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Leaning against the wind

Authors: Weill, Pierre-Olivier
Keywords: Marketmaking capital;marketmaker inventory management
Issue Date: 20-Feb-2005
Series/Report no.: FIN-05-017
Abstract: During financial disruptions, market makers provide liquidity by absorbing external selling pressure. They buy when the pressure is large, accumulate inventories, and sell when the pressure alleviates. This paper studies optimal dynamic liquidity provision in a theoretical market setting with large and temporary selling pressure, and order-execution delays. I show that competitive marketmakers offer the socially optimal amount of liquidity, provided they have access to sufficient capital. If raising capital is costly, this suggests a policy role for lenient centralbank lending during financial disruptions.
Appears in Collections:Finance Working Papers

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