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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26149

Title: Corporate Governance and Managerial Risk Taking: Theory and Evidence
Authors: Yeung, Bernard
Litov, Lubomir
John, Kose
Keywords: Corporate Governance
Investor Protection
Managerial Incentives
Issue Date: 17-Dec-2004
Series/Report no.: EC-04-35
Abstract: We study how the investor protection environment affects corporate managers’ incentives to take value-enhancing risks. In our model, the manager chooses higher perk consumption when investor protection is low. Since perks represent a priority claim held by the manager, lower investor protection leads the manager to implement a sub-optimally conservative investment policy, effectively aligning her risk-taking incentives with those of the debt holders. By the same token, higher investor protection is associated with riskier investment policy and faster firm growth. We test these predictions in a large Global Vantage panel. We find strong empirical confirmation that corporate risk-taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/26149
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers

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