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Title: 

Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?

Authors: Carpenter, Jennifer N.
Issue Date: 10-Aug-1999
Series/Report no.: FIN-99-076
Abstract: This paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse manager compensated with a call option on the assets he controls. Under the manager's optimal policy, the option ends up either deep in or deep out of money. As the asset value goes to zero, volatility goes to infinity. However, the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk-seeking. Sometimes, the manager's optimal volatility is less with the option than it would be if he were trading his own account. Furthermore, giving the manager more options causes him to reduce volatility.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/27231
Appears in Collections:Finance Working Papers

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