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Hedge Fund Activism

Authors: Klein, April
Zur, Emanuel
Issue Date: Oct-2006
Series/Report no.: CLB-06-017
Abstract: This paper examines the causes and consequences of hedge fund activism. Hedge funds target profitable and healthy firms, with above-average cash holdings. The target firms earn significantly higher abnormal stock returns around the initial 13D filing date than a sample of control firm. However, they do not show improvements in accounting performances in the year after the initial purchase. Instead, hedge funds extract cash from the firm through increases in the target’s debt capacity and higher dividends. Examination of proxy fights and threats accompanying the activist campaign suggests that hedge fund managers achieve their goals by posing a credible threat of engaging the target in a costly proxy solicitation contest.
Appears in Collections:NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business Working Papers

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