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dc.contributor.authorGilo, David - Recanati Graduate School of Business Adminstration-
dc.contributor.authorSpiegel, Yossi - Recanati Graduate School of Business Adminstration-
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-08T00:22:00Z-
dc.date.available2009-12-08T00:22:00Z-
dc.date.issued2003-01-01-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2451/28383-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two LECs) and a third network (e.g., an IXC) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC's network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive transit could justify partial or even complete deregulation of access to a network’s customer base.en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNET Institute Working Paper;03-05-
dc.subjectInterconnection, access pricing, transit, telecommunication, 'billand keep'en
dc.titleNetwork Interconnection With Competitive Transiten
Appears in Collections:NET Institute Working Papers Series

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