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dc.contributor.authorYermack, David-
dc.date.accessioned2008-05-30T15:25:32Z-
dc.date.available2008-05-30T15:25:32Z-
dc.date.issued1994-10-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2451/27285-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes stock option wards to CEOs of 792 U.S. public corporations between 1984 and 1991. Using a Black-Scholes approach, I test whether stock options’ performance incentives have significant associations with explanatory variables related to agency cost reduction. Further tests examine whether the mix of compensations between stock options and cash pay can be explained by corporate liquidity, tax status, or earnings management. Results indicate that few agency or financial contracting theories have explanatory power for patterns of CEO stock option awards, a finding in accord with others’ conclusions that CEO pay arrangements do not reflect well the normative predictions of compensation theorists.en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFIN-94-054en
dc.titleDo Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectivelyen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
Appears in Collections:Finance Working Papers

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