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dc.contributor.authorZhang, Jiawei-
dc.date.accessioned2008-05-25T11:45:54Z-
dc.date.available2008-05-25T11:45:54Z-
dc.date.issued2007-07-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2451/26277-
dc.description.abstractWe consider the one-warehouse multiple retailer inventory model with a sub modular joint setup cost function. The objective of this model is to determine an inventory replenishment policy that minimizes the long-run average system cost over an infinite time horizon. Although the optimal policy for this problem is still unknown, a class of easy-to-implement power-of-two policies are 98% effective. This paper focuses on how the cost, under an optimal power-of-two policy, should be allocated to the retailers. This question generates an interesting cooperative game. We prove that this cooperative game has a non-empty core. The key to our result is a strong duality theorem for the one-warehouse multiple retailer problem under power-of-two policies.en
dc.languageEnglishEN
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherStern School of Business, New York Universityen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesOM-2007-03en
dc.subjectCooperative Gameen
dc.subjectJoint Replenishmenten
dc.subjectStrong Dualityen
dc.titleCost Allocation for Joint Replenishment Modelsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.description.seriesOperations Management Working Papers SeriesEN
Appears in Collections:IOMS: Operations Management Working Papers

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