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dc.contributor.authorKim, Duk Gyoo-
dc.contributor.authorMin, Daehong-
dc.contributor.authorWooders, John-
dc.date.accessioned2026-05-01T09:27:43Z-
dc.date.available2026-05-01T09:27:43Z-
dc.date.issued2024-05-
dc.identifier.citationKim, D. G., Min, D., & Wooders, J. (2024). Viable Nash equilibria: An experiment. NYUAD Division of Social Science Working Paper, #0101.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2451/75661-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)’s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai’s measure captures well how the viability of the everyone-participates (eP) equilibrium depends on the success threshold; the measure does not capture other elements of the game which affect the likelihood that the eP equilibrium is played.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNYUAD Division of Social Science, Working Papers;#0101-
dc.rightsThe version of record for this working paper can be found at: Kim, D. G., Min, D., & Wooders, J. (2026). Viable Nash equilibria: An experiment. Economic Theory, 81, 77-92. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01585-6en
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen
dc.subjectviabilityen
dc.subjectlaboratory experimentsen
dc.subjectcoordination gameen
dc.titleViable Nash equilibria: An experimenten
dc.typeWorking Paperen
Appears in Collections:Social Science Working Papers

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