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dc.contributor.authorAsker, John-
dc.contributor.authorLjungqvist, Alexander-
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-03T14:42:43Z-
dc.date.available2008-06-03T14:42:43Z-
dc.date.issued2008-04-01-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2451/27383-
dc.description.abstractWe document that firms appear disinclined to share underwriters with other firms in the same industry. We show that this disinclination is evident only when firms engage in product-market competition. This leads us to suggest that concerns about information leakage may motivate the patterns we see in the data. We discuss how these effects help us understand how the investment banking industry is structured, how banks compete, and how prices are set. At each step we exploit sources of exogenous variation that correspond to specific margins on which the effects of interest directly influence incentives and choices.en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFIN-06-003en
dc.subjectInvestment bankingen
dc.subjectSecurities underwritingen
dc.subjectCompetitionen
dc.subjectBank deregulationen
dc.subjectBank entryen
dc.subjectGlass-Steagall Acten
dc.subjectCommercial banksen
dc.titleCompetition and the Structure of Vertical Relationships in Capital Marketsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
Appears in Collections:Finance Working Papers

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