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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26298

Title: Real Options in a Dynamic Agency Model, with Applications to Financial Development, IPOs, and Business Risk
Authors: Philippon, Thomas
Sannikov, Yuliy
Issue Date: Oct-2007
Series/Report no.: FIN-07-010
Abstract: We study investment options in a dynamic agency model. Moral hazard creates an option to wait and agency conflicts affect the timing of investment. The model sheds light, theoretically and quantitatively, on the evolution of firms’ dynamics, in particular the decline of the failure rate and the decrease in the age of IPOs.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26298
Appears in Collections:Finance Working Papers

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