Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Acharya, Viral V. | - |
| dc.contributor.author | John, Kose | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Sundaram, Rangarajan K. | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2008-05-29T19:32:08Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2008-05-29T19:32:08Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 1998-12-09 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/27086 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Recent empirical work has documented the tendency of corporations to reset strike prices on previously-awarded executive stock option grants when declining stock prices have pushed these options out-of-the-money. This practice has been criticized as counter-productive since it weakens incentives present in the original award. | en |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | FIN-98-088 | en |
| dc.title | Contract Renegotiation and the Optimality of Resetting Executive Stock Options | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |
| Appears in Collections: | Finance Working Papers | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| wpa98088.pdf | 2.34 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Items in FDA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.