Title: | The Incentive To Participate In Open Source Projects: A Signaling Approach |
Authors: | Spiegel, Yossi - Tel Aviv University |
Issue Date: | 2005 |
Series/Report no.: | NET Institute Working Paper;05-23 |
Abstract: | This paper examines the incentives of programmers to contribute to open source software projects on a voluntary basis. In particular, the paper looks at this incentive changes as (i) performance becomes more visible to the relevant audience, (ii) effort has a stronger impact on performance, and (iii) performance becomes more informative about talent. In all three cases, it is shown that whether we start from a stable interior equilibrium or an unstable interior equilibrium. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28434 |
Appears in Collections: | NET Institute Working Papers Series |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Spiegel_05-23.pdf | 209.39 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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