| Title: | Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting |
| Authors: | Ganglmair, Bernhard Tarantino, Emanuele |
| Keywords: | patent holdup; patent disclosure; standard setting organizations; industry standards; disclosure rules; conversation; asymmetric information; Bertrand competition. |
| Issue Date: | 21-Dec-2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | NET Institute Working Papers;11_15 |
| Abstract: | We present a model of industry standard setting with two-sided asymmetric information about the existence of intellectual property. We provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) rms' incentives to communicate ideas for improvements of an industry standard, and (b) rms' decisions to disclose the existence of intellctual property to other participants of the standardization process. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/31409 |
| Appears in Collections: | NET Institute Working Papers Series |
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