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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26055

Title: Information Manipulation, Coordination and Regime Change
Authors: Edmond, Chris
Keywords: global games
hidden actions
signal-jamming
propaganda
Issue Date: Aug-2007
Series/Report no.: EC-07-25
Abstract: This paper studies endogenous information manipulation in games where a population can overthrow a regime if individuals coordinate. The benchmark game has a unique equilibrium and in this equilibrium propaganda is effective if signals are sufficiently precise. Despite playing against perfectly rational individuals, a regime is able to manipulate information in a way that exploits heterogeneity in individual beliefs so that at equilibrium its chances of surviving are higher than they otherwise would be. This result is robust to alternative payoffs where the regime cares only for survival and to a number of alternative information structures, including situations where individuals have access to high-quality private information that is entirely uncontaminated by the regime.This paper studies endogenous information manipulation in games where a population can overthrow a regime if individuals coordinate. The benchmark game has a unique equilibrium and in this equilibrium propaganda is effective if signals are sufficiently precise. Despite playing against perfectly rational individuals, a regime is able to manipulate information in a way that exploits heterogeneity in individual beliefs so that at equilibrium its chances of surviving are higher than they otherwise would be. This result is robust to alternative payoffs where the regime cares only for survival and to a number of alternative information structures, including situations where individuals have access to high-quality private information that is entirely uncontaminated by the regime.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26055
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers

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