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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26615

Title: Internal vs. External Financing: An Optimal Contracting Approach
Authors: Inderst, Roman
Müller, Holger M.
Keywords: Financial contracting
internal capital markets
theory of the firm
Issue Date: Dec-2001
Series/Report no.: FIN-01-062
Abstract: This paper compares optimal financial contracts with centralized and decentralized firms. Under centralized contracting headquarters raises funds on behalf of multiple projects and then allocates the funds on the firm’s internal capital market. Under decentralized contracting each project raises funds separately on the external capital market. The benefit of centralization is that headquarters can use excess liquidity from high-cash flow projects to buy continuation rights for low cash-flow projects. This allows headquarters to make greater repayments to investors, which eases financing constraints ex ante. The cost is that headquarters may pool cash flows from several projects, thereby accumulate internal funds, and make follow-up investments without having to return to the capital market. Absent any capital market discipline, however, it is more difficult for investors to force headquarters to pay out funds, which tightens ex-ante financing constraints.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26615
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers

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