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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26611

Title: The Role of Bank Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions
Authors: Allen, Linda
Jagtiani, Julapa
Peristiani, Stavros
Saunders, Anthony
Keywords: Relationship banking
investment bank advisors
commercial bank advisors
commercial bank advisors
conflict of interest effect
mergers
acquisitions
Issue Date: Dec-2001
Series/Report no.: FIN-01-058
Abstract: This paper looks at the role of commercial banks and investment banks as financial advisor's. Unlike some areas of investment banking, commercial banks have always been allowed to compete directly with traditional investment banks in this area. In their role as lenders and advisor's, banks can be viewed as serving a certification function. However, banks acting as both lenders and advisor's face a potential conflict of interest that may mitigate or offset any certification effect. Overall, we find evidence of the certification effect for target firms, but conflicts of interest for acquirers. In particular, the target earns higher abnormal returns when the target’s own bank certifies the (more information ally opaque) target’s value to the acquirer. In contrast, we find no certification role for acquirers. This may be due to two reasons. First, certification plays less of a role for acquirers because it is the target firm that must be priced in a merger. Second, acquirers predominantly utilize commercial bank advisor's in order to obtain access to bank loans that may be used to finance the post-merger transition period. Thus, we find that acquirers tend to choose their own banks (those with prior lending relationships to the acquirer) as advisors in mergers. However, this choice weakens any certification effect and creates a potential conflict of interest because the acquirer’s advisor negotiates the terms of both the merger transaction and future loan commitments. Moreover, the advisor’s merger advice may be distorted by considerations related to the bank’s credit exposure resulting from both past and future lending activity. The market prices these conflicts of interest; we find significantly negative abnormal returns for bank advisor's when they advise their own loan customers in acquiring other firms.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26611
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers

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