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  5. Real Options in a Dynamic Agency Model, with Applications to Financial Development, IPOs, and Business Risk
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dc.contributor.authorPhilippon, Thomas-
dc.contributor.authorSannikov, Yuliy-
dc.date.accessioned2008-05-25T13:44:57Z-
dc.date.available2008-05-25T13:44:57Z-
dc.date.issued2007-10-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2451/26298-
dc.description.abstractWe study investment options in a dynamic agency model. Moral hazard creates an option to wait and agency conflicts affect the timing of investment. The model sheds light, theoretically and quantitatively, on the evolution of firms’ dynamics, in particular the decline of the failure rate and the decrease in the age of IPOs.en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFIN-07-010en
dc.titleReal Options in a Dynamic Agency Model, with Applications to Financial Development, IPOs, and Business Risken
dc.typeWorking Paperen
Appears in Collections:Finance Working Papers

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