Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Dybvig, Philip H. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Farnsworth, Heber K. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Carpenter, Jennifer N. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-05-30T13:37:56Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2008-05-30T13:37:56Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003-09 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/27261 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The literature traditionally assumes that a portfolio manager who expends costly effort to generate information makes an unrestricted portfolio choice and is paid according to a sharing rule. However, the revelation principle provides a more efficient institution. If credible communication of the signal is possible, then the optimal contract restricts portfolio choice and pays the manager a fraction of a benchmark plus a bonus proportional to performance relative to the benchmark. If credible communication is not possible, an additional incentive to report extreme signals may be required to remove a possible incentive to underprovide effort and feign a neutral signal. | en |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | FIN-03-031 | en |
dc.title | Portfolio Performance and Agency | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
Appears in Collections: | Finance Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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wpa03031.pdf | 154.66 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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