http://hdl.handle.net/2451/42235 Thu, 12 Nov 2026 23:34:35 GMT 2026-11-12T23:34:35Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/76569 Title: Minimax play in Armageddon chess Authors: Fonseca, Miguel A.; Kaplan, Todd; Wooders, Andrew; Wooders, John Abstract: We use data on bids and game outcomes from Armageddon chess in high-stakes professional chess tournaments to undertake the first test using field data of the Minimax Hypothesis, and its generalization to Nash equilibrium, when the solution is in pure strategies. Under Armageddon rules, Black wins either by winning or drawing, while White must win outright. In the game we study, players bid time for the right to play Black. The player who makes the smaller bid plays Black, with the starting time on their clock equal to their bid; their opponent plays White with a full clock. We find that bids and game outcomes are consistent with minimax and hence Nash play: each player is equally likely to play Black or White, and a player's probability of winning the game is the same whether playing Black or White. In this latter respect, Armageddon bidding fairly divides the probability of winning a match. We show that players sacrifice time, and hence playing accuracy, in exchange for the advantage of playing Black. In the data, these two factors exactly balance, as predicted by theory. Sun, 01 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2451/76569 2026-11-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/76049 Title: Who is watching? Gender composition of observers and risk-taking Authors: Baranski, Andrzej; Chauhan, Prinsa; Dariel, Aurélie Abstract: We experimentally investigate whether the gender composition of an observing peer group affects individual risk-taking. Participants are randomly assigned to three-person groups differing only in gender composition. They complete an incentivized lottery task knowing that their choices will be observed by the other group members. We find that men’s willingness to choose the riskiest lottery increases monotonically with the number of female observers, whereas women exhibit no comparable response to the number of male observers. Men in all-male groups display levels of risk-taking statistically indistinguishable from those of women in all-female groups, indicating that the observed gender gap emerges primarily in mixed-gender groups. A mating-motivated signaling mechanism is consistent with our results. Tue, 01 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2451/76049 2026-09-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/76048 Title: CAT: An LLM-based tool for content analysis in experimental economics Authors: Baranski, Andrzej; Cooper, David J.; Lee, Jeong Kyu Abstract: We introduce the Communication Annotation Tool (CAT), an LLM-based tool for content analysis. CAT is intended to analyze free-form communication from economic experiments, accommodating a wide variety of communication structures. We describe CAT’s features including a broad array of customization options and a template for developing a coding manual. A detailed guide for using CAT is provided, including a step-by-step demonstration showing how CAT is used to quantify the content of communication from an experimental dataset. CAT is designed for easy monitoring of the coding process which ensures replicability of the communication coding method and simplifies identification and resolution of problems. We conclude by discussing CAT’s limitations and issues that users should keep in mind. Fri, 14 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2451/76048 2026-08-14T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/76046 Title: Divide-and-choose games and the Shapley value Authors: Van Essen, Matt; Wooders, John Abstract: We establish an equivalence between two classic approaches to fairness: the Shapley value and divide-and-choose. We study the allocation of a single indivisible item among N players with heterogeneous values, where the player receiving the item compensates the others. On the cooperative side, we introduce sharing games, in which players are partitioned into syndicates and a coalition's value is determined by the highest-valued player accessible through its members' syndicates. On the procedural side, we introduce an N-player divide-and-choose game inspired by Kuhn's classic cake-cutting procedure. Our main result links the two approaches: for every ordering of proposers in the divide-and-choose game, there is a unique assortative syndicate structure for which the Shapley value of the corresponding sharing game coincides with the payoffs under maxmin-perfect play. Conversely, the Shapley value of every assortative sharing game can be implemented in a divide-and-choose game with an appropriate ordering of proposers. The equivalence provides a procedural foundation for the Shapley value and a cooperative interpretation of fairness in divide-and-choose. Mon, 10 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2451/76046 2026-08-10T00:00:00Z