Faculty Digital Archive

Archive@NYU >
Stern School of Business >
Economics Working Papers >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26023

Title: Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment
Authors: Skreta, Vasiliki
Keywords: mechanism design
optimal auctions
limited commitment
Issue Date: Dec-2007
Series/Report no.: EC-08-14
Abstract: This paper characterizes revenue maximizing auctions for a Önite horizon version of the standard IV P model of Myerson (1981) for a seller who cannot commit not to propose a new mechanism, if previously chosen ones fail to allocate the object. We show that a revenue maximizing mechanism in the Örst period assigns the good to the buyer with the highest virtual valuation, provided that it is above a buyer-speciÖc reserve price. If no buyer obtains the good in the Örst period, the same procedure is repeated in the second period, where virtual valuations are calculated using the posterior distributions and the reserves prices are lower, and so forth, until we reach the last period of the game. This is the Örst paper that characterizes optimal mechanisms in a multi-agent environment where the designer behaves sequentially rationally.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26023
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
8-14 NC.pdf337.56 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in Faculty Digital Archive are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

 

The contents of the FDA may be subject to copyright, be offered under a Creative Commons license, or be in the public domain.
Please check items for rights statements. For information about NYU’s copyright policy, see http://www.nyu.edu/footer/copyright-and-fair-use.html 
Valid XHTML 1.0 | CSS