http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28333 Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications 2026-04-14T07:28:41Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/31462 Title: 06_01_Economides Authors: Economides, Nicholas 2012-02-09T21:03:16Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/31461 Title: Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard Setting Organizations Authors: Rysman, Marc; Simcoe, Tim Abstract: This paper measures the technological significance of voluntary standard setting organizations (SSOs) by examining citations to patents disclosed in the standard setting process. We find that SSO patents are cited far more frequently than a set of control patents, and that SSO patents receive citations for a much longer period of time. Furthermore, we find a significant correlation between citation and the disclosure of a patent to an SSO, which may imply a marginal impact of disclosure. These results provide the first empirical look at patents disclosed to SSOs, and show that these organizations not only select important technologies, but may also play a role in establishing their significance. 2012-02-09T21:00:49Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/31460 Title: Linux vs. Windows: A Comparison of Application and Platform Innovation Incentives for Open Source and Proprietary Software Platforms Authors: Economides, Nicholas; Katsamakas, Evangelos Abstract: The chapter analyzes and compares the investment incentives of platform and application developers for Linux and Windows. We find that the level of investment in applications is larger when the operating system is open source rather than proprietary. The comparison of the levels of investment in the operating systems depends, among others, on reputation effects and the number of developers. The chapter also develops a short case study comparing Windows and Linux and identifies new directions for open source software research. 2012-02-09T20:56:05Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/31459 Title: Vertical Leverage and the Sacrifice Principle: Why the Supreme Court got Trinko Wrong Authors: Economides, Nicholas Abstract: Trinko, a local telecommunications services customer of AT&T, sued Verizon for anti-competitively raising the costs of AT&T, Verizon's rival in the market for local telecommunications services. Pursuant to the rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, AT&T was leasing parts of the local telecommunications net- work (unbundled network elements, "UNEs") from Verizon at "cost plus reasonable profit" prices. The Supreme Court held that Trinko's complaint failed to state a claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act, and dismissed the complaint. I argue that the Court drew in- .correct inferences from its AsPen Skiing decision. The Court also missed a key vertical leveraging issue in Trinko. The opening of competition mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 challenged Verizon's traditional monopoly in the local telecommu- nications services market. By raising the cost and/or decreasing the quality of the service of rivals in the retailing services market, Verizon aimed to preserve that monopoly. As a result of these ef- forts, rivals suffered a disadvantage. Yet Verizon also caused retail- ing rivals to lease a lower number of unbundled network elements and thus incurred a revenue sacrifice. Therefore the actions ofVer- izon in raising the costs of retailing telecommunications services ri- vals are an indication of. liability according to the. "sacrifice principle" proposed in the Government's brief in Trinko, according to which a defendant is liable if its conduct "involves a sacrifice of short-term profits or goodwill that makes sense only insofar as it helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly power," eventhough the sacrifice principle defines a stringent condition for a finding of liability. 2012-02-09T20:44:13Z