistence.

2025-10-01T00:00:00Z