Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Lee, Samuel | - |
dc.contributor.author | Persson, Petra | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-06-28T19:45:15Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-06-28T19:45:15Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012-06-28T19:45:15Z | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/31577 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Financing from family and friends is the predominant type of informal finance. This paper proposes a theory that reconciles two seemingly paradoxical traits of this form of finance, namely, it is often provided at negative prices but nevertheless eschewed by borrowers. A central prediction is that such finance, while breeding trust, deters risk taking. Demand is thus constrained: entrepreneurs may forgo risky investment rather than finance it through family and friends. Formal finance is valuable precisely because it is regulated only by contract. The highlighted trade-offs between formal and informal finance are potentially relevant for the provision of microventure capital. | en |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | FIN-12-007 | - |
dc.title | Financing from Family and Friends | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.authorid-ssrn | 473212 | en |
Appears in Collections: | Finance Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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SSRN-id2086625.pdf | Main Working Paper | 731.8 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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