Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Cabral, Luis | - |
dc.contributor.author | Salant, David | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-05-13T16:53:21Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2008-05-13T16:53:21Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008-04 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26025 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Spectrum regulation necessarily involves some regulation of the technology that licensees can use. One commonly stated assertion is that a mandated single standard, the solution followed by the EU for 2G wireless, is a successful model for spectrum regulation. We argue that a single standard leads to a free riding problem, and thus to a significant decrease in marginal incentives for R&D investment. In this context, keeping two separate standards may be a necessary evil to sustain a high level of R&D expenditures. We also provide conditions such that a non-standardization equilibrium is better for consumers and for society as a whole. | en |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EC-08-16 | en |
dc.title | Evolving Technologies and Standards Regulation | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers |
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