http://hdl.handle.net/2451/74526 Social Science Division Working Papers at NYUAD Sun, 12 Apr 2026 11:56:58 GMT 2026-04-12T11:56:58Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75583 Title: The timing of communication and retaliation in bargaining: An experimental study Authors: Baranski, Andrzej; Haas, Nicholas Abstract: Communication is central to multilateral negotiations in settings such as legislatures, committees, juries, and corporate boards. We conduct an experiment to investigate how the timingo f communication affects bargaining outcomes and dynamics in a multilateral, majoritarian bargaining game. We find t hat allowing for free-form written communication at the proposal making stage results in behavior closer to equilibrium predictions. However, when communication channels are also open during the voting stage, the proportion of equilibrium play is between the proposal stage and no communication treatments. Communication in general affects bargaining dynamics in that, following a disagreement, voters strongly retaliate against failed proposers by offering them a lower share in subsequent rounds. Our results underscore the importance of a detailed analysis of processes and dynamics to understand bargaining outcomes, because even if communication leads to outcomes closer to equilibrium, the strategies employed by subjects need not resemble equilibrium. Thu, 01 Sep 2022 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75583 2022-09-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75516 Title: Coordination through bargaining in weakest-link games Authors: Baranski, Andrzej; Lozano, Lina; Nikiforakis, Nikos Abstract: Coordination problems are often modeled as weakest-link games, where the minimum-contributing agent determines their group’s surplus to be shared in equal parts. Yet in many settings, the sharing of a jointly-produced surplus occurs through bargaining, which acts as a double-edged sword: It can promote effort by disciplining low contributors or deter it through the added uncertainty of returns. We present experimental evidence that bargaining improves coordination by promoting equitable divisions that reward higher contributions, even in one-shot interactions. High contributors are more likely than low contributors to propose allocations that reward effort, creating a virtuous cycle that increases efficiency. Allowing groups to endogenously select who can act as proposers can backfire: Efficiency increases when high contributors are endorsed but falls otherwise. These results highlight the scope and limits of participatory surplus division mechanisms in providing incentives for efficient coordination. Mon, 08 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75516 2025-12-08T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75507 Title: The third check: Surplus extraction, Malthus, and the origins of agrarian civilization Authors: Allen, Robert C. Abstract: The paper analyzes the economic basis of agrarian civilizations. These had an agricultural part that produced food and a non-agricultural part that was supported by food from the countryside. The agricultural surplus was necessary for these cities but not sufficient. The technology (domestic seed, the plough) that generated the surplus was created by foragers and hoe cultivators who held the land in common. Their technology is modeled with engineering production functions derived with linear programming. Had they exploited the advanced technology, the result would have been a large population of cultivators living at subsistence and consuming the entire ‘surplus.’ This Malthusian nightmare was avoided by landlords who privatized land and organized it to maximize their income. Taxation could have a similar effect but less precisely. The rent proceeds supported the city. Theoretical analysis and simulation show that the effect of private property was to reduce the total population (the third Malthusian check) and to reduce the agricultural population even more. The difference was the urban population. In equilibrium the urban and rural labourers were at subsistence, the landowners were rich, Gini coefficients were high, and GDP per capita was greater than subsistence. Wed, 01 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75507 2025-10-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75506 Title: The role of fairness ideals in coordination failure and success Authors: Baranski, Andrzej; Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno Abstract: In a laboratory experiment, we study the role of fairness ideals as focal points in coordination problems in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. We elicit the normatively preferred behavior about how a subsequent coordination game should be played. In homogeneous groups, people share a unique fairness ideal for how to solve the coordination problem, whereas in heterogeneous groups, multiple conflicting fairness ideals prevail. In the coordination game, homogeneous groups are significantly more likely than their heterogeneous counterparts to sustain efficient coordination. The reason is that homogeneous groups coordinate on the unique fairness ideal, whereas heterogeneous groups disagree on the fairness ideal to be played. In both types of groups, equilibria consistent with fairness ideals are most stable. Hence, the difference in coordination success between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups occurs because of the normative disagreement in the latter types of group, making it much harder to reach an equilibrium at a fairness ideal. Wed, 01 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2451/75506 2025-10-01T00:00:00Z