Closing the gender gap in multilateral negotiations Through institutional changes

Abstract

Experimental evidence from different subject pools shows that men earn more than women in majoritarian negotiations. Three stylized modes of behavior emerge as potential reasons for the gap: men sort into making opening offers more often, prefer to partner with other men, and when partnering with each other, their coalitions are more stable compared to mixed-gender ones. We design three experimental interventions to investigate the explanatory role each channel plays in the emergence of the gap and, consequently, provide potential solutions. We find that enabling everyone to simultaneously make an initial proposal does not close the earnings gap, if anything, it weakly grows in magnitude. Hiding gender eliminates bias in coalition partner choice, alters bargaining dynamics, and equalizes mean earnings. Finally, allowing for instantly-binding agreements in bargaining closes the gap, not only because mixed-gender coalitions become more stable, but also because women become preferred partners. Our results highlight how the attributes of the negotiation environment interact with gender, and suggest that the design of bargaining institutions can be leveraged to promote gender equity.