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Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications

Authors: Stennek, Johan - Gothenburg University and CEPR
Tangeras, Thomas P. - Research Institute of Industrial Economics
Keywords: network competition; two-way access; mobile termination rates; entry; collusion
Issue Date: 2008
Series/Report no.: Net Institute Working Paper;08-09
Abstract: This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show that the monopolistic outcome may prevail independently of market concentration when access prices are determined in bilateral negotiations. A light-handed regulatory policy can induce effective competition. Call prices are close to the marginal cost if the networks are sufficiently close substitutes. Neither demand nor cost information is required. A unique and symmetric call price equilibrium exists under symmetric access prices, provided that call demand is sufficiently inelastic. Existence encompasses the case of many networks and high network substitutability.
Appears in Collections:NET Institute Working Papers Series

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