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Title: 

Intense Network Competition

Authors: Stennek, Johan - Gothenburg University and CEPR
Tangeras, Thomas P. - Research Institute of Industrial Economics
Keywords: networking competition; two-way access; mobile termination rates; network substitutability; entry deterrence
Issue Date: 2008
Series/Report no.: Net Institute Working Paper;08-36
Abstract: First, we demonstrate how unregulated price setting in mobile communications may lead to monopolization even when networks are highly substitutable. Second, we demonstrate that a menu of structural rules, including (i) mandatory interconnection, (ii) reciprocal access prices and (iii) a ban on price discrimination of calls to other networks may restore competition. This regulation requires neither demand data nor information about call costs.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/29461
Appears in Collections:NET Institute Working Papers Series

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