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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26076

Title: Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
Authors: Veldkamp, Laura
Hellwig, Christian
Issue Date: 12-Mar-2008
Series/Report no.: EC-06-14
Abstract: We explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models. When a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity, information choices exhibit complementarity as well: If an agent wants to do what others do, they want to know what others know. This makes heterogeneous beliefs difficult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria. In models with substitutability, agents prefer to differentiate their information choices. We use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price-setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26076
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers

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