An experiment on gender representation in majoritarian bargaining

Abstract

Women are underrepresented in political and business decision-making bodies across the world. To investigate the causal effect of gender representation on multilateral negotiations, we experimentally manipulate the composition of triads in a majoritarian, divide-the-dollar game. A gender gap in earnings arises in mixed-gender groups. Experiments with different subject pools show that distinct bargaining dynamics can underlie the same inequitable outcomes: While gender-biased outcomes may be caused by outright discrimination, they can also follow from more complex dynamics due to gender differences in bargaining strategies. For example, men are more likely to make opening offers and women are less likely to fight back when excluded from a coalition. Men also earn more in same-gender groups because they reach agreements faster than women, thus incurring lower delay costs. Finally, inclusive splits and unanimous agreement rates are highest in all-female groups and lowest in all-male groups suggesting that female representation increases fairness.