| Title: | Intense Network Competition |
| Authors: | Stennek, Johan - Gothenburg University and CEPR Tangeras, Thomas P. - Research Institute of Industrial Economics |
| Keywords: | networking competition; two-way access; mobile termination rates; network substitutability; entry deterrence |
| Issue Date: | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | Net Institute Working Paper;08-36 |
| Abstract: | First, we demonstrate how unregulated price setting in mobile communications may lead to monopolization even when networks are highly substitutable. Second, we demonstrate that a menu of structural rules, including (i) mandatory interconnection, (ii) reciprocal access prices and (iii) a ban on price discrimination of calls to other networks may restore competition. This regulation requires neither demand data nor information about call costs. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/29461 |
| Appears in Collections: | NET Institute Working Papers Series |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stennek_Tangeras_08-36.pdf | 570.31 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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