| Title: | Adoption Delay in a Standards War |
| Authors: | Rysman, Marc - Boston University |
| Issue Date: | 1-Jan-2003 |
| Series/Report no.: | NET Institute Working Paper;03-11 |
| Abstract: | We analyze a dynamic model in which firms and consumers choose to adopt one of two technologies or delay their adoption. Adoption allows agents to trade with other adopters of the same technology. We show that there is an inefficient equlibrium in which firms differentiate across standards and consumers delay their adoption. With one standard, there is immediate adoption, which matches the experience of the 56K modem market. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28389 |
| Appears in Collections: | NET Institute Working Papers Series |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rysman_03-11.pdf | 338.59 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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