Network Interconnection With Competitive Transit

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Gilo, David - Recanati Graduate School of Business Adminstration	-
dc.contributor.author	Spiegel, Yossi - Recanati Graduate School of Business Adminstration	-
dc.date.accessioned	2009-12-08T00:22:00Z	-
dc.date.available	2009-12-08T00:22:00Z	-
dc.date.issued	2003-01-01	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28383	-
dc.description.abstract	We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two LECs) and a third network (e.g., an IXC) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC's network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive transit could justify partial or even complete deregulation of access to a network’s customer base.	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	NET Institute Working Paper;03-05	-
dc.subject	Interconnection, access pricing, transit, telecommunication, 'billand keep'	en
dc.title	Network Interconnection With Competitive Transit	en
Appears in Collections:	NET Institute Working Papers Series

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