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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28383
Title: Network Interconnection With Competitive Transit
Authors: Gilo, David - Recanati Graduate School of Business Adminstration
Spiegel, Yossi - Recanati Graduate School of Business Adminstration
Keywords: Interconnection, access pricing, transit, telecommunication, 'billand keep'
Issue Date: 1-Jan-2003
Series/Report no.: NET Institute Working Paper;03-05
Abstract: We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two LECs) and a third network (e.g., an IXC) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC's network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive transit could justify partial or even complete deregulation of access to a network’s customer base.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28383
Appears in Collections:NET Institute Working Papers Series

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