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dc.contributor.authorNieuwerburgh, Stijn Van-
dc.contributor.authorVeldkamp, Laura-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a rational model of investors who choose which asset payo®s to acquire informa- tion about, before forming portfolios. Scale economies in information acquisition lead investors to specialize in learning about a set of highly-correlated assets. Knowing more about these assets makes them less risky and more desirable to hold. Bene¯ts to specialization compete with bene¯ts to diversi¯cation. The resulting asset portfolios appear under-diversi¯ed from the perspective of standard theory, but are optimal. In equilibrium, information is a strategic substitute because assets that many investors learn about have low expected returns. Increasing returns, combined with strategic substitutability leads ex-ante identical investors to specialize in di®erent information, and hold different portfolios. Information choice rationalizes investing in a diversified fund and a set of highly-correlated assets, an allocation observed in the data but usually deemed anomalous.en
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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