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dc.contributor.authorChoi, Jay Pil - Michigan State University-
dc.contributor.authorKristiansen, Eirik Gaard - Michigan State University-
dc.contributor.authorNahm, Jae - HKUST, Hong Kong-
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-10T01:09:05Z-
dc.date.available2009-12-10T01:09:05Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2451/28420-
dc.description.abstractIt is a widely adopted practice for firms to announce new products well in advance of actual market availability. The incentives for pre-announcements are stronger in markets with network effects because they can be used to induce the delay of consumers' purchases and forestall the build-up of rival products' installed bases. However, such announcements often are not fulfilled, raising antitrust concerns. We analyze the effects of product pre-announcements in the presence of network effects when firms are allowed to strategically make false announcements. We also discuss their implications for consumer welfare and anti-trust policy.en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNET Institute Working Paper;05-09-
dc.subjectproduct pre-announcements, network effects, cheap talk, reputationen
dc.titleStrategic Product Pre-announcements in Markets with Network Effectsen
Appears in Collections:NET Institute Working Papers Series

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