| Title: | Contract Renegotiation and the Optimality of Resetting Executive Stock Options |
| Authors: | Acharya, Viral V. John, Kose Sundaram, Rangarajan K. |
| Issue Date: | 9-Dec-1998 |
| Series/Report no.: | FIN-98-088 |
| Abstract: | Recent empirical work has documented the tendency of corporations to reset strike prices on previously-awarded executive stock option grants when declining stock prices have pushed these options out-of-the-money. This practice has been criticized as counter-productive since it weakens incentives present in the original award. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/27086 |
| Appears in Collections: | Finance Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| wpa98088.pdf | 2.34 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Items in FDA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.