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Title: Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis
Authors: Economides, Nicholas - NYU Stern School of Business
Tag, Joacim - IFN
Keywords: net neutrality, two-sided markets, Internet, monopoly, duopoly, regulation, discrimination
Issue Date: 2007
Series/Report no.: NET Institute Working Paper;7-14
Abstract: We discuss net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided market model. Platforms sell Internet access services to consumers and may set fees to content - and application providers on the Internet. When access is monopolized, for reasonable parameter ranges, net neutrality regulation (requiring zero fees to content providers) increases the total industry surplus as compared to the fully private optimum at which the monopoly platform imposes positive fees on content providers. However, there are also parameter ranges for which total industry surplus is reduced. Imposing net neutrality in duopoly with multi-homing content providers and single-homing consumers increases the total surplus as compared to duopoly competition with positive fees to content providers.
Appears in Collections:NET Institute Working Papers Series
NET Institute Working Papers Series

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