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dc.contributor.authorAcharya, Viral V.-
dc.contributor.authorJohn, Kose-
dc.contributor.authorSundaram, Rangarajan K.-
dc.description.abstractRecent empirical work has documented the tendency of corporations to reset strike prices on previously-awarded executive stock option grants when declining stock prices have pushed these options out-of-the-money. This practice has been criticized as counter-productive since it weakens incentives present in the original award.en
dc.titleContract Renegotiation and the Optimality of Resetting Executive Stock Optionsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
Appears in Collections:Finance Working Papers

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