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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26008" />
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    <dc:date>2026-04-12T23:51:47Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26008">
    <title>From Club to Market: The Evolving Role of Business Lawyers</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26008</link>
    <description>Title: From Club to Market: The Evolving Role of Business Lawyers
Authors: Miller, Geoffrey</description>
    <dc:date>2005-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26007">
    <title>Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26007</link>
    <description>Title: Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes
Authors: Sitkoff, Robert H; Schanzenbach, Max
Abstract: abstract . This Article presents the first empirical study of the domestic jurisdictional competition for trust funds. To allow donors to exploit a loophole in the federal estate tax, since 1986 a host of states have abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities as applied to interests in trust. To allow individuals to shield assets from creditors, since 1997 a handful of states have validated self-settled asset protection trusts. Based on reports to federal banking authorities, we find that,&#xD;
on average, through 2003 a state’s abolition of the Rule increased its reported trust assets by $6 billion (a 20% increase) and increased its average trust account size by $200,000. By contrast, our examination of validating self-settled asset protection trusts yielded indeterminate results. Our perpetuities findings imply that roughly $100 billion in trust funds have moved to take&#xD;
advantage of the abolition of the Rule. Interestingly, states that levied an income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state experienced no observable increase in trust business after abolishing the Rule. Because this finding implies that abolishing the Rule does not directly increase a state’s tax revenue, it bears on the study of jurisdictional competition. In spite of the&#xD;
lack of direct tax revenue from attracting trust business, the jurisdictional competition for trust funds is patently real and intense. Our findings also speak to unresolved issues of policy concerning state property law and federal tax law.</description>
    <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26006">
    <title>Restoring Trust in American Business</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26006</link>
    <description>Title: Restoring Trust in American Business
Authors: Lorsch, Jay W; Berlowitz, Leslie; Zelleke, Andy</description>
    <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26005">
    <title>Destruction of Value in the New Era of Chapter 11</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26005</link>
    <description>Title: Destruction of Value in the New Era of Chapter 11
Authors: Adler, Barry E; Capkun, Vedran; Weiss, Lawrence A
Abstract: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 placed corporate managers in control of corporate debtors in bankruptcy and of the bankruptcy process. Although the act remains law, between 2000 and 2001 it became common for creditors to control financially distressed firms and the bankruptcy process. This study tests whether the change from manager to creditor control created or exacerbated managerial incentive to delay filing for bankruptcy or gave secured creditors an opportunity to delay such filing. We observe a significant and prolonged deterioration in the financial condition of firms that filed for bankruptcy after 2001 as compared to firms that filed before 2000. We also&#xD;
observe patterns of operating losses and liquidations that suggest adverse economic consequences from such delay.</description>
    <dc:date>2006-10-24T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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