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dc.contributor.authorGode, Dhananjay (Dan) K.-
dc.contributor.authorSunder, Shyam-
dc.description.abstractDouble auctions with profit-motivated human traders as well as "zero-intelligence" programmed traders have previously been shown to converge to Pareto optimal allocations in partial equilibrium settings. We show that these results remain robust in two-good general equilibrium settings and elucidate how market structure, not optimization by traders, guides efficient resource allocation.en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDhananjay (Dan) K. Gode-09en
dc.subjectPareto optimal allocationsen
dc.subjectEdgeworth Boxen
dc.subjectDouble auctionen
dc.subjectZero-intelligence tradersen
dc.titleConvergence of Double Auctions to Pareto Optimal Allocations in the Edgeworth Boxen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
Appears in Collections:Accounting Working Papers

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