Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Veldkamp, Laura | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-05-19T18:49:27Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2008-05-19T18:49:27Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004-08-31 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26132 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Traditional asset pricing models predict that covariance between prices of different assets should be lower than what we observe in the data. This model generates high covariance within a rational expectations framework by introducing markets for information about asset payoffs. When information is costly, rational investors will not buy information about all assets; they will learn about a subset. Because information production has high fixed costs, competitive producers charge more for low-demand information than for high-demand information. A price that declines in quantity makes investors want to purchase a common subset of information. If investors price many assets using a common subset of information, then a shock to one signal is passed on as a common shock to many asset prices. These common shocks to asset prices generate `excess covariance.' The cross-sectional and time-series properties of asset price covariance are consistent with this explanation. | en |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EC-04-18 | en |
dc.title | Information Markets and the Comovement of Asset Prices | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
Appears in Collections: | Economics Working Papers |
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