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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/27291

Title: Repeated Auctions with Endogenous Selling
Authors: Garleanu, Nicolae
Pedersen, Lasse Heje
Keywords: auctions
revenue equivalence
no trade
volume
welfare
Issue Date: 20-Feb-2003
Series/Report no.: FIN-03-046
Abstract: This paper studies trade in repeated auction markets. We show, for conditionally independent signals, that an owner’s decision to sell, expected prices, and continuation values are the same for a large class of auction mechanisms, extending the Revenue Equivalence Theorem to a multi-period setting. Further, we derive a robust No-Trade Theorem. For conditionally affiliated signals, we give conditions under which revenue ranking implies volume and welfare ranking. In particular, we show that English auctions have larger volume and welfare than second-price auctions, which in turn have larger volume and welfare than first-price auctions.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/27291
Appears in Collections:Finance Working Papers

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