Skip navigation
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSundaram, Rangarajan K.-
dc.contributor.authorYermack, David L.-
dc.description.abstractMany companies pay their executives using inside debt, such as pensions and deferred compensation. Though these instruments are widely used, their valuation and incentive effects for managers have been almost entirely overlooked by prior research. CEO compensation in most firms exhibits a balance between debt and equity based incentives, and the balance systematically shifts away from equity and toward debt as CEOs grow older. CEOs with high debt-based incentives manage their firms conservatively to reduce default risk. Pension plan compensation strongly influences patterns of CEO turnover and CEO cash compensation.en
dc.titlePay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensationen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
Appears in Collections:Finance Working Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
FIN-05-002.pdf302.97 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in FDA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.