Skip navigation
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCabral, Luis M.B.-
dc.date.accessioned2008-05-22T22:20:54Z-
dc.date.available2008-05-22T22:20:54Z-
dc.date.issued2000-08-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2451/26224-
dc.description.abstractI uncover a new force towards increasing dominance (the property whereby, in dynamic games, the leader tends to increase her lead in expected terms). The new effect results from the strategic choice of covariance in races. I assume that players must choose not the amount of resources to spend but how to allocate those resources. I show that the laggard has an incentive to chose a different path from the leader. In equilibrium, this results in the laggard choosing a less promising path, in effect trading off lower expected value for lower correlation with respect to the leader. This in turn leads to increasing dominance. In order to make the point as clear as possible and differentiate it from the forces previously characterized, I assume that no joint payoff (or efficiency) effect is present.en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEC-00-06en
dc.subjectDynamic competitionen
dc.subjectincreasing dominanceen
dc.subjecte±ciency effecten
dc.subjectR&Den
dc.titleIncreasing Dominance With No Efficiency Effecten
dc.typeWorking Paperen
Appears in Collections:Economics Working Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
00-06.pdf189.25 kBAdobe PDFView/Open


Items in FDA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.