Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | White, Lawrence J | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-05-11T21:19:08Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2008-05-11T21:19:08Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008-01-24 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26011 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Over the past two to three decades economics has played an increasingly important role in the development of U.S. antitrust enforcement and policy. This essay first reviews the major facets of U.S. antitrust enforcement and next reviews the ways in which economics -- starting from a low base -- has grown in importance in antitrust. The essay then highlights three antitrust areas in which the influence of economics has had the greatest influence: merger analysis, vertical relationships, and predatory pricing. The essay concludes with the identification of four antitrust areas where further economics analysis could have high returns. | en |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EC-08-03 | en |
dc.subject | Antitrust | en |
dc.subject | industrial organization | en |
dc.subject | merger analysis | en |
dc.subject | vertical relationships | en |
dc.title | The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust: An Extended Discussion | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers |
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